It has become almost universal practice for countries to adopt written constitutions that include a bill of rights. Yet we know little about the origins and evolution of the practice of constitution-writing on a global scale. Are bills of rights defining statements of the nation’s character and identity? Or are they more standardized documents that are similar across countries, and vary only at the margins? Are substantive constitutional features rooted in the society for which they are written, or are they borrowed from elsewhere? What are the origins of the world’s “words of liberty”? This thesis presents the first-ever systematic substantive exploration of the world’s written constitutions. It introduces a new database, based on the coding of the constitutions of 188 countries, for the period 1946-2006. With this data, it explores the historical trajectory of the world’s written constitutions and offers explanations for their substantive content. This thesis's most important finding is that constitutions are inherently “transnational” documents. As it turns out, substantive constitutional choices are remarkably unrelated to local needs and values. Constitutions do not express identity or national character. Instead, the most important predictor of whether any particular country adopts any particular constitutional provision is whether other countries previously did the same thing. Constitutions do not tell stories of the nation’s history, but rather tell stories of transnational interactions and international politics. As a result, constitutions have become at least partly standardized documents that vary along a small number of underlying dimensions. But this thesis also shows that not all constitutions are the same, and that there exists no evidence of a global constitutional convergence. Instead, the world’s constitutions divide in a limited number of constitutional families. This thesis is not currently available in ORA.

This thesis concerns the theoretical issues that arise in the application of the constitutional model known as the plurinational state, developed through the experience of such Western liberal democratic states as Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom, to non-Western contexts of national pluralism through the case study of Sri Lanka. There are two closely intertwined and complementary objectives to the thesis. Firstly, to provide a fresh analytical and prescriptive framework of understanding and potential solutions to the constitutionally unresolved problem of national pluralism in Sri Lanka that has so far only generated protracted conflict. Secondly and more importantly, to contribute in more general terms to the theoretical literature on plurinational constitutionalism by way of the comparative insights generated through applying the model to an empirical context that is fundamentally different in a number of ways to that from which it originally emerged. In this latter, comparative, exercise, there are three key empirical grounds of difference that are identified in the thesis. Firstly, the difference between the sociological character of nationalisms in the two contexts, defined at the most basic level by the civic-ethnic dichotomy; secondly, the different meanings of democratic modernity in the present, determined by colonial modernity and post-colonial ethnocracy; and thirdly, the differences in the substantive content of democracy as between liberal and nonliberal democracies. The thesis argues that the plurinational state may be adapted to have a role and relevance beyond Western conditions, by addressing the theoretical issues that arise from these divergences. In doing so, it seeks to demonstrate that ethnic forms of nationalism are not necessarily inconsistent with the plurinational logic of accommodation; that an exploration of pre-colonial history reveals indigenous forms of the state that are more consistent with plurinational ideals than the classical modernist Westphalian nation-state introduced by nineteenth century colonialism; and that plurinational constitutions may be based on a broader conception of democracy than political liberalism. Building on these discussions, the principal normative contribution of the thesis is the development of a constitutional theory for the accommodation of national pluralism that is based on the norm of asymmetry, as distinct from equality, between multiple nations within the territorial and historical space of the state.

On June 26th, 2015 the United States Supreme Court handed down a much anticipated decision answering whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex.[1] In a divisive 5-4 decision, the majority ruled that marriage as a fundamental liberty applies to same-sex couples. Although, Obergefell v. Hodges was facially related to the LGTBQ movement, in reality, this case was pivotally about the Supreme Court's role in our society. Obergefell was a fisticuff battle between liberal and conservative jurisprudence over the Court’s influence on the democratic process in America. This paper will attempt to show that the majority’s ruling, and the reasoning they used to reach it, was inconsistent with the Framers’ wishes for the role of the Court in our constitutional democracy. [1] "Obergefell v. Hodges." Oyez, 3 Dec. 2017, www.oyez.org/cases/2014/14-556.

In Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that ss. 35(1) is “a solemn commitment that must be given meaningful content” the objective of which is to ensure that Aboriginal rights “are taken seriously.” Despite such a clear directive from the highest court, in Manitoba Métis Federation v. Canada [2007], MacInnes J. of the Queen’s Bench of Manitoba seemed incapable of taking seriously the Aboriginal title of the Métis under s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, and in no way thought of its explicit recognition as ‘a solemn commitment that must be given meaningful content’. For his part, if Scott C.J. of the Manitoba Court of Appeal was able to find a ‘cognizable Aboriginal interest’ in the expression ‘Indian title’, and thereby recognize to some extent Métis Aboriginal rights, he seemed incapable of conceiving such interests as title. This thesis is basically an attempt to ‘take seriously’ the common law Aboriginal title of the Métis. In order to do so, it first looks at the treatment of the concept of Indian title and the Royal Proclamation, 1763, in the lower courts throughout the infamous St. Catharine’s Milling and Lumber case. Subsequently, the existing common law doctrines of inherent Métis rights, those of the derivative rights doctrine, the empty box doctrine and the distinct Aboriginal people doctrine are all found to be inadequate to the task of providing cogency to the ‘constitutional imperative’ that was evoked in Powley. A fourth doctrine is therefore proposed, that of a Métis Autochthonous or Indigenous rights doctrine. In light of this, it is argued that the recognition of the ‘Indian’ title in s. 31 was not a mere ‘political expediency’ but is rooted in the underlying constitutional principle of the protection of minorities. Furthermore, insofar as the ‘Indian’ title of the Métis is taken seriously, it can be seen as having been extinguished through the federal power over ‘lands reserved for Indians’ under ss. 91(24). The legal implication is that they were, in the logic of the times, basically enfranchised ‘Indians’. Finally, by applying the grid established in Sioui for determining the existence of a ‘treaty’, it is argued that s. 31 is a ‘treaty’ or land claims settlement within the meaning of s. 35.

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This study aims to investigate the field where law, sexuality and disability meet, with a particular focus on constitutional law. Through the use of comparative law and an interdisciplinary approach, the study will try to understand whether the law might have a role in overcoming social barriers affecting people with disabilities in the sphere of sexuality, and which are the criteria the State should follow when intervening in this complex field. Drawing on different notions of disability, we will sketch how law itself is slowly enacting a paradigm shift in disability law, while leaving outside some of the ultimate inquiries elaborated by disability theorists. It is the case of the issue of sexuality, which still remains a "silenced discourse" both on the international and domestic level. In spite of its relevant legal implications (e.g. forced sterilization and legal denial of sexual agency) and recent efforts to secure its negative aspects, the right to sexuality for people with disabilities has not been the object of positive measures, with few exceptions (e.g. Denmark). One of the most debated instruments in this field is currently sexual assistance: a controversial praxis, even in its definition and boundaries. It was observed, both at the domestic level and by comparative analysis, that the legal status and the factual development of this tool is strictly linked to the regulation on sex working. An alternative solution, namely framing sexual assistance as a form of personal assistance in Italy, will be theorized. Sexual assistance, however, is condemned to be ineffective if not surrounded by other tools (such as inclusive sexual education, sexual counselling etc.) aimed at fostering self-determination in the sexual sphere for people with disabilities. These policies need to be developed down the constitutional path already traced by the jurisprudence, starting from the experience and questions of people with disabilities and using flexible sources of law rather than hard law. In this way law could contribute to the social change needed to dismantle social barriers and discrimination experienced by people with disabilities in the field of sexuality and grant them full participation in all areas of life

No / The Law Express series is designed to assist students in effective exam revision by guiding users in understanding the basic concepts, the recall and application of key legislation in the exam environment.

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AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Volumes I and II, combines cases, decisions, and authorial commentary to maximize your learning and understanding in this course. These comprehensive volumes cover the entire range of topics in constitutional law. Volume I examines the institutional aspects of constitutional law; Volume II deals with civil rights and liberties. Each of the chapters includes an introductory essay providing the legal, historical, political, and cultural context of Supreme Court jurisprudence in a particular area of constitutional interpretation. Each chapter also contains several boxed features (labeled "Case in Point" and "Sidebar") to provide additional perspective and context for the set of edited decisions from the United States Supreme Court cases that follow. In selecting, editing, and updating the materials, the authors emphasize recent trends in major areas of constitutional interpretation, as well as many landmark decisions, some of which retain importance as precedents while others illustrate the transient nature of constitutional interpretation. Because the book provides a good balance of decisions and authorial commentary, this text appeals to instructors of law as well as instructors of political science. / https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1021/thumbnail.jpg

Thesis (LL. M)--York University, 2002. / "Graduate Programme in Law." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-168). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pMQ75397.