This paper examines the effect of the mandatory adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on transparency for investors by measuring the increase in earnings management during the post-adoption period of IFRS. One sign of earnings management is current year earnings being only slightly higher than the previous year’s earnings. An increase in earnings management means a decrease in accounting quality and a decrease of transparency for investors. By comparing firms that mandatorily adopted IFRS to similar benchmark firms in terms of strength of legal enforcement, book-to-market ratios, market values and net incomes, I am able to run empirical regressions examining variables of growth, equity issuance, leverage, debt issuance, turnover, size, cash flow, and time period in order to determine the effect of the adoption on IFRS on earnings growth. After looking at 516 firms from 20 countries for the years of 2002-2007, I conclude that IFRS is decreasing financial reporting quality and decreasing transparency for the investing public, and therefore is not accomplishing its goal of bringing efficiency, accountability, and transparency to global financial markets.

This study investigates two variables, number of investors and an intangible assets/revenue ratio, that are potential industry-specific predictors of deal failure in technology M&A. I document that number of investors has a significant ability to predict deal failure in all M&A transactions: an increase in number of investors decreases deal failure rates. However, I find that neither variable is able to significantly predict deal failure differently for transactions involving technology targets and those involving non-technology targets. Broadly, my findings suggest that technology M&A and non-technology M&A may share more similarities than previously expected in the ultimate goal of properly evaluating them.

This paper utilizes a hazard model to predict the probability of leveraged buyout transactions for public firms. Rather than testing specific hypotheses, this paper incorporates all plausible predictors identified in existing literature to better delineate the effects of different characteristics. Largely confirming past results, I find that LBO transactions are more likely to occur for companies with more stable cash flows, less market visibility, lower market valuation, lower ownership concentration and lower costs of financial distress. By including LBO transactions from 1980 to September 2018, I find preliminary evidence that since the financial crisis of 2008 – 2009, private equity firms have modified their selection criteria when sourcing LBO deal targets.

This paper explores private investments in public equity (PIPE) deals as a means of alternative firm financing. Poorly performing companies often look towards PIPEs to quickly raise capital when traditional means of financing are limited. This study provides an analysis on both the discount and premia that PIPEs are issued at, as well as the performance of firms after the deal announcement. Overall, this study finds that successful PIPEs from the investor’s perspective are issued at a discount of close to 17%, and unsuccessful PIPEs are issued at an average of a 15% premium. I find substantial cumulative abnormal returns of 9% over a three-day period due to positive information shocks. Overall, this thesis corroborates past research in the field.

This study analyzes the impact of merger and acquisition financing method on buyer cumulative abnormal returns. The model builds on findings in previous literature by including deal structure variables, company variables, industry variables, time variables, and post-acquisition announcement return data from 2000 to 2018. The analysis does not find a statistically significant relationship between cash plus debt/stock financing and cumulative abnormal returns. However, significant coefficients for buyer and target industry suggest that deal structure varies and ultimately effects cumulative abnormal returns within specific industries. Additionally, significant results for buyer profitability and time variables provide insight on how the financial market interprets synergy realization and economic crises in relation to security valuation and the mergers and acquisitions market.

Historically, merger and acquisition (or M&A) activity has occurred in cyclical patterns, forming what are known as “merger waves.” To date, there have been a total of seven waves. Though it is widely acknowledged that merger waves exist, there is no consensus on what drives these waves. Through both qualitative and quantitative analysis, this paper aims to determine the causes of merger waves and looks at those causes through two different lenses: the neoclassical view, which states that economic shocks cause merger waves, and the behavioral view, which states that increases in merger activity are due to managerial behavior and decisions. By analyzing the economic, political, and technological landscapes as well as valuation and interest rate data during periods of intense merger activity, I conclude that neoclassical theories are stronger in explaining the first three waves, whereas behavioral theories are stronger in explaining the last three waves.

This dissertation examines the impact of regulation and public policies on firm performance. Chapter 1, entitled “Political Contributions, Insider Trading, and CEO Compensation”, determines why CEOs from politically-connected firms receive higher pay compared to their non-politically connected peers. We investigate whether insider trading can explain high CEO pay. Using hand-collected firm-level lobbying data, we examine whether politically-connected CEOs engage in insider trading after sponsored bills are introduced and passed in the U.S. legislative bodies. Our results show that politically-connected CEOs commit insider trading, which yields higher compensation packages. In addition, we also find that lobbying benefits firm performance. Politically-connected firms receive more government contracts, which increases firm value. Overall, political contributions benefit both CEOs and shareholders. Chapter 2, entitled “The Impact of Incarceration on Firm Performance” conducts analyses on the impact of incarceration on firms based in the United States. Through time series Granger Causality Vector Autoregression (VAR) tests by state, we find that incarceration can influence labor markets measured by the state’s unemployment rate. We find that firms based in states with high incarceration underperform compared to firms based in states with low incarceration. This also holds true when examining prison reform data from the Pew Charitable Trust. Through differences in differences tests, we find that firms based in states with prison reform outperform firms based in states without prison reform. When controlling for firm and state macroeconomic factors, we find that increases in incarceration rates have a negative effect on firm performance.

A debate exists regarding the effect of labor protection laws on labor costs. Whether labor protection laws increase or decrease labor costs has implications for risk exposure of affected firms. If the labor costs go up, all else the same, the firm’s breakeven point goes up. Facing increased business risk, the firm must resort to strategies that inhibit the risk exposure, especially if the higher labor costs cannot be transferred, without adverse consequences, to consumers. The strategies include reigning in, if at all possible, operating leverage and financial leverage. Conversely, if the labor costs decrease, a firm’s business risk declines, and the firm has options to increase its operating leverage and/or financial leverage, lower the product price, or do nothing. By examining the Chinese firms’ reactions to the 2007 labor protection laws, we draw conclusions about laws’ directional impact on labor costs. We find that Chinese firms attempt to reduce business risk by lessening labor intensity, and labor-intensive firms are able to reduce the labor intensity at a significantly higher rate than capital-intensive firms. Neither group is able to significantly reduce asset tangibility. We also find that all firms significantly reduce their financial leverages. Consequently, firms’ investments, as measured by sales growth, decline in the post-reform period. These results are consistent with the cost of labor increasing as a result of the stricter labor protection laws.

The first chapter evaluates the zero-leverage effect on firms' financial constraints. Moreover, using investment- and cash-to-cash-flow sensitivities as financial constraint indicators, the results suggest that unleveraged firms are expected to face lower constraints relative to leveraged firms. Lastly, the results indicate that the zero-leverage effect on firms’ financial constraints is more likely stronger for smaller firms, zero-dividend firms, firms with lower proportions of tangible assets, and growth firms. The second chapter develops a new quantitative measure that reflects the extent to which a firm complies to Shariah relative to the other firms located in a certain region at a certain time. This measure can be customized to be consistent with each investor’s objectives, constraints, and beliefs. We argue that the use of this measure is preferable to the existing use of ratio thresholds for the following two reasons. First, it is more Shariah-appropriate because it provides the Shariah-compliant investor with a clear understanding of the relative compliance status of each firm he wishes to invest in. Second, it can be incorporated into any portfolio optimization model to create a balance between improving Shariah compliance and not compromising investment returns.

This dissertation examines the effects that intangible capital and diversity reputation have on firm performance. In Chapter 1, entitled “CEO Overconfidence and Intangible Corporate Investments,” we extend the corporate investment and CEO overconfidence literature by examining how CEO overconfidence affects investment-cashflow sensitivity using a new measure of Tobin’s q and cashflow. Specifically, we incorporate intangible capital, which neo-classical investment theory mostly ignores, in the empirical analysis. We develop three overconfidence measures and their interaction with the respective standard and new cashflow settings to capture the investment-cashflow sensitivity effect of CEO overconfidence. We use three investment measures (physical, intangible, and total investments) and find that the effect of managerial overconfidence on investment-cashflow sensitivity is more prominent for corporate intangible investments than physical investments. Moreover, our results show that the standard measure of physical capital weakly explains the intangible investment-cashflow density. Our study offers useful insights in that it explains the reason why investment-cashflow sensitivity has been weaker in recent years. We also show that investment-cashflow sensitivity is stronger when intangible capital is incorporated into the analysis. Chapter 2 is entitled “Diversity Reputation and Firm Performance.” The modern American workplace is a microcosm of modern American society. The increasing diversity of the American workforce has made the increasing diversity of the American workplace a necessity. We explore the impact of diversity reputation on firm performance. We measure a firm’s diversity reputation by its inclusion in DiversityInc’s list of Top 50 Companies for Diversity. We measure firm performance by various accounting measures (return on assets, return on investment, and return on sales) as well as one market-based measure, Tobin’s Q. We find that firms that have a better diversity reputation outperform firms that do not.