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<p> Water is one of the most precious elements on Earth. Yet we find ourselves in a global water crisis, struggling to address freshwater scarcity, pollution, climate change, and the need for safe drinking water and sanitation. Given the urgency of the global water crisis, it is imperative that we reinvent our relationship to water and cultivate an integral water ethic.</p><p> This dissertation, and the ethic it explores, is grounded in an integral approach to ecology that studies phenomena across multiple perspectives (e.g., natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities). Relating to water in an integral mode entails acknowledging that water has not only exterior, objective dimensions but also interior, subjective qualities. Thus, an integral water ethic holds that water is not a mere passive object to be exploited for human purposes; instead, this approach recognizes that water is an intrinsically valuable, vital member of the Earth community. An integral water ethic encourages humans to learn to cultivate love and compassion for water and for those suffering from the global water crisis. Through the cultivation of love and compassion for water, humans will be better able to see water not as a mere resource and commodity, but rather as a loving and compassionate member of the Earth community who nourishes all beings.</p><p> This dissertation explores three world religions (Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism) and considers the following contributions to an integral water ethic: sacramental consciousness of baptism, loving service of the Yamuna River, and compassionate wisdom of the bodhisattva. Contemplative practices for developing love and compassion for water are also shared. The purpose of this study is to draw attention to creative avenues for cultivating mutually enhancing relations between humans and water and thereby to help overcome destructive attitudes toward the natural world.</p><p>

Beginning with an overview of the appropriation of Heidegger’s thought to environmental philosophy, I proceed to identify two themes as holding a prominent place within the current literature: Heidegger’s conception of primordial nature or physis as well as the notion of “poetic dwelling”. Drawing on both of these themes, I argue that a prominent implication of Heidegger’s thought for environmental philosophy concerns the conservation of the natural world’s “natural otherness”—its differences from and indifference to humanity. However, within the current discussion concerning the conservation of nature’s otherness little is said concerning nature itself. The question arises as to whether or not non-human natural beings compel us to protect and conserve their differences. How does nature “call” us to protect its otherness? Following this, Chapter Two seeks to establish the relevance of Heidegger’s theory of moods for answering the question at hand. In particular, I illustrate the potential of moods by comparing the occurrence of an “equipmental breakdown” with the mood of “anxiety” (Angst). While the former experience exposes Dasein to nature’s “ownness”—its Being outside of the worldhood—its potential insight is easily re-subsumed into the world of work and projects. In contrast, the experience of anxiety avoids such a shortcoming while simultaneously disclosing Dasein as responsible for what it makes of its existence. These features, or so I argue, demonstrate the relevance of moods in answering the question of this project. Having established the relevance of moods I return, in Chapter Three, to the question posed at the outset of this thesis. Specifically, I investigate the nature of nature’s call by exploring the phenomenology of “profound boredom” as Heidegger presents it in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. Significantly, profound boredom discloses nature in a distinctly primordial manner, while simultaneously revealing Dasein to be responsible for its own there-being. In light of this disclosure, I argue that within the experience of profound boredom primordial nature can be interpreted as calling Dasein towards responsibility, not by demand or challenge, but through its ambiguous indifference towards Dasein and its choices. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-27 17:11:17.45

<p> Multidisciplinary research and philosophical discourse have long explored the complex relationship between the objective environment and subjective human perception. No two humans perceive, experience, and form attitudes about the same phenomenon in exactly the same way. Individual demographics (sex, age) and group identity (culture, religion, ethnicity, political ideology) have been shown to have a profound effect on perception of phenomena; research has also focused on the effect of the physical environment itself. Differences in perception, experience, and resulting behavior have great implications for governance, particularly in regards to planning and development. Recognizing these differences, modern urban planning increasingly seeks to include varying degrees of public participation in the planning process, in order to promote inclusiveness and citizen empowerment. The inclusion of measurement and analysis tools, such as survey questionnaires and Geographic Information Systems (GIS), enable policymakers, planners, and researchers to support their findings and formulate planning strategy by utilizing objective, quantitative data. While previous research has explored perception differences between the sexes, between residents of different cities, and within specific religious groups, there has been little exploration or quantitative measurement of differences in environmental perceptions and attitudes among the diverse, multicultural residents of Jerusalem, a divided city with myriad planning, development, and equality issues.</p><p> In the summer of 2012, 225 Jerusalemites of varying religious, demographic, and social backgrounds completed a questionnaire survey that was designed to quantify their individual environmental perceptions, opinions of the city&rsquo;s growth, and priorities for urban development. While the results indicated great differences between the urban experiences and perceptions of Israeli and Palestinian Jerusalemites, it was also found that these populations&mdash;commonly characterized as enemies by popular media and their respective political establishments&mdash;shared many issues in their day-to-day lives, particularly transportation accessibility, utility provision, unemployment, and housing availability. The majority of respondents indicated that cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians is necessary to solve such issues. These shared issues, experienced in spaces that are socially and physically segregated as a result of past and ongoing governmental action and cultural divisions, may act as the foundation for cooperative, inclusive solutions that seek to improve the lives and urban experiences of all Jerusalem residents.</p>

<p> Since the Neolithic period and the rise of agriculture along Mesopotamia&rsquo;s &ldquo;Fertile Crescent,&rdquo; greater societies have formed thus requiring laws and governance to ensure their continued preservation. The Babylonian Code of Hammurabi is one such example of how agricultural technologies directly created new social and institutional structures in codifying slavery into law, or how mercantile transactions are to be conducted. Similarly, GMOs are the result of modern agricultural technologies that are altering laws and society as a result of their implementation. This transformation informs the central inquiries of my research question: Why are GMOs necessary, and what influences do they have on the project of human rights? As our age is defined by the products of bioluminescent &ndash; or glow-in-the-dark &ndash; cats and goats that can excrete spider silk proteins from their mammary glands, these questions become essential. I conclude that the technology does not, at least conceptually, conflict with or undermine human rights. Instrumental reason has firm limitations in biological applications as well as conflict with its inherent anarchical nature. We are now compelled to question the utility of genetic engineering and if it merely places humanity into another precarious &ldquo;arms race&rdquo; with weeds and pests, in addition to the pressure of maintaining current dependencies of petrochemicals, fertilizers, and continued observations of ecological homeostasis.</p>

<p> This thesis utilizes concepts of the ecocritical theory of deep ecology to elucidate non-anthropocentricism and nature&rsquo;s agency as depicted by three apocalyptic eco-narratives written in the long nineteenth century: Mary Shelley&rsquo;s <i>The Last Man</i> (1826), Richard Jefferies&rsquo; <i> After London</i> (1885), and M. P. Shiel&rsquo;s <i>The Purple Cloud </i> (1901). I offer readings of these texts as &ldquo;Anthropocenic&rdquo; science fiction novels, building upon Paul J. Crutzen&rsquo;s work on the Anthropocene, our current geological epoch. Utilizing literary, historic, and scientific rationale, I make an argument for the reframing of literary periods according to geological transformations due to human interaction with the environment and collectively term apocalyptic eco-narratives written at the time of the Industrial Revolution through today as &ldquo;Anthropocenic.&rdquo; In my analysis, I demonstrate how Shelley&rsquo;s, Jefferies&rsquo;, and Shiel&rsquo;s science fiction works exaggerate environmental concerns contemporary to their respective historical moments, and I offer deep ecological interpretations of their perceptions of industrialism and pollution, specifically in and around London. I also expound upon the way in which all three novels depict nature as an active, nonhuman character with agency and intention, either inducing an ecological apocalypse to protect itself or, as in Shiel&rsquo;s novel, to punish humanity for ecological crimes. My &ldquo;deepist&rdquo; approach attempts non-anthropocentricism whenever possible and allows a progressive, nontraditional critique of these texts primarily from nature&rsquo;s perspective&mdash;not humanity&rsquo;s. Particularly, this thesis is interested in how nature retakes and re-greens spaces that are polluted by human activity or abused in the interest of human consumption. Demonstrating the way in which perceptions of nature&rsquo;s agency evolved through the long nineteenth century and providing historical context for Great Britain&rsquo;s ecological condition, I position that these three Anthropocenic texts ultimately blame London&rsquo;s industrialism for ecological devastation in and around the city and conflate natural phenomena, like volcanoes, with industrialist pollution in fictional explorations of nature&rsquo;s agency and potential ability to retaliate against humanity for irresponsible environmental practices. In the last chapter, I analyze the way in which Biblical allusion is used in <i>The Purple Cloud</i> to both sensationalize and rationalize punishment for anthropogenic climate change as an ecological sin according to the Book of Genesis.</p><p>

Recent years have seen a growing interest in and the publication of more formal scholarship on philosophical hermeneutics and environmental philosophy--i.e. environmental hermeneutics. Grasping how a human understanding of environments is variously mediated and how different levels of meaning can be unconcealed permits deeper ways of looking at environmental ethics and human practices with regard to environments. Beyond supposed simple facts about environments to which humans supposedly rationally respond, environmental hermeneutics uncovers ways in which encounters with environments become meaningful. How we understand and, therefore, choose to act depends not so much on simple facts, but what those facts mean to our lives. Therefore, this dissertation explores three paths. The first is to justify the idea of an environmental hermeneutics with the hermeneutic tradition itself and what environmental hermeneutics is specifically. The second is to demonstrate the benefit of addressing environmental hermeneutics to environmental philosophy. I do this in this dissertation with regard to the debate between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism, a debate which plays a central role in questions of environmental philosophy and ethics. Thirdly, I turn to environmental justice studies where I contend there are complementarities between hermeneutics and environmental justice. From this reality, environmental justice and activism benefit from exploring environmental justice more deeply in light of philosophical hermeneutics. This dissertation is oriented toward a continuing dialogical relation between philosophical hermeneutics and environments insofar as environments are meaningful.

Thesis advisor: Jeffrey Bloechl / This dissertation addresses the first and most fundamental question in environmental philosophy: how should we conceive of the human place within nature? The title derives from the moment in Descartes’ second meditation when he considers what he believed himself formerly to be: a rational animal. Inquiring into what animality and rationality are would send him down a slippery slope, and he decides that he does not have the time to waste on such questions. Prioritizing the rational over the empirical, the metaphysical distinctions that follow precipitate a pivotal episode in the rise of modern science and technology: a disembodied intellect is freed to discover and manipulate the laws and forces at work in nature, conceived mechanistically. While generating many positive advances, for instance in anatomy and medicine, that break with Aristotelian ontological suppositions also marks the beginning of centuries of violence toward the animal within, not to mention the animals, or animal-machines, without. In response, many contemporary environmental thinkers swing the metaphysical pendulum in the opposite direction. Troubled by the consequences of an implicit mind-body dualism, they assume some rendition of its early modern antithesis, Spinozist ontological monism. God, or Nature is understood as comprising a single substance, with all other beings conceived as modifications of that substance. Such ontological humbling is supposed to produce an ethical humility, putting the human back in its place as one humbled part of the larger whole. Our concern is that without important qualifications, such ontological humbling merely provides another justification for man’s modern conquest of nature, in accordance with instrumentalizing, human-centered ends. If the human is conceived as merely one more species among others, we boast an equal right to act in accordance with the powers of our own natures. In response, we develop a thesis that builds from insights in the works of Maurice Merleau- Ponty. We argue that Merleau-Ponty’s thought is characterized by an “archeological,” or origin-directed orientation, according to which he eventually theorizes a phenomenological analogue to Spinoza’s ontological monism: his instigating insight is that both the perceiver, or the subject, and the perceived, or the object, derive from a common ontological fabric. Beginning from insights indicative of a contrary, but complimentary orientation present in Merleau-Ponty’s early works, we begin to construct a “developmental” account to balance out his increasingly “archeological” path, introducing qualifications that orient his thought in an ethical direction. The integrative ethical ideal that we propose entails a developmental, rather than regressive “descent” of the animal slope (le versant animal), without undermining or denying ethical capacities and responsibilities that are specifically human. Drawing from the works of Schelling’s middle period to which Merleau-Ponty turns in his late lectures on Nature, we argue that we must acknowledge tendencies toward violence and domination present within nature itself—and, consequently, present within us, as part of nature—such that becoming fully human would demand the overcoming of those tendencies in the service of a higher ethical ideal. Taking a cue from Schelling’s Freiheitsschrift, we propose an integrative ideal of self-giving love. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

In this thesis, the framework within which long-term goals are set and subsequently achieved or approached is analyzed. Sustainable development and climate change are areas in which goals have tobe set despite uncertainties. The analysis is divided into the normative motivations for setting such goals, what forms of goals could be set given the empirical and normative uncertainties, and how tomanage doubts regarding achievability or values after a goal has been set. Paper I discusses a set of questions that moral theories intended to guide goal-setting should respond to. It is often claimed that existent normative theories provide only modest guidance regarding climate change, and consequently have to be revised or supplemented. Two such suggested revisions or supplements are analyzed in order to determine whether they provide such guidance. Paper II applies the deep ecological framework to survey the extent to which it can be utilized to discuss issues concerning the management of climate change. It is suggested that the deep ecological framework can provide guidance by establishing a normative framework and an analysis of how the overarching values and principles can be specified to be relevant for actions. Paper III is focused on normative political theory, and explicates the two dimensions of empirical and normative uncertainty. By applying recent discussions in normative political theory on ideal/non-ideal theory, political realism, and the relation between normative demands and empirical constraints,strategies for managing the proposed goals are suggested. Paper IV suggests a form of goal that incorporates uncertainties. Cautious utopias allow greater uncertainty than realistic goals (goals that are known to be achievable or approachable, and desirable),but not to the same extent as utopian goals (goals wherein it is highly uncertain whether the goal can actually be achieved). Such goals have a performance-enhancing function. A definition and quality criteria for such goals are proposed. Paper V considers whether a goal that is becoming all the more unlikely to be achievable should be reconsidered. The paper focuses on the two degrees Celsius target, and asks whether it could still be a sensible goal to aspire to. By applying the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, the role of such obligations is investigated. Paper VI surveys how to treat circumstances in which an already set goal should be reconsidered and possibly revised, and what would evoke doubt in the belief upon which those goals have been set.Two situations are analyzed: (i) a problematic or surprising event occurs, upsetting confidence in one’s relevant beliefs, or (ii) respectable but dissenting views are voiced concerning one’s means and/or values. It is suggested that the validity of doubt has to be considered, in addition to the level in a goal-means hierarchy towards which doubt is raised. / <p>QC 20151204</p>

The global community faces ecological problems with the natural environment and cultural impediments to solving them. Natural systems are constantly changing and so are cultural practices. Humans need to address both: the interaction between those dynamic systems, the natural and cultural, because what happens in one system changes things in the other. The changes to the ecosystems are rapid and sometimes irreversible while dealing with them has been inadequate. Environmental movements, including deep ecology, have been at the forefront of the efforts to engage the public, various groups, politicians, and world governments to address environmental problems on a coordinated large scale, but their efforts have not produced substantive results. Cultural, ideological, and other reasons provide some insights into the reasons why this has happened. They show that the ecological crisis is now at the point at which deep ecological principles offer a way out of the crisis more clearly, given that it offers a new, ecological worldview for humans to adopt. This worldview suggests there is inherent unity between the human and natural worlds based on the concept of interdependence. This paper attempts to show that such inherent unity exists and that humans need to use precaution because the risks are too great to ignore.