In the early 1990s Graham Nuthall and Adrianne Alton-Lee developed a model of the learning and remembering process which has profound implications for teaching and learning at all levels. Using their model they were able to predict what selected primary school students would and would not learn and remember from the teaching of a series of Science and Social Studies units and to do so with an accuracy of between 80 to 85 per cent. The Nuthall model states that for a student to learn and remember a new fact or concept he or she needs three to four learning opportunities with the complete set of information needed to learn the new fact or concept, and a gap of no more than two days between any pair of those two learning opportunities. It had always been Graham Nuthall's intention to test the model he developed with Adrienne Alton-Lee in a series of experiments. Tragically, Professor Graham Nuthall died before this was possible. The ten experiments in this thesis put the Nuthall model to the test.

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This thesis examines Turkey&rsquo / s Balkan policy in the Post-Cold War Era with regard to changing parameters in this region. Every crisis and conflicts in the Balkans affects not only Turkey but also all international actors. For this reason, it is argued that external dynamics rather than internal ones largely affected the change in Turkish foreign policy. It is pointed out that the policy maintained by Turkey during the wars and crisis in the Balkans, was harmonious with its power and capacity in international arena. After Bosnian War and Kosovo crisis the European Union (EU) policy towards the Balkans gained impetus. Turkey attempts to participate in both North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU initiatives in the Balkans for the sake of balancing Greece. Besides, Turkey encouraged and took an active role in the process of the Balkan countries to NATO and the EU for the sake of following the regulations being made for Turkish minority. Then, this thesis argues that the neo-Ottomanist ideas lost its significance as the process of EU&rsquo / s incorporation of the Balkans gains impetus.

This thesis attempts to challenge the way military historiography deals with the state of the Ottoman army between 1683 and 1792 and the military reform attempts prior to the Nizam-i Cedid army. Western military historians have ascribed to the inferiority of the Ottoman military technology the waning of the Ottoman military power in the post-1683 period. Any attempt at reform was allegedly obstructed by religious reaction against borrowing European methods and technology. This thesis argues that technology was not the decisive factor in the Ottoman failure against the Austrians and Russians since those two were not too far ahead of the Ottomans with regards to the level of military technology to justify such a conclusion. The comparison with the Russian army, the archenemy of the Ottomans in the period under question, reveals that the Russian success in such departments as conscription, logistics, military leadership and continuous tactical adjustments made to accommodate the needs of steppe warfare, rather than outright application of Western methods of warfare, resulted in victories against the Ottomans. The Ottomans in the meantime were bothered by instability at the Porte, which could neither provide the necessary leadership on the battlefield nor carry out the military reforms. As a result, the vestiges of the Ottoman military organization in its classical form continued to take up economic resources and block any attempts at reform. Religion in this process served as nothing more than a rallying cry for a certain group who vied for power in Istanbul at a time of state formation.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Atatürk Universitesi. / At head of title: Atatürk Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi. Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı Bölümü.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Atatürk University, 1970. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 140-143).

Thèse (M.Sc.) -- Université Laval, 1997. / Bibliogr.: f. 60-74. Publ. aussi en version électronique.

Thèse (M.Sc.) -- Université Laval, 1997. / Les chap. 2 à 5 rédigés par l'auteur et collab. en anglais, avec résumés en français, ont été soumis ou publiés dans différents titres de périodiques. Bibliogr.: f. 179-191. Publié aussi en version électronique.

This thesis examines secret intelligence cooperation between three asymmetric partners – specifically the UK, US and Turkey – from the end of the Second World War until Turkey’s first military coup d'état on 27 May 1960. The thesis shows that our understanding of the Cold War as a binary rivalry between the two blocs is too simple an approach and obscures important characteristics of intelligence cooperation among allies. To reveal a more comprehensive analysis of intelligence cooperation, this thesis develops our understanding of it more broadly, by developing a model called ‘intelligence diplomacy’. This model explores a vital, if little understood, aspect of contemporary international relations given the prevalence of transnational threats today. Intelligence diplomacy involves negotiations and the exploitation of different aspects of joint intelligence activities, synchronized between diplomats and specialized intelligence officers. While such efforts often result in overlap between diplomats and intelligence liaison efforts, there is strong evidence that the acts of intelligence services vary from the instructions of their foreign ministries. The thesis also shows that a pragmatic approach offers states new opportunities to protect national interests, by conducting intelligence diplomacy to influence crucial areas such as nuclear weapons and to exploit cooperation in support of their own strategic imperatives. By doing so this thesis not only reveals previously-unexplored origins of secret intelligence cooperation between Turkey and the West, but also contributes to wider academic debates on the nature of the Cold War by highlighting the potential agency of weaker states in the Western Alliance.

In this study, I examine the material culture of the Rio Fuerte Basket-Maker Phase (200 B.C. - 1000 A.D.) and Cave-Dweller Phase (1000 - 1600 A.D.) occupations in southern Chihuahua, Mexico, that is represented in the Dr. Robert Zingg Archaeological Collection. Zingg believed that the material culture showed a clear progression from the Basket-Maker Phase to the Cave-Dweller Phase, which he interpreted to indicate a relationship between these two phases, and that these phases were the precursors of the twentieth century Tarahumara. I test this hypothesis by comparing the artifacts in the Dr. Robert Zingg Archaeological Collection curated by the University Museum at Southern Illinois University Carbondale to the artifacts in the ethnographic Tarahumara Collection curated by the Milwaukee Public Museum. Following an evaluation of the archaeological and ethnographic material culture, I conclude that Zingg's hypothesis is only partially supported by the museum collections. Although the material culture of the later Cave-Dweller Phase is sufficiently similar to the material culture of the twentieth century Tarahumara to suggest a relationship between the two cultures, the earlier Rio Fuerte Basket-Maker Phase does not provide enough artifacts that show similarity with either the Cave-Dweller Phase or the twentieth century Tarahumara.