The English online auction creates great business opportunities. However, it¡¦s different from traditional English auction in long bidding time, wide area, high risk, massive information, and low switching cost. It makes bidders easy to search information of the goods but difficult to win the auction. The bidders' transaction cost structure has changed from information phase to agreement phase. So, the bidders need more precise supporting tools to help them make decisions. The aim of this research is to investigate two-person optimal bidding strategies under three dimensions of the decision space: the sequence decision (bid firstly or later), the bid decision (bid or quit), and the jump decision (minimum increase or jump bid). It is assumed that there are two bidders competing in one auction. Variables associated with the auction system include the floor price and the minimum increase. Variables associated with the bidders include the private value of the bidding object, and the cost of bid per turn. Strategies were evaluated based on the following criteria: who wins, how many turns to win the bid, the deal price, the utility of the winner and the loser, the probability of winning, and the expected utility. The results indicate that every strategy has its advantages and disadvantages under certain conditions. This research provides guiding rules for the bidders to choose a better strategy.

The major internet auction sites eBay and Yahoo have developed innovative hybrid auction designs that incorporate buy prices. My dissertation focuses on the Buy It Now (BIN, hereafter) version of the auctions on eBay, the largest online auction site. The BIN hybrid auction combines a standard ascending bid auction with a posted-price offer. A seller in a BIN auction lists his auction with a "buy price". A bidder may purchase the item immediately at the buy price and end the auction. If he places a bid instead, the option to purchase the item at the buy price disappears and the subsequent bidders participate in the standard eBay auction. This auction format has been very popular with both buyers and sellers. In 2005 eBay's sales in fixed price platform (BIN and Half.com) totaled $13.8 billion, which was 33.1% of eBay's total sales.The dissertation explores the BIN auctions using theory, experiments and field data. Chapter 1 theoretically analyzes BIN auctions within the common values framework. An equilibrium is characterized, shown to exist, and the revenues generated by BIN and standard eBay auctions are compared. Chapter 2 compares the bidding behavior and the revenue implications of BIN auctions in lab experiments under common and private value assumptions. The third develops an "incomplete" theoretical model of BIN auctions within the private values framework. An "incomplete" empirical specification is derived and then field data collected from eBay's BIN auctions are used to estimate the primitives of the model, including the bidders' risk aversion and time preference. I then explore how heterogeneity of sellers and items influence these primitives. Chapter 1 (Common Values Auctions with a Buy Price: the case of eBay): Several explanations for the popularity of buy price have been provided for independent private value auctions. Risk aversion and impatience of either the bidders or the seller have mainly been used to explain the popularity of buy prices in IPV models. This paper, using a pure common value framework, models auctions with eBay-style "temporary" buy prices, when the bidders and the seller are either risk neutral or risk averse. It characterizes equilibrium bidding strategies in a general setup and then analyzes a seller's incentive to post a buy price when there are two bidders. When bidders are either risk neutral or risk averse there is no incentive to post a buy price for a risk neutral seller. But when the seller is risk averse, a suitably chosen buy price can raise the seller's expected utility when the bidders are either risk neutral or risk averse. Chapter 2 (An Experimental Study of Auctions with a Buy Price Under Private and Common Values): We use experiments to examine several predictions from the theoretical studies of buy prices. The theoretical predictions from Wooders and Reynolds (2003) and Chapter 1 show that the introduction of a buy price causes the seller's revenue to move in opposite directions in private value and common value settings. Meanwhile, Mathews and Katzman (2006) find that risk averse sellers might find buy prices advantageous because they reduce the variance in seller revenue in eBay auctions with risk-neutral bidders. The lab experiments are used to answer three key questions. (a) Can a buy price raise seller revenue and lower the variance of seller revenue in an independent private value auction? (b) Does a buy price lower seller revenue in common value auctions? (c) If the theoretical predictions do not hold, can a behavioral model explain the patterns observed in the data? Using a between-subjects design the results show that the use of a buy price has a positive and statistically significant effect on seller revenue in private value auctions. The buyers are risk averse. The estimate of the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) index of 1.11 for the bidders is equivalent to a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) index of 0.62 which is centered within the range of other estimates of relative risk aversion. As predicted by the theory when buyers are risk averse, the use of a buy price yields a statistically significant reduction in the variance of seller revenue. Hence, as predicted, the use of a buy price is advantageous to the seller when either the bidders or the seller are risk averse. The results for common value auctions are inconsistent with the theoretical predictions. Use of a buy price did not lower seller revenue, and the bidders' behavior departed from theoretical predictions in several respects. As a result, we develop and estimate a behavioral model of common value BIN auctions based on the winner's curse and overweighting of a bidder's private information. We find statistically significant evidence of overweighting of the bidder's own signal and estimated a CARA index of 0.001. This behavioral model explains all the departures from the rational model we found in the common values experiments. Chapter 3 (The Buy-it-now Option, Risk Aversion, and Impatience in an Empirical Model of eBay Bidding): Haile and Tamer (2003) first used an incomplete econometric model in an auction context, assuming that bidders bid up to their values and do not allow an opponent to win at a price they are willing to beat. Canals-Cerda and Pearcy (2004) used a similar incomplete econometric model to study eBay auctions while adding the assumption that the maximum of all the bids placed by the bidder with the second highest value is exactly equal to his value. Chapter 3 extends these incomplete models to eBay's BIN auctions. We develop and estimate an equilibrium model for BIN independent private value auctions with a stochastic and unknown number of potential bidders who enter the auction sequentially. In the model risk averse and time impatient bidders buy at the BIN price because it allows them to avoid the uncertainties and delay of the ascending bid auction that takes place if no one chooses the BIN option. As a result, the bidders' decisions to choose the BIN option in BIN auctions of different lengths can be used to identify the bidders' risk aversion and time preference parameters. Our model is "incomplete" in the sense that we do not impose any stylized structure on bidding in the ascending bid auction and, although bid revision is allowed, the process is not explicitly described. Our "incomplete" econometric model uses a partial likelihood approach proposed by Cox (1975) that allows the analysis to bypass modeling bidding and the bid revision process. The model is estimated using a new data set of 3245 eBay auctions of Pentium-3 laptops that ran between 22 July to 10 August 2005.

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於土地標售成交案例中，市場上不乏以高溢價率標得土地之案例。惟究竟土地投標人何以願意支付高出底價甚多之金額取得土地?何以部份土地溢價率相對較高，其他土地溢價率相對較低?則未能從過去之單一文獻探究。 本文透過彙整過去關於土地標售溢價率之文獻，歸納拍賣理論共同價值觀點、私人價值觀點、特徵價格理論觀點、實質選擇權理論觀點，建立土地標售溢價率之分析架構。此外，本文以新莊副都心為實證分析標的，說明該分析架構之操作方式。其中，透過列聯表分析，卡方獨立性檢定、相關係數及其檢定，驗證新莊副都心土地標售溢價率高低之成因能透過前述四大觀點切入，且影響溢價率可再歸納為受人的因素、地的特質影響。至於該實證分析衍生之政策意涵有二。第一，若以財政角度切入，政府得將待標售抵費地劃分為面積較小之土地，藉以降低進入門檻；此外，政府亦能透過加強宣傳或採第二價格密封拍賣制增加競標人數，以創造高溢價率、達到增加財政收入之目的。第二，以社會責任角度切入，政府應擬定及檢視相關政策是否能減少因得標後短期轉售土地所創造之高溢價率，以降低市場上之投機情形。 / Why do the land auction participants bid a land at a premium? While reviewing the paper about the land auctions, none of the papers can describe the high premium situation in land auction completely. This thesis constructs a framework of price premium analysis in land auctions and includes the views of auction theory, hedonic model theory and real option theory. Besides, this research presents how to analyze the price premium in land auctions with an empirical study. Using the contingency table, Pearson's chi-squared test of independence and calculating the correlation coefficient with 52 land auction data in Xinzhuang Fuduxin, there are two findings. First, we can use the points of the analyzed framework to describe the price premium. Second, the reason of the price premium can be summarizes as the factors of people and land characters. According the empirical result, there are some policy implications. First, due to the view of enhancing revenue, the government can create high premiums by dividing the land into small areas to lower the entry barrier to participate the auction. Besides, the government can have more advertisements or sell the land through second price sealed bid auctions to increase the number of the competitors. Second, due to the view of responsibility, the government should restrain the phenomenon of selling the land in the short term.

Firstly, this thesis contains an overview of basic concepts that we can meet on the real estate market. In the theoretical part of the thesis, the issues of auctions and their requirements are dealt with. Secondly, the practical part describes the specific real estate auction made in the area of Liberec Heights-Stary Harcov and there is further prepared by statistics dealing with the difference of the estimated price of the apartments, which were sold at auction, with prices of involuntary, which these flats were actually auctioned for. The work also includes its own estimate of one of these flats with an explanation of why the assessed prices differ from the prices at which the apartments are auctioned

Nós comparamos o leilão aberto e o leilão selado utilizados para compras públicas na Bolsa Eletrônica de Compras (BEC) do Estado de São Paulo usando dados das transações de açúcar refinado entre 2008 e 2011. O leilão selado gera uma economia para o Estado de aproximadamente 3% em relação ao leilão aberto. Sob a ótica do paradigma de valores privados independentes, nós adotamos um modelo com licitantes assimétricos e aversão ao risco. Ao recuperar a propensão a pagar dos participantes com econometria estrutural, descobrimos que estas hipóteses se encaixam razoavelmente bem aos leilões, ainda que não possamos descartar conluio ou comportamentos gerados por leilões online / We compared the open and the sealed bid auctions used for procurement transaction at the electronic platform Bolsa Eletrônica de Compras (BEC) of São Paulo state using data from refined sugar purchases between 2008 and 2011. The sealed bid generates lower prices in about 3% compared to the open auction. Under the independent private values paradigm, we adopted asymmetric bidders and risk aversion. We recover with structural econometrics the cumulative distribution functions of cost of potential bidders and we found evidence we can fit reasonably well our data, although we cannot reject collusion or behaviors generated by online auctions.

Online auction, as one way of the online shopping has become increasingly popular. During the process of online auction, there are many factors influencing the the final auction price. This dissertation will focus on the factors influencing the online auction price. Thus, the sellers and buyers in online auction process will be much more clear how to make decision in future auction process.

Submitted by Marcos Paulo de Jesus (mpj@gvmail.br) on 2018-07-11T20:46:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Jesus - Um estudo de caso entre 3 tipos de leilão reverso sob a perspectiva de uma organização de compras.pdf: 883117 bytes, checksum: 78501c0ba874ec5e74051216e041b45a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Mayara Costa de Sousa (mayara.sousa@fgv.br) on 2018-07-13T22:22:34Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Jesus - Um estudo de caso entre 3 tipos de leilão reverso sob a perspectiva de uma organização de compras.pdf: 883117 bytes, checksum: 78501c0ba874ec5e74051216e041b45a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzane Guimarães (suzane.guimaraes@fgv.br) on 2018-07-16T13:29:20Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Jesus - Um estudo de caso entre 3 tipos de leilão reverso sob a perspectiva de uma organização de compras.pdf: 883117 bytes, checksum: 78501c0ba874ec5e74051216e041b45a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-16T13:29:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jesus - Um estudo de caso entre 3 tipos de leilão reverso sob a perspectiva de uma organização de compras.pdf: 883117 bytes, checksum: 78501c0ba874ec5e74051216e041b45a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-06-11 / Essa dissertação é um estudo de caso experimental em laboratório com três tipos de leilão reverso, visando aplicar as lições aprendidas no experimento a um caso real. Como há diversos tipos de leilão disponíveis, selecionar a modalidade mais indicada para um processo de compras torna-se um problema relevante para que uma empresa compradora consiga o melhor resultado do ponto de vista de redução de custo e continuidade do negócio. Fundamentado nisso, o objetivo dessa dissertação é identificar qual a modalidade de leilão pode trazer o melhor resultado do ponto de vista da empresa que está realizando a compra. Dessa forma, foi selecionado um item específico a ser comprado pela empresa, nesse caso um serviço de transporte de carga excedentes, e solicitado a fornecedores selecionados que enviassem propostas de fornecimento com o objetivo de atender à solicitação de cotação (RFQ, ou request for quotation) e, baseado nessas propostas, foi elaborada uma série de simulações em laboratório de três tipos de leilão: leilão reverso inglês, leilão reverso japonês e leilão de primeiro preço em envelope fechado. Após a execução desse experimento, foi selecionada a modalidade de leilão que gerou os melhores resultados esperados pela companhia, nesse caso o menor lance entre os participantes, e aplicada em um caso real, cujo resultado foi reportado nesse trabalho para enriquecer a aplicabilidade dessa dissertação. Com base nesses resultados foi possível comparar o efeito de redução de custos entre esses três tipos de leilão para então aplicá-los em situações futuras. / This dissertation is an experimental case study with three different types of reverse auction in a laboratory aiming to apply the lessons learned in the simulations to a real case. As there are several auctions types available in the software used by companies, selecting the most suitable type for a specific procurement process becomes a relevant problem for a company aiming to get the best result regarding cost reduction and business continuity. Based on that, the goal of this dissertation is to identify which type of auction may lead to the best result from the perspective of the buyer. Thus, it was selected one specific item to be purchased by the company, in this case heavy lift transportation services and it was asked to some suppliers to submit proposals to meet the request for quotation (RFQ). Based on these proposals, it was designed a series of auctions simulations in a laboratory of three types of auctions (reverse English auction, reverse Japanese auction and first price sealed envelope auction). After the performance of these simulations in a laboratory, the type of auction that generated the best results expected by the company, in this case the one with the lowest winning bid from bidders, was selected, applied in a real case situation and the result was reported to enrich the application of this dissertation. Based on these results it is possible to infer the cost reduction effect of these three types of auction and apply it further in the procurement processes.

This internship academic report is the result of a 480--‐hour internship at New Orleans Auction Galleries completed from February--‐September 2015. New Orleans Auction Galleries is a for--‐profit arts organization located in the Arts District of New Orleans, Louisiana. During my internship, I worked closely with the Art Department and Office Administration, as well as preview receptions andauctions. This experience provided me with a valuable education of the inner workings of New Orleans Auction Galleries from its day--‐to--‐day operations to its vision as an organization. His report begins with the history and goals of New Orleans Auction Galleries and moves forward with discussing the structure of the organization as it stands today, a SWOT analysis, best practices, recommendations, and concludes with my final thoughts.

<p>In most electricity markets, producers submit supply functions to a procurement uniform-price auction under uncertainty before demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every producer commits to the supply function that maximises his expected profit given the bids of competitors. </p><p>The presence of multiple equilibria is a basic weakness of the SFE framework. Essay I shows that with (i) symmetric producers, (ii) perfectly inelastic demand, (iii) a reservation price (price cap), and (iv) capacity constraints that bind with a positive probability, a unique symmetric SFE exists. The equilibrium price reaches the price cap exactly when capacity constraints bind.</p><p>Another weakness is difficulty finding a valid asymmetric SFE with non-decreasing supply functions. Essay II shows that for firms with asymmetric capacity constraints but identical constant marginal costs there exists a unique and valid SFE. Equilibrium supply functions exhibit kinks as well as vertical and horizontal segments. The price at which the capacity constraint of a firm binds is increasing in the firm’s share of market capacity. The capacity constraint of the second largest firm binds when the market price reaches the price cap. Thereafter, the largest firm supplies its remaining capacity with a perfectly elastic segment at the price cap. Essay III presents a numerical algorithm that calculates a similar SFE for asymmetric firms with increasing marginal costs. </p><p>Essay IV derives the SFE of a pay-as-bid auction such as the balancing market for electric power in Britain. A unique SFE always exists if the demand’s hazard rate is monotonically decreasing, as for a Pareto distribution of the second kind. Assuming this probability distribution, the pay-as-bid procurement auction is compared to the SFE of a uniform-price procurement auction. Two theorems in Essay V prove that the demand-weighted average price is (weakly) lower in the pay-as-bid procurement auction. </p>