Central Bank communication has become, in the last period, a topic of increased interest both in academia, as well as in the process of conducting the monetary policy. This thesis addresses the communication of central banking and compares the Czech National Bank's (CNB) communication practices with the ones of the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) for the period of 2005 - 2010. Communication of both central banks is analyzed by compyling a Transparency Index, based on a detailed analysis of actual information disclosure by the two banks. In order to analyze how surprising are the monetary policy decisions in the two countries, an investigation about how much the short-term money market rates change after the monetary policy decision's announcement has been made. The results of the analyses show that the CNB has achieved almost full transparency in 2010 in conducting the monetary policy, while the NBM, even though registered a gradual increase in its transparency since 2005, still needs to put more effort into improving its communication practices. The research also reveals that the CNB manages to lower the pace of market surprises related to its monetary policy decisions, while in the case of NBM, the money market rates respond little to the policy rate changes. Also, in order to show the importance...

This thesis examines two closely related issues: (1) the ability of imperfect information models to explain some aspects of business cycle dynamics, and (2) the interaction between central bank communications and monetary policy. These issues are related because central bank communications can only be studied in models with imperfect information. In chapter 1, I investigate the ability of a noisy rational expectations model to generate plausible macroeconomic dynamics. The model allows for imperfect, heterogeneous information, and signal extraction from endogenous variables. I find that imperfect information significantly improves the model's ability to generate persistent, hump-shaped responses to a transitory monetary policy shock. This is achieved without the need for mechanical frictions. In addition, the model generates realistic inflation forecast errors. Chapter 2 explores the relationship between central bank statements about future policy and the degree of commitment. I allow the central bank to make (possibly vague) statements about its expected future policy. I begin by assuming that the central bank adopts a loss function which internalizes the bygone costs of deviating from such a pre-announced policy action. The resulting policy is a convex combination of pure discretion and full commitment. As the precision of central bank statements increases, this policy converges to the full commitment policy. I then show that this type of commitment to internalize bygone costs is sustainable only for moderate degrees of precision. Chapter 3 studies the impact of central bank communications about the state of the economy. In particular, I examine the extent to which increased central bank transparency creates a meaningful trade-off between beneficially conveying fundamental information and adversely contaminating observed data with the central bank's opinion. This question is addressed in a variant of the model from chapter 1. In this environment, both the central bank and private agents learn about the state of the economy from observations of endogenous variables. By making the central bank learn from endogenous variables, I am able to study the impact of communications precision on the bank's signal extraction problem.

This thesis examines two closely related issues: (1) the ability of imperfect information models to explain some aspects of business cycle dynamics, and (2) the interaction between central bank communications and monetary policy. These issues are related because central bank communications can only be studied in models with imperfect information. In chapter 1, I investigate the ability of a noisy rational expectations model to generate plausible macroeconomic dynamics. The model allows for imperfect, heterogeneous information, and signal extraction from endogenous variables. I find that imperfect information significantly improves the model's ability to generate persistent, hump-shaped responses to a transitory monetary policy shock. This is achieved without the need for mechanical frictions. In addition, the model generates realistic inflation forecast errors. Chapter 2 explores the relationship between central bank statements about future policy and the degree of commitment. I allow the central bank to make (possibly vague) statements about its expected future policy. I begin by assuming that the central bank adopts a loss function which internalizes the bygone costs of deviating from such a pre-announced policy action. The resulting policy is a convex combination of pure discretion and full commitment. As the precision of central bank statements increases, this policy converges to the full commitment policy. I then show that this type of commitment to internalize bygone costs is sustainable only for moderate degrees of precision. Chapter 3 studies the impact of central bank communications about the state of the economy. In particular, I examine the extent to which increased central bank transparency creates a meaningful trade-off between beneficially conveying fundamental information and adversely contaminating observed data with the central bank's opinion. This question is addressed in a variant of the model from chapter 1. In this environment, both the central bank and private agents learn about the state of the economy from observations of endogenous variables. By making the central bank learn from endogenous variables, I am able to study the impact of communications precision on the bank's signal extraction problem.

This dissertation presents three chapters addressing issues pertaining to monetary policy, information, and central bank communication. The first chapter studies optimal monetary policy in an environment where policy actions provide a signal of economic fundamentals to imperfectly informed agents. I derive the optimal discretionary policy in closed form and show that, in contrast to the perfect information case, the signaling channel leads the policymaker to be tougher on inflation. The strength of the signaling effect of policy depends on relative uncertainty levels. As the signaling effect strengthens, the optimal policy under discretion approaches that under commitment to a forward-looking linear rule, thereby decreasing the stabilization bias. This contributes to the central bank finding it optimal to withhold its additional information from private agents. Under a general linear policy rule, inflation and output forecasts can respond positively to a positive interest rate surprise when the signaling channel is strong. This positive response is the opposite of what standard perfect information New Keynesian models predict and it matches empirical patterns found by previous studies. Chapter 2 provides new empirical evidence supporting the predictions of the model presented in Chapter 1. More specifically, I find that the responses of inflation forecasts to interest rate surprises is especially positive when there is greater uncertainty regarding the previous forecast. Finally, Chapter 3 examines whether communications by the Federal Open Market Committee might have the ability to influence financial market responses to macroeconomic news. In particular, I am able to relate labor-related word use in FOMC statements and meeting minutes to the amount by which interest rates' response to labor-related news exceeds their response to other news. / Economics

v Abstract The aim of this thesis is to assess the effect of central bank communication on joint occurrence of extreme returns and on extreme movements shared by two stock markets. The research concentrates on the following aspects: predictability of increased share of countries experiencing extreme returns in the eurozone based on the nature of policymaker's statement and also a set of control variables, change in probability of extreme returns joint occurrence after president's speech, determinants of joint occurrence when non-standard measures were announced and finally, effect of crisis period. Additionally, determinants of shared extreme movements between particular countries are examined. The results suggest that communication nature or crisis are not significant predictors of extreme returns joint occurrence. Moreover, markets seem to react jointly to ECB president's speech only when they have extremely high returns. Furthermore, markets jointly react on days of nonstandard measures announcement differently. We also found that in the first quantile dovish statements tend to increase returns above their mean in case of Greece and Germany, and Greece and the UK. Rest of the pairs of countries have opposite reaction to dovish tone and communication is significant in the 95th quantile for the pair...

The aim of this thesis is to assess the effect of ECB's communication on financial market co- movements between Italy, Spain, Germany and France using MGARCH family of models. Author addresses partially the potential problem of endogeneity of central bank communication by using Composite indicator of systemic stress and excess liquidity. The author estimates the impact of ECB's communication on correlations of government bond yield changes using daily data from 2008 to 2014. For this purpose author employs bivariate diagonal BEKK(1,1) and bivariate scalar BEKK(1,1) with surprises of macroeconomic announcements under control. The results are consistent and robust for all models, the results suggest that communication does not have statistically significant effect on financial market correlations in the Euro area. Furthermore, author defines delta functions which describe and quantify the immediate and full effect of explanatory variables on conditional correlations in bivariate diagonal BEKK(1,1) and bivariate scalar BEKK(1,1). To the best of author's knowledge this thesis is the only one in the literature which examines this effect of ECB's communication by MGARCH models. Keywords: Financial markets, central bank communication, correlation, MGARCH, BEKK Author's e-mail: milankucera1@seznam.cz...

The topic of this diploma thesis is to measure and investigate the clarity of Financial stability reports from 27 European central banks. Using unbalanced panel data from 2004 to 2017 we found out variables that determine the level of clarity of Financial stability reports. Clarity indices are calculated by Flesch-Kincaid readability tests. Based on our results, we claim that the clarity of the Financial stability report is affected by the level of independence of the central bank and by non-housing macroprudential policy index. Furthermore, the clarity of Financial stability reports changes among years and especially during the financial crisis. According to spatial models, the distance between central banks really matters in the terms of the clarity of Financial stability reports.

As the amount of information available on the internet has increased sharply in the last years, methods for measuring and comparing text-based information is gaining popularity on financial markets. Text mining and natural language processing has become an important tool for classifying large collections of texts or documents. One field of applications is topic modelling of the minutes from central banks' monetary policy meetings, which tend to be about topics such as"inflation", "economic growth" and "rates". The central bank of Sweden is the Riksbank, which hold 6 annual monetary policy meetings where the members of the Executive Board decide on the new repo rate. Two weeks later, the minutes of the meeting is published and information regarding the future monetary policy is given to the market in the form of text. This information has before release been unknown to the market, thus having the potential to be market-sensitive. Using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), an algorithm used for uncovering latent topics in documents, the topics in the meeting minutes should be possible to identify and quantify. In this project, 8 topics were found regarding, among other, inflation, rates, household debt and economic development. An important factor in analysis of central bank communication is the underlying tone in the discussions. It is common to classify central bankers as hawkish or dovish. Hawkish members of the board tend to favour tightening monetary policy and rate hikes, while more dovish members advocate a more expansive monetary policy and rate cuts. Thus, analysing the tone of the minutes can give an indication of future moves of the monetary policy rate. The purpose of this project is to provide a fast method for analysing the minutes from the Riksbank monetary policy meetings. The project is divided into two parts. First, a LDA model was trained to identify the topics in the minutes, which was then used to compare the content of two consecutive meeting minutes. Next, the sentiment was measured as a degree of hawkishness or dovishness. This was done by categorising each sentence in terms of their content, and then counting words with hawkish or dovish sentiment. The resulting net score gives larger values to more hawkish minutes and was shown to follow the repo rate path well. At the time of the release of the minutes, the new repo rate is already known, but the net score does gives an indication of the stance of the board.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The effectiveness of monetary policy depends importantly on the expectations of the private sector, as it is largely through this channel of the transmission mechanism that policy changes are transmitted to long-term interest rates. This has increased the emphasis on the role of central bank communication as a monetary policy tool. Successful communication is essential both to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy and to build support for the institutional framework within which monetary policy is implemented. While the large and growing literature on central bank communication over the past decade has delivered strong support for the important role of central bank communication, there is less agreement about what the optimal communication strategy is. Furthermore, research has been limited mainly to studies of communication between central banks and the financial markets. In an evaluation of progress in the literature, Blinder et al. (2008) highlight the need to examine the interaction between central banks and the rest of the private sector (the general public) as well. The objective of this PhD dissertation is to evaluate the South African Reserve Bank’s (SARB’s) use of communication as a monetary policy tool. Special focus is given to communication with the inattentive general public, who set prices in the labour market and the market for goods and services. Different aspects of the SARB’s communication were studied, including the consistency of the South African Reserve Bank’s communication, the transmission of this communication via the media to the general public, and the process by which the general public gathers and processes the information on inflation. An evaluation of the SARB’s communications (its original messages) provided some evidence that the SARB has succeeded in communicating consistently over the inflation targeting period. This was followed by an assessment of the role of the media in transmitting the original communications to the general public. The results suggest that South African media reports generally show a lack of critical assessment of monetary policy decisions and that the inter-meeting communication by the SARB is ineffective at influencing these. An important challenge is for the SARB to consider how it can participate more actively in the economic discussion at this level and how it can build productive strategic relationships with the media. The final section of this dissertation explores the process by which the general public forms its inflation expectations, relying on epidemiological models to describe the spread of inflation information and to estimate the speed at which the general public, in aggregate, updates their inflation expectations. This estimate of the speed of adjustment will be valuable to future research that aims to build a Phillips curve in a new way for South Africa. A well-modelled Phillips curve will both improve the monitoring of the impact of monetary policy and inform future policy design and implementation. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die doeltreffendheid van die monetêre beleid is beduidend afhanklik van die verwagtinge in die privaat sektor, aangesien beleid hoofsaaklik deur hierdie kanaal langtermyn rentekoerse beïnvloed. Hierdie bewustheid het die klem op die rol van sentrale bank kommunikasie as ‘n monetêre instrument versterk. Suksesvolle kommunikasie is noodsaaklik om beide die effektiwiteit van monetêre beleid te verseker sowel as om ondersteuning vir die institusionele raamwerk waarbinne die monetêre beleid geïmplimenteer word, te bou. Hoewel daar ‘n groot en groeiende literatuur is wat die belangrikheid van sentrale bank kommunikasie oor die afgelope dekade beklemtoon, is daar nie eenstemmigheid oor wat die optimale kommunikasie strategie behels nie. Daarbenewens is meeste studies beperk tot die kommunikasie tussen monetêre owerhede en die finansiële sektor. In ‘n evaluering van die literatuur het Blinder et al. (2008) die noodsaaklikheid beklemtoon om die wisselwerking tussen monetêre owerhede en die res van die privaat sektor (die publiek) te bestudeer. Die doel van hierdie proefskrif is om die Suid-Afrikaanse Reserwebank (SARB) se gebruik van hierdie kommunikasie instrument te evalueer. Spesiale aandag word geskenk aan kommunikasie met die onoplettende publiek wat pryse bepaal in die arbeidsmark en markte vir goedere en dienste. Verskillende aspekte van die SARB se kommunikasie strategie word bestudeer, insluitende die konsekwentheid van kommunikasie, die oordrag van hierdie kommunikasie via die media aan die publiek, asook die proses waarmee die publiek informasie rakende inflasie versamel en verwerk. ‘n Evaluering van die SARB se kommunikasie (die oorspronklike boodskappe) lewer bewys dat die SARB daarin geslaag het om konsekwent te kommunikeer tydens die inflasie teikeningsperiode. Dit word gevolg deur ‘n evaluering van die rol van die media om oorspronklike informasie suskesvol aan die publiek oor te dra. Die resultate dui daarop dat berigte in die Suid Afrikaanse media oor die algemeen aan kritiese evaluering van die monet.re beleidsbesluite ontbreek en die SARB se kommunikasie tussen monetêre beleidsvergaderings is ook oneffektief gevind. ‘n Belangrike uitdaging vir die SARB is dus om te bepaal hoe dit op hierdie vlak tot die ekonomiese debat kan toetree en hoe dit produktiewe strategiese verhoudings met die media kan bou. Die laaste afdeling van die proefskrif bestudeer die proses waarvolgens die publiek hul inflasieverwagtinge formuleer deur gebruik te maak van epidemiologiese modelle wat die verspreiding van inflasie verwagtinge, asook die spoed waarteen die publiek oor die algemeen hul inflasieverwagtinge opdateer, beskryf. Die snelheid waarmee die publiek hul verwagtinge opdateer behoort veral van waarde te wees vir toekomstige studies wat poog om ‘n Phillips kurwe met ‘n nuwe aanslag vir Suid Afrika te skort. ‘n Goed geformuleerde Phillips kurwe sal monitering van monetêre beleide se impak verbeter, en sal ook as ‘n goeie riglyn vir toekomstige beleidsontwerp en -implimentering dien.

This thesis analyzes the effect of the Czech National Bank's (CNB) communica- tion on the interest rate volatility (PRJBOR reference rate). Starting with the literature survey about the central bank communication in the world, I focus on the literature that concerns the CNB. To model the CNB's communication, I use the GARCH(l,1), EGARCH(l,1) and TARCH(l,1) models. I have created a unique data set containing the dummy variables for the CNB communication. The results are as follows: (a) the CNB's communication tends to decrease the volatility, (b) timing of the communication has a key role as the comments closer to the meeting have bigger calming effect, and that (c) there is no clear effect concerning the comments of the Bank Board members in the media. JEL Classification Keywords E43, E44, E52, E58 Czech National Bank, monetary policy signaling, central bank communication, the term structure of interest rates, GARCH analysis Author's email karasp@email.cz Supervisors's email roman. horvath@gmail.com