Thesis (M.A.)--The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2010. / Directed by Scott Romine; submitted to the Dept. of English. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Jul. 9, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-84).

A pintura como geradora da reflexão sobre as imagens produzidas: da sutileza e da dúvida. Partindo do suporte, tomar o material como determinante de uma visualidade delicada, de vazios, escorridos, vapores e condensações. Imagens que resistem em se mostrar, propostas tímidas, como pontuação de delicadeza em um cotidiano saturado de imagens. O corpo como medida: da ação artística e da fluidez que dela resulta. / Painting as a reflection on generating images produced: the subtlety and doubt. Starting from the support, taking the material as determinant of a visual delicate, empty, drained, vapors and condensations. Images that resist showing off, timid proposals, as score of delicacy on a daily saturated images. The body as measure: from the artistic action and fluidity that it brings.

Modern philosophy is often said to privilege rationality over received wisdom, but to some extent this is an ideal which we pursue under a measure of uncertainty. It is not always obvious what rationality requires. Nor is it clear how rationality is to be traded against other ideals. This dissertation seeks to clarify both questions as they pertain to the rationality of belief. The choice of topic is apposite, since many argue that the case of belief illustrates that what is rational and what there is most reason to do is one and the same thing. In particular, so-called evidentialists often argue that to believe what the evidence indicates is both to believe rationally and to believe what one has most reason to believe, since (i) rationality consists in responding to reasons, and (ii) only evidence that p can be a reason to believe that p. My first objective is to challenge this thesis. I do so by arguing that the class of reasons that rationalise a belief does not coincide with the class of reasons there are to have the belief all things considered. To equate the two classes would be to conflate the psychological issue of how we respond to reasons with the ontological issue of what reasons there are. My case against evidentialism does not depend on pragmatism being true, however. Even if Pascal was wrong to claim that the expected benefit of believing can be a reason to believe, it does not follow that evidentialism is true. Some non-pragmatic form of anti-evidentialism may still be true. The latter half of the dissertation explores this possibility in greater detail. There I argue that there is at least one class of beliefs which is not subject to common evidentiary strictures. When we use practical reasoning to form intentions about what to do in the future, we typically also form beliefs about what we will do. Yet, those beliefs are not based on evidence about what we will do, I argue. Typically, we do not predict what we do based on what we intend to do. Nor should we. When it is up to us whether we will perform an action, our intentions do to not carry enough weight as evidence that we must use them to predict what we will do. In the last part of the dissertation, I use this point to elucidate how we acquire self-knowledge and how belief relates to truth.

A pintura como geradora da reflexão sobre as imagens produzidas: da sutileza e da dúvida. Partindo do suporte, tomar o material como determinante de uma visualidade delicada, de vazios, escorridos, vapores e condensações. Imagens que resistem em se mostrar, propostas tímidas, como pontuação de delicadeza em um cotidiano saturado de imagens. O corpo como medida: da ação artística e da fluidez que dela resulta. / Painting as a reflection on generating images produced: the subtlety and doubt. Starting from the support, taking the material as determinant of a visual delicate, empty, drained, vapors and condensations. Images that resist showing off, timid proposals, as score of delicacy on a daily saturated images. The body as measure: from the artistic action and fluidity that it brings.

abstract: Anglo-Saxon women wielded a remarkable amount of power in the early English church. They founded some of the country’s most influential institutions, and modern Christians continue to venerate many of them as saints. Their path to canonization, however, was informal—especially compared to men and women who were canonized after Pope Gregory IX’s decree in 1234 that reserved those powers for the pope. Many of Anglo-Saxon England’s most popular saints exhibited behaviors that, had they been born later, would have disqualified them from canonization. This project examines how the problematic lives of St. Æthelthryth of Ely and St. Edith of Wilton were simultaneously doubted and adopted by post-Norman Christians. Specifically, it considers the flawed ways that the saints, petitioners, and their communities were simultaneously doubted and legitimized by late-medieval hagiographers. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation English 2018

A pintura como geradora da reflexão sobre as imagens produzidas: da sutileza e da dúvida. Partindo do suporte, tomar o material como determinante de uma visualidade delicada, de vazios, escorridos, vapores e condensações. Imagens que resistem em se mostrar, propostas tímidas, como pontuação de delicadeza em um cotidiano saturado de imagens. O corpo como medida: da ação artística e da fluidez que dela resulta. / Painting as a reflection on generating images produced: the subtlety and doubt. Starting from the support, taking the material as determinant of a visual delicate, empty, drained, vapors and condensations. Images that resist showing off, timid proposals, as score of delicacy on a daily saturated images. The body as measure: from the artistic action and fluidity that it brings.

Trata-se de mostrar alguns argumentos, desenvolvidos por Ludwig Wittgenstein nos seus últimos escritos, contra uma espécie de investida cética que pretende colocar em suspensão a certeza que temos a respeito da existência do mundo. Para tanto, procuramos, primeiramente, a partir da exegese do parágrafo 308 de Da Certeza, explorar a relação estabelecida entre os conceitos de dúvida, saber e certeza a fim de esclarecer a concepção de que a dúvida apenas pode ser aplicada sobre proposições empíricas e jamais sobre proposições gramaticais. Em segundo lugar, mostramos que, ao entender que a dúvida ( o ato de duvidar) sobre qualquer coisa faz sentido apenas quando aceitamos um sistema de proposições, Wittgenstein a (o) coloca como dependente da estabilidade da gramática de nossa linguagem. Nesse sentido, buscamos elucidar a maneira como o filósofo caracteriza a lógica demonstrando-a, de um lado, como algo constante um quadro de referência que possibilita o curso das proposições relacionadas à experiência e, de outro, como algo inconstante que comporta fissuras, quebras e até desmoronamento. Por fim, desenvolvemos a ideia de que essa precária condição de nossa gramática não impede que confiemos nela e que, unicamente por conta disso, possamos dizer que algumas proposições fundamentam nossos jogos de linguagem. É nesse sentido que o cético, ao tentar colocar uma proposição fundante em nossos jogos tal qual o mundo existe em dúvida, suspende sem perceber a fluência do jogo assertivo que pretende estabelecer e, por que não dizer, sua lógica. / This work aims to show some arguments, developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his later writings, against a kind of skeptical assault that wants to put in suspension our assurance about the existence of the world. First, we should clarify the conception that a doubt can only be applied on empirical propositions and never on grammatical ones, from the relationship established between the concepts of doubt, know and certainty. Secondly, we aim to show that by identifying that raising a question makes sense only when we accept a system of propositions, Wittgenstein puts it as dependent on the stability of our grammar. Accordingly, we seek to elucidate how the philosopher characterizes grammar as something stable, on one hand as a reference framework which enables the course of the propositions that refer to the experience and, on the other, as something unstable that can crack, break and even collapse. Finally, we developed the idea that this precarious condition of our grammar does not prevent us to trust her and solely because of that we can say that some propositions underlie our language games. In this sense, the skeptic, when trying to put a founding proposition for our language games like \"the world exists\" in doubt, suspend without notice the fluency of the assertive game he intended to stablish, its consistency and, for that matter, its logic.

The world needs entrepreneurs now more than ever; fresh thinkers, who spot opportunities and apply their talents to overcome obstacles to make their ideas happen. Entrepreneurs need to reframe the recession as an area of business opportunity for all. They must unleash their innovative ideas around the world and inspire solutions that will tackle issues ranging from poverty, unemployment and climatic change. It is the fundamental precept of the Christian faith that God calls not only ministers and other spiritual workers, but everyone to specific roles in his kingdom. Christian Entrepreneurs must realise that their calling to establish and lead business organisations that are designed to achieve results in the secular world. Christian Entrepreneur Organisations differ from secular businesses because they do business while being led by the Holy Spirit. Christian Entrepreneurship is the return of unfulfilled business leaders to the sense of "calling" enjoyed by fellow laity in the U.S.A. and Western Europe prior to the 20th Century. The goal is to develop a business that blends business excellence and entrepreneurship with Christian Biblical and theological perspectives. This exploratory study investigated the role of the Christian faith in Entrepreneurship and in Entrepreneurial businesses. The study identified some of the Christian business practices and introduced the reader to the different approaches this group of entrepreneurs have to that of the secular business equivalent.

Are we morally responsible for what we believe and intend? If so, what is the nature of this responsibility, and how does it differ from our moral responsibility for our outward bodily deeds? How is our moral responsibility for belief and intention grounded in mental action? I argue that we do bear a species of moral responsibility for our beliefs and intentions. But our beliefs and intentions are nonvoluntary—we neither believe nor intend ‘at will.’ This raises a pressing question about how we can be legitimately held accountable for the attitudes. Given that we do not choose our attitudes in the same way we choose to perform ordinary intentional actions, how do we exercise agency in belief and intention? My answer is that responsibility for the attitudes is grounded in a fully intentional yet nonvoluntary form of mental action. This is a thinker’s reasoning to a conclusion in thought (or inferring). Drawing on the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, I argue that reasoning is active because it is constituted by the very species of self-conscious practical knowledge as intentional bodily action. This practical knowledge positions a thinker to answer the justificatory demands that mark our responsibility for the attitudes.

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a critique of the idea that skepticism was the driving force in the development of early modern thought. Historian of philosophy Richard Popkin introduced this thesis in the 1950s and elaborated on it over the next five decades, and recent scholarship shows that it has become an increasingly accepted interpretation. I begin with a study of the relevant historical antecedents—the ancient skeptical traditions of which early modern thinkers were aware—Pyrrhonism and Academicism. Then I discuss the influence of skepticism on three pre-Cartesians: Francisco Sanches, Michel de Montaigne, and Pierre Charron. Basing my arguments on an informed understanding of both ancient Greek skepticism and some of the writings of these philosophers, I contend that it is inaccurate to predominantly characterize Sanches, Montaigne, and Charron as skeptics. To support his thesis about the singular influence of skepticism on early modern thought, Popkin says that René Descartes’ metaphysical philosophy was formed as a response to a skeptical threat and that Descartes ultimately conceded to the force of skepticism. He also argues that David Hume was a Pyrrhonist par excellence. I disagree with Popkin’s claims. I argue that Descartes was not as deeply affected by skepticism as Popkin suggests and that it is inaccurate to characterize Hume as a Pyrrhonist. By offering this critique, I hope to make clear to the readers two things: first, that Popkin’s thesis, though it is both enticing and generally accepted by many scholars, is questionable with regard to its plausibility; second, that the arguments I present in this dissertation reveal that further research into the role of skepticism in early modern philosophy is in order.