Thèse (M.A.)--Université Laval, 1998. / Bibliogr. Publié aussi en version électronique.

Zugl.: Diss. Univ. Berlin (Humboldt-Universität), 2007. / Literaturverzeichnis: S. 394-412.

Zugl.: Marburg, Univ., Diss., 2006/07.

Thèse (M.A.)--Université Laval, 1997. / Bibliogr.: f. [90]-92. Publié aussi en version électronique.

Marburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2004.

Thesis (Ph. D.--Philosophy)--Catholic University of America, 2002. / Typescript. Also microfilm. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 289-326).

Th. cpl. : Lett. : Paris : 1915.

Th. 3e cycle--Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines--Université de Tunis. / Bibliogr. p. 187-189. Index.

For Kant the religious is less an independent domain of consciousness with its own laws of synthesis than a contested territory which critique must defend against both the dogmatic pretensions of speculative philosophy and an ecclesiastical orthodoxy determined to deprive reason of its authority. The result is a religion within the limits of reason alone, a rational faith which resists the false promise of knowledge through transcendent revelation but yields a practical faith in the immanent field of action. It is traditionally asserted that Kant's rational faith is the most refined expression of the aporia at which the Enlightenment arrives when philosophy and religion, rational and positive authority, become opposed. This thesis addresses the way in which Kant's confidence in the idea of an invisible church as the natural meeting-place of religion and philosophy - and to which all belong by virtue of their reason - is modulated by his understanding of the necessity of the visible church as an institution that, given certain precautions, can mediate the political concern with coercive law and the philosophical concern with freedom. The thesis has an Introduction and a Conclusion. The main body of the text divides into two sections, the first with two chapters, the second with four. The Introduction gives an account of the Enlightenment diremption between religion and philosophy, faith and reason, and its genesis in the Reformation. In the first chapter, we assess Kant's treatment of the speculative proofs in the light of Mendelssohn's description of him as der Allzermalrnende, the restricted role he retains for transcendental theology and the Ideal, and the light this sheds upon his alleged Deism. In the second, we discuss his moral proof and ethicotheology and the conjunction of ethics and religion that this necessitates. Section Two addresses the genesis of his realisation that the visible, institutional church must assume the responsibility for the preparation of the establishment of a divine ethical state on earth: chapter three considers the issue of censorship surrounding Kant's religious writings and the notion of religion as the 'focal point of Enlightenment'; chapter four, Kant's notion of the visible, its relation to what we shall formulate as the logic of the staff, and the development of the concept of the exemplarity of Christ; chapter five, the concept of the expedient as a figure which dictates the function of the letter and historical faith in their relation to the visible church; chapter six, Kant's defence of ethics and religion against the dangers of fanatical interiority and the corresponding attempt to balance out the political duty to civil society and the rational duty to the ethical commonwealth. In the Conclusion, we address the question of why Kant's philosophy of religion was to offend both the religious orthodox and the philosophical Enlightenment.

How do concepts mediate the relation between minds and the world? This is the main topic of John McDowell's Mind and World where McDowell attempts to dissolve a number of dualisms making use of a particular philosophical methodology which I identify as a version of Wittgenstein's quietism. This thesis consists of a critical analysis of a number of dualisms which McDowell attempts to dissolve in Mind and World. These include the Kantian dualism of sensibility and understanding, the dualism of conceptual versus non conceptual content, the dualism of scheme and content and the dualism of reason and nature. These dichotomies are all intricately intertwined and can be seen to be subsumed by the main topic of this thesis, namely, thinking and the world. McDowell persuasively draws attention to the unsustainability of particular philosophical positions between which philosophers have 'oscillated' such as coherentism and the given. However I claim that he does not go far enough in his attempt as a quietist to achieve peace for philosophy as traditional dichotomies such as that of realism and anti-realism still appear to exert a grip on his thinking. In this regard, 1 argue that, although McDowell’s work indicates the viability of quietism in addressing seemingly intractable philosophical positions, it would have gained by incorporating insights from European phenomenologists, such as Heidegger, who have been as intent as McDowell on reworking traditional dualisms. McDowell’s quietist methodology plays an important role in Mind and World and some of the criticism that has been directed towards his work displays a lack of appreciation of this method. I claim that a proper understanding of McDowell's version of quietism is important for a correct understanding of this text.