The main intention of this paper is to ascertain whether the Speakership and Parliament are involved in a symbiotic relationship. This paper will assess whether a weak incumbent will have an adverse effect on the NA thereby weakening the capacity of the NA itself.

This paper argues that, in light of the prevalence of administrative policies, the normative force they carry and the reliance placed upon them by the public, there is a need for the courts to develop the law regulating the way that administrators use policy to structure and guide the exercise of their statutory discretions. It will be argued that such developments would give effect to both the 'controlling' and the 'facilitating' objectives that underpin administrative law, and, would strike an appropriate balance between the competing values at play so as to foster good governance. First, the nature2of administrative policies, their rise as a regulatory tool of government and the growing administrative preference for policy over delegated legislation are explored. It is argued that there is a necessity for the courts to develop the law regulating the administrative use of policy to foster the democratic principle of accountability. The current legal principles regulating the use of administrative policies in a discretionary context, under the broad banner of the 'fettering by rigidity principle' are explored and assessed. It is argued that the fettering by rigidity principle has been applied in a nuanced and variable way, and that it plays an important role in fostering good governance, particularly by promoting flexibility, responsiveness and participation, but does not go far enough in promoting the values of certainty, fairness and consistency. It is argued that a more appropriate balance between these values could be struck by developing a duty for administrators to apply policy consistently and only to depart for good reasons. Finally, it is argued that the principle of legitimate expectations should be developed to allow for substantive protection where an administrator unjustifiably frustrates the trust and reliance which individuals may have placed in an existing policy where that policy is subsequently replaced by a new one.

This research is a doctrinal study into Section 2(2), read with section 23, of the City of Cape Town's Streets Public Places and the Prevention of Nuisances By-law of 2007 and whether it violates the right to human dignity entrenched in section 10 of the Constitution. The provision prohibits begging, sitting, standing and lying in public places in the City of Cape Town. The overall argument made in this dissertation is that this prohibition is unconstitutional for the following three reasons: Firstly, it unlawfully interferes with homeless peoples efforts to maintain and build and decent life. Secondly, it disproportionally discriminates against black people. Lastly, it halts transformation in South Africa. Upon the findings of its analysis, this study aims to make recommendations and suggestions to improve the protection of homeless people in South Africa.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1983. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 297-314). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (doctoral)--Humboldt-Universität, Berlin, 2002.

Thesis (S.J.D.)--Catholic University of America, 1941. / Lithographed. "Cases cited and discussed": p. [x]-xii. "Federal statutes cited or discussed": p. [xiii] "Authorities cited or discussed": p. [xiv]-xxi.

Thèse--Université de Paris. / "Indications bibliographiques": p. [255]-260.

This thesis presents an analysis of the South African Parliament’s attempts to create a mechanism to enable oversight of delegated legislation. The question sought to be addressed is, whether Parliament has done anything to create a mechanism to oversee the delegation of its law-making authority to the executive and if so, whether any of these efforts have been successful. This paper illustrated how the making of delegated legislation is not foreign to South Africa’s system of separation of powers as provided for in our Constitution and as interpreted by our courts. It is shown how, despite what the Constitution allows, recent law-making efforts have not strengthened Parliament’s ability to oversee delegated legislation. Instead legislators purposefully sought to curb attempts to improve rule-making and delegated legislation. Similarly, efforts to make delegated legislation more accessible to the public have been missing from government’s list of priorities. The South African Parliament’s efforts to scrutinise delegated legislation is contrasted with the efforts of the Gauteng Provincial Legislature and several foreign legislatures. Finally, it is indicated how Parliament, after more than 20 years since the promulgation of the final Constitution, has failed to create a permanent mechanism to enhance and strengthen its oversight of delegated legislation.

This dissertation discusses ways to advance social rights, considering the significant gap between their ambitious normative recognition and their poor implementation in practice. It presents some of the challenges that social rights typically face and explores ways to overcome them, noting the role that courts can play in triggering solutions. The project zooms into the connection between social rights and administrative institutions to argue that, while often under-discussed, social rights’ fulfillment is largely dependent on administrative law and administrative action. The dissertation further claims that “canonical” administrative law, however, is unfit to facilitate the fulfillment of social rights and discusses possible ways to rethink discrete administrative institutions. While the dissertation focuses on Latin America, its arguments are of relevance for other parts of the world. The project is structured around two case studies of social rights litigation in Argentina (Chapter 2) and Colombia (Chapter 3), which triggered relevant innovations that can help respond to frequent challenges around social rights. Both cases involve similar circumstances of historical unfulfillment of human rights, particularly the rights to a healthy environment, health, and housing. They also illustrate similar capacity constraints in relevant administrative institutions (such as norms and staff volatility and bureaucratic fragmentation). Both cases represent what has been often called “structural litigation ” and were decided in similar legal backgrounds. The case studies are as detailed as possible, in an effort to supplement long standing theoretical debates on social rights with a nuanced analysis of the results of cases on the ground (as even though recent research has focused on empirical assessments, most relevant scholarship uses normative and doctrinal approaches ). The research conducted for this project therefore involved reviewing judicial records, legislation, press coverage and other secondary sources; and for the Argentine case, talking to public officials, judicial employees, non-governmental organizations, and other key actors, visiting the river basin and courts’ offices, and filing freedom of information requests. My research perspective is also informed by my previous work with different non-governmental organizations devoted to advancing social rights. I therefore came to this project with practical knowledge of how relevant institutions, mainly in Argentina, function in practice, with the consequent subjectivity of a practitioner from the Global South. The dissertation connects to existing literature on social rights and on the reform of administrative law. It also speaks, more indirectly, to ongoing conversations on effective government, State capacity, the growth of the administrative state, and structural litigation. Throughout the dissertation, I use a common analytical framework: experimentalism. I describe this framework in detail in the Introduction to this dissertation. When confronted with existing scholarship, the dissertation shows that many concerns around social rights in general, and social rights’ litigation in particular, do not necessarily play out in practice as traditional literature would anticipate. For example, the case studies prove that litigation does not necessarily exclude more confrontational alternatives for rights-claiming, and that middle class plaintiffs are not always prioritized in courts’ work. Both cases essentially show a decision-making model that is court-led but places responsibilities for policy making on local administrations. Under this model, courts set goals that administrations then need to pursue by themselves, with strong court oversight. As such, the model moves beyond the dichotomy between judicial abdication and judicial usurpation that traditional literature routinely describes. Traditional models of social rights adjudication also suggest a stark division between approaches based on the substance of rights and other based on procedures that the dissertation proves to be more nuanced, as in the case studies courts define some substance of rights, but also set strong procedures directed precisely at further defining rights’ substance. Importantly, this alternative model shows how courts intervention can lead to improved institutional capacities (directed mainly at increasing transparency and coordination) in responsible administrative entities. The cases finally show the barriers that traditional administrative law can create for the innovations needed to advance social rights. The last Chapter of the dissertation consequently explores ways to reimagine administrative law, to promote principles and institutions which are more aligned with the demands of social rights, such as recognizing informal administrative action and promoting administrative coordination.

Le recours pour excès de pouvoir introduit par les tiers fait l’objet de transformations de plusieurs natures et l’urbanisme est un domaine dans lequel la mutation est particulièrement frappante. Estimé attentatoire à la stabilité des autorisations d’urbanisme, ce « procès fait à un acte, d’utilité et d’ordre publics » a été amendé, en grande partie par le législateur, dans le sens d’une plus grande sécurisation et subjectivisation. Par ce fait, il peut désormais être décrit comme altéré dans la mesure où les caractères constitutifs de ce monument du contentieux administratif tendent à s’effacer face à de nouveaux impératifs. La fermeture de l’accès au prétoire ainsi que l’évolution profonde de l’office du juge urbanistique conduisent ainsi à interroger la permanence d’un recours pour excès de pouvoir en urbanisme. Or, le processus d’altération du recours pour excès de pouvoir se heurte à des obstacles qui empêchent toute dénaturation de ce dernier. La pertinence d’un recours en légalité, objectif et ouvert demeure certaine tant ces caractères permettent de pallier les défauts du droit de l’urbanisme et l’absence de moyen alternatif de contestation de la décision administrative. En outre, le recours en urbanisme ne peut adopter le régime d’aucun autre recours, le conduisant irrémédiablement vers l’hybridation de son régime. / Actions of annulment by third parties are undergoing various transformations, most strikingly in the field of urban planning. Perceived as prejudicial to the stability of urban planning permissions, this “deed put on trial, of public utility and nature,” was amended, mostly by legislators, towards greater security and subjectivity. Consequently, it can henceforth be described as somewhat distorted, inasmuch as the constitutive characteristics of this pillar of administrative litigation tend to fade in the face of new priorities. The closing of the access to the courtroom as well the radical evolution of the urban planning judge’s function raise questions about the enduring nature of the action of annulment in urbanism. Yet, the alteration process of the action of annulment runs into obstacles that prevent any denaturation of it. The relevance of a legal appeal, objective and open, remains unquestioned in light of the degree to which its characteristics enable to overcome the flaws of urban planning law, and the absence of alternative means to appeal the administrative ruling. Moreover, appeals in urban planning law cannot adopt any other appeal’s legal rules, which inevitably renders its own system hybridized.