Law Faculty Charles University in Prague DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCIAL LAW Regulation of the Investor Compensation Scheme in the Legal System of the Czech Republic Abstract of the dissertation Dissertation Supervisor: doc. JUDr. Ivana Štenglová Author: JUDr. Libor Němec April 2012 This dissertation deals with the Czech legal regulation of the investor compensation schemes. The investor compensation schemes are special compensation mechanisms financed by investment firms (securities broker dealers) whose main purpose is a protection of retail investors, customers of securities brokers dealers, against a default of securities broker dealers (investment firms) resulting in their inability to meet their obligations against their clients and to return to the clients their assets which were entrusted to these firms in connection with investment business. In the case of such failure the compensation schemes will compensate the loss to the clients (in a specified amount and under given conditions). The investor compensation schemes therefore substantially strengthen the confidence of investors in the capital market which is absolutely necessary not only for their smooth operation but also for the smooth operation of the whole economy. Regarding the importance of investor compensation schemes for preservation of the...

本研究結果的重點如下：一、各樣本金融機構經由模型計算出的費率差異 頗大，顯示財務結構的不同，確實應課收不同保費。而現行的單一費率對 於好壞金融機構收取的費率一視同仁無法反應金融機構其經營風險的差異 ，也就無法避免低風險金融機構補貼高風險金融機構的弊病。因此應實施 差別費率較為合理。二、根據研究結果顯示，若以金融機構性質為分類， 其費率估計負擔由低至高依序為：一般民營銀行、國家行局、省市屬行庫 、民營中小企業銀行、信託投資公司、外商銀行、信用合作社、漁會信用 部、農會信用部。而此法的一大優點在於可對個別機構評估其相對風險性 的高低，即可依各自經營情況、組織結構分別評估其風險，以達精算上的 合理性。三、由各家樣本金融機構應負擔之估計存保費率可知，只要金融 機構資產結構稍有不同，便會使存保公司的負擔不同。換言之，因金融機 構體質的互異，其為存保公司所帶來的承保風險也有別，為避免資源配置 不當的缺失，實施以個別金融機構風險為基礎的差別費率是較公平、合理 的方式。四、承保比率亦是影響費率估計的一項因素，由實證可知承保比 率對費率估計有顯著的影響。即承保比率高的金融機構，其估計費率與全 部承保時的差異較小；承保比率低者，其估計費率與全部承保時的差異較 大。

銀行恐慌現象的探討一直都廣受研究金融危機與系統性風險等領域的經濟學者所青睞，而銀行擠兌潮更經常被視為導致銀行恐慌的主因之一。由於金融全球化已是時勢所趨，因此金融危機的蔓延更加受到學術界重視。Allen and Gale (2000)建構出不同型態的銀行同業拆借市場(Interbank market)，並以此為基礎進一步探討在最佳風險分攤的前提之下，銀行與消費者如何決定其投資與消費的最佳資源配置。 本文的基本架構係基於Allen and Gale (2000)所提出的經濟模型，配合存款保險制度的導入，嘗試驗證他們所提出的最佳資源配置是否仍然成立。而本文的結果證實政府實施存款保險制度，銀行與消費者仍然可以得到他們在投資與消費的最佳配置，即使在完美與不完美的銀行同業拆借市場，其結果仍然成立。另外本文也嘗試對存款保險制度是否能有效預防銀行恐慌與其蔓延作出驗證。其結果證實提高存款保險稅率後，銀行擠兌潮的發生需要較高的不可預期流動性需求。換言之，存款保險制度有效提高了銀行倒閉門檻。而對於預防透過銀行同業拆借市場所衍生的金融危機蔓延，存款保險制度的有效性也在本文中獲得證實。 然而存款保險制度並非具絕對優勢，過多則損害消費者的預期效用。因此本文將銀行倒閉風險機率納入模型，利用軟體模擬消費者預期效用極大化條件下的最適存款保險稅率。並且進一步證實，長期資產到期日清算與到期前清算，其兩者報酬率之間的利差愈大，存款保險最適稅率須同步增加，才能使消費者效用最大。另外我們也證實存款保險制度能夠提高社會福利水準與降低銀行倒閉風險。 / Bank panic serves as a favored subject for economists who engage in researches of financial crisis and systematic risk. Because financial liberalization and globaliza-tion have been inevitable, economic scholars have regarded financial contagion. Allen and Gale (2000) established different interbank market structures to achieve the first-best allocation of banks’ investment portfolio and depositors’ consumptions. In this paper, we try to confirm Allen and Gale’s first-best allocation when the deposit insurance is implemented, and we obtain the same consequence as well. Be-sides, we also approve that occurrence of a bank run must accompany by a high level of unexpected liquidity shock if the deposit insurance exists. In other words, it raises the threshold of bankruptcy. Therefore, the deposit insurance is feasible to avert bank panic. With regard to the contagion effect, the deposit insurance undoubtedly de-creases its negative influence because financial interdependence between different financial sectors will be attenuated by imposing a deposit-insurance tax on depositors. The deposit insurance, however, is not constantly superior due to the depositors’ loss in consuming utility. We achieve the optimal deposit-insurance tax rate by intro-ducing probability of bank’s bankruptcy, and find that the optimal tax rate may be raised, so as to boost consumers’ utility if return spread between early and late with-drawn long assets keeps higher. We also testify that the deposit insurance can enhance the social welfare and decrease the incidence of bankruptcy.

Abstract This dissertation explores two interrelated aspects of banking crises and bank regulations in perspective of regulator¡¦s soft budget constraints (SBCs in brief) and bank top management compensation. First, this paper models, in a game of incomplete information, bank behavior during banking crises when asymmetric information exists between regulators and banks. Here, I show that the situation creates the incentives for banks to roll over their defaulting loans to disguise their financial statements. Although a prudential regulator may mitigate this incentive by offering a ¡§slack¡¨ rescue packages, the bank¡¦s reputational concern may cause them to reject rescue offers. In this instance, regulators may be forced to offer amounts of recapitalization that will meet the amount necessary to restore banks to solvency. Otherwise, banks may have to gamble for resurrection, or wait until the banking crises become severe, and then more banks become insolvent, regulators have to offer optimal rescue packages subject to SBCs. New findings include (1) During banking crises, the optimal regulatory policies, on the one hand, may cause regulators have to offer rescue or bailout packages subject to different SBCs, on the other hand, mitigate banker¡¦s moral hazard. The more severe the crises will be, the greater soft budget constrained to regulators. (2) The potential severity of banking crises can be measured by the ratios, getting from net worth over the total amount of recapitalization offered by regulators and recovered from nonperforming loans. (3) As banking crises become severe, the cost of rescue becomes larger than that of bailout, the best regulatory policy is to intervene; On the contrary, if a situation labeled ¡§ too-many-to-fail¡¨ arises, the regulators may offer to rescue distressed banks subject to SBC. (4)As Bayesian equilibrium cost of regulator in crises is increasing, a random creative ambiguity for regulators to offer bailout or rescue plans may be the optimal policy to mitigate the expectation of SBC for banks . Second, this paper also shows that in the circumstances of universal banking or bank holding company, concentrating bank regulation on bank capital ratios and risk-based deposit insurance may be ineffective in controlling banker¡¦s risk-taking and moral hazard. Here, this paper follows, a more direct mechanism of influencing bank risk-taking incentives, in which the insurance premium scheme incorporate features of top management compensation. In a model of universal banking with two-periods and three-subsidiaries or departments, bank owner pre-commits to regulators to pick an optimal management compensation structure that induces the first-best value-maximizing investment choices by a bank¡¦s management. Findings include (1) If insurance premium is not fairly priced, the incentives are created for banks to have a ¡§regulatory arbitrage¡¨ by segregating its nonperforming assets from the investment bank, and shift it to the commercial bank, that increases the deposit-insurer an additional risk liability, and aggravates the risk-shifting within the universal bank; and vice versa. (2) Given management contracts{ fixed salary, a bonus paid, a fraction of equity of the bank} and { fixed salary, a penalty , a fraction of equity}for bank and security investment department respectively ; and a capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome , here bonus paid larger than 0, a penalty larger than 0, a fraction of equity between 0 and 1, then the investment policies implemented by managers, is less risky than when manger¡¦s interests are fully aligned with the equity interests. (3) Given a fairly priced insurance premium, and capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome, then the optimal management compensation structure can internalize the cost of moral hazard and induce the Pareto-optimal and department-equilibrium investment policies, thus mitigate moral hazard under universal banking. Finally, the state-owned and half-state-owned banks have experienced the institution-induced ineffectiveness; and the latter suffer from poor business performance level, partially because of the issues of ownership structure. This paper shows the investment policy with moral hazard under these banks incorporated with optimal compensation structures, and given capitalization level corresponding must exceed the lower risky investment outcome, then the optimal policies induced, that will improve their business performance level. This paper also shows that as the controlling shareholders have power over banks in excess of their cash flow rights, the incentives will be created for them to expropriate the minority shareholders. And, when the incentives for expropriation exists, the investment policy will be distorted with the managerial bias induced by their private benefits, and deteriorate morale of the banks. The regulatory mandatory requirements of one-share-one-vote principle may be proposed, instead.

The thesis studies the impact of European banking regulatory reforms on the stability of Central and Eastern European countries after the financial crisis with the annual data from Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia from 2009 to 2019. The thesis reaches several conclusions. Firstly, increasing minimum Tier 1 capital adequacy ratio through CRR/CRD IV did not significantly promote the bank stability in sample countries. However, total capital adequacy ratio is found to have positive and significant association with overall insolvency risk. Secondly, relaxing restrictions would have negative impact on bank stability measured by bank z-score. Thirdly, countries that are more open on the regulation may have more stable banks, while tighter entry restrictions boost bank fragility. Fourthly, when only taking deposit insurance variables as explanatory variables, increasing the level of deposit insurance coverage may dampen the bank stability. However, when controlling other regulation and supervision indexes, the results do not show any significant effect of deposit insurance scheme on bank z-score. Lastly, the supervisory variables are not significantly associated with bank stability in sample countries.

Les banques sont des institutions à part, car elles sont au coeur du fonctionnement des économies et de la dynamique de croissance des pays. Leurs services représentent de ce fait un bien public, et il est donc primordial de les maintenir éloignées autant que possible du risque de faillite. Toutefois, des crises bancaires surviennent régulièrement et affectent les sociétés, souvent de manière durable et profonde, à l’image de la crise financière des subprimes qui a éclaté en 2007, et dont nous ne connaissons pas encore toutes les conséquences désastreuses. Pour prévenir le risque de faillite et de crises bancaires, les autorités de régulation nationales ont développé des filets de sécurité qui, en partie, suivent les standards internationaux de réglementation et de supervision bancaire développés par le Comité de Bâle sur le contrôle bancaire, sous l’égide de la Banque des Règlements Internationaux. Cependant, les crises récurrentes se produisent et nous montrent les limites de la régulation bancaire et, surtout, nous indiquent que celle-ci doit être en permanence revue et adaptée, de façon dynamique, à l’évolution des systèmes bancaires et de l’innovation financière. L’un des principaux objectifs est de s’assurer que les banques soient suffisamment et solidement capitalisées pour faire face à des pertes exceptionnelles inattendues. Par ailleurs, il est primordial, afin d’assurer une stabilité financière durable, que les superviseurs bancaires soient à même de contrôler efficacement les banques et d’entreprendre les actions nécessaires pour que ces dernières demeurent à des niveaux de risques engagés raisonnables et qui ne menacent ni leur solvabilité, ni celle de l’ensemble du système bancaire. Enfin, les banques sont censées être régulées par le marché (discipline de marché), sur la base des informations qu’elles sont tenues de divulguer publiquement, sur leur santé financière. Dans ces politiques de régulation bancaire et de prévention du risque de crise, il ne faut pas oublier le rôle de l’assureur dépôt, à qui certains économistes et instances internationales veulent prêter de plus en plus de pouvoir sur les banques. Nous montrons dans notre travail de thèse, à travers des analyses empiriques menées sur des données contemporaines, les insuffisances des politiques de régulation et de supervision bancaire, les erreurs commises dans l’approche de la régulation bancaire, et nous présentons les aspects qu’il serait souhaitable de prendre en compte, pour approcher une politique de réglementation et de supervision bancaire plus efficace, et dynamique, dans l’objectif de maintien de la stabilité bancaire. Nous avançons notamment qu’il est nécessaire de mieux prendre en compte la nature de l’activité des différents types d’institutions financières qui composent les systèmes bancaires, et dont la nature et le degré d’exposition aux risques ne sont pas les mêmes. Il est également important de considérer les caractéristiques de l’environnement institutionnel dans lequel évoluent les banques, de manière à développer une structure de supervision adaptée et efficace. En définitive, nous étudions dans cette thèse un large ensemble de déterminants économiques et institutionnels, susceptibles d’impacter la stabilité bancaire, de manière à identifier celles des politiques de régulation qu’il s’agirait de mettre en oeuvre, afin d’assurer dans l’avenir un meilleur maintien de la stabilité financière des banques. / Banks are special institutions because they are central to the functioning of economies and to economic growth. Their services represent a public good. Therefore, it is essential to keep them as far as possible from risk of bankruptcy. However, banking crises occur regularly and affect societies, often dramatically and over a long period, like the current subprime financial crisis which burst into 2007, and which consequences are still not very well perceived. To prevent the risk of bankruptcy and banking crisis, the national authorities of regulation have developed safety nets. These follow partially the international standards of regulation and banking supervision developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision under the aegis of the Bank for International Settlements. However, recurrent crises occur and show us the limits of the banking regulation and, especially, indicate that the latter should be continually revised and adapted to the evolution of banking systems and financial innovations. One of the main goals is to make sure that banks are enough capitalized to face unexpected large losses. In order to achieve long-lasting financial stability, it is essential that banking supervisors can monitor efficiently banks. By doing so, the risk taken by banks would be sustainable and would not threaten either their own solvency or the whole banking system solvency. Finally, banks are supposed to be regulated by the market (market discipline) on the basis of information about their financial health which should be disclosed publicly. Along the policies of banking regulation and crisis risk prevention, one should not forget the role of the deposit insurers. Indeed, some economists and international authorities want to attribute more power over banks to deposit insurers. In our research, the empirical analysis, based on contemporary data, show the weakness of the actual regulation and banking supervision policies and the mistakes in banking regulation. Different features of the banking system that should be taken into account for an efficient implementation of regulation and banking supervision policies are also discussed in this work. Hence, we suggest that the type of financial institutions' activities should be better taken into account as it changes with the degree of risk exposure. We also find that it is important to consider the characteristics of the institutional environment in which banks evolve in order to develop a suitable and efficient supervision agency. To summarize, we study in this thesis a large range of economic and institutional determinants of the banking system, which are likely to affect the banking stability. By doing so, we are able to identify the regulation policies which would be the most likely to preserve the financial stability of banks.

The diploma work is concerned with the topic of bank client security, as a consumer and an investor, captured in the Czech law, incorporating elements of EU directives. The thesis defines terms of "consumer" and "investor", explains why they are considered bank clients and introduces reasons of their protection. It describes elements of bank clients' protection such as: deposit insurance (including comparison of foreign systems - Switzerland and New Zealand), consumer credits rules, payment system and Bureau of Financial Arbiter, personal information security and bank secret. The last chapter addresses investor protection, falling under European directive MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive).

This project focused on developing the ideal Asset / Liability Model for credit unions with assets between one hundred million and five hundred million dollars. Ideally the model should be closely aligned with that of a successful credit union at the high end of this range. SELCO Community Credit Union of Eugene Oregon was used in creating the model.

Submitted by Fabiana Okamoto (fabianaokamoto@bancojbs.com.br) on 2011-09-19T14:58:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_v3_impressa_alterada.pdf: 783036 bytes, checksum: 8c60fbb3c75157e27ebb53b0a55a68c5 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2011-09-19T15:13:48Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_v3_impressa_alterada.pdf: 783036 bytes, checksum: 8c60fbb3c75157e27ebb53b0a55a68c5 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2011-09-19T15:13:59Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_v3_impressa_alterada.pdf: 783036 bytes, checksum: 8c60fbb3c75157e27ebb53b0a55a68c5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-09-19T15:18:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TESE_v3_impressa_alterada.pdf: 783036 bytes, checksum: 8c60fbb3c75157e27ebb53b0a55a68c5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-08-18 / This study aims at giving an overview on the issurance of Special-Guarantee Certificates of Deposit (DPGEs, for their acronym in Portuguese), which was created amid the 2008-09 financial crisis by Resolutions 3.692/09, 3.717/09 e 3.793/09 of the Brazilian National Monetary Council. These pieces of regulation authorized banks to issue deposits with a special guarantee of up to BRL 20 million per depositor, to be provided by the Brazilian Credit Guarantee Fund (Fundo Garantidor de Crédito – FGC). These measures aimed to restore liquidity to financial markets, creating improved conditions for banks to fund themselves and consequently reestablish credit supply. The data indicate that DPGE was capable of restoring bank liquidity to banks that experienced runs during late 2008, which increased the capacity of these banks to make loans. In addition, it is also part of the scope of this study to identify bank-specific characteristics that led banks to issue this type of certificate of deposit.. / O objetivo deste trabalho é apresentar um panorama sobre a emissão de Depósitos a Prazo com Garantias Especiais (DPGEs), que foi criado junto a diversas medidas implementadas em meados da crise financeira de 2008 – 2009, por meio das Resoluções 3.692/09, 3.717/09 e 3.793/09 do Conselho Monetário Nacional. Essa medidas autorizaram os bancos a captar depósito a prazo com garantia especial de R$ 20 milhões por depositante a ser proporcionada pelo FGC (Fundo Garantidor de Crédito). Essas Resoluções foram publicadas com o intuito de aumentar a liquidez nos mercados, criando melhores condições para que as instituições financeiras voltassem a captar recursos e conseqüentemente realizar operações de crédito. Os dados indicam que o DPGE restabeleceu a liquidez de bancos que sofreram com saques no final de 2008, e houve consequente aumento da capacidade desses bancos em voltar a fornecer crédito. Adicionalmente, faz parte do escopo do trabalho compreender quais as características dos bancos que emitiram esse tipo de passivo.

[pt] Esta tese é uma coleção de três ensaios empíricos em economia bancária no Brasil. O capítulo 1 mostra evidências que cidades governadas por prefeitos da base aliada do governo federal recebem mais crédito de bancos públicos federais. Utilizando uma base de dados longitudinal única que cruza informações de crédito em nível municipal com resultados eleitorais no período 1997-2008, eu exploro variações no alinhamento político de cada município ao longo do tempo para estimar seu impacto no montante de crédito. Como resultado, observo que os bancos públicos federais aumentam seus empréstimos em 10 por cento a mais em cidades alinhadas. Em resposta, os bancos privados restringem sua expansão de crédito nessas localidades, embora o efeito líquido seja de um aumento no crédito agregado para cidades alinhadas, deixando a questão de uma provável má alocação de capital entre cidades. Eu também utilizo outra base de dados de crédito única e ainda mais abrangente, disponível somente a partir de 2004, e emprego a metodologia de regressão com descontinuidade em disputas eleitorais apertadas para avaliar possíveis problemas de identificação. Em contraste com a literatura, eu observo que os resultados não são conduzidos por empréstimos direcionados, mas por operações de crédito livre. O capítulo 2 analisa firmas que contribuem para campanhas eleitorais de modo a testar a hipótese de favorecimento de crédito como retribuição a contribuição de campanha. Combinando dados de contribuição de campanha e informações de crédito ao nível da firma, eu exploro variações em uma mesma firma ao longo do tempo para testar se aquelas que contribuem para partidos da base aliada do governo federal recebem mais crédito de bancos públicos federais. Os resultados indicam que contribuintes de campanha de partidos da base aliada têm maior proporção de seu crédito oriundo de bancos públicos federais e tomam de uma maneira geral 20 por cento a mais de crédito que firmas que contribuem para outros partidos. No capítulo 3, eu aproveito da introdução de uma nova forma de seguro depósito voluntário, conhecido por DPGE (Depósito a Prazo com Garantias Especiais), para avaliar questões relevantes relativas a corrida bancária, liquidez de mercado (market liquidity) e liquidez na captação (funding liquidity). Primeiramente, documento uma corrida de depositantes a bancos pequenos e médios no Brasil após o agravamento da crise financeira global de 2008. A seguir, observo que esta corrida bancária foi impulsionada primordialmente por investidores institucionais. Em seguida, demonstro que, em resposta ao enfraquecimento da posição no seu passivo, os bancos reduziram seu ativo liquidando suas posições de crédito. Em quarto lugar, encontro evidências de que a introdução do DPGE ajudou a estabilizar as captações bancárias. Com este novo instrumento, os certificados de depósito (CD) passaram a ser segurados em até 20 milhões de reais, enquanto os demais eram segurados em até 60 mil reais. Por fim, demonstro que bancos com menor liquidez nos ativos foram aqueles que escolheram emitir DPGE, apesar de seu elevado custo (emissores devem pagar prêmio mensal de mais de seis vezes o valor cobrado em depósitos segurados convencionais). Portanto, restaurar a liquidez pelo lado do passivo (funding liquidity) foi mais importante a bancos mais afetados pela liquidez de mercado (market liquidity), ou seja, para aqueles com menos ativos líquidos. Uma investigação dos determinantes da emissão de DPGE mostra que: 1) bancos mais dependentes de cessão de carteira de crédito antes da crise estão mais propensos a emitir no novo esquema de depósito segurado; e 2) bancos com proporção mais elevada de crédito em relação ao ativo estão mais propensos a emitir sob o novo esquema, embora os resultados sejam menos precisos. Tais resultados são importantes por diversas razões. Primeiramente, estão entre os primeiros resultados empíricos a documentar a relação entre liquidez de mercado (ma / [en] This thesis is a collection of three empirical essays on banking using Brazilian data. Chapter 1 provides evidence that cities ruled by a mayor from the presidential coalition s party receive significantly more credit from public federally owned banks. Using a unique longitudinal database that matches branch-level credit information with election outcomes over the period 1997-2008, I explore the within-municipality variation in political alignment to estimate the impact of alignment on the amount of credit. I find that public federal banks increase their lending 10 per cent more in aligned cities. In response, private banks contract credit, but the net effect is an increase in aggregate credit to aligned cities, raising the issue of a misallocation of capital across cities. I also use another unique and more comprehensive credit database, available only since 2004, and apply a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to address possible identification concerns. In contrast with the received literature, I find that the results are not driven by earmarked lending, but by non-earmarked operations. Chapter 2 focuses the analysis on firms that donate to electoral campaigns in order to test for the hypothesis of favored lending as a reward mechanism for campaign giving. I combine data from firm level campaign contributions with credit information and explore within-firm variation in order to test whether donating to aligned parties results in a better access to credit from public federal banks. Results indicate that campaign contributors to aligned parties have a higher lending share from public federal banks and borrow 20 per cent more than firms that donate to nonaligned parties. In Chapter 3 I take advantage of the introduction of a voluntary deposit insurance program to address several important questions concerning bank runs, market liquidity and funding liquidity. I first document a depositors run on small and medium banks in Brazil after the worsening of the global financial crisis. Second, I find that the bank run was led mainly by institutional investors. Third, I show that, in response to the weakening position on the liability side, banks responded by liquidating their credit position on the asset side of the balance sheet. Fourth, I find evidence that the introduction of a new voluntary insurance instrument called DPGE (Time Deposits with Special Insurance) seemed to have helped stabilize banks positions. Under DPGE, Certificates of Deposit (CD) are insured up to 20 million reais, while standard non-DPGE other time deposits are secured up to 60 thousand reais. Fifth, I show that banks whose assets were more illiquid selected themselves into expensive DPGE (issuers have to pay monthly premium of more than six times the value charged on conventionally insured deposits). Thus, providing funding liquidity was more important for banks that were more affected by market liquidity (having less liquid assets). An investigation of the determinants of issuing DPGE shows that: 1) banks that relied more on credit assignments before the crisis are more likely to issue under the new insurance scheme; 2) banks with higher credit-to-assets ratios are also more likely to issue under the new scheme, although the results on credit-to-assets are a little less precise. These results are important for several reasons. First, they are the first empirical results to document the relationship between market and funding liquidity. In particular, self-selecting into DPGE allows us to see that banks with more illiquid assets need more funding liquidity in the midst of a crisis. Second, the fact of the voluntary nature of the program is interesting per se. By providing voluntary, albeit expensive, insurance, banks may self-select only when they have little option (because of asset-side market illiquidity). Although I do not perform a full welfare analysis, this suggests that mandatory insurance may be sub-optimal for two reasons. First, banks that do not need it may be paying excessive premiums. Second, mandatory insurance may