published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Social Sciences

published_or_final_version / Urban Studies / Master / Master of Social Sciences

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Social Sciences

published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / Architecture / Master / Master of Philosophy

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No description available.

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This thesis examines the changing role of British Columbia's municipal governments in affordable housing policy. In recent years, the federal government of Canada has withdrawn from active involvement in affordable housing provision, and has passed responsibility back to the provinces. The government of British Columbia has, in turn, amended its Municipal Act through Bills 20 (1992), 57 (1993) and 31 (1994), to grant municipal governments increased planning powers in the field of affordable housing. This thesis examines the responses of municipal governments to these changes and specifically investigates whether the decentralization of responsibility has to led to policy innovation. This research question is addressed in three ways. First, through a review of the theoretical literature and legislation, a discussion is presented concerning the issue of decentralization and the ways it has been enacted in the case of housing policy in British Columbia. Secondly, the results of a postal survey of 52 municipalities in British Columbia are presented, reflecting the range of local responses to the provincial housing legislation. Thirdly, case studies, derived from key informant interviews and document analysis in three municipalities (Burnaby, Sidney and Prince George) are presented. These provide more detailed illustrations of housing strategies in different geographical contexts. The research suggests that housing is a dynamic area of public policy in British Columbia, with a distinct pattern of innovation. In particular, some 'entrepreneurial' municipalities exhibited a shorter response time in reacting to the provincial legislation, and have adopted more innovative approaches to housing policy; these in turn, serve as examples to other jurisdictions. The wide range of innovative housing strategies adopted by local governments across the province, which are highlighted in this thesis, suggest that decentralization has ensured the potential for a greater fit between the preferences and needs of a particular locale. To the extent that it provides municipalities with the powers and resources they need, the decentralization policy allows communities to capitalize on their existing strengths and to more readily meet their housing needs.

In this dissertation, I examine two research questions. In chapters 2 and 3, based on idea of reference value that was first proposed by Kahneman and Tversky, I look at a potential house seller’s pricing strategy when the reference value plays a role. In chapter 2, I focus on the reference-dependence and its implications on loss aversion behavior, and I compare model predictions with documented empirical findings in the literature. In particular, I show that the stylized empirical evidence in the literature has relatively limited power on testing loss aversion, and I provide new specifications that aim to correctly test the loss aversion effect. In chapter 3, I examine a reference-dependent seller’s pricing strategy in a less heterogeneous housing market such as the multi-unit residential market. Acknowledging the fact that units in the same building serve as close substitutes for each other, I show that the recent transaction price on a unit in the same building may generate two signaling effects. First, the average willingness to pay among buyers is positively correlated with the observed price, which generates a spatio-temporal autocorrelation effect; second, after observing the prior price, the heterogeneity of the potential buyer’s willingness to pay decreases, inducing house sellers to mark down their asking prices. In chapter 4, I examine the power of monitoring and forcing contract on improving the managerial efficiency of REITs. I put particular emphasis on its implications regarding the choice of advisor type in REITs. I show that, for both internal and external advisors, increasing levels of monitoring power will increase their equilibrium effort under a stochastic forcing contract. Furthermore, I show that a crucial driving force regarding advisor choice is the heterogeneity of monitoring power between internal and external advisors and across REIT firms. Provided that the gap of monitoring power is large enough between internal and external advisors, shareholders could make use of the heterogeneity, and induce higher effort from external advisors. Hence, I am able to provide a theoretical justification regarding the potential appeal of an external managerial structure, which is usually regarded as being inferior to an internal managerial structure.