This dissertation examines two issues in the theory of banking: the role and efficiency of a monopoly bank in a spatial economy and, the design of a deposit insurance contract. Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis present the development and analysis of a simple production economy with two types of agents. Lenders have an endowment of one unit of a good that may be consumed or invested in a firm. Firms have access to a project but lack the capital necessary to operate it and thus are forced to borrow: firms' projects are identically independently distributed crosssectionally. A simple information asymmetry prevents efficient contracting by lenders and firms and results in deadweight default costs being incurred. One way these deadweight costs could be avoided is to establish a "delegated monitor"—a bank—who collects deposits from the lenders and makes loans to firms. This may result in an efficiency gain since the firms' projects are Ltd. so, as the bank makes more loans, the probability that it defaults will be lower than the probability that an individual firm defaults. This diversification reduces the probability that the bank will fail and the probability that default costs are incurred. However, I assume that these costs are related to distance. This restricts the bank's ability to diversify and may induce costly strategic behavior on the part of the bank. The bank may also lend 'locally' in that it may attract deposits in a region yet not make loans to firms near those depositors. The social welfare implications of this bank are examined in Chapter 3. The results show that the socially optimal outcome is one that restricts the firms' ability to compete with the bank in the debt market and that credit rationing may also be efficient. Chapter 4 examines a model where a deposit insurance scheme is designed by a regulator whose objective is to maximize social welfare. There is a single bank in the economy which can be one of two types: the true type is unknown to the regulator. The results show that the regulator's efficacy is improved when regular insurance premia are combined with a premia that are refunded to solvent banks—akin to a deposit insurance fund.

This dissertation examines two issues in the theory of banking: the role and efficiency of a monopoly bank in a spatial economy and, the design of a deposit insurance contract. Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis present the development and analysis of a simple production economy with two types of agents. Lenders have an endowment of one unit of a good that may be consumed or invested in a firm. Firms have access to a project but lack the capital necessary to operate it and thus are forced to borrow: firms' projects are identically independently distributed crosssectionally. A simple information asymmetry prevents efficient contracting by lenders and firms and results in deadweight default costs being incurred. One way these deadweight costs could be avoided is to establish a "delegated monitor"—a bank—who collects deposits from the lenders and makes loans to firms. This may result in an efficiency gain since the firms' projects are Ltd. so, as the bank makes more loans, the probability that it defaults will be lower than the probability that an individual firm defaults. This diversification reduces the probability that the bank will fail and the probability that default costs are incurred. However, I assume that these costs are related to distance. This restricts the bank's ability to diversify and may induce costly strategic behavior on the part of the bank. The bank may also lend 'locally' in that it may attract deposits in a region yet not make loans to firms near those depositors. The social welfare implications of this bank are examined in Chapter 3. The results show that the socially optimal outcome is one that restricts the firms' ability to compete with the bank in the debt market and that credit rationing may also be efficient. Chapter 4 examines a model where a deposit insurance scheme is designed by a regulator whose objective is to maximize social welfare. There is a single bank in the economy which can be one of two types: the true type is unknown to the regulator. The results show that the regulator's efficacy is improved when regular insurance premia are combined with a premia that are refunded to solvent banks—akin to a deposit insurance fund. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 128-133).

This paper empirically estimates the impact of the deposit insurance coverage changes on deposit levels and growth. The analysis is based on a Canadian dataset from a variety of sources. It covers quarterly data on deposits by province and by type of banking institution over the period of 1997-2011. During this period there were eight deposit insurance coverage changes. I employ a triple difference in difference estimation strategy to take advantage of changes in coverage levels between and within provinces. I find that in a year following a provincial regulator increases the deposit insurance coverage level to unlimited, credit unions in that province experience higher deposit levels than chartered banks in that province, and credit unions in provinces with lower deposit insurance coverage limits. I also find that during the 2008 financial crisis, credit unions in provinces with unlimited coverage had higher deposit levels. / Graduate

This thesis empirically investigates the bank runs probability cases over the period 2005-2011 on Russian banking market and, simultaneously, tests the hypothesis of influence of bank-fundamental factors and macroeconomic conditions on the decision of depositors to withdraw their funds from banks. Methodologically, was conducted a logit econometric model to test our assumptions. We find evidence on both bank- fundamentals, such as high debt ratio, rising real interest rates, small asset size, and macroeconomic conditions, such as high inflation, and sharp increases in the real exchange rates, to influence on bank runs. In addition, the thesis analyzes the significance of deposit insurance implementation in avoiding bank runs. Moreover, we compare if the newly adopted deposit insurance diminished the credibility of the depositors in the state-controlled banks compared with private banks, thus, increasing the amount of investments to private banks. Finally, based on our approach, the method identifies a run on Russian deposit market during quarter four of 2008 year; however we would not characterize it as a severe run because it did not touch all banks but more as a partial one (approx. 1/3 of banks from the system were affected).

This dissertation studies empirical corporate finance problems of regulations and monitoring. The dissertation is composed of three chapters. First, I study how firms deal with business regulations that limit their operations. In the first chapter I exploit a natural experiment in Argentina to show that the ownership structure of a firm affects its degree of compliance with regulations, with publicly listed firms complying more than privately held ones. In 2012 the Argentine government banned companies from transferring funds abroad from their domestic operations. Despite this limitation, companies trying to repatriate capital could still overprice products they import from their headquarters or affiliates. I find that after the regulation, private firms overprice imports by almost 10% and manage to repatriate up to 46% of the profits that would have otherwise remained locked in at the Argentine subsidiary. Listed companies do not exploit this mechanism, showing that listing status affects compliance. The second chapter studies whether the differential cost imposed on listed firms operating in emerging markets by these higher compliance rates is significant. The main empirical challenge is that the cost is firm-time-regulation specific, and, for that reason, it is empirically unfeasible to measure it. I take an alternative route and show that changes in the levels of market regulations impose compliance costs of such magnitude that they shape the patterns of M&A transactions. First, I show that after the regulation studied in Chapter 1, private firms acquired listed ones at an extraordinary pace, while listed firms stopped acquiring private ones. This evidence suggests that the regulation increased the cost of being public. Then, I show that this finding is not specific to the Argentine market but is common across emerging markets. I do so by analyzing the response of M&A transactions to changes in the regulatory intensity of each country. Finally, the third chapter, co-authored with Matthieu Chavaz, studies the effect of deposit insurance on market discipline in a close-to-ideal setting. We exploit the political relationship between the United Kingdom and its Crown Dependencies and use a novel dataset to test this effect. Tracking the price paid for thousands of deposit products between 2007 and 2015, we find that deposit insurance deters discipline. In addition, we provide the first direct test of the interaction between depositors’ attention, deposit insurance, and market discipline. We show that when attention increases, risky banks offer higher rates both to insured and uninsured depositors, but that the effect is stronger for uninsured depositors. These results suggest that discipline is imposed even in the presence of deposit insurance, but only when information becomes salient.

ABSTRACT Deposit Insurance: Is it good for the development of Financial Markets? BY Kaysia Therese Campbell April 25, 2006 Committee Chair: Dr. Stephen Smith and Dr. James Owers Major Department: Finance The literature on deposit insurance has focused primarily on the role it plays in promoting banking sector stability and growth, while little attention has been placed on its possible effect on the development of other markets. Failure to examine the impact of deposit insurance on other markets could lead to premature conclusions about the full effect it has on total financial market development and, in turn, economic growth. Using panel data and cross sectional averages on 96 countries covering the time period 1975 – 2004 to distinguish between short run and long run effects, and including a host of controls, I find evidence that deposit insurance is associated with greater long run, total financial market development, as measured by the size and activity of banks, equity markets, bond markets and non-bank financial intermediaries. This indicates that it is able to accelerate banking sector development without necessarily retarding the development of other markets so that overall financial market development is improved. It is important to note that this is primarily evident for countries with a strong legal and contracting environment. The results also suggest that the immediate impact of deposit insurance is greatest for middle income economies but over time there is no clear evidence that this persists. Using design features thought to contribute to the generosity and ability of the scheme to curb moral hazard and provide a credible guarantee, I construct two indices to summarize the various design features and examine their impact on financial market development. I find that countries adopting more credible schemes appear to have smaller and less active markets over time. However the results also indicate that more credible and generous design features are better able to promote total market activity in the long run. The hopeful conclusion to be made from this study is that the positive influence of deposit insurance on the banking sector is translated into the entire financial market system over time and may be irrespective of a country’s particular stage of economic development.

The aim of this thesis is to compare DGS European Union member states before the unification of law and analyze the current situation and developments in this area in the European Union with a more detailed focus on the Czech Republic. Another objective is to evaluate the significance of the Deposit Insurance Fund in the Czech Republic and its ability to meet its obligations. At first are given the fundamental characteristics of the elements of context and parameters of deposit insurance. Then it is made a legal analysis of important directives on deposit insurance, which determine the current situation and developments in this area in the European Union. On the basis of events caused by the financial crisis, a single fixed level of insurance coverage had been introduced in the European Union. The thesis contains a comparison of deposit insurance systems of the Member States prior to the unification of this law. Attention is paid to deposit insurance in the Czech Republic. A determined importance of the Deposit Insurance Fund and the characteristics of its activity are also described. Finally, the thesis contains an example describing the Deposit Insurance Fund meeting its commitments to Volksbank CZ, illustrated by the situation where this bank is unable to meet its obligations to beneficiaries.

In late 2003 after two financial crises and many years of deliberation, the Russian Government introduced a deposit insurance scheme (DIS) aimed primarily at protecting the savings of the population. The DIS's stated objectives were to protect the right and legal interests of depositors, to strengthen public confidence in the banking system, and to encourage household savings. Recent official assessments of the scheme have been, at best, partial, have tended to use government statistics and have failed to establish a link between the banking sector outputs and the impact of the DIS. This thesis undertakes a detailed evaluation of the Russian DIS based on a comprehensive analysis of vast literature on deposit insurance schemes globally covering rationales for its establishment and its main features, as well as of the relevant Russian legislation and past attempts at evaluating the Russian DIS which were somewhat patchy. Adopting a cross-sectional, mixed methods approach, the study reports on the findings that emerged from a combination of surveys, interviews and observations conducted at six participating Russian banks in spring 2009. These were supplemented by documentary evidence from the banks and the Russian Deposit Insurance Agency. To facilitate the analysis and interpretation of the data, a theoretical framework was devised, and included a set of success criteria and impact indicators. The results of the analysis indicate that the Russian DIS does not appear to have fully achieved its stated objectives. Irrefutably, the Russian Government failed to establish an effective institutional and regulatory environment which could have enforced uniform provision of information about the DIS to retail depositors. This is evidenced by visible differences among bank practices in relation to the implementation of the DIS. Consequently, as a result of these variations in implementation, the retail depositors’ understanding of the DIS and its perceived impact differs depending on which bank they patronise. This research provides a number of original theoretical, empirical, analytical and methodological contributions

Our country, the same type of deposit applies the same interest rate. The reserve ratio in the world has gradually been reduced even adjusted to zero. Because of the control policy increases in bank operating costs, and impact the efficiency of resource allocationa. The competent national authorities still see the control policy as the main monetary policy. Domestic banks under this system face a very high control costs. Presently our country is still unable to adopt "zero" reserve, so this study consider existing banking supervision system to develop a "Risk-Based Deposit System" for existing national reserve system.The concept of risk stratification derives from deposit insurance, using the capital adequacy ratio, banks integrated risk rating score and the financial leverage ratio. Each Bank based on their respective level of risk to employ different deposit reserve ratio. "Risk-Based Deposit System" can make the banking sector to spontaneously reduce their own business risk in order to meet the lower deposit reserve ratio of the risk criteria. Therefore, it will help banking sector to reduce regulatory burden, and assist banks in Taiwan to follow Basel III to strengthen its competitiveness and meet the world trend.