Questions concerning the ethics of terraforming Mars have received some attention from both philosophers and scientists during recent decades. A variety of theoretical approaches have been supplied by a number of authors, however research pursuant to this thesis has indicated at least two major blindspots in the published literature on the topic. First, a broad category of human considerations involving risks, dangers, and social, political, and economic inequalities that would likely be associated with efforts to terraform Mars have been woefully overlooked in the published literature to date. I attempt to rectify that oversight by employing the interpretive lens of environmental justice to address questions of environmental colonialism, equality in terms of political participation and inclusion in decision making structures, risks associated with technological progressivism, and responses to anthropogenic climate change. Only by including the historically marginalized and politically disenfranchised "voices," of both humans and nonhumans, can any future plan to terraform Mars be deemed ethical, moral or just according to the framework provided by environmental justice. Furthermore, broader political inclusion of this sort conforms to what ecofeminist author Val Plumwood calls the "intentional recognition stance" and provides an avenue through which globally societies can include nonanthropocentric considerations in decision making frameworks both for questions of terraforming Mars and also for a more local, contemporary set of environmental issues. The second blindspot I seek to correct concerns motivations for attempting terraforming on Mars previously inadequately philosophically elaborated in the published discourse. Specifically, the nonanthropocentric considerations postulated in the second chapter by various authors writing about terraforming, and elaborated in third with regard to environmental justice, reach their culmination in an ecofeminist ethic of care, sustainability, reproduction, and healthy growth which I uniquely elaborate based on a metaphorical similarity to the relationship between a gardener and a garden. Although at first glance, this metaphor may appear overly domineering, or uncritically paternalistic, I argue a deep understanding of its implications will be eminently beneficial for discussions of what is moral, good, right, and just to do regarding not only whether or not to terraform Mars, but for contemporary environmental concerns as well. Ultimately, extreme caution and a robust precautionary principle are the moral prescriptions arrived at in this thesis for the near term future. Until a sustainable civilization and just society can be established and effectively maintained, efforts to terraform and colonize another planet are practically certain to produce as much that is undesirable as that which might be good.

One of the major themes in environmental philosophy in the twenty-first century has broadly focused on how we experience and value the natural world. Along those lines, the driving question I take up in this project is if our ordinary experiences are seen as interpretations, what is the significance of this for our moral claims about the environment? Drawing on the hermeneutic philosophies of Hans Georg-Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, I examine environmental interpretation as it relates particularly to identity, meaningful action, and the mediating function of the imagination. These three interconnected aspects show both our capability for new understandings related to the natural world, as well as problem of conflicting, yet equally valid, views on environmental value. To explore this tension further I consider the relevance of hermeneutic conceptions of truth and translation for environmental ethics. A hermeneutic notion of truth highlights the difficulties in making strong normative claims about the environment, while a hermeneutic view of translation is helpful in thinking about the otherness of nature and what this means for ecological values. In this project I am particularly interested in the conflict of environmental interpretation and the implications that a hermeneutic frame has for the limits of environmental understanding and value. I argue that hermeneutics and narrative theory shows that we can argue for direct moral consideration of ecological others or the natural world only as merely possible interpretations among others.

<p> What is the most effective problem solving method at the environmental policy table in the context of a radical diversity of worldviews? I answer the question in the dissertation by developing a theory that accommodates diversity in policymaking. My line of reasoning is as follows. </p><p> In Chapter One, I survey the diverse discourse about Global Climate Models in detail. I demonstrate that a radical diversity of worldviews is expressed in the discourse. In Chapter Two, I advance a model of language that is an accurate foundation for discourse in policymaking. In Chapter Three, I consider the best policymaking strategy in view of the language model: idea-based policymaking. I then demonstrate that the policymaking strategy is weakly theorized. I introduce a theory of its operation at the end of Chapter Three, and develop it in detail in Chapters Four and Five. Because there is not currently a model, I consider an analogue model in play and explain the analogy in Chapter Four. I apply the analogue to the policy table in Chapter Five and fully develop an operational theory to explicate the problem solving method in policymaking. </p><p> The force of the dissertation's contribution is made in Chapters Three to Five. Chapters One and Two are a ground of the argument. </p><p> In Chapters Three to Five, I argue that idea-based policymaking is a promising form of policymaking practice because social learning is the operative problem-solving mechanism. In social learning: (1) the worldviews of the actors are leveraged in discourse and (2) power relations are dynamically distributed among actors (Hajer). The result is a fortified problem solving operation. This is because in (1) the heterogeneous problem solving resources of the group members are distributed and in (2) social learning shifts power relations by dislodging, mediating, and subsuming a new power regime. </p><p> In summary, the dissertation is a contribution in applied philosophy. I comprehensively demonstrate that an effective policymaking method will manage the incommensurability of worldview and stipulate a problem solving method that engages the basic condition of policymaking&mdash;radical diversity&mdash;rather than denies it.</p>

<p> The author argues that ecocriticism has overlooked important works of mid-20th-century American literature because of their unorthodox approaches to writing about nature. These unorthodox approaches revolve around the use of humor and play to formulate arguments about nature. The author argues that because ecocriticism as a political critique emphasizes ecological catastrophe, humor and ludic writing tend to get ignored in the critical discussion. The author expresses the desire to expand the conversation on ludic texts. The author argues that two texts with relatively little ecocritical attention, Thomas Pynchon&rsquo;s <i>Gravity&rsquo;s Rainbow</i> and Vladimir Nabokov&rsquo;s <i>Pale Fire,</i> use the aesthetic theories of Friedrich Nietzsche to explain the role of the non-human in human civilization. </p><p> In the first chapter, Vladimir Nabokov&rsquo;s <i>Pale Fire</i> is argued to be a novel that is about the natural source of human aesthetic production. The author synthesizes studies of the novel and argues that Nabokov&rsquo;s novel, both in its language and form, valorizes mimesis as the source of all aesthetic production. Nabokov&rsquo;s belief in some form of design is examined through mimicry, and is found to permeate the novel through structural and descriptive references to games and nature. Nabokov is found to be influenced by the theories of Friedrich Nietzsche, Johan Huizinga, and Walter Benjamin. Nabokov ultimately finds that the justification for the world is aesthetic, that nature is important to humans as the origin of all artistic impulses. </p><p> The second chapter reads Thomas Pynchon&rsquo;s <i>Gravity&rsquo;s Rainbow</i> through the many references to Nietzsche&rsquo;s <i> Birth of Tragedy,</i> finding that the novel sets nature against civilization according to Nietzsche&rsquo;s distinction between the Dionysian and the Apollonian. The author finds that the novel holds up the natural world as a counter-force to the capitalist impulse to control and exploit the natural and human worlds. The author examines how Pynchon uses Dionysian tropes like drunkenness, absurdity, music, and feelings of oneness in the novel in moments of resistance to the dominant order. </p><p> The conclusion suggests that the work of Friedrich Nietzsche ought to be examined as an influential source for modern views on the value of nature. </p>

<p>Dwelling with the alterity of the deep sea, my dissertation, "Wild Blue Media: Thinking Through Seawater," considers how the ocean environment produces cognitively estranging conditions for conceptualizing media and media theory. Concepts in media theory have thus far exhibited what I call a "terrestrial bias," theorizing primarily dry technologies through a language whose metaphorics have developed through human lives lived on land, rather than in the volume of the sea. In order to better understand the "terrestrial bias" in media theory, I develop a critical method of "conceptual displacement" that involves submerging key concepts in media theory underwater, engaging both literary texts and digital media. Specifically, I turn to Vilém Flusser's speculative fiction text "Vampyroteuthis Infernalis" to rethink "inscription"; ocean data visualizations to rethink "database"; and Jacques Cousteau's diving narratives to rethink "interface." Focusing on the ocean expands the critical discussion of the relation between embodiment and knowledge taken up by feminist science studies, and necessitates the inclusion of the environmental conditions for knowing; our milieu determines the possibilities of our media, and the way that we theorize our media in language. The ocean thus serves as an epistemic environment for thought that estranges us from our terrestrial habits of perception and ways of speaking about media, providing an important check on the limits of theory and terrestrial knowledge production, compelling us to have the humility to continually try to see--and describe--differently. </p><p>Turning to the ocean to rethink concepts in media theory makes apparent the interrelation between technology, desire, ecology, and the survival of human communities. While media theory has long been oriented toward preservation and culture contexts of recording, studying media in ocean contexts requires that we consider conditions that are necessarily but contingently ephemeral. Yet to engage with the ephemeral is also to engage with issues of mortality and the desire towards preservation--of what we want to remain--a question that especially haunts coastal communities vulnerable to sea-level rise. What the ocean teaches us, then, is to reflect on what we want our media technologies to do, as well as the epistemological question of how we are habituated to see and perceive. By considering the ocean as a medium and as an estranging milieu for reconsidering media concepts, I argue for an expanded definition of "media" that accounts for the technicity of natural elements, considering how media futures are not only a matter of new digital innovations, but fundamentally imbricated with the archaic materiality of the analog.</p> / Dissertation

Within the environmental aesthetics literature, there is a noticeable schism between two general approaches to understanding the aesthetic value of nature: the ambient approach and the narrative approach. Ambient thinkers focus on the character of aesthetic appreciation of nature, the way in which one is embedded in multi-sensory environment. These ambient theorists emphasize the importance of those aesthetic experiences that are difficult to articulate. Narrative thinkers argue that aesthetic appreciation of nature is enhanced and enriched by narratives that are relevant to the natural object or environment encountered. Certain narratives – usually those based on scientific knowledge – encourage a depth of appreciation that is inaccessible to those unfamiliar with the narratives. In this dissertation, I attempt to articulate an account of environmental aesthetic experience that does justice to both of these approaches by drawing on the resources of philosophical hermeneutics, and especially on the aesthetic theory of Hans-Georg Gadamer. The most important aspects of Gadamer's work for environmental aesthetics are his phenomenology of play, his revival of practical philosophy, and his emphasis on the interpretive character of all understanding. His discussion of play fleshes out the core of ambient accounts, his focus on interpretation explains the insights of narrative accounts, and the two accounts are tied together by his attention to practice.

In this dissertation, I analyze climate change as a collective action problem. Decades of consistent policy and indeed institutional failure suggest that climate change cannot be managed top-down by experts and politicians alone. Climate communicators must therefore take up the challenge of ethically and politically motivating public action on this issue. Unfortunately, the ethical and political logic of climate response presents profound challenges to public motivation that appears to confound thinkers in the climate literature across disciplines. I thus endeavors to rethink the climate situation today from the perspective of collective motivation. Doing justice to the complexities of this multifaceted problematic demands interdisciplinary analysis, but the equally pressing need for general comprehension requires philosophical synthesis. For the climate issue is at once global and intergenerational in scale, and is systemic to modern social and cultural institutions that have long-evolved to structure the way people relate to each other, to nature, and ultimately to the world of everyday experience. My thesis, then, is that this collective action problem is ultimately an existential problem that calls for an existential response. Specifically, I argue that the ethical and political implications of climate response are largely received as an “existential threat” to the extent that they unsettle the integrity of everyday existence lived in common. That is, the deeper implications of this issue roundly contradict the background structures of “lifeworld identity” informing collective experience at some of the most general (socio-cultural) levels of being in the world. The consequences of this existential problem present us with two “quandaries” that must be addressed coherently. The “quandary of denial” signifies the largely ethical challenges of motivating a collective response to the historical and material realities of the climate ‘problem.’ The “quandary of transition,” by contrast, speaks to the relatively political challenges of relating the climate problem as such to climate ‘solutions’ that are collectively meaningful enough to positively inspire viable ways forward. Finally, I conclude by drawing on Maurice Merleau-Ponty to advance a critical phenomenology of public motivation responsive to these two moments of the existential problem.

This work is part of a wider personal and eco-cultural wondering about how to restore and conserve the pleasure of living aligned with the ecology of life. There is a growing concern that one of the biggest challenges we have is to generate sustainable communities. Based on this, the research particularly deals with the following two questions: What is ecological design? And, how does Ecological Design both emerge from, and contribute to, the constitution and conservation of human sustainable communities in our Western-European culture? The research proposes that the only way to understand the practice of ecological design is by dealing with the broader dynamics of human ecology—or, ultimately with what it means to be a human being. Based on a systemic, interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approach, the research first explores the phenomenological and bio-cognitive dynamics that generate an ongoing, embodied–ecological epistemology of the human-Nature relationship, thereby overcoming the modern dualism of mind-body and man-nature. It suggests that design ineluctably takes place in this embodied-ecological domain—particularly, in an ongoing eco-cultural network of interactions. Then it explores the emotional basis of human intentionality and behaviour and, based on the work of the biologist Humberto Maturana, proposes that human beings exist in a dynamic interweaving of languaging and emotioning in an eco-cultural medium. This is synthesized through the notion of conversation. The research claims that to design is to converse. Based on this, the research then explores biological and philosophical accounts of the emotion of loving. By exploring basic elements of a synthesis of the ecology of loving, the research suggests that this emotion is the only one that allows the emergence and cultivation of intimate socio-ecological relationships. Accordingly, it also argues that loving is the foundation of environmental ethics and ultimately, the practice of ecological design. The research also explores the conscious sense and practice of homing (or home-making). It argues that homing and loving are interdependent; they form a circular causality—homing-in-love. The research suggests that homing-in-love is what we do when we design ecologically. Finally, the research explores a general framework that may contribute to the process of recovering the vital dynamics of homing-in-love in a global age. In a four-month ethnographic investigation of three Western-European ecovillages, the research explores particular designed platforms of conversation as examples of the practice of ecological design from which more sustainable manner of homing are emerging and being cultivated.

abstract: The coyote of the natural world is an anthropomorphic figure that occupies many places within Southwestern Pueblo cultures in oral traditions as well as the natural environs. The modern-day coyote is a marginalized occupant of Southwestern milieu portrayed as an iconic character found in cartooned animations or conceptualized as a shadowed symbol of a doglike creature howling in front of a rising full moon. Coyote is also a label given to a person who transports undocumented immigrants across the United States–Mexico border. This wild dog is known as coyote, Coyote, Canis latrans, tsócki (Keresan for coyote), trickster, Wylie Coyote, and coywolf. When the biology, history, accounts, myths, and cultural constructs are placed together within the spectrum of coyote names or descriptions, a transmergent materiality emerges at the center of those contributing factors. Coyote is many things. It is constantly adapting to the environment in which it has survived for millions of years. The Southwest landscape was first occupied by rudimentary components of life evolving into a place first populated by animals, followed by humans. To a great extent, the continued existence of both animals and humans relies on their ability to obtain food and find a suitable niche in which to live. This dissertation unpacks how the coyote that is embedded in American Pueblo literature and culture depicts a transmergent materiality representing the constantly changing human–animal interface as it interprets the likewise transformative state of food systems in the American Southwest in the present day. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation English 2019

Le projet de cette thèse est d’examiner ce que nous avons appelé le problème du monde, en entendant par là le problème du mode d’apparition d’une totalité intotalisable qui ne se réduit pas à la somme de ce qui apparaît, et le problème du mode d’être de celui qui appartient au monde et qui est également celui pour lequel le monde comme totalité apparaît. Le problème a été examiné dans le cadre de deux philosophies privilégiées : la philosophie kantienne et la phénoménologie husserlienne. La thématique de l’homme comme habitant du monde apparaît au croisement de trois grandes entreprises kantiennes : l’élaboration d’une épistémologie de la géographie physique en tant qu’elle comporte nécessairement un examen des modalités de l’existence de l’homme sur Terre ; le projet d’une réfutation de l’idéalisme, qui conduit à définir l’homme par son appartenance au monde ; la constitution d’une anthropologie pragmatique qui, tout en unifiant les thématiques précédentes les élargit en les intégrant dans la perspective de la destination pratique de l’homme auquel incombe la tâche de réaliser les conditions de son existence mondaine d’agent moral. Chez Husserl, le mode d’apparition du monde comme totalité est expressément élucidé dans le cadre de la phénoménologie de la perception au moyen de la doctrine de l’intentionnalité horizontale, au terme d’un assez long parcours que nous nous efforçons de reconstituer. En revanche, le mode d’être de celui pour lequel le monde apparaît en tant que tel ne fait l’objet de sa part que d’analyses programmatiques, auxquelles nous proposons de donner un prolongement dans la perspective d’une philosophie de l’environnement. / The objective of this study is to inquire into what has been called the problem of the world, i.e. the problem of the mode of apparition of an intotalisable totality which cannot be reduced to the addition of what appears, and the problem of the mode of being of the subject who belongs to the world and to whom the world as totality appears. This problem has been examined with reference to two privileged philosophies : Kant’s philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology. The theme of the inhabitant of the world appears at the meeting-point of three major Kantian undertakings, which are (1) the elaboration of an epistemology of geographical physics that necessarily contains an examination of the modalities of existence of man on Earth ; (2) the project of refuting idealism, which leads to defining man in his belonging to the world ; (3) the constitution of a pragmatic anthropology which, while unifying the foregoing topics, broadens them by integrating them into the perspective of the practical destination of man, upon whom falls the task of realising the conditions of his worldly existence as moral agent. In Husserl’s phenomenology, the concept of horizontal intentionality, developed in the phenomenology of perception, helps to explain the mode of apparition of the world as totality, at the end of a long run of thought which we try to reconstitute from the beginning. By contrast, the mode of being of the subject to whom the world as such appears is only programmatically examined in Husserl’s phenomenology. Our study seeks to give a prolongation to Husserl’s insights on this topic, in the direction of an environmental philosophy.