A Teoria de Jogos tem sido amplamente utilizada para compreender e avaliar o comportamento dos agentes econômicos. Sua aplicação no estudo de leilões criou um ramo de estudos chamado Teoria de Leilões, através do trabalho pioneiro de Vickrey. Uma negociação realizada através de um leilão pode tomar diversas formas ou sistemáticas, cada qual com suas características. No Brasil, com a segunda reestruturação do setor elétrico em 2004, passou-se a utilizar este mecanismo para concessão de direitos de geração de energia elétrica, um monopólio do estado, por parte de organizações privadas. Diversos estudos abordam a eficiência de leilões, do ponto de vista da entidade organizadora, com objetivo de maximizar o bem estar para a sociedade. Este estudo visa construir um simulador numérico de leilões para avaliação de estratégias do ponto de vista do investidor. Estas estratégias estão condicionadas as características dos agentes participantes e do tipo de leilão. O trabalho adota uma perpectiva de avaliação da recente história dos leilões brasileiros a fim de identificar as estratégias possivelmente adotadas e sugere um modelo baseado na sistemática dos leilões aplicado computacionalmente a um simulador. De uma forma geral o trabalho segue o seguinte roteiro: teoria de jogos e teoria de leilões; mercado energético brasileiro de eletricidade; ferramentas financeiras para financiamento de projetos de energia; resultados dos leilões brasileiros; sistemática dos leilões; formatação do modelo. Elaboração do simulador utilizando: agentes; lógica fuzzy; função utilidade esperada e estratégias. Exercício de simulação: definição dos cenários; geração das bases de dados; execução do simulador. Para o fim a que se propõe, o simulador demonstrou refletir bem as situações encontradas na fase de pesquisa documental, propiciando boa flexibilidade para eventuais ajustes e adaptações. Foi possível utilizá-lo para testar situações limites entre ambientes de competição além de inferir questões relevantes ao investidor. A utilização de um simulador computacional tornou possível analisar numericamente situações não alcançadas somente com a teoria ou ferramentas analíticas. / Game theory has been widely used to understand and evaluate the economic agents’ behavior. Its application in auctions studies came up a study called Auction Theory, created by the pioneering job of Vickrey. A negotiation conducted through an auction, can take several ways or systematic, each one with its own characteristics. In the second restructuring process in Brazilian electricity sector, in 2004, started to use this mechanism, to granting electric power generation, a state monopoly, by private organizations. Several studies broach the efficiency of auctions, from organizer's point of view, in order to increase welfare for the society. This study aims to build an auction numerical simulator to evaluate strategies, from investor point of view (bidder). Those strategies are conditioned by auction mechanism and bidder characteristics. The job takes an assessment of recent history of Brazilian auctions, in order to identify possible adopted strategies, and suggests a model based on the auction systematic computationally applied to a Simulator. In general, the job follows those directions: game theory and auction theory; the Brazilian energy market for electricity; financial tools to finance energy projects; Brazilian auctions results; auctions’ systematic; formatting model. Working up the Simulator, using: agents, fuzzy logic; expected utility function and strategies. Exercise Simulation: environment definition; databases generation; to run the Simulator. The Simulator showed good representation from real situations for those was proposed, with flexible code to new adoptions and implementations. It was possible to run in boundaries of competition environment that show some insight to investor’s perspective. Use a computational simulator brings up a numerically way to understand some situations where just theory and analytical tools can’t reach.

This paper seeks to find whether the spectrum auctions in Sweden have been conducted efficiently and if there is a de facto model that suits all auctions. The efficiency is conditions that emphasise truthful bidding, price discovery and limits collusive behaviour. The paper compares three different auction models used in Sweden, a beauty contest used in the allocation of 3G spectrums, and the auction model selected for the upcoming 5G spectrum auction. The auction models are as follows: first and second-price sealed-bid auction, SMRA and CCA. We found that beauty contests should not be used in any spectrum allocation as it did not meet the criteria of efficiency outlined in this paper. The first-price sealed-bid auction is not a suitable format for spectrum auctions. According to the theory, it generates equivalent revenues on average as the second-price format, which shows a higher degree of efficient allocation. We found that depending on the blocks sold, both SMRA and CCA can result in somewhat efficient results, but they are not suitable for a single object auction. We found that no de facto auction format is suitable for every spectrum auction to be conducted in the future, but instead that the auction format is dependent on the characteristics of the individual auctions.

The aim of this thesis is to give a comprehensive overview about the internet auctions from several different perspectives, but mainly form the law-related perspective. The relation of the internet auctions to other branches of law is examined -- especially to the consumer protection or the questions of counterfeit goods. Part of this thesis is devoted to pay-per-bid auctions and their place in legal regulations in Czech Republic. The German regulations are also introduced a compared to the Czech ones. In the end there is an introduction to some interests from the auction world.

Master of Science / Department of Agricultural Economics / Ted C. Schroeder / Value-added management at the cow-calf level is integrated across breeding, health and nutrition programs. Hedonic pricing models are necessary to navigate through the layered management standards imposed by certified health and marketing programs on the cow-calf sector. Previous research in feeder calf pricing models provides insight on the use and development of ordinary least squares in estimating price effects. Breed, vaccination program, age-and-source verification and natural-beef production have become more relevant as vertical coordination has influenced commercial cow-calf producers. This study provides the industry with new information pertaining to the revenue opportunities that exist for cow-calf producers through increased coordination in the beef industry. Video and satellite auction markets are recognized as a national pricing mechanism for feeder cattle in the United States. These markets represent the management and marketing practices of national cow-calf producers and the tastes and preferences of a national stocker and feedlot industry. Previous research in feeder cattle pricing models is applied to the current genetic, management, marketing and market structure information from video auction markets to discover relevant price effects pertaining to value-added calf production. More intensive value-added management practices were expected to enhance the revenue of cow-calf producers selling their calves through video auction markets. This research confirms that verified health and genetic claims produce higher calf prices compared to commodity calves. Weaned calves with at least two rounds of respiratory vaccinations generated an additional $5.50 to $7.50 per cwt., and weaning created $2.75 to $4.50 per cwt. in premiums over non-certified health programs. There were statistical differences among the premiums for each aggregated breed influence, and Angus and black and black-white faced cattle offered the highest breed premiums at $5.25 to $7.50 per cwt. compared to Brahman-influenced calves. Age-and-source verification presents the best opportunity for video auction market premiums among recently developed marketing programs. Statistically significant premiums ranged from $1.25 to $2.00 per cwt. for both steers and heifers over the last five years.

On the one hand, time-honored practices of open outcry, bazaar and other flea markets, as well as Sotheby's and Christie's, the traditional auction houses. On the other hand, the Internet technology quickly and cheaply connects people anywhere in the world at anytime. A true love story then began and gave rise to online auctions, which are undoubtedly one of the greatest successes of e-commerce. Thanks to the Internet, individual consumers, average people, generally used to posted prices, discover an efficient mechanism of price setting. The weak popularity of auctions until the dawn of the third millennium (auctions were intended to B2B transactions, or to B2C transactions but in specific markets, such as the art market) certainly justifies the lack of interest of researchers in marketing for this mechanism. On the other hand, economists made auctions one of their favorite topics, as this mechanism constitutes a wonderful application of game theory, which has been playing a preponderant role in economics for twenty-five years. Entitled “Essays on Online Auction Design and Bidding Behavior”, this doctoral dissertation helps enrich the traditional economic approach of auctions by a behavioral and dynamic approach. The original part of the research is structured in three main stages, which go deeper and deeper in the study of bidders' behavior and auction dynamics. The whole research is based on online auctions organized by the French airline company Air France and by the auction site eBay. In the first stage of the research, on the basis of hypotheses coming from the auction theory, the impact of auction rules on bidders’ participation and seller's revenue is econometrically studied, using simultaneous equations models and the 2SLS method. Does a high opening bid have a negative effect on the number of bidders and a positive one on the auction revenue, as predicted by the auction theory? Do sequential auctions of similar items lead to similar auction price? These are examples of questions that are investigated. While the auction theory literature typically takes the number of bidders as exogenously given, we chose to consider it as endogenous. Even though an increasing number of researchers acknowledge the endogenous feature of auction participation, no empirical study really takes this feature into account. Hypotheses from the auction theory turn out to be confirmed, as far as the minimum bid and the number of bidders are concerned. Interesting results are found regarding the performance of sequential auctions of similar items, since auctions in a sequence turn out to yield increasing revenues. Furthermore, the impact of the starting bid turns out to be moderated by the effect of these sequential auctions. In the second stage of this research, a disaggregated perspective (at the bidder’s level) is adopted, since a typology of bidding behaviors based on bidders' choices is built. This part is thus aimed at investigating whether heterogeneity exists in bidder’s behavior in online auctions, contrary to the longstanding assumption of homogenous, rational and strategic bidders made by the auction theory. A clustering analysis is conducted, based on decisions that bidders have to make during an auction, whose keywords are certainly: when? How? How much? For example: do bidders submit a small or a large number of bids? Do they react quickly when they lose auction leadership? When do they make their bids: at the beginning of the auction, at the end of it, or during the whole auction? What increment do they use? Results, based on two different samples related to Air France and eBay auctions provide a description of different bidding behaviors. The analysis focusing on Air France auctions highlights five types of bidding behavior: jump bidders, rational bidders, active bidders, bottom fishers and pioneers. Slightly different results are obtained for eBay auctions, since six types of bidding behavior are highlighted: snipers, evaluators, unmasking bidders, bottom fishers, pioneers and late pioneers. A closer look is given to the group of bidders who turned out to win an auction, in order to determine whether these bidders are characterized by specific bidding decisions, and thus, by specific bidding behaviors. The third stage focuses on the dynamic bidding process of an English auction, by specifically studying the impact of signals – namely, promotional messages – sent during an online auction on the final auction price. It proposes to test a model of the genesis and the impact of these messages aimed at informing current bidders and potential bidders about the item or urging them to submit a bid. This impact is modeled through a disaggregated and dynamic model. It exploits the recent behavioral view that each bid submitted by a bidder in an English auction is a particular decision that may be influenced by signals sent by the auctioneer during the auction, that is, between the decisions that the bidder makes. This model simultaneously takes into account the following three factors: (i) the direct impact of marketing messages on the auction price when messages affect bidders’ valuations, (ii) the indirect impact of messages on this price when messages attract a new bidder to the auction, and (iii) the possibility that the auctioneer’s strategy for sending messages depends on past events in the auction and on the timing of past messages. In this model, we thus propose that messages influence final auction prices through a dual-path system. The model also reflects an important feature of auction messages, which is the real time interactivity between the auctioneer and auction participants. The results, obtained through Bayesian inference, support the proposed model. This doctoral dissertation globally helps better understand bidders’ behavior in view of the rules set by the seller, and estimate how this seller can maximize his/her revenues. The main original aspects of this research consist in considering the English auction as a dynamic process and in focusing on bidders’ behavior, these two elements being ignored by economists. From a managerial point of view, this research can help online auction designers to better design their auctions in order to maximize their revenue.

This thesis concerns the interdisciplinary field of combinatorial auctions, combining the fields of computer science, optimization and economics. A combinatorial auction is an auction where many items are sold simultaneously and where bidders may submit indivisible combinatorial bids on groups of items. It is commonly believed that good solutions to the allocation problem can be achieved by allowing combinatorial bidding. Determining who wins in a combinatorial auction is fundamentally different from a traditional single-item auction because we are faced with a hard and potentially intractable optimization problem. Also, unless we are limited to truthful mechanisms, game theoretic analysis of the strategic behavior of bidders is still an open problem. We have chosen primarily to study the first-price combinatorial auction, a natural auction widely used in practice. Theoretical analysis of this type of auction is difficult and little has been done previously. In this thesis we investigate and discuss three fundamental questions with significant practical implications for combinatorial auctions. First, because the number of possible bids grows exponentially with the number of items, limitations on the number of bids are typically required. This gives rise to a problem since bidders are unlikely to choose the "correct" bids that make up the globally optimal solution. We provide evidence that an expressive and compact bidding language can be more important than finding the optimal solution. Second, given a first-price (sealed-bid) combinatorial auction, the question of equilibrium bidding strategies remains an open problem. We propose a heuristic for finding such strategies and also present feasible strategies. And finally, is a first-price combinatorial auction worth pursuing compared to the simpler simultaneous (single-item) auction? We prove, through a model capturing many fundamental properties of multiple items scenarios with synergies, that the first-price combinatorial auction produces higher revenue than simultaneous single-item auctions. We provide bounds on revenue, given a significantly more general model, in contrast to previous work.

Detta är en undersökning som är gjord för att jämföra prissättningen av fastigheter som är till salu i Sverige och Spanien. För att avgränsa oss har vi valt att jämföra Stockholms innerstads prissättning med prissättningen i Palma på Mallorca i Spanien. Lockpris fenomenet har fått hård kritik under den senaste tiden i media. På grund av denna kritik så har många mäklare, speciellt i Stockholms innerstad, gått ihop och arbetar mot att undvika lockpriser och har infört begreppet accepterat pris. Dock kan accepterat pris uppfattas som ett nytt ersättningsnamn på lockpriser. Trots att Mäklarsamfundet tar bestämt avstånd från användning av lockpriser så har vi genom intervjuer med mäklare i Stockholms innerstad fått fram att detta används fortfarande vid prissättning av bostäder. Vi har genom våra intervjuer med fastighetsägare i Stockholm och Palma, mött flera fastighetsägare som har känt sig lurade då de har köpt en fastighet till ett avsevärt mycket högre slutpris än utgångspris. Samtidigt har vi mött flera fastighetsägare som är nöjda med Sveriges budgivningssystem. De flesta föredrar dock att köpa eller sälja en fastighet till verkligt accepterat pris. Det spanska budgivningssystemet där budgivningen går nedåt har, trots att de flesta fastighetsköpare som vi intervjuat lyckats förhandla ned slutpriset, mötts med en del kritik. Största delen av kritiken bygger på att priset inte sätts relaterat till marknadspriset, vilket det trots lockpriser, görs i Sverige. / This is a survey where we compare the pricing of properties that are for sale in Sweden and Spain. To make delimitation, we have chosen to compare the pricing in the inner city of Stockholm of Sweden with the pricing in Palma in Mallorca, Spain. The cap rates phenomenon has been very criticized in the Swedish media in the latest couple of years. Because of this criticism, many real estate agents in the inner city of Stockholm are working to avoid cap rates and introduced the concept of using acceptable prices. However, acceptable price rates are perceived as a replacement name for the cap prices. Although the Mäklarsamfundet, of Sweden, disagrees with the use of cap rates, we have trough our interviews with real estate agents in the inner city of Stockholm received that this concept is still used in the pricing of properties. We have, through our interviews with property owners in Stockholm and Palma, met several property owners who have felt cheated when they bought a property at a significantly higher final price than the asking price. We have as well met several property owners who are satisfied with the Swedish pricing. But most people prefer to buy or sell a property at fair agreed price, using acceptable pricing. Many of the Spanish property buyers who we have interviewed are critical to the Spanish pricing, where the bidding goes down. This despite that most of them, managed to negotiate down the final price. Most of the criticism is based on that the prices are not related to market price, which, despite the cap rates, is in Sweden.

Orientador: Flávio Keidi Miyazawa / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Computação / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-23T01:59:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pereira_ViniciusdeNovaesGuimaraes_M.pdf: 1343382 bytes, checksum: e44e4ecf8abf29e4b44af22979e1269b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: Uma das fontes de receita mais lucrativas da internet são os anúncios para sites de busca. O crescimento deste mercado bilionário foi, em média, 20% ao ano nos últimos anos. Como o público alvo e variedade de anunciantes deste mercado são grandes e diversificados, um pequeno aumento da eficiência deste mecanismo representa um grande aumento de receita para os sites. Neste trabalho discutimos a evolução dos mecanismos usados neste mercado, identificando as razões destas mudanças. Avaliamos os mecanismos usados atualmente, modelando-o de formas diferentes e calculando o seu preço da anarquia / Abstract: Sponsored search auction is one of the most profitable sources of revenue on the internet. The growth of this market was, on average, 20% per year over the past years. Since the target audience and advertiser variety are big and diverse, a small increase in efficiency in this mechanism can bring a huge increase in the sites profits. In this work we discuss the evolution of the mechanisms used in this market, identifying the reasons of these changes. We evaluate the currently used mechanism, modeling in different ways and calculating the price of anarchy / Mestrado / Ciência da Computação / Mestre em Ciência da Computação

. Informacinės technologijos, tokios kaip Internetas ir elektroninė komercija, radikaliai pakeitė būdus, kaip keistis informacija ar vykdyti įvairius atsiskaitymus. Sparčiai besivystančios informacinės technologijos neaplenkė ir verslo, kuriam suteikė naujų galimybių didinant konkurencingumą. Per pastaruosius keletą metų ypač išpopuliarėjo elektroninės komercijos šaka – elektroniniai aukcionai, kuri dar labiau paskatino verslą keltis į elektroninę erdvę. Aukciono valdymas yra sudėtingas. Vienas iš svarbiausių konkurencingumo veiksnių yra kaina, kuriai nustatyti įmonė taiko įvairias kainodaros taisykles. Aukcionas tai dinaminės kainodaros būdas, kuris leidžia įmonei ir klientui rasti pačią tinkamiausią sandorio kainą. Tinkamai valdydamos ir kaupdamos verslo taisykles, įmonės galėtų gauti didesnį pelną, greičiau parduoti turimas prekes. Elektroniniai aukcionai, paremti turinio valdymo principu ir norimų taisyklių sudarymu galėtų prisidėti prie verslo efektyvumo didinimo, t.y. kokiu būdu įmonės galėtų integruoti elektroninio aukciono metodą į savo informacines sistemas. Atlikta įvairių aukciono metodų teorinių veikimo principų analizė, kuri leido apibendrinti visus metodus, išskiriant ir palyginant pagrindines jų taisykles. Darbe atlikta sukurtų elektroninių aukcionų informacinių sistemų analizė ir jų kūrimo principai, kurie leido apibendrinti pagrindines naudojamas taisykles. Atliktas eksperimentinis tyrimas, kurio metu koreliacinės analizės metodu buvo rasti ryšiai tarp... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Modern business is increasingly looking for more effective marketing techniques, not only in domestic but also international markets. Over the past few years, online auctions became very popular, which encouraged the business move to Internet. Online auctions based on content management principles and rules could help to increase business efficiency. The operating principles of online auctions are reviewed and analyzed in this graduation paper. Online auction systems diversity is analyzed in analytical part of the work. Four different auction systems were analyzed and their main development principles (rules) were summarized. Considering to analysis part online auction model that can help companies increase sales and profits through the auction approach was designed. Experimental study has been made to verify the functionality of the proposed model. Data – jewelry – listings were collected from the world's largest online auction eBay. Quantitative and qualitative data was analyzed; the results are shown in graphs and tables. The final result was derived under the rules of price categories to choose the basic parameters of an auction: the starting price, auction duration and reliability. New benefit option was introduced, which enabled to compare and evaluate the obtained rules. Different methods were used to generate and evaluate auction rules. One of them is self organizing map (SOM). Its aid was used to classify the data. The statistical analysis method was used to evaluate... [to full text]

Hay auctions have generally been understudied due to their unique market structure. Therefore, the factors that influence the price of hay at auction markets are not well-known. The price of hay at auction markets reflects the various characteristics that differentiate each lot of hay sold. This study is aimed at analyzing the determinants of Central Kentucky hay prices. A hedonic price model is estimated using data collected from a Central Kentucky hay auction. Known hay attributes include forage species, form, bale weight, and nutritive value. An important aspect of this analysis is to determine whether the quality measures of the hay are significant factors in determining hay prices in this auction setting. While price discovery of hay is important, it is also important to know about the insurance that is available to producers. Insurance for hay production is very limited with only two insurance programs available to Kentucky producers. An evaluation of the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program is conducted by simulating yields from an alfalfa producer and alfalfa trials from University of Kentucky Agriculture Research Centers in Princeton and Lexington, Kentucky. This analysis reveals the effectiveness of the coverage levels offered through the program for alfalfa producers in Kentucky.