This project interrogates the claims made for the possibility of collapsing all the various disciplines into one discipline, probably physics, and surely a science, in the name of making clearer the relations between our various fields of knowledge. This is the aim of the radical reductionist, and I take E. O. Wilson's Consilience as exemplary of such attempts. Central to Wilson's method of achieving unity is the new science of evolutionary psychology - itself a re-working of the sociobiology with which Wilson first achieved notoriety. In the on-going project of explaining culture under a Darwinian description, the evolutionary psychologists have begun to suggest explanations for the popularity and content of narrative fiction. Because they are consonant with the rest of science, these biologistic accounts of fiction might be preferable to the accounts traditionally offered by Literary Studies. Consequently, there is a risk that the traditional practices of Literary Studies will be made redundant within the academy and gradually atrophy. The demand is that Literary Studies either makes itself rigorous like the sciences (as with such projects as Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism), or else forfeit its claims to produce knowledge. Aware of this threat, some literary critics embrace forms of relativism in an attempt to deny the unity or effectiveness of scientific knowledge and so neuter the threatened takeover. Among these forms of relativism, Richard Rorty's account seeks to collapse the hierarchy of disciplines and seemingly offers Literary Studies a means of retaining its distinctive approach without denying the effectiveness of scientific knowledge. I aim to show that Literary Studies need not become a science, and that such sciences as evolutionary psychology are neither as threatening as some had feared, nor as useful to literary study as some have hoped.

This study examined the distinguishing physiological characteristics of the disgust reaction across different domains. According to an evolutionary analysis, disgust is a heterogeneous emotion with features that are specific to three distinct domains: pathogens, sex, and morality. Each domain is predicted to take as input information specific to the adaptive problem it evolved to solve and regulate behavior accordingly. The goal of the present study was to investigate whether there are any adaptive physiological differences associated with the disgust response across domains. Participants were asked to imagine acts that elicit pathogen, sexual, and moral disgust. It was hypothesized that there would be both quantitative and qualitative differences in the physiological reactions based on the appropriate functional outputs for the social (moral and sexual) and nonsocial (pathogen) domains. Individual differences in self-report ratings of disgust as well as the role of religiosity in regulating social disgust were also explored. Results showed significant differences in parasympathetic influences on the heart in response to the sexual stimuli but not to the other domains. Also, the self-report ratings showed that females were more sensitive than males to the sexual stimuli but not to pathogens or moral acts. These results lend further support to the dissociation between the functional domains of disgust. Correlations between levels of religiosity and both subjective ratings of fear towards pathogens and levator labii activation when viewing pathogen stimuli were found. This study provides preliminary evidence of dissociations between different domains of disgust and provides a methodological guideline which can help inform future studies of disgust. Implications of the current findings are discussed, as well as limitations of the current methodology and avenues for further exploration.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Bowling Green State University, 2009. / Document formatted into pages; contains x, 125 p. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Humboldt State University, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 59-63). Also available via Humboldt Digital Scholar.

This thesis takes an evolutionary perspective on human psychology. To the extent that inherited tendencies shape behaviour, their design will be fitted to the social environments prevailing as Homo sapiens evolved, in foraging groups, the nearest modem equivalent being hunter-gatherers. From ethnographies of hunter-gatherers, food-sharing and counterdominance were identified as universal. Food-sharing was more thorough than is explicable purely by kinship or reciprocation; one functional effect was to even out the supply of valuable high-variance food. In contrast with the social systems of the other great apes, counter-dominance spread influence widely, preventing the emergence of dominant individuals who could obtain resources disproportionately. Potential paths for the evolution of egalitarian tendencies are discussed. Two falsifiable hypotheses were generated from this perspective. First, sharing will facilitate risk-taking. The predicted effect was confirmed at high risk levels, similar to those faced by hunters. Given that during evolution risk was reduced primarily by social means, social as well as rational factors are treated by the evolved brain as relevant to risky decisions. It is argued that this result may suggest a new perspective on the Group Polarisation experiments. The second hypothesis tested was that an egalitarian environment will produce beneficial effects on individual and social behaviour. The data collected were consistent with the hypothesis: a comparison between three Italian towns showed that measures of health (including cardiovascular mortality), education, social involvement, crime and social perceptions were significantly more positive where co-operatives employed a larger percentage of the population. The evolutionary perspective showed its value as a means of generating novel testable hypotheses.

O objetivo desta pesquisa é explorar a motivação e as potenciais complicações do uso da tecnologia para melhorar fundamentalmente a condição humana. Inicialmente a pesquisa se debruçará sobre alguns pressupostos filosóficos básicos para a discussão deste melhoramento. Para tal será abordado a heurística evolutiva proposta por Anders Sandberg e Nick Bostrom, em seguida será apresentado brevemente alguns traços básicos da condição humana a saber: cognição, moralidade e ligação afetiva de acordo com a perspectiva da psicologia evolucionista, um passo importante na heurística evolutiva supramencionada. A seguir o trabalho versará especificamente sobre melhoramentos que tenham como alvo a própria moralidade humana, inicialmente sobre as fortes motivações de realizar tal melhoramento, e ao final sobre os riscos e problemas tanto filosóficos como técnicos de tentar realizar tal modificação na moralidade humana. Tentativamente, a análise será original ao (1) aceitar pressupostos dos defensores do melhoramento moral, e sua conclusão de que o mesmo é um imperativo caso conduzido de maneira correta, (2) abandonar alguns dos possíveis contra-argumentos, no entanto, também (3) concluir a existência de severos problemas em potencial no que tange ao melhoramento moral / The intent of this research is to investigate the motivations and potential risks of using technology to alter the human condition. Firstly, it will explore some of the basic philosophical assumptions behind such discussions. Hence, it will evaluate the evolutionary heuristics proposed by Anders Sandberg and Nick Bostrom and its potential for solving many issues arising when considering human enhancement, therefore introducting one basic philosophical ground when arguing for or against these modifications. Thence, it will be given an introduction to some basic traits of the human condition, e.g.: cognition, morality and pair-bonding, from the perspective of Evolutionary Psychology. Such traits will be then considered as targets for human enhancement. These are important steps in, and thus a application of, the aforementioned evolutionary heuristics. Secondly, this dissertation will specifically investigate the risks of using technology to alter human morality. It will focus on the possibility that attempting to improve human moral dispositions moral enhancement could in fact yield a future without moral value. This analysis will be tentatively novel in that it will focus on risks that could arise even if the claims of moral enhancement advocates are true and some arguments against it unsound

In his recent book, Moral Minds, Marc Hauser claims that humans are genetically endowed with a moral faculty operating in much the same way as our linguistic faculty, and that this faculty delimits normative moral systems. Further, he states that this work represents the beginning of what will become a science of morality. These claims contrast sharply with the conception of human nature presupposed by many of the dominant Western moral theories. For the most part, these conceptions of human nature are not flattering: they suggest that our natural instincts, in large part, or in whole, are not conducive to living a moral life. Given these presuppositions, such theories typically call for setting aside our natural instincts when determining the basis upon which normative moral theory should be established. This thesis seeks to show that there is a middle ground between these two views. On my account, recent scientific learning about innate traits impacting our behaviour towards others can be employed to construct a conception of human nature that is at odds with that used by a number of the dominant Western moral theories. As the impact of such innate traits is constrained by our analytic intellect, however, I argue that views such as Hauser’s overstate the implications for normative moral theory.

In his recent book, Moral Minds, Marc Hauser claims that humans are genetically endowed with a moral faculty operating in much the same way as our linguistic faculty, and that this faculty delimits normative moral systems. Further, he states that this work represents the beginning of what will become a science of morality. These claims contrast sharply with the conception of human nature presupposed by many of the dominant Western moral theories. For the most part, these conceptions of human nature are not flattering: they suggest that our natural instincts, in large part, or in whole, are not conducive to living a moral life. Given these presuppositions, such theories typically call for setting aside our natural instincts when determining the basis upon which normative moral theory should be established. This thesis seeks to show that there is a middle ground between these two views. On my account, recent scientific learning about innate traits impacting our behaviour towards others can be employed to construct a conception of human nature that is at odds with that used by a number of the dominant Western moral theories. As the impact of such innate traits is constrained by our analytic intellect, however, I argue that views such as Hauser’s overstate the implications for normative moral theory.

This dissertation consists of four manuscripts on the emotion of disgust, all of which are published or in press. These papers report studies linking the emotion of disgust with areas of psychology to which it has seldom been connected. Paper 1 reports findings linking disgust with stress and satiation, providing support for an a priori hypothesis generated on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of how these inputs should affect disease avoidance behavior. Paper 2 reports the first findings linking disgust with mating strategy, two important areas of psychology that have theoretical relevance for one another but whose connection has yet to be explored. Paper 3 presents the first solid empirical evidence that disgust sensitivity predicts food neophobia. This work also found a theoretically interesting, but unpredicted, connection between food neophobia and mating strategy. Paper 4 pans back, presenting a broader evolutionary framework on the emotions and providing a variety of novel empirical hypotheses for both disgust and sexual arousal. The dissertation then concludes by presenting important questions for future research and describing experiments currently underway to answer questions emerging from this line of research. As a whole, this dissertation and research program aim to a) build bridges between disgust and other domains of psychology such as stress and human mating, b) make methodological contributions to research on disgust, and c) present an evolutionary framework that carries conceptual and empirical implications for disgust and for a broad array of other emotions. / text