This doctoral thesis contains three essays on equalization transfers in a fiscal federalism. In Chapter One, we study the impact of equalization transfers in a fiscal federalism on the policies of the regional governments. This chapter presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of a fiscal federalism in which two asymmetric regions provide their residents with non-productive public expenditures (a flow) and public capital (a stock). In our model, each regional government behaves strategically in choosing its policies to maximize the discounted welfare of its own residents, under the equalization transfer scheme. Our analysis indicates that the the tax on the use of the private capital input is equal to zero in the steady state. In addition, we observe that the only change induced by the equalization transfer scheme is an increase in the non-productive public expenditures in less-endowed region (Quebec) with an offsetting fall in the non-productive public expenditures in more-endowed region (Ontario). The results of the numerical exercise we carry out also suggest that an equalization scheme in a federal state lowers the welfare gap between a rich and a poor region. In Chapter Two, we investigate how the equalization transfer formula is determined and how the equalization transfer program affects a region’s policies. This chapter presents a political economy model of equalization payments in a fiscal federalism in which asymmetric regional governments, who care about the welfare of its own residents, lobby the (incumbent) federal government, who takes into consideration both the welfare of the federation and the political support it receives from the states when allocating equalization transfers. It is shown that if the federal government allows politics to distort its economic policy it actively implements an equalization transfer program that is different from the one it would implement if it behaved like a benevolent dictator. The equalization transfer scheme implemented by the federal government induces a fall in the investment of public capital in both regions, and if the political power of the poor region is sufficiently higher than that of the rich province, then the equalization transfer scheme induces a higher level of the non-productive public good in the poor region than in the rich region. A numerical example is provided to illustrate this result. Chapter Three presents a model of equalization transfers in a federation in which each regional government has private information on its own technology for public service delivery. The aim of the federal government is to design an equalization transfer scheme that is Bayesian incentive compatible and satisfies the interim participation constraint in order to achieve the goal of providing residents of a poor region with at least a certain level of utility without imposing an excessive burden on the giving region. We show that the equalization transfers allow the recipient region to raise its private consumption above the level it would have attained in the absence of equalization transfers because some of the transfer is allocated to raise private consumption. Furthermore, it is shown that the equalization transfers are also lower if the federal government can observe the type of the poor region.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2004. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains xviii, 215 p.; also includes graphics. Includes bibliographical references (p. 201-212).

Thesis (M. A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 98-106).

Thesis--Wisconsin. / Vita.

This doctoral thesis contains three essays on equalization transfers in a fiscal federalism. In Chapter One, we study the impact of equalization transfers in a fiscal federalism on the policies of the regional governments. This chapter presents a dynamic general equilibrium model of a fiscal federalism in which two asymmetric regions provide their residents with non-productive public expenditures (a flow) and public capital (a stock). In our model, each regional government behaves strategically in choosing its policies to maximize the discounted welfare of its own residents, under the equalization transfer scheme. Our analysis indicates that the the tax on the use of the private capital input is equal to zero in the steady state. In addition, we observe that the only change induced by the equalization transfer scheme is an increase in the non-productive public expenditures in less-endowed region (Quebec) with an offsetting fall in the non-productive public expenditures in more-endowed region (Ontario). The results of the numerical exercise we carry out also suggest that an equalization scheme in a federal state lowers the welfare gap between a rich and a poor region. In Chapter Two, we investigate how the equalization transfer formula is determined and how the equalization transfer program affects a region’s policies. This chapter presents a political economy model of equalization payments in a fiscal federalism in which asymmetric regional governments, who care about the welfare of its own residents, lobby the (incumbent) federal government, who takes into consideration both the welfare of the federation and the political support it receives from the states when allocating equalization transfers. It is shown that if the federal government allows politics to distort its economic policy it actively implements an equalization transfer program that is different from the one it would implement if it behaved like a benevolent dictator. The equalization transfer scheme implemented by the federal government induces a fall in the investment of public capital in both regions, and if the political power of the poor region is sufficiently higher than that of the rich province, then the equalization transfer scheme induces a higher level of the non-productive public good in the poor region than in the rich region. A numerical example is provided to illustrate this result. Chapter Three presents a model of equalization transfers in a federation in which each regional government has private information on its own technology for public service delivery. The aim of the federal government is to design an equalization transfer scheme that is Bayesian incentive compatible and satisfies the interim participation constraint in order to achieve the goal of providing residents of a poor region with at least a certain level of utility without imposing an excessive burden on the giving region. We show that the equalization transfers allow the recipient region to raise its private consumption above the level it would have attained in the absence of equalization transfers because some of the transfer is allocated to raise private consumption. Furthermore, it is shown that the equalization transfers are also lower if the federal government can observe the type of the poor region.

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教育机会差异是多族群国家存在的普遍现象。多族群国家的少数族群往往面临教育的困境，难以取得和主体族群均等的教育机会，在成就、成绩等多方面均与主体族群有差异。 / 社会学理论认为，族群间教育成就差异未必是族群身份的直接结果，他与族群在社会结构中所处的位置与文化特征相关。但在中国社会变迁的过程中，族群间的教育成就差异不断转变，一些与中国市场化变革相关的教育体制改革，通过家庭背景和文化等中介机制扩大了中国社会的族群间学业成就差异。本研究分析了中国的族群教育成就差异及其形成机制，并讨论了族群教育成就差异在教育扩张和市场化变革过程中的变化趋势。此外，本研究也分析了中国的族群间学业成绩差异以及资源和文化因素对族群学业成绩差异的影响。结构和文化仍然是限制少数族群取得和主体族群一致学业成绩的主要因素。 / 本研究关注中国社会的族群间教育机会差异，包括成就和成绩两方面。以北京大学中国社会科学调查中心设计、实施并公开发布的中国家庭动态追踪调查(Chinese Family Panel Studies, CFPS)中的儿童和成人数据作为分析样本，综合运用了描述性统计、逻辑斯特回归以及最小二乘法回归等方法分析不同因素对儿童的成就和成绩的影响，并采用多重插补法填补遗失数据。基本研究结论如下： / 第一，中国教育机会呈现明显的瓶颈式结构，瓶颈式结构在少数族群中表现更明显；在较低层级的族群教育成就差异更加明显，中国的族群教育成就差异多出现在较低层级中；家庭背景、口和结构以及文化是造成中国的少数族群取得小学入学和升学的主要因素，其中入学阶段地区和语言因素和族群身份有显著的交互作用，使那些居住在经济最为落后地区和汉族文化差异更大的少数族群成为最不利者；市场化的变革改变了使少数族群社会经济地位更加边缘化，同时也拉大了族群间教育成就差异。 / 第二，少数族群和汉族在家庭资本、规模、教育期望和交友等方面与汉族有显著差异，其中资本匮乏是限制少数族群取得学业成绩的中介因素，而教育期望、交友状况等因素均等个人学业成绩相关。 / 第三，在中国不同的少数族群间也有差异，其中模范少数族群如满族、蒙古族和朝鲜族与汉族的社会经济地位差异较小，而其他少数族群和汉族社会经济地位差异较大。因此，中国的少数族群和汉族的差异主要是其他少数族群和汉族的教育成就和学业成绩差异，模范少数族群小学升学概率较汉族少，而小学入学、语文和数学成绩方面与汉族并无差异。 / 第四、本研究显示两种不同的族群教育机会差异，教育成就和学业成绩差异的形成机制并不完全相同。家庭背景尤其是家庭财物资本、父母受教育水平等对子代的教育成就和学业成绩都有显著影响，但籍和地区等制度性因素仅对教育成就产生影响，对个人的学业成绩的影响不显著。 / 基于统计分析的结论，本研究讨论了一些可能促进族群均等的教育政策，包括少数族群经济发展政策、多元文化教育政策以及少数族群教育优惠政策等。 / The disparities of educational opportunities between ethnic groups are common phenomena in multi-ethnic countries. Compared with dominant groups, minority groups usually do not gain equal educational opportunities measured by educational attainment and achievement. / Structure and culture are two major sociological explanations for the disparities of educational attainment between minority and majority groups. It means that the disparities are not due to minority status per se but work through structural and cultural factors associated with ethnic minority groups. In China, these disparities might have enlarged during the periods of education expansion and marketization when educational reform occurred and the criteria for educational selection changed. This research is an analysis of the disparities in educational attainment and achievement between ethnic minority groups and Han Chinese. It illustrates the effects of family background and cultural factors on ethnic minorities’ educational attainment. Moreover, it shows that the ethnic disparities enlarged during the periods of education expansion and market reform. This research also finds that ethnic minorities do not achieve equally because of their lack of capitals. / Using the nationally representative dataset, The Chinese Family Panel Survey 2010, this research employs quantitative methods. A variety of statistical methods are applied in this research. In addition, it uses the multiple imputation method to deal with missing data. The main findings include: / (1) There is a bottle-neck in the structure of educational opportunities, as revealed by the low transition rate from junior high school to senior high school, and the high transition rate from senior high school to tertiary school, and these gaps within minority groups are bigger than they are within the Han majority group. Constrained by the bottle-neck structure, the disparity of educational attainment between ethnic minorities and Hans are more significant in lower educational levels. Further analysis shows that family background, house registration status, residential location, and language are the factors associated with the disparity of educational attainment between minorities and the Han majority. There are interaction effects between minority status on the one hand, and residence in the western region and language on the other hand. Moreover, education expansion and market transition enlarge the social and economic disparities between minority groups and the Han majority, which also indirectly marginalize minorities in education. / (2) Minority ethnic groups are significantly different from the Han Chinese in terms of capitals, educational aspiration and friends. Among those factors, capitals account for minorities’ disadvantage in educational achievement. Educational aspiration and friends are associated with individuals’ educational achievement. / (3) Heterogeneity exists among ethnic minority groups. Some groups, such as Manchurians, Mongolians and Koreans are "model" ethnic minority groups. They are well educated and attain high socioeconomic status. The sensitivity analysis shows there are no disparities of education attainment and achievement between the Han majority and the Manchurian, Mongolian and Korean minority groups. / (4) Family background factors are the major mediator of the disparities between ethnic minority groups and the Han Chinese. Hukou (household registration) status and residence constrain ethnic minority groups’ educational attainment but they do not impact their achievement. / Policy implications are discussed based on those findings. This research emphasizes that economic development policies, multicultural education policies, and educational preferential policies are potential instruments to alleviate the educational disparities between minorities and the Han majority. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 張雯聞. / Thesis (Ph.D.) Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2014. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 127-139). / Abstracts also in English. / Zhang Wenwen.

The central theme is the study of error propagation effects in decision feedback equalizers (DFEs). The thesis contains: a stochastic analysis of error propagation in a tuned DFE; an analysis of the effects of error propagation in a blindly adapted DFE; a deterministic analysis of error propagation through input-output stability ideas; and testing procedures for establishing correct tap convergence in blind adaptation. To a lesser extent, the decision directed equalizer (DDE) is also treated.¶ Characterizing error propagation using finite state Markov process (FSMP) techniques is first considered. We classify how the channel and DFE parameters affect the FSMP model and establish tight bounds on the error probability and mean error recovery time of a tuned DFE. These bounds are shown to be too conservative for practical use and highlight the need for imposing stronger hypotheses on the class of channels for which a DFE may be effectively used.¶ In blind DFE adaptation we show the effect of decision errors is to distort the adaptation relative to the use of a training sequence. The mean square error surface in a LMS type setting is shown to be a concatenation of quadratic functions exposing the possibility of false tap convergence to undesirable DFE parameter settings. Averaging analysis and simulation are used to verify this behaviour on some examples.¶ Error propagation in a tuned DFE is also examined in a deterministic setting. A finite error recovery time problem is set up as an input-output stability problem. Passivity theory is invoked to prove that a DFE can be effectively used on a channel satisfying a simple frequency domain condition. These results give performance bounds which relate well with practice.¶ Testing for false tap convergence in blind adaptation concludes our study. Simple statistic output tests are shown to be capable of discerning correct operation of a DDE. Similar tests are conjectured for the DFE, supported by proofs for the low dimensional cases.

Single-carrier linear modulation techniques combined with frequency-domain equalization provide a viable alternative to multicarrier techniques for combating multipath fading in channels with large delay spread. Such modulations tolerate frequency offset and have well controlled peak to average power ratio. They have comparable complexity to orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) systems, and are more robust to synchronization errors. If error correction coding is used, then information can be iteratively passed between the equalizer and the decoder to improve performance. This is referred to as turbo equalization. To date, several turbo equalization schemes have been proposed, but little work has been done to address the problem of channel estimation for the turbo equalization process. The work in this thesis considers frequency-domain turbo equalization with imperfect channel state information (CSI) at the receiver for different wireless channels. A receiver structure incorporating joint frequency-domain turbo equalization and time- domain channel estimation is developed. The novelty of this scheme lies in the combination of time-domain channel estimation and frequency-domain turbo equalization, and in its extension to high level modulation formats. The performance of the system is investigated by a combination of analysis and computer simulation. It is found that the system performs well over a range of dispersive channels.

published_or_final_version / China Development Studies / Master / Master of Arts in China Development Studies