Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1967. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Delaware, 2005. / Principal faculty advisor: Lawrence H. Cohen, Dept. of Psychology. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (MA(Philosophy)--University of Pretoria, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Lund University, 1994. / Summary in English. Includes bibliographical references (p. 193-200).

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2007. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on October 25, 2007) Includes bibliographical references.

La question de l’émancipation individuelle est présente dans l’œuvre de Gide dès ses débuts littéraires. Liée à la découverte de son cas particulier, qui fonde sa singularité, cette question est d’abord posée par Gide sur le plan moral. Progressivement, la critique morale débouche sur une critique sociale, l’œuvre gidienne esquissant une réflexion sur les formes et les enjeux de la domination sociale exercée aussi bien sur les corps étrangers dans la société que sur d’autres groupes sociaux. La thèse se focalise ainsi plus précisément sur la représentation des Arabes dans des œuvres comme L’Immoraliste ou, plus tard, Si le grain ne meurt ; la représentation des corps étrangers et de leur place dans la société ; la représentation de la femme, perçue finalement par Gide comme entravée dans son développement par les règles et les valeurs de la société bourgeoise / The question of the individual emancipation is present in the work of Gide as of its literary beginnings. Bound on a tour of its typical case, which founds its singularity, this question is initially asked by Gide on the moral level. Gradually, moral criticism leads to a social criticism, Gidian work outlining a reflection on the forms and the challenges of the social domination exerted as well on the foreign bodies in the company as on other social groups. The thesis is focused thus more precisely on the representation of the Arabs in works like the Immoralist one or, later, If the grain does not die; the representation of the foreign bodies and their place in the company; the representation of the woman, perceived finally by Gide as blocked in its development by the rules and the values of the middle-class company

Esta tese possui dois objetivos fundamentais, quais sejam, 1) a apresentação de um aspecto da obra de Durkheim que consiste em enunciados sobre o dever ser moral 2) a discussão em torno da fundamentação possível de sua defesa de um ideal moral específico, o individualismo, e de sua proposta de institucionalização de uma moral laica. A tese central é a de tudo aquilo que ele afirma como dever ser corresponde a um ideal criado coletivamente, portanto, sua fundamentação é a própria coletividade. A defesa desse ideal em detrimento de outro qualquer se dá pela avaliação, por parte de sua ciência, de que ele corresponde à lógica imanente de sua sociedade sendo, portanto, normal, desejável e necessário. / I have to main purposes in this thesis, which are 1) to present an aspect of Durkheims work that is basically about what morals should be and 2) look for a plausible grounding of this very specific moral ideal sustained by him, which himself refers as individualism, and of his proposals regarding the institutionalization of a secular moral education. The main thesis to be sustained affirms that all his arguments regarding what moral should or ought to be corresponds to an ideal collectively created, therefore, its ground is collectivity itself. Defending this particular ideal instead of any other possible one depends upon the evaluation made possible by his science that it corresponds to the intrinsic rationale of his own society, therefore, is both normal and desirable.

The guiding question of this project is, "Why does it count as a critique of Heidegger that he does not defend a particular moral position?" A standard criticism levied against Heidegger is that, since he has nothing positive to say about post-Enlightenment moral theory, he has nothing to contribute to moral philosophy, and this marks his greatest shortcoming as a philosopher. Why is there a demand for Heidegger, or any other philosopher, to theorize about morality, when we do not have this expectation for, say, aesthetics, theology, or various other regional domains of human life? Why should we expect Heidegger to theorize about what humans must be like in order to care about and engage in moral thought? Answering these questions involves an extended discussion of ways of understanding ethics in Western philosophical thought, as well as, Heidegger's own view of ethics. I begin with a detailed exposition of the paradigmatic shift from premodern ethics, as it is based on an understanding of ethos (a form of life with its practical and normative dimensions), to modern conceptions of ethics based on Enlightenment (1750-1850) individualism and the fact-value distinction. This account of the history of ethics in philosophy attempts to demonstrate that the transition to modernity is marked by a schism between Being (ontology) and Ought (ethics) which makes any post-Enlightenment justification of ethics impossible (and helps us see why Heidegger always scoffs at the project of working out an ethics). My primary goal is to prove that Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle's thought not only challenges the underlying metaphysical assumptions of mainstream moral philosophy, but also shows us a way back to the unity of ethics and ontology. My claim is that Being and Time is an ethics in the same way Nicomachean Ethics is an ethics: both are based on an understanding of the human ethos and attempt to show what is characteristic of a life that is structured by the "ought." This argument sets the stage for uncovering the underlying presuppositions governing two prominent objections raised against Heidegger: the existentialist and nihilistic critiques. I find that these critiques are grounded on the assumption of "ontological individualism." In contrast to this individualistic ontology of the social world, I argue that, for Heidegger, individuality is not an ontological or biological given; rather, it is a relatively rare accomplishment of members of a linguistic community. What is important, in Heidegger's view, is that the ethos is the ontological bedrock of ethics. The ethos does not offer us universal principles or morals rules of the kind modern morality seeks, but it does provide paths, ways of being, and possibilities for living meaningful lives. In the end, all we have are understandings of life in certain domains (art, religion, love, etc.) that provide character ideals that, together with meaningful goals and projects for the whole of our lives, make possible a flourishing ethos. My secondary goal is to demonstrate that Heidegger undercuts the uncritical presuppositions of much of mainstream moral philosophy and provides an alternative account of ethics that picks up the stick from the other end. I formulate my thesis as an extension of the recent scholarship on Heidegger's work, arguing that Heidegger's emphasis on the human ethos puts forth a proper way of dwelling and Being-at-home within the current of the historical essence of a community. What is original about Heidegger's post-humanist ethics is that it denies the modern Being-Ought distinction and calls us to be ready and prepared to be claimed by Being. Refusing to give an absolute position to anthropomorphism, Heidegger's ethics serves as an attempt to specify what it is to be fully human in the sense of being a respondent who receives an understanding of Being and has to own up to the task of being claimed by Being. If I am correct, then it is a mistake to judge Heidegger's ethics according to whether he succeeds at formulating a list of responsibilities, rights, and obligations of individuals. Whereas modern moral theory is concerned with providing impartial and value-free guidelines and principles for individual behavior, Heidegger is asking about the conditions for the possibility of transforming how one lives. This puts the burden of proof on those who think there is something important about moral theory. The onus of proof rests with those who want to claim that a right way to be human exists and that there is an absolute, unchanging, timeless ground for understanding the right.

Hungry Ghost is a collection of poetry that examines the relationships between fathers and daughters, sisters, and one's selves.

Detta är en kvantitativ studie som avser att undersöka och redogöra för relationen mellan attityd och handling gällande miljön. Studien relaterar till den aktuella samhällsdebatten om den rådande klimatkrisen. Vidare undersöks hur människors position inom sociala strukturer påverkar det initiala sambandet. Valet av studiens variabler baseras på tidigare studier inom ämnet som hävdar att kulturella faktorer påverkar individers benägenhet att agera för miljön. Resultatet frambringas genom en korrelationsanalys, bivariata samt multivariata regressionsanalyser. Studiens resultat analyseras i enlighet med det teoretiska ramverk som utgörs av teorier från Bauman (2002;2012), Butler (2005), Connell och Pearse (2017), Collins och Bilge (2016), Mellor (1996) samt Bourdieu (2016). Resultatet av studien visar att det finns en korrelation mellan handling och attityd när det kommer till den rådande miljöproblematiken samt att det individuella agerandet påverkas av strukturella förhållanden. / <p>2021-06-10</p>