<p>This dissertation explores the causes and consequences of real estate price fluctuations. Given the collapse of US house prices during 2007-2009 along with the simultaneous rise in national unemployment an thorough understanding of both the housing market and its relation to the labor market has perhaps never been more important. While this dissertation fits in the real estate finance literature, my broader purpose is to use to new micro-level data to empirically test the relevance of financial and macroeconomic theories. Chapter 2 offers evidence that small firms borrow against real estate holdings to pay employment and this collateral channel is responsible for 8-16% of the total decline in employment between 2007-2009. Chapter 3 develops the locally-weighted repeat sales technique, a new econometric estimation to price any real estate property by comparing the house to all properties on the market. We then apply the method to the US Housing Market and find that traditional aggregate house indices such as Case-Shiller have overestimated the bubble by 10%.. Chapter 4 uses new data on small firm financials to exhibit that home equity is a significant source of initial financing for large startups: specifically, in our preferred specification we find that a 100% increase in real estate price growth is responsible for an 11% increase in home equity financing among all entrepreneurs and a 21% increase for large start-ups.</p> / Dissertation

Thesis advisor: Thomas Chemmanur / My doctoral dissertation consists of three chapters focused on topics in entrepreneurial finance and corporate innovation. In the first chapter, I analyze secondary market patent transactions from public assignors (seller firms) to assignees (buyer firms). I show that firms with higher innovation productivity (more able to innovate) but with lower production efficiency (less able to commercialize) are more likely to sell patents distant from their operations. Using a linked assignor-assignee dataset, I find that patents technologically closer to buyer than to seller firms are more likely to be sold in a patent transaction, implying gains from trading patents. I document that, in the three years following patent transactions, seller firms experience a positive and statistically significant improvement in their ROA and operating profitability. I find that the improvement in ROA and operating profitability is concentrated in seller firms which increase their R&D focus after patent transactions, suggesting that an increase in innovation focus is one of the channels driving these results. Consistent with this channel, I find that inventors who are either newly hired by or remaining in assignor firms over the three years subsequent to patent transactions have technological expertise more similar to those of assignor firms. In the second chapter, co-authored with Xi Chen, we study how venture capitalists (VCs) create value in the product market for the entrepreneurial firms backed by them. By constructing a novel dataset based on Nielsen Retail Scanner and VentureXpert, we document that, compared to non-VC-backed firms, VC-backed startups have more than doubled their sales and seized more nationwide market share in the five years following the first VC investment. A further decomposition indicates that VC-backed firms achieve the growth in sales and market share by lowering their product prices. In addition, subsequent to the first VC investment, VC-backed firms enlarge their product portfolios by introducing new products and establishing new product lines, and they expand their products to more stores and geographic locations. Using the limited partner return as an instrument for the supply of VC financing, we show that the above effects are causal. We document heterogeneous value creation effects of VC financing for firms with different market share and for firms with different geographic proximity to the lead VC investors. This suggests that, apart from providing capital, VCs also add value to startups by directing their marketing strategy and monitoring their operations. In the third chapter, co-authored with Thomas Chemmanur, Jiajie Xu, and Xiang Zheng, we analyze the effect of the composition of venture capital (VC) syndicates on value creation to the entrepreneurial firms they invest in. We hypothesize that VCs may learn about each other’s skills at value creation when they co-invest together in entrepreneurial firms, allowing for more efficient value creation when they co-invest in subsequent syndicates. Further, if VCs view syndication as a repeated game, this may generate incentives to co-operate to a greater extent with each other when investing together in a syndicate, reducing the probability of conflicts among VCs. We empirically analyze the implications of these hypotheses and find the following. First, prior collaboration between a lead VC and any of the VCs in a syndicate leads to greater short-term value creation, as evidenced by greater sales growth, employment growth, probability of patented innovation, and the quality of innovations generated during the three years subsequent to VC syndicate investment. Second, prior collaboration between the lead VC and at least one of the syndicate members leads to greater long-term value creation, as evidenced by the higher probability of a successful exit (IPO or acquisition). Third, if the prior collaboration is very successful (leading to an IPO exit resulting from the previous collaboration), then there is even greater value creation by the VC syndicate compared to the case where the prior collaboration was less successful. Finally, consistent with prior collaboration allowing VCs to learn about each other’s value creation skills and reducing potential conflicts among the VCs forming a syndicate, syndicates with prior collaboration between the lead VC and at least one syndicate member are characterized by more uniform syndicate compositions across financing rounds. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management. / Discipline: Finance.

Crowdfunded marketplaces have recently emerged as a novel avenue for entrepreneurs to raise capital in support of innovative ideas and ventures. In these markets, any individual can propose a project, and interested others can contribute their funds to support it. The economic potential of these markets has recently become apparent and, as a result they have begun gaining significant attention from legislators and regulators, who see crowdfunding as a possible solution to the economic woes currently facing the country. However, the behavior of participants in these marketplaces, a key factor that must be accounted for in any effort to formulate policy or regulation, or to identify appropriate design practices, remains poorly understood, primarily due to the many novelties of crowdfunding. Bearing in mind the need to ensure crowdfunding's sustainability as an industry, the formulation of policy and regulation, as well as best practices for participants, I report on three empirical studies that seek to identify and quantify a variety of important aspects of, and influences upon, participant behavior in crowdfunded markets. These three studies, presented as separate essays herein, i) explore the influence upon subsequent contributors from social information about prior others' actions, ii) examine the frictions that arise due to cultural differences between and amongst users, and iii) assess crowdfunders' use of information-hiding mechanisms, and the subsequent impact on later contributors in the market. In regard to each, I discuss the relevant theory, the methodology, data sources, results and implications. I conclude by highlighting the contributions of my work, and possible avenues for future research. / Business Administration/Management Information Systems

Abstract  Background:                     In an equity crowdfunding campaign, the investor receives shares in the company in return for the investment, which makes equity crowdfunding similar to traditional sources of equity funding. Nevertheless, skeptics have referred to equity crowdfunding as “dumb money”, since it might not provide similar non-financial value added as realized from professional investors. The main literature used for the frame of reference were Boué (2007), Macht and Robinson (2008) and Macht and Weatherston (2014). The literature worked as a basis for deriving a table, outlining the non-financial value added received by venture capitalists and business angels, as well as showing where literature is lacking regarding non-financial value added by equity crowdfunding investors. Purpose: The purpose of this thesis was to explore the non-financial value added by equity crowdfunding investors to the entrepreneur. This purpose was answered by two research questions: (1) Do equity crowdfunding investors provide similar non-financial value added to the entrepreneur as traditional equity funding investors do? (2) Are there any additional non-financial value added realized from equity crowdfunding? Method: This thesis follows the interpretivist research paradigm and undertakes an abductive research approach in order to explore the purpose. Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews with seven entrepreneurs who had successfully conducted an equity crowdfunding campaign in Sweden. Secondary data was collected from peer-reviewed articles containing relevant theories and models. Conclusion: This research suggests that there are similarities between professional investors and equity crowdfunding investors in terms of non-financial value added. The contribution from equity crowdfunding investors seems to be dependent on the effort that the entrepreneur puts into the relationship with the investors. Furthermore, equity crowdfunding also allows the entrepreneur to maintain ownership and control over the company. However, each equity crowdfunding case is different and there are no guarantees of receiving certain types of investors.

In many developed countries angel capital investment is the main source of external financing for high growth early-stage entrepreneurial companies. In spite of its importance, research in the angel capital market is still very limited. This is partly due the fact that data on angel capital investment is rare and unsystematic. This dissertation attempts to learn more about this important but not well-understood angel capital market. In particular, the first essay looks at the relationship between angels and venture capitalists in financing start-up ventures. This essay juxtaposes a complements hypothesis – angel financing is a springboard for venture capital, against a substitutes hypothesis – angels and venture capital are distinct financing methods that ought not to be combined. The result shows that companies that obtain angel financing subsequently obtain less venture capital, and vice versa. On average venture capitalist make larger investments, but this alone cannot explain the substitutes pattern. In addition, this essay reports that companies funded by venture capital perform better than angel backed companies, as measured by successful exits or revenues. Mixing angel and venture capital funding tends to be associated with worse performance. The second essay studies the role of geographic distance between the angel investors and the investee companies on the angel investment performance. This essay conjectures four possible channels that can explain the relationship between distance and the return to angel investment. It shows that distance has a positive relationship with the return to angel investment. Examining the effect of distance across different categories of angel investors, across angel investor’s locations, and across company’s location, this essay finds evidence that this positive relationship is mainly driven by the “objectivity effect”, which suggests that distant investors can evaluate the prospect of a company more objectively than close-by investors, who tend to be more biased in their judgments. The third essay examines why entrepreneurs find it generally hard to find angel investors. This essay modifies the standard search model introduced by Pissarides to explain this phenomenon. In this model, angels hide to force entrepreneurs to engage in a costly search. The result shows that angel investors adopt the hiding strategy to screen out low-productivity entrepreneurs who would otherwise inundate angels. Interestingly, social surplus is often increased when angels hide, though in some circumstances surplus may fall. / Graduate / 0505 / danvo@uvic.ca

My dissertation is focused on developing a better understanding of the technology and innovation strategies of corporations and their impacts on firm performance. I am particularly interested in corporate venture capital (CVC), which serves as a strategy for accessing external technology for corporate investors and as an alternative source of financing and complementary assets for start-ups. I have investigated the conditions under which corporate investors and start-ups achieve the strategic goals by establishing CVC ties, and on estimating the technological and financial gains created by the CVC ties. Specifically, I have concentrated on when and where CVC ties are established in order to maximize economic value. The former relates to a timing issue, whereas the latter is a space issue of CVC investments. In the first essay, I examine corporate investors' decisions to establish CVC ties and their subsequent strategic actions. Consistent with the real options perspective on CVC investments, I find that CVC investments can help corporate investors effectively search for and select future acquisition or licensing partners by reducing asymmetric information and uncertainty that may characterize markets for technology. Specifically, CVC investments facilitate the external acquisition of technology by substituting for a corporate investor's absorptive capacity, as reflected by its upstream research capabilities. CVC investments instead complement the portfolio of internally generated new products, since they allow highly productive corporate investors to shift their focus onto exploratory initiatives with the objective of selecting future technology and partners. Finally, CVC investments facilitate exploratory investments in distant technological areas that are subsequently integrated through licensing or acquisitions. These findings contribute to emerging research on the organization and financing patterns of external R&D activities. In the second essay, I investigate the nature of the relationship between technological spillovers and capital gains created by CVC investments for corporate investors. Using a simple equilibrium model and data from the global bio-pharmaceutical industry between 1986 and 2007, I find that these technological spillovers and capital gains are complements. This complementarity is enhanced when CVC investments are made in post-IPO and technologically diversified start-ups. Beyond providing a broad benchmark for heterogeneous returns on CVC investments, this study has important implications for corporate investors and start-ups. In particular, to the extent that capital gain is greatly determined by changes in the market values of start-ups, it implies that CVC investments can create value for start-ups as well as corporate investors. These mutual benefits can be greatly determined by when (e.g., post-IPO start-ups) and where (e.g., technologically diversified start-ups) CVC investments are made. In the third essay, I analyze the contextual factors that impact the probability of start-ups' obtaining financing through independent venture capitalists and corporate investors. The systematic empirical evidence based on a three-stage game theoretic model suggests that start-ups that possess better evaluated technology tend to be financed through independent venture capitalists, rather than corporate investors. In contrast, start-ups tend to be financed through corporate investors, rather than independent venture capitalists, when their intellectual properties are effectively protected and their research pipelines contain multiple products. These findings provide a theoretical basis to explain why several types of investors co-exist in the entrepreneurial financing market. Moreover, the existence of such determinants indicates that, although investors traditionally have been viewed as the powerful partner that dominates the investment decision, start-ups are also active decision makers in investment ties.

Traditional investment practices have been revamped with more and more modern methodsto fit entrepreneurial settings. The evolution of equity crowdfunding has created an alternative to venture capital,bank loans and business angels. Due its novelty, recent studieshave onlyfocusedon its mechanisms and financial regulations. We draw from crowdfunding concept and social theories to develop an understandingonthe connection between social media networkand equity crowdfunding success.Utilizingdata from LinkedIn and a leading equity crowdfunding platform in the Nordics, we explore the impact of social media network to funding campaigns’ success. We collected data on every company on the platform, and we collected data on the key members’ LinkedIn connections. The results propose that it is possible to predict certain types of success in equity crowdfunding based on the number of LinkedIn connections. This study contributes to existing literature by providing better understanding on another social network, LinkedIn, which is often connected to project pages on crowdfunding platforms. We contribute even for improved insight in decision making processes behind the investments; which is in high interest of entrepreneurs, investors and platforms

Le financement institutionnel du capital initial, l’investissement providentiel le financement collectif des entreprises entrepreneuriales : un cadre conceptuel et quelques exemples » est une thèse de doctorat qui décrit un cadre conceptuel global des différentes facettes financières de l'entrepreneuriat et propose une étude empirique approfondie de certains éléments. Le nouvel apport de ce travail consiste à identifier les complexités croissantes du marché du financement en fonds propres de l’entreprenariat en développant un cadre conceptuel qui met l'accent aussi bien sur l'interaction croissante des acteurs du marché que sur de nouvelles recherches empiriques. Les thèmes choisis utilisent un ensemble de données uniques qui vont au-delà des études de recherches existantes et sont les premiers dans leur domaine à explorer de nouvellespistes. / Institutional Seed Financing, Angel Financing, and Crowdfunding of EntrepreneurialVentures : a conceptual framework and selected examples is a doctoral dissertation that outlines an overall conceptual framework for the financial facets of entrepreneurship and proposes an empirical in-depth exploration of designated components. The novel contribution of this work lies in identifying the increasing complexities of the entrepreneurial equity finance market by developing this conceptual framework that emphasizes the growing interaction of the market players as well as investigating additional empirical topics. The selected topics use unique datasets that go beyond existing research studies and are the first in their fields to explore new avenues.

Si le succès d'une campagne de crowdfunding dépend du projet qui est financé, il est aussi fortement lié aux choix stratégiques faits par l'entrepreneur et par le design de la campagne de financement en elle-même. Cette thèse étudie trois composants principaux du design d'une campagne de crowdfunding en se basant sur une base de données unique de plus de 22 000 projets présentés sur la plateforme Indiegogo. Premièrement, en choisissant entre les modèles de financement "keep-it-all" et "all-or-nothing", l'entrepreneur a la possibilité de transférer lerisque entre lui-même et la foule. Cela aura un impact sur la quantité d'informations qu'il divulguera et sur le comportement des participants. Deuxièmement, la personnalité de l'entrepreneur, et plus particulièrement son niveau de narcissisme, affecte également la manière dont la campagne est mise en place (taille, informations,...) et du soutien qu'il/elle obtient de la foule. Enfin, étant donné que nous savons que les entrepreneurs en série bénéficient habituellement de leur expérience via leur réseau et leur réputation, nous analysons sa capacité à recommencer une seconde campagne, la manière dont l'entrepreneur la conçoit et sa capacité à gagner, ou pas, le soutien du public après un premier succès ou un premier échec. / If the crowdfunding campaign success depends on the project that is financed, it is also closely linked to the strategic choices of the entrepreneur and by the design of the financing campaign in itself. This thesis investigates three main components of the campaign design by using a unique database of more than 22,000 crowdfunding projects presented on the Indiegogo platform. First, by choosing between the keep-it-all and the all-or-nothing funding model, the entrepreneur is able to shift the risk between himself and the crowd. This will impact thecampaign disclosures and the behavior of the participants. Second, the personality of the entrepreneur and more precisely his level of narcissism also affects the way that the campaign is set up (size, soft information,...) and the support he/she receives from the crowd. Finally, since we know that serial entrepreneurs usually benefit from experience through network and reputation, we analyze his/her ability to restart a second campaign, the way that entrepreneurs design it and his/her capacity to gain, or not, support from the crowd after a first success or after a first failure.

L’objectif de cette thèse est de développer des modèles quantitatifs utilisant les options réelles pour une évaluation financière des choix stratégiques entrepreneuriaux. Cependant, il ne s’agit pas seulement de développer des aspects techniques (ou manipulations mathématiques). Les modèles proposés dans la thèse visent également à fournir des informations pratiques utiles à la fois aux entrepreneurs et aux investisseurs, afin de faciliter la prise de décision dans les négociations contractuelles pour le financement et l'investissement dans les start-ups et les firmes entrepreneuriales.Cette thèse se compose de deux parties. La première partie définit les concepts utilisés afférents à la question de recherche. L’adoption de la perspective proposée par la finance entrepreneuriale nous permet de centrer notre approche sur la négociation et une relation d'égalité entre les participants dans le processus de prise de décision, alors que la finance d’entreprise traditionnelle s’intéresse à la relation principal-agent. En effet, les méthodes généralement utilisées comme les cash-flows actualisés (DCF) ou le Taux de Rendement Interne (TRI) ne sont pas adéquates pour effectuer une évaluation financière dans un contexte entrepreneurial. Ainsi, la problématique de cette thèse peut être formulée de la manière suivante : Comment les choix stratégiques des start-ups et firmes entrepreneuriales devraient-ils être évalués dans le cadre des négociations contractuelles ?Afin de traiter cette problématique, trois problèmes particuliers seront exposés dans la deuxième partie. Nous proposerons de les étudier à partir de l’approche par les options réelles qui convient parfaitement à l'analyse des choix stratégiques dans un contexte de finance entrepreneuriale.Le premier article analyse l’évaluation d’un contrat de licence dans le secteur biopharmaceutique. En résumé, lors de la conclusion d’un contrat de licence, les dirigeants et les responsables de la négociation doivent prendre en compte de nombreux facteurs tels que la phase de développement, la prévision des coûts d'investissement et la volatilité des marchés. De plus, la prise en compte des interactions comportementales des deux parties lors de la négociation du contrat de licence est essentielle pour la construction d'un modèle de simulation, notamment en ce qui concerne l’interaction dynamique entre le donneur de licence et le preneur de licence.Le deuxième article s’intéresse à la question de la dilution pour les nouveaux actionnaires lors du deuxième tour de financement en présence de détenteurs d’obligations convertibles. Selon les résultats de la simulation, il est possible de vérifier que le taux de « discount » et le « valuation cap » ont un impact important sur le coût de la prise de décision en matière d’investissement en actions. Les résultats montrent également que plus le taux de discount est élevé et moins le valuation cap est important, plus les coûts sont élevés, et la probabilité de succès de la négociation devient donc faible. Par conséquent, l’entrepreneur doit en tenir compte lorsqu’il entre en négociation lors du deuxième tour de financement.Le troisième article aborde le choix d’une stratégie de sortie pour un entrepreneur (acquisition ou introduction en bourse) notamment « The IPO valuation premium puzzle » proposé par Bayar et Chemmanur (2011). Bien qu'il soit normal que l’entrepreneur et les investisseurs en capital-risque envisagent l’introduction en bourse, il est également possible qu'ils choisissent l'acquisition comme stratégie de sortie. En utilisant la théorie des jeux, ce phénomène contradictoire peut être expliqué par l’existence de deux équilibres de Nash. En complément de la gestion des risques afférents au marché, l’entrepreneur doit prêter attention à la relation avec le capital-risqueur lorsqu’il choisit la stratégie de sortie. / The objective of this dissertation is to develop the quantitative models that adopt the real options analysis for financially evaluating the entrepreneurial strategic choices. However, it does not only focus on the technical aspects (or its mathematical methodologies). The models proposed in the dissertation aim to provide the practically useful information in order for both entrepreneurs and investors to make decisions in the contractual negotiation of financing and investing in the start-ups and ventures.This dissertation consists of two parts. The first part gives the definitions of the essential concepts that shall be incorporated into the research question. Adopting the perspectives that are provided in entrepreneurial finance leads us to focus on the fair negotiations among participants in the process of decision-making, while the traditional corporate finance emphasises the principal-agent problem. Actually, the common methods, such as Discounted Cash-Flows and Internal Rate of Return, are not always suitable for implementing financial valuations in the context of entrepreneurial finance. Therefore, the research question of this dissertation can be set as follows: How should strategic choices in contract negotiation be financially evaluated?In order to deal with this problem, three particular issues are introduced in the second part. The real options analysis is utilised in all of the three issues, which is quite suitable for analysing them.The first article deals with the issue of licensing contract with bio-pharma venture. In summary, when closing a licensing contract negotiation, those in charge of the negotiation must consider many factors, such as the phases of R&D, the investment costs and the market volatility. In addition to those, the interaction of the participants of the contractual negotiation should be taken into account. For modelling this relationship, the assumption of dynamic interaction between licensor and licensee is introduced.The second article focuses on the dilution problem in the second financing round under the existence of convertible note holders. According to the simulation results, “discount” and “valuation cap” have a great impact on the equity decision-making cost. The results also show that the costs increase when the degree of discount becomes greater and the valuation cap becomes smaller. This may jeopardize the success of negotiation. Entrepreneurs should take these factors into consideration in the second financing round.The third article analyses the exit choice (acquisition or IPO), especially the “IPO valuation premium puzzle” proposed by Bayar et Chemmanur (2011). While entrepreneurs and venture capitalists prefer an IPO, acquisition can be chosen. Utilising the game theory, this contradictory phenomenon can be explained as the two Nash equilibria. In addition to financial market risks, entrepreneurs should pay attention to the relationship with venture capitalists, when they choose the exit strategy.