Uma das características que nos distinguem de outros seres vivos é nossa cultura. Entretanto, como comportamentos não fossilizam, é difícil reconstruir o passado para gerar insights sobre por que nos tornamos o que somos hoje. Juntamente com dados etnográficos e experimentais, os modelos matemáticos têm sido utilizados para abordar a questão sobre como nossos comportamentos foram moldados pela evolução. Esta tese está dividida em duas partes. Na primeira parte, discutiremos sobre seleção multinível e sobre como o framework matemático chamado Two-level Fisher Wright (TLFW) pode nos ajudar a entender a evolução da cooperação em populações humanas. Após descrevermos o problema da cooperação através do uso de ferramentas de teoria dos jogos, revisamos algumas das teorias atuais sobre por que a cooperação evoluiu. Em seguida, empregamos o framework TLFW ao problema da emergência de altruísmo em populações de caçadores-coletores, considerando uma situação em que o conflito entre grupos direciona a seleção. Na segunda parte, abordamos o tópico de diversidade linguística e apresentamos a importância de se estudar a competição entre línguas para ajudar a preservá-las. Traçando um paralelo entre a evolução das línguas e a evolução de normas sociais, introduzimos um modelo para analisar a persistência de dialetos, quando existe competição com uma língua padrão nacional. / One of the features that distinguish human beings from other living species is our culture. However, since behaviors do not fossilize, it is difficult to reconstruct the past to get insights about why we are who we are. Along with ethnographic and experimental data, mathematical models have been used to address the question of how our behaviors were shaped by evolution. This thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part, we will discuss multilevel selection and how the mathematical framework Two-Level Fisher-Wright (TLFW) can help us to understand the evolution of cooperation in human populations. After describing the problem of cooperation by using game theory, we review some of the present theories about why cooperation has evolved. Then, we apply the TLFW framework to the problem of the evolution of altruism in populations of hunter-gatherers, considering a situation in which group conflict drives selection. In the second part, we discuss language diversity and present the importance of studying the competition between languages for helping to preserve them. By drawing a parallel between the evolution of language and social norms, we introduce a mathematical model to analyze the persistence of dialects competing against a national standard language.

The results section of my thesis includes three chapters. The first two chapters are on theoretical game theory. In both chapters, by mathematical modelling and game theoretical tools, I am predicting the behaviour of the players in some real world issues. Hoteling-Downs model plays an important role in the modern political interpretations. The first chapter of this study investigates an extension of Hoteling-Downs model to have multi-dimensional strategy space and asymmetric candidates. Chapter 3 looks into the inspection game where the inspections are not the same in the series of sequential inspections. By modelling the game as a series of recursive zero-sum games I find the optimal strategy of the players in the equilibrium. The forth chapter investigates direct optimization methods for large scale problems. Using Matlab implementations of Genetic and Nelder-Mead algorithms, I compare the efficiency and accuracy of the most famous direct optimization methods for unconstraint optimization problems based on differing number of variables.

This dissertation studies firms' strategic interactions in anticipation of random service disruption following technology failure. In particular it is aimed at understanding how contracting decisions between a vendor and one or multiple clients affect the firms' subsequent decisions to ensure disruption response and recovery are managed as efficiently as possible. This dissertation consists of three studies that were written as standalone papers seeking to contribute to the literature on contract design and technology management in operations management. Together, the three studies justify the importance of structuring the right incentives to mitigate disruption risks. In the first study we contribute to this literature by means of an analytical model which we use to examine how a client and vendor should balance investments in response capacity when both parties' efforts are critical in resolving disruption and each may have different risk preferences. We study the difference in the client's optimal expected utility between a case in which investment in response capacity is observable and a case in which it is not and refer to the difference in outcomes between the two cases as the cost of complexity. Firstly, we show that the cost of complexity to the client is decreasing in the risk aversion of vendor but increasing in her own risk aversion. Secondly, we find that a larger difference in risk aversion between a client and vendor leads to underinvestment in system uptime in case the client's investment is observable, yet the opposite happens when the client’s investment is not observable. In the second study we further examine the context of the first study through a controlled experiment. We examine how differences in risk aversion and access to information on a contracting partner’s risk preferences interact in affecting contracting and investment decisions between the client and vendor. Comparing subject decisions with the conditionally optimal benchmarks we arrive at two observations that highlight possible heuristic decision biases. Firstly, subjects tend to set and hold on to an inefficiently high investment level even though it is theoretically optimal to adjust decisions under changing differences in risk preferences. Secondly, subjects tend to set and hold on to a penalty that is too high when interacting with more risk averse vendors and too low in case the vendor is equally risk averse. Furthermore, cognitive feedback on the vendor’s risk aversion appears to have counterproductive effects on subject’s performance in the experiment, suggesting cognitive overload can have a reinforcing effect on the heuristic decision biases observed. In the third study we construct a new analytical model to examine the effect of contract design on a provider's response capacity allocation in a setting where multiple clients may be disrupted and available response capacity is limited. The results show that while clients may be incentivized to identify and report network disruptions, competition for scarce emergency resources and the required investment in understanding their own exposure may incentivize clients to deliberately miscommunicate with the vendor.

Trust and speech are both essential aspects of human interaction. On the one hand, trust is necessary for vocal communication to be meaningful. On the other hand, humans have developed a way to infer someone’s trustworthiness from their voice, as well as to signal their own. Yet, research on trustworthiness attributions to speakers is scarce and contradictory, and very often uses explicit data, which do not predict actual trusting behaviour. However, measuring behaviour is very important to have an actual representation of trust. This thesis contains 5 experiments aimed at examining the influence of various voice characteristics — including accent, prosody, emotional expression and naturalness — on trusting behaviours towards virtual players and robots. The experiments have the "investment game"—a method derived from game theory, which allows to measure implicit trustworthiness attributions over time — as their main methodology. Results show that standard accents, high pitch, slow articulation rate and smiling voice generally increase trusting behaviours towards a virtual agent, and a synthetic voice generally elicits higher trustworthiness judgments towards a robot. The findings also suggest that different voice characteristics influence trusting behaviours with different temporal dynamics. Furthermore, the actual behaviour of the various speaking agents was modified to be more or less trustworthy, and results show that people’s trusting behaviours develop over time accordingly. Also, people reinforce their trust towards speakers that they deem particularly trustworthy when these speakers are indeed trustworthy, but punish them when they are not. This suggests that people’s trusting behaviours might also be influenced by the congruency of their first impressions with the actual experience of the speaker’s trustworthiness — a "congruency effect". This has important implications in the context of Human–Machine Interaction, for example for assessing users’ reactions to speaking machines which might not always function properly. Taken together, the results suggest that voice influences trusting behaviour, and that first impressions of a speaker’s trustworthiness based on vocal cues might not be indicative of future trusting behaviours, and that trust should be measured dynamically.

Neste projeto analisamos jogos de formação de redes que são variantes do problema da floresta de Steiner, nos quais indivíduos desejam conectar conjuntos de vértices terminais em um grafo de forma a minimizar seus custos, podendo dividir o custo das arestas com os demais participantes. Estudamos como o método de divisão de custos influencia na existência e na qualidade dos equilíbrios desses jogos em comparação com o valor da solução ótima centralizada. / In this project we analyze network formation games that are variants of the Steiner forest problem, in which individuals wish to connect sets of terminal vertices of a graph in a way that minimizes their costs, being able to divide the cost of an edge with the other participants. We study how the method used to divide the costs influences the existence and quality of the equilibria of these games in relation to the centralized optimal solution.

O presente trabalho busca apresentar uma aplicação da teoria dos jogos, de modo a complementar a literatura que utiliza esse referencial teórico e alcançar conclusões pertinentes que desafiam o senso comum. O assunto trabalhado são os debates políticos televisivos e o excesso de acusações realizadas pelos participantes. Através de premissas e expectativas dos jogos não cooperativos, que foram aplicadas sobre os debates de 2º turno das eleições presidenciais de 1989, 2006, 2010 e 2014, a hipótese de que a razão de tal comportamento é a própria organização do jogo, e não uma eventual falta de propostas a serem apresentadas pelos políticos, não é refutada empiricamente. Além disso, sugestões de mudanças de regras desses programas são realizadas, de modo que seu objetivo principal, a exposição de planos de governo, passe a ser atingido. / The present work seeks to present an application of the Game Theory, in order to complement the literature that uses this theoretical reference and to reach pertinent conclusions that defy common sense. The topic that is going to be studied are the televised political debates and the excess of accusations made by the participants. Through assumptions and expectations of non-cooperative games, that were applied to the 2nd round debates of the 1989, 2006, 2010 and 2014 presidential elections, the hypothesis that the reason for such behavior is the organization of the game, not an eventual lack of proposals by the political parties, is not empirically refuted. In addition, suggestions for changes in the rules of these programs are made, in order to ensure that the primary debates\' goal of exposing government plans is reached.

by Lo Ting Shek = 複雜適應系統中的個體為本模型 / 盧庭碩. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2000. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 105-107). / Text in English; abstracts in English and Chinese. / by Lo Ting Shek = Fu za shi ying xi tong zhong de ge ti wei ben mo xing / Lu Tingshuo. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2 --- Minority game --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1 --- The model --- p.9 / Chapter 2.2 --- Review on selected work on MG --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Market efficiency and Phase transition --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2.2 --- Crowd effect in MG --- p.17 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- Hamming distance between strategies --- p.19 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- Statistical mechanics of systems with heterogeneous agents --- p.21 / Chapter 3 --- Theory of the minority game --- p.23 / Chapter 3.1 --- Formalism --- p.23 / Chapter 3.2 --- Discussion --- p.31 / Chapter 4 --- Evolutionary Minority Game --- p.33 / Chapter 4.1 --- Model --- p.33 / Chapter 4.2 --- Results --- p.36 / Chapter 4.3 --- Discussion --- p.38 / Chapter 5 --- Theory of the Evolutionary Minority game --- p.43 / Chapter 5.1 --- The theory of D'hulst and Rodgers [1] --- p.44 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Discussion on the D'hulst and Rodgers's theory --- p.51 / Chapter 5.2 --- Theory of EMG [2] --- p.54 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Formalism --- p.55 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Results --- p.60 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Discussion --- p.66 / Chapter 6 --- Evolutionary Minority Game with arbitrary cutoffs --- p.68 / Chapter 6.1 --- Model --- p.68 / Chapter 6.2 --- Results --- p.69 / Chapter 6.3 --- Theory --- p.76 / Chapter 6.4 --- Discussion --- p.85 / Chapter 7 --- Evolutionary minority game with heterogeneous strategy distribution --- p.88 / Chapter 7.1 --- Model --- p.89 / Chapter 7.2 --- Results --- p.90 / Chapter 7.3 --- Discussion --- p.99 / Chapter 8 --- Conclusion --- p.103

by Tsang Wai-Hung. / Thesis sumbitted in: December 1997. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 46-48). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Acknowledgements --- p.ii / Abstract --- p.iii / Table of Contents --- p.v / Chapter / Chapter I. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- Model and Main Results --- p.8 / Chapter III. --- Proofs --- p.16 / Chapter IV. --- Correlated Equilibrium and Myopic-Consistent Equilibrium --- p.29 / Chapter V. --- Application --- p.33 / Chapter VI. --- Conclusion --- p.36 / Chapter VII. --- Appendix --- p.37 / Reference --- p.46

This dissertation studies several problems centered around developing a better understanding of the energy efficiency of cooperative wireless communication systems. Cooperative communication is a technique where two or more nodes in a wireless network pool their antenna resources to form a "virtual antenna array". Over the last decade, researchers have shown that many of the benefits of real antenna arrays, e.g. spatial diversity, increased range, and/or decreased transmission energy, can be achieved by nodes using cooperative transmission. This dissertation extends the current body of knowledge by providing a comprehensive study of the energy efficiency of two-source cooperative transmission under differing assumptions about channel state knowledge, cooperative protocol, and node selfishness. The first part of this dissertation analyzes the effect of channel state information on the optimum energy allocation and energy efficiency of a simple cooperative transmission protocol called "orthogonal amplify-and-forward" (OAF). The source nodes are required to achieve a quality-of service (QoS) constraint, e.g. signal to noise ratio or outage probability, at the destination. Since a QoS constraint does not specify a unique transmit energy allocation when the nodes use OAF cooperative transmission, minimum total energy strategies are provided for both short-term and long-term QoS constraints. For independent Rayleigh fading channels, full knowledge of the channel state at both of the sources and at the destination is shown to significantly improve the energy efficiency of OAF cooperative transmission as well as direct (non-cooperative) transmission. The results also demonstrate how channel state knowledge affects the minimum total energy allocation strategy. Under identical channel state knowledge assumptions, the results demonstrate that OAF cooperative transmission tends to have better energy efficiency than direct transmission over a wide range of channel conditions. The second part of this dissertation focuses on the development of an opportunistic hybrid cooperative transmission protocol that achieves increased energy efficiency by not only optimizing the resource allocation but also by selecting the most energy efficient cooperative transmission protocol from a set of available protocols according to the current channel state. The protocols considered in the development of the hybrid cooperative transmission protocol include compress-and-forward (CF), estimate-and-forward (EF), non-orthogonal amplify-and-forward (NAF), and decode-and-forward (DF). Instantaneous capacity results are analyzed under the assumption of full channel state knowledge at both of the sources and the destination node. Numerical results are presented showing that the delay limited capacity and outage probability of the hybrid cooperative transmission protocol are superior to that of any single protocol and are also close to the cut-set bound over a wide range of channel conditions. The final part of this dissertation focuses on the issue of node selfishness in cooperative transmission. It is common to assume in networks with a central authority, e.g. military networks, that nodes will always be willing to offer help to other nodes when requested to do so. This assumption may not be valid in ad hoc networks operating without a central authority. This section of the dissertation considers the effect selfish behavior on the energy efficiency of cooperative communication systems. Using tools from non-cooperative game theory, a two-player relaying game is formulated and analyzed in non-fading and fading channel scenarios. In non-fading channels, it is shown that a cooperative equilibrium can exist between two self-interested sources given that the end of the cooperative interaction is uncertain, that the sources can achieve mutual benefit through cooperation, and that the sources are sufficiently patient in the sense that they value future payoffs. In fading channels, a cooperative conditional trigger strategy is proposed and shown to be an equilibrium of the two-player game. Sources following this strategy are shown to achieve an energy efficiency very close to that of a centrally-controlled system when they are sufficiently patient. The results in this section show that cooperation can often be established between two purely self-interested sources without the development of extrinsic incentive mechanisms like virtual currency.

Online networks of individuals have been used to solve a number of problems in a scale that would not be possible if not within a connected, virtual and social environment such as the internet. However, the quality of solutions provided by individuals of an online network can vary significantly thus making work quality unreliable. This dissertation investigates factors that can influence the quality of the work output of individuals in online social networks. Specifically, we show that when solving tasks with small duration (under 5 minutes), also known as microtasks, individuals decision making will be strongly biased by costs of searching (and evaluating) options rather than financial or non-financial incentives. Indeed, we are able to show that we can influence individuals decisions, when solving problems, by rearranging elements visually to modify an the search sequence of an individual, be it by designing the virtual work environment or manipulating which options are first shown in non-controlled environments such as the Amazon Mechanical Turk labor market. We performed several experiments in online networks where individuals are invited to work on tasks with varying degrees of difficulty within three settings: mathematical games with objective truth (Sudoku and SAT instances), surveys with subjective evaluation (public policy polling) and labor markets (Amazon Mechanical Turk). We show that the time spent solving problems and the user interface are more relevant to the quality of work output than previous research have assumed and that individuals do not change this behavior while solving the sets of problems. Finally, to complement our study of online problem-solving, we present additional experiments in an online labor market (Amazon Mechanical Turk) that agrees with our networked experiments, shedding new light on how and why people solve problems.