CHDS State/Local / This thesis examines the structure and intelligence process of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group to assess its effectiveness as measured through the application of a Program Logic Model. This model verifies the links between the assumptions on which the program is based and actual program activities. It further assesses its status as a â smart practiceâ based on measurable criteria that are beyond perception or peer approval alone. The TEW is a regional, multi-agency and multi-disciplinary network that functions as a focal point for analyzing the strategic and operational information needed to prevent, mitigate, disrupt and respond to threats and acts of terrorism. Although efforts toward prevention are difficult to measure in any program, input and outcome are assessable. This method provides an effective means to evaluate a program while documenting what works and why. Effectiveness should not be based solely on outputs; a structure that produces them is also an indicator. The objective of this thesis is to establish a benchmark of practical standards for collaborative intelligence sharing operations that can be replicated by other regions and that will establish a common nationwide homeland security intelligence network. Based on these criteria, it is reasonable to conclude that the TEW is in fact a â smart practice.â It meets its intended goals and objectives when measured according to the parameters of the Program Logic Model, and has a structured process and system that leads to preferred outcomes. / Commander, Los Angeles County (California) Sheriff's Department

CHDS State/Local / In the final report on the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) found that the attacks were successful in part because information was not shared and analysis not pooled among the different agencies across all levels of government. Since that time, there have been significant strides to improve cooperation and close the intelligence gaps among the different intelligence and law enforcement services. Effective terrorism prevention, however, requires information and intelligence fusion as a cooperative process at all levels of government so that the flow of intelligence can be managed to support the identification of emerging threats to the homeland. This thesis explains the value of a state/regional fusion center by examining three successful fusion centers in Arizona, Georgia, and Los Angeles. Recommendations from each agency on lessons learned, as well as independent research, have been provided to help state and local agencies develop their own fusion centers. / Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

This thesis will focus on the area of 802.20 wireless networking as a feasible "last mile" solution to wireless access in a tactical coalition environment and will be implemented into a series of experiments. Implementation will primarily utilize Flarion's FLASH OFDM (Fast, Low-Latency Access with Seamless Handoff Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing). Current and future military and homeland security forces, conducting operations in a tactical environment, require instant access to data. Wireless data requires a reliable air-link resource anchored to a viable service platform. Flarion's FLASH-OFDM wireless air-link mimics the performance of a high-speed wireline environment. Through Flarion's Radio Router base station and mobile data terminal, a Radio Access Network is created. It connects directly to a standard IP Packet Data Network forming a wireless data network. Utilizing this network environment, this thesis intends to document the implementation of a limited objective experiment (LOE) in support of homeland security and the War on Terrorism (WOT), specifically, the testing of an IEEE 802.20 network enabling US and key foreign partners to integrate mobile wireless local area network (WLAN) technologies into a surveillance and target acquisition network program.

The traditional role of the active-duty military force at home is one of support to a civilian Lead Federal Agency (LFA) that primarily falls under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). During emergencies, military domestic assistance is historically provided when local, state, and federal resources have been overwhelmed. During and in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, however, the slow and perceived inept response to the massive disaster prompted a national debate on the appropriate role of the military in response to major domestic disasters. Many concerned with the federal response to Katrina believed that America's homeland security system could not aptly respond to a large-scale natural or man-made catastrophe without the military in a lead role. Defining the roles and understanding the responsibilities outlined for the Department of Defense (DOD) within the National Response Plan (NRP) is an important first step towards an effectively coordinated incident response. The purpose of this research is to explore the role of the active-duty military in domestic disaster response, using Hurricane Katrina, to determine if DOD and DHS response to the disaster was implemented according to the NRP. This research will help explain the role that the military plays in supporting the civilian LFA in disaster response.

As the United States Air Force air base defense doctrine evolved over the years, implementation and execution errors were occasionally exploited by insurgent forces operating in the areas adjacent to U.S. occupied air bases. Executing unconventional attack methodologies, primarily via stand-off weapons, these insurgents were able to wreak havoc on U.S. and allied air bases, causing massive destruction and the loss of American lives. An examination of the literature from air base (ground) attacks in Korea, Vietnam and at Khobar Towers indicated several problematic areas resonating in all three cases. These common areas include: inadequate intelligence (both organic and external), lack of proper focus on critical infrastructure and insufficient or absent force protection technologies. Many of today[alpha]s security experts are predicting future attacks on military infrastructure to include stateside and forwarddeployed air bases. Today[alpha]s slightly diverse, yet consistent insurgent enemy, with attack methodologies mirroring those of Korea, Vietnam and Khobar Towers, remains a constant and formidable threat. As the Air Force moves forward with its newly implemented Integrated Base Defense doctrine, specific attention must be paid to improving upon the problem areas from the past. This thesis focuses on the specific problematic areas, and provides policy recommendations for force protection planners.

The Air Base has long been a potential target of attack for enemy planners. An effective way to attack the United States Air Force (USAF) is to avoid its usual dominance in the air and use an asymmetrical approach, attacking air bases with ground forces inserted into the Joint Rear Area. The history of airbase ground attacks from 1942 to 1994, documented in the book Snakes in the Eagles' Nest, shows that the dominant strategy employed by air base attackers has been the standoff attack. Roughly, 75 percent of all airbase attacks have been through the use of rockets or mortar fire from outside the airbase's perimeter defenses. In Vietnam, where the defenses against penetrating ground attacks were emphasized, this percentage rose to 96 percent. Historically, robust main operating bases, with passive defensive measures such as hardened facilities and redundant systems, have been able to withstand standoff attacks. The relative inaccuracy of the attacker's standoff systems and their limited ability to sustain fire on the air base minimized damage. Times have changed and the USAF finds itself operating in an expeditionary mode across the globe. Expeditionary Air Forces cannot depend on the luxury of operating off airfields with the robust infrastructure of main operating bases. In addition, the emergence of man portable, guided munitions for mortars and guided anti-tank missiles has increased the accuracy of potential standoff weapons. Finally, the sophistication of Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq and of modern radio-controlled model aircraft suggests the potential for attackers to build their own guided standoff weapons. The potential for a "one shot, one kill" standoff weapon is here today, negating the effectiveness of passive hardening measures. Disrupting these attacks will take new strategies. Understanding current Joint and USAF doctrine is the first step. Areas for further study include disrupting the enemy forces before they launch a standoff attack, intercepting the standoff round in flight and mitigating the damage on impact are discussed.

CHDS State/Local / Our national security and prosperity depend in part on secure and competitive ports. Effective public and private sector collaboration is needed in a world with myriad security challenges and fierce global competition. Although steps have been taken in the years since 9/11 to realize these twin goals, much more needs to be done. The current maritime domain awareness (MDA) paradigm needs to be expanded to provide comprehensive awareness of intermodal operations in our ports. An effective Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) program that succeeds in leveraging intermodal data is fundamental to better port-level MDA. Developing effective port level MDA and using it to enhance the security of our ports relies on the effective organization of public and private sector resources. The joint operations centers called for in the SAFE Port Act, once broadened to include key intermodal players, provide an excellent organizational model to pursue enhanced port security. / Comptroller, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

CHDS State/Local / Many states currently do not have an intelligence fusion center, and therefore, their ability to prevent and deter a terrorist attack is limited by the lack of information sharing. Wisconsin in addition to many states lacks a central hub for information exchange and currently has no system in place that allows the variety of technologies to gain access to a common database to gather and/or exchange information. The vast majority of public safety agencies currently operate their own systems that are incapable of exchanging information. The inability to exchange and/or access information in user-friendly format has inhibited many state and local efforts to keep its citizens safe from the possibility of a terrorist attack. The ultimate goal is to provide a mechanism where law enforcement , public safety and private sector partners can come together with a common purpose and improve the ability to safeguard our homeland and prevent criminal activity. Terrorism Early Warning Systems (TEW's) embody the core of collaboration and are an effective tool to maximize available resources and build trusted relationships. The fusion process should be organized and coordinated on a statewide level between the major Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) areas and the statewide fusion center concept. / Wisconsin Office of Justice

CHDS State/Local / As the threat of domestic terrorism increases and the demands on Emergency Responders and the public intensify, a more distributed, efficient, and flexible training and collaboration model is needed to guide future efforts. The current blended learning strategy unintentionally limits collaboration. As learners move away from interactive learning to more static based solutions, continuing education and collaboration is severely limited. This research investigates the potential impact of Homeland Security Communities of Learning on information sharing, training costs, and innovation. This study reviewed current efforts in Internet-based interactive learning through an analysis of Networked Based Learning. A futures forecast was conducted identifying trends and events that may influence the future of Communities of Learning. The research findings support the creation of Homeland Security Communities of Learning that are designed to include collaborative technologies such that information sharing leads to enhanced capabilities and innovation. A strong correlation (r=.798) was attributed to the degree to which Networked Based Learning contributed to knowledge accumulation. The study presents a strategic plan, implementation framework, and Community of Learning pilot. The pilot includes previously excluded participants from non-Emergency Responder public and private stakeholders. Additionally the pilot identifies a significant cost savings with Communities of Learning. / Deputy Chief, Sacramento Police Department

CHDS State/Local / The Citizen Corps (CC) is the primary Department of Homeland Security vehicle for achieving civilian preparedness. CC volunteers are included in the National Preparedness System (NPS) through various sponsoring agencies who determine the roles and functions of the volunteers within their organization. However, not defining the CC as an independent support function within the NPS makes it difficult to isolate data for the purpose of creating Target Capabilities Lists, measuring performance, and including volunteers in operations plans. This thesis posits that to achieve adequate civilian preparedness, the CC's roles and functions need to be restructured to align with the certification systems of the professional emergency response disciplines. CC certifications will also bridge gaps in the response continuum. The CC reorganization will modularize and isolate roles and functions for the purpose of strategic planning, measuring performance levels, serving as a predeployment civilian response, typing, credentialing, and pre-registering as an independent resource capability (which will be essential in planning for a pandemic and surge capacity needs). For planning purposes, and to add visual clarity to the CC roles and functions, the CC should be positioned as an independent Emergency Response Function within the National Response Plan.