This thesis investigates different issues related to the issuance of debt by sovereign bodies such as governments, under uncertainty about the future interest rates. Several dynamic models of interest rates are presented, along with extensive numerical experiments for calibration of models and comparison of performance on real financial market data. The main contribution of the thesis is the construction and demonstration of a stochastic optimisation model for debt issuance under interest rate uncertainty. When the uncertainty is modelled using a model from a certain class of single factor interest rate models, one can construct a scenario tree such that the number of scenarios grows linearly with time steps. An optimization model is constructed using such a one factor scenario tree. For a real government debt issuance remit, a multi-stage stochastic optimization is performed to choose the type and the amount of debt to be issued and the results are compared with the real issuance. The currently used simulation models by the government, which are in public domain, are also reviewed. Apparently, using an optimization model, such as the one proposed in this work, can lead to substantial savings in the servicing costs of the issued debt

This thesis deals with public procurement of mobile network operators services and analysis of institutional and procedural characteristics under which public authorities are able to reach lower prices than regular retail customers. The applied model attempts to explain a variation in final price of high consumption mobile services consumer basket. The variation is explained as a function of estimated price of consumer basket, year of tender, length of contract, supplier, governance structure of public authority, number of bidders and use of electronic auction. The results indicate that usage of electronic auction brings lower final price of mobile services by 8.6 %, T-Mobile is more expensive than O2 and Vodafone on average by 8 % and each additional bidder decreases the final price on average by 6.1 %. We found that there exists statistically significant difference in the final price with respect to type of public authority. The final price of mobile services is decreasing in time, on average by 9 % per year. Together with insignificance of the variable measuring length of contract, it follows that long term contracts are not cost-efficient.

Public tenders procedure - a dynamic purchase system and electronic auction The purpose of public tenders is to serve as an instrument of effective and efficient distribution of public funds, in order to acquire specific goods or services in accordance with the public interest. Therefore, the law defines the process of awarding public tenders. The main purpose of this thesis is to explore and analyze the electronization of the public tenders procedure with an emphasis on dynamic purchase systems and electronic auction. The thesis is based on the current provisions of the Act on Public Tenders No. 137/2006 Coll., and is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one focuses on evolution of public tenders, or public procurement, providing a brief historical outline with an emphasis on national legal regulations. Chapter two explores public procurement law regulations in force that are significant in relation to the aim of the thesis. The first part of the chapter highlights the most important legal documents on the international level, and the second part proceeds with an overview of European Union law. Part three presents a summary of the Act on Public Tenders in force. The third chapter contains a definition of the most essential terms of the Act. Part one deals with the instrument of the public tender...

Thesis advisor: Hideo Konishi / My doctoral dissertation contains three essays on menu auction and its related applications. The first chapter is a theoretical generalization of classical menu auction model, and the second and the third chapters are applications to a resource allocation problem and an industrial organization problem. Menu auction (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986) is a first-price package auction with complete information. They show that every Nash equilibrium under some refinements always leads to an efficient outcome. Therefore, this becomes a natural efficiency benchmark for package auction designs (e.g., Ausubel and Milgrom 2002). Menu auction can also be viewed as a model of economic influence where the auctioneer is going to choose an action which affects bidders' payoff so that each bidder tries to influence the outcome by monetary transfer to the auctioneer. This framework is widely adopted in political lobbying models where the special interest groups lobbying the government over trade policies (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1994). However, the applicability is limited by quasi-linear preferences and the absence of budget constraints. In my first chapter, ``Menu Auctions with Non-Transferable Utilities and Budget Constraints'', I extends Bernheim and Whinston's (1986) menu auction model under transferable utilities to a framework with non-transferable utilities and budget constraints. Under appropriate definitions of equilibria consistent with subgame perfection, it is shown that every truthful Nash equilibrium (TNE) is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) and that the set of TNE payoffs and the set of CPNE payoffs are equivalent, as in a transferable utility framework. The existence of a CPNE is assured in contrast with the possible non-existence of Nash equilibrium under the definition by Dixit, Grossman, and Helpman (1997). Moreover, the set of CPNE payoffs is equivalent to the bidder-optimal weak core. The second chapter relates menu auction to a resource allocation problem. Kelso and Crawford (1982) propose a wage-adjustment mechanism resulting in a stable matching between heterogeneous firms and workers. Instead of a benevolent social planner, in ``Profit-Maximizing Matchmaker'' (w. Hideo Konishi), we consider a profit-maximizing auctioneer to solve this many-to-one assignment problem. If firms can only use individualized price, then the auctioneer can only earn zero profit in every Nash equilibrium and the sets of stable assignments and strong Nash equilibria are equivalent. Otherwise, the auctioneer might earn positive profit even in a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. This reinforces Milgrom's (2010) argument on the benefit of using simplified message spaces that it not only reduces information requirement but also improves resource allocation. The third chapter applies menu auction in an industrial organization problem. In ``Choosing a Licensee from Heterogeneous Rivals'' (w. Hideo Konishi and Anthony Creane), we consider a firm licensing its production technology to rivals when firms with heterogeneous in production costs competing in a Cournot market. While Katz and Shapiro (1986) show that a complete transfer in duopoly can be joint-profit reducing, we show that it is always joint-profit improving provided that at least three firms remain in the industry after transfer. While transfers between similarly efficient firms may reduce welfare, the social welfare must increase if the licensor is the most efficient in the industry, contrast with Katz and Shapiro (1985) in the duopoly environment. This has an important implication in competition regulation. Then we investigate relative efficiency of the licensee under different licensing auction mechanisms. With natural refinement of equilibria, we show that a menu auction licensee, a standard first-price auction licensee, and a joint-profit maximizing licensee are in (weakly) descending order of efficiency. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2012. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

No atual modelo do setor elétrico, conforme previsto na legislação vigente, o Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME) promove leilões de compra de energia elétrica, como mecanismo para o atendimento à demanda das distribuidoras de energia, proporcionando a busca pelo menor valor de compra possível, que será repassado ao consumidor final, por meio de tarifas. A negociação, resultante dos leilões, é firmada entre as empresas geradoras e distribuidoras de energia, por meio de contratos, em um ambiente conhecido por Ambiente de Contratação Regulada, o que caracteriza o reconhecimento por Contrato de Comercialização de Energia no Ambiente Regulado (CCEAR). Dentre estes leilões, estão previstos os chamados leilões de energia nova, que tem como objetivo não somente atender à demanda futura das distribuidoras de energia, mas também viabilizar a expansão do potencial de oferta na matriz energética brasileira, por meio da construção de novos empreendimentos de geração. Para isto, além de um planejamento de médio e longo prazo que assegure um suprimento sustentável ao mercado regulado de energia elétrica, é necessário que existam regras definidas para a negociação e entrega da energia e que sejam mitigados os riscos do não cumprimento das obrigações dos geradores, previstas nos contratos. Neste sentido, cláusulas contratuais são previstas para assegurar tais obrigações dos geradores durante o compromisso de suprimento, além de outras penalidades na legislação vigente para os agentes do setor elétrico brasileiro. Desta forma, a análise aqui apresentada retrata o estudo aprofundado de todos os mecanismos de penalidades utilizados até o final do suprimento do CCEAR de energia nova, para que se possa então verificar os impactos para o gerador, na ocorrência do descumprimento de cada uma de suas obrigações, além de observar os possíveis impactos para o consumidor final, na contabilização do mercado de energia como um todo e, até mesmo, na operação do sistema interligado nacional (SIN). / In the current institutional model of the Brazilian electricity sector, according to the legislation in force, the Ministry of Mines and Energy promotes auctions of electricity, as a mechanism to meet the demand power distribution, ensuring the lowest possible purchase price, that will be passed through to final consumers tariff. The negotiation associated to the auctions is consolidated between generating and distribution companies through contracts in a business environment known Regulated Contracting Environment, giving rise to the Contract Energy Trading in a Regulated Environment (CCEAR). Among these auctions, it is worthwhile to note the new energy auctions, which aims to not only meet the future demand of energy distribution, but also facilitate the expansion of the supply potential of the Brazilian energy matrix, through the construction of new generation plants. For this, in addition to a medium and long term planning to ensure a sustainable supply to the regulated market of electricity, it is necessary to define rules for the negotiation and delivery of energy and to mitigating the risks of non-compliance with the obligations of generators to these contracts. In this sense, contractual clauses are provided to enforce the generators to comply with such obligations during the commitment to supply, in addition to other penalties in the legislation for the agents of the Brazilian electricity sector. Thus, the analysis presented here synthesizes a study of all penalties mechanisms established in the new energy CCEAR and then verifies the impacts for the generator in the event of non-compliance with each of their obligations and the possible impact to the consumer, in accounting for the energy market as a whole and even in the operation of the national grid (SIN).

La définition et la mesure de la confiance restent toujours une ambiguïté en économie, sociologie et philosophie. Les "trois papiers" de cette thèse comparent, tout en considérant le niveau de confiance deux mécanismes de vente: la vente de gré à gré et la vente aux enchères. Le marché de Boulogne-sur-Mer, caractérisé par la coexistence stable de deux systèmes de vente constitue le centre de notre analyse empirique. Ces trois papiers sont précédés par une introduction générale et une revue de la littérature. Le premier papier est dédié à la comparaison des deux structures en termes de robustesse et de "nestedness", en s’appuyant sur de outils de réseaux employés par les écologistes. Le deuxième papier analyse la création des liens de confiance du côté de l’acheteur à l’aide d’un modèle de durée. La taille des acheteurs a son rôle sur la confiance. Le troisième papier s’intéresse à l’effet de l’indice de confiance sur les "outcomes" des transactions. Des graphes bipartis et homogènes montrent une différence de structure. Nos résultats affirment que le marché de gré à gré est plus atteint par la confiance comme l’information est centralisée. Les agents se basent sur cette confiance comme alternative au risque. Cela n’est pas le cas des enchères où l’information est connue. / How to define and measure trust is still an enigma in economics, philosophy and sociology. This "three papers" thesis compares two different mechanisms - egotiated(decentralised submarket) and auction (centralised submarket) - on the basis of trust. Through an empirical study, the level of trust is evaluated and its impact is analysed on the "Boulogne-sur-Mer" fish market characterised by a stable coexistence of these two mechanisms. The three papers are preceded by a general introduction and a literature review. Paper one aims at comparing the nestedness and the robustness of both submarkets. Social network tools of ecologists are applied in order to provide an answer. Paper two models trust creation on both structures from the buyer side using the survival analysis and considering the buyer size. Paper three studies the effect of a trust index on the outcomes of transactions. Bipartite and projected graphs reveal the difference between submarkets. This thesis shows that the negotiated market is marked by a higher level of trust as agents interact and are not fully informed about the market situation unlike the auction one where information is centralised. We believe that trust is a way out of risk when there is lack of information.

Diploma thesis describes the slection of supplier of testing services for Everest project at Raiffeisenbank a. s. with aid of methods of multi-criteria decision and operation research. Thesis compares achieved results with the decision made in real tender realised in year 2010. Solution deals with two approaches via operation research. For the first round of tender were used three methods of multi-criteria evaluation of alternatives, WSA, TOPSIS and ELECTRE III. According to the results of each method were chosen suppliers who advanced to the next round. Second round operates with prices of particular phases of project and discounts offered by suppliers. Solution uses modified model of Reverse Auction. Calculations were supported by program packages SANNA and LINGO. Diploma thesis proved usability of mathematical modelling of multi-criteria decision task as support for management decision in real life business.

The diploma work is focused on situation and function of Czech mobile providers market. The theoretical background is based on Ronald Coase's findings. The functionality of theoretical hypothesis is verified and further discussed on the basis of foreign telecommunication markets. Different real economics provide valuable experience concerning identification of possible assets and problems. The acquired information is consequently used for analysis of Czech mobile market. Next to the evaluation of the current situation the focus is given to the planned auction of frequencies. Conditions of this auction are described and the potential influence to future Czech mobile providers market is monitored.

The present work discuss the continuous double auction mechanisms and the order book models. After a brief introduction to selected models, a general model of the the continuous double auction from the thesis title is described. Further, a structure of british market data is given as well as an approach to them. Based on these data the validity of Smith Farmer's model and Cont Stoikov's model is tested in the context of general model by linear regression. Finally, based on the previous results, the own order book model is suggested and its validity tested.

No atual modelo do setor elétrico, conforme previsto na legislação vigente, o Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME) promove leilões de compra de energia elétrica, como mecanismo para o atendimento à demanda das distribuidoras de energia, proporcionando a busca pelo menor valor de compra possível, que será repassado ao consumidor final, por meio de tarifas. A negociação, resultante dos leilões, é firmada entre as empresas geradoras e distribuidoras de energia, por meio de contratos, em um ambiente conhecido por Ambiente de Contratação Regulada, o que caracteriza o reconhecimento por Contrato de Comercialização de Energia no Ambiente Regulado (CCEAR). Dentre estes leilões, estão previstos os chamados leilões de energia nova, que tem como objetivo não somente atender à demanda futura das distribuidoras de energia, mas também viabilizar a expansão do potencial de oferta na matriz energética brasileira, por meio da construção de novos empreendimentos de geração. Para isto, além de um planejamento de médio e longo prazo que assegure um suprimento sustentável ao mercado regulado de energia elétrica, é necessário que existam regras definidas para a negociação e entrega da energia e que sejam mitigados os riscos do não cumprimento das obrigações dos geradores, previstas nos contratos. Neste sentido, cláusulas contratuais são previstas para assegurar tais obrigações dos geradores durante o compromisso de suprimento, além de outras penalidades na legislação vigente para os agentes do setor elétrico brasileiro. Desta forma, a análise aqui apresentada retrata o estudo aprofundado de todos os mecanismos de penalidades utilizados até o final do suprimento do CCEAR de energia nova, para que se possa então verificar os impactos para o gerador, na ocorrência do descumprimento de cada uma de suas obrigações, além de observar os possíveis impactos para o consumidor final, na contabilização do mercado de energia como um todo e, até mesmo, na operação do sistema interligado nacional (SIN). / In the current institutional model of the Brazilian electricity sector, according to the legislation in force, the Ministry of Mines and Energy promotes auctions of electricity, as a mechanism to meet the demand power distribution, ensuring the lowest possible purchase price, that will be passed through to final consumers tariff. The negotiation associated to the auctions is consolidated between generating and distribution companies through contracts in a business environment known Regulated Contracting Environment, giving rise to the Contract Energy Trading in a Regulated Environment (CCEAR). Among these auctions, it is worthwhile to note the new energy auctions, which aims to not only meet the future demand of energy distribution, but also facilitate the expansion of the supply potential of the Brazilian energy matrix, through the construction of new generation plants. For this, in addition to a medium and long term planning to ensure a sustainable supply to the regulated market of electricity, it is necessary to define rules for the negotiation and delivery of energy and to mitigating the risks of non-compliance with the obligations of generators to these contracts. In this sense, contractual clauses are provided to enforce the generators to comply with such obligations during the commitment to supply, in addition to other penalties in the legislation for the agents of the Brazilian electricity sector. Thus, the analysis presented here synthesizes a study of all penalties mechanisms established in the new energy CCEAR and then verifies the impacts for the generator in the event of non-compliance with each of their obligations and the possible impact to the consumer, in accounting for the energy market as a whole and even in the operation of the national grid (SIN).