Thesis (M. Arch and M.C.P.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Architecture, 1978. / Bibliography: leaves 134-137. / by Julie A. Moir. / M.Arch and M.C.P.

This project will investigate how daily encounters with digital technologies and the sense of rapid comprehension that they require can be used to make tactile and contemplative visual artwork. Completed over 3 years, studio work will be undertaken with the goal of making art that engages with a physical experience of time in terms of the range of technologically complex and disembodied ways of communicating today.

Some comparative studies of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas put emphasis on the similarities between Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics. In this study, however, I have attempted to show a salient difference; a respect in which Thomas's system cannot accommodate certain Aristotelian tenets. I have argued that, although Thomas tries to incorporate Aristotle's account of intellection, he cannot consistently do so. For an integration of this sort entails that the created intellect is identical with God when it contemplates him. This, however, is a conclusion that would rightly be rejected as metaphysically implausible in Thomas's system. Aristotle's view of intellection entails that the intellect is identical with whatever it contemplates when that object possesses no matter. For, intellection, which is itself immaterial, assumes the form of whatever it contemplates, and furthermore, matter is what individuates distinct entities that share the same form. If all this is so, then the human intellect becomes identical with Aristotle's god when it contemplates him. In Aristotle's system, this would not present any problems, for a very interesting reason: Aristotle, on an interpretation of his thought that seems textually plausible, teaches that part of the human mind is identical with divine intellect, or nous; that this part is "implanted" in the human being "from outside" and is the most divine part?and so, part of the human being can rightly be said to be eternal.1 Thomas, however, in accordance with Christian doctrine, holds that the human intellect has its own created identity, and differs numerically from person to person. But Thomas's adoption of prominent theses from Aristotle's account of intellection unfortunately entails that the human intellect, in contemplatio, becomes identical with God, since God is immaterial and identical with his essence. After looking at some possible solutions, I argue that this is not a desirable outcome in Thomas's Christian metaphysic, for several good reasons.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Ashland Theological Seminary, 2008. / Abstract . Description based on microfiche version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 201-204).

This dissertation explores Aristotle's concept of human flourishing, or eudaimonia, through the lens of the flourishing self. Connections will be made with Heidegger's concept of authenticity, as seen through the lens of authentic selfhood. It is argued that there is some type of authenticity or self-appropriation already present in Aristotle's ethical thought. For both thinkers, however, the particularized self is subsumed into a type of universality--the universality of excellence or care. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts / Philosophy / PhD / Dissertation

Thesis (M.A.)--St. John's College, 1975. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-64).

Thesis (Ed. D.)--University of Toronto, 2004. / Adviser: John (Jack) Miller.

Project report (D. Min.)--George W. Truett Theological Seminary, Baylor University, 2006. / Abstract. Abstract subtitle: a ministry of introducing monastic spirituality to the working life of a Baptist church staff. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-91).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Ashland Theological Seminary, 2008. / Abstract . Includes bibliographical references (leaves 201-204).

Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät I--Zürich--Universität, 1991. / Bibliogr. p. 249-275.