My thesis is an attempt to develop a naturalistic account of mental representation based on the notion of causation. The thesis consists of two main parts. The first part (chapters II and III) develops an understanding of naturalization. According to my proposal, naturalization is a two-step process: in the first step a set of conditions is specified which are thought to be the essential aspects of the notion under study and in the second step a naturalistic system is proposed which is claimed to satisfy these conditions. In accordance with this understanding of naturalization, the second part (chapters IV and V) of the thesis sets out the conditions which a successful naturalization of mental representation has to satisfy and then develops a new naturalistic account of mental representation based on the causal connections between environmental properties and the brain.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2004. / Thesis directed by W. David Solomon for the Department of Philosophy. "May 2004." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 234-239).

Playwriting theory has, from its beginning, been concerned with the search for the essential nature of dramatic writing. Early playwriting treatises (poetics) defined the essential aspects of drama as being the plot (creation of sequences of fictional events), the moral character of its heroes, the idea of enactment, or the rhetorical and lyrical qualities of the text. These categories were kept through later treatises with different emphasis being put on each category. An understanding of drama as a sequence of fictional events (plot) has been central in acting theory. Modern theories and techniques centred on Stanislavsky’s ideas rely heavily on rehearsal methods that carefully establish the sequence of actions of the characters in a play as a result of psychological motivations. This method was described by Stanislavsky in An Actor’s Work on a Role, published in 1938, and is known as the Method of Physical Actions. This thesis reassesses the definition of playwriting as consisting essentially in the creation of a plot populated by suitable characters. Rather than discussing playwriting theory in isolation it attempts a bridge between acting theory and playwriting theory by using the Method of Physical Actions as an equivalent to plot. Acting theory is thus considered as a theoretical justification for the centrality of plot. The method used is hermeneutic — a systematic interpretation of poetics, unveiling in almost an archaeological manner the relevance of the essential definitions of drama, such as character, source, genre, and language to the concept of plot. The chronological path of development of dramatic theories is shown to be gradual: from the strict obedience to the narrative line imposed by the mythic sources, in classical treatises; through to an interest in the lyrical expression of the predicament of specific characters, in neoclassical theory; to an awareness of specific social types in the eighteenth century; and, finally, to the conception of the plot as a product of the mental life of individual characters in modern theory.

This is the first time such an extensive application has been attempted. The thesis argues that Gestalt therapy as a modality of perception, can best come to a recognition of itself in the Phenomenology oj Perception. That Gestalt therapy requires such a support is apparent right from its flawed foundation in the writings of Paul Goodman. Its weak philosophical foundation has diverted its development away from the lived body, impoverished its view of phenomenology, constrained its language so that the articulation of its theoretical structures lacks depth, left it vulnerable to the distortions of post-modem constructivism, rendered unclear the domain proper to it as a psychotherapy, and bequeathed to those who would work to construct a consistent, organic and cohesive theoretical structure, an impossible task. The epistemological foundation of the theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy is to be found in what Merleau-Ponty calls 'primordial contact' or belief. This is that timeless pre-conceptual 'moment', when, without theme or image, a world begins to form itself about me. In this 'moment' I experience myself as 'given' to me in my body. This primordial experience of givenness is henceforth the ever-present anchorage of all subsequent experience. It is this which authenticates the therapist's immediacy to his/her client which constitutes the dialogue between them as healing. The argument in the thesis hinges upon the congeniality between Gestalt therapy and Merleau-Ponty's philosophy: they are both experiential, radically holistic and centred upon the lived body. They both claim to transcend the subject/object, mind/body dualism and view the human being in his/her embodiment as the Gestalt, actualizing being-in-theworld. The thesis demonstrates how, with the application of four key concepts from Merleau-Ponty's philosophy to the theoretical structures of Gestalt therapy-intentionality, anonymity, transcendence and intersubjectivity - there emerge new horizons of understanding for such Gestalt therapy concepts as field theory, immediacy, holism, personal relationship and the body as a carrier of our history. Such an application also reveals to us the 'phenomenal field' as the domain of operation proper to a therapy of bodily presence, awareness and exploration. The thesis concludes that the development of Gestalt therapy theory lies in a more profound development of its phenomenology along the lines of the analysis made by Merleau-Ponty in the Phenomenology of Perception. Such a direction will at once correct its list towards scientism, and the penchant for involvement in distracting philosophical debates. The thesis also points up the need for development at the training level of skills in reflection upon the experiential learning of the Gestalt therapy concepts, the paramount importance of relationship between trainers and trainees based upon an exacting personal authenticity and transparency.

We often want to explain and predict behavior, both our own and that of others. For various reasons we want to know not only why (in the sense of etiology) someone is doing what he is, but we also have interests in understanding the agent's reasons for which he is acting as he is. Though not uncontroversial, it is common to cite intentional states when offering such explanations. Most philosophers take certain intentional states to be the causes of our actions and to play a role in accounting for the reasons for which one acts. Additionally, most theorists who adopt such a line take the relevant intentional states to be propositional attitudes, most commonly beliefs and desires (or other pro attitudes which relate one to a proposition). In many of our explanations, we do indeed cite beliefs and desires, but we also cite many other psychological states that aren't obviously beliefs or desires. In fact, some of the relevant psychological states don't even appear to be propositional attitudes. In this paper I pursue two lines of questioning, one about the explanations of action and one about intentionality. First, what role is played by these apparently non-propositional attitudes? Such attitudes turn up in Davidson's locus classicus and can be found in the most recent work on action as well, but explications are sparse. Second, are these attitudes in fact non-propositional? Despite appearances to the contrary, one might argue that such states are to be, in some way or other, assimilated to the more familiar propositional attitudes. I resist this line in the second chapter. / text

Fred Dretske (1981) claimed that the essence of the kind of cognitive activity that gives rise to Intentional mental states is a process by which the analogue information coming from a source-object is transformed into digital form. It is this analogue-to-digital conversion of data that enables us to form concepts of things. But this achievement comes with a cost, since the conversion must involve a loss of information. The price we pay for the lost information is a proportional diminishment in our ability to discriminate the source-object from others that may be similar to it. I argue that this fact underlies an important distinction between what a mental state may be about and to what the state may be directed, Aboutness and directedness are two of four Intentional dimensions on which this project concentrates. The other two are aspectual shape and misrepresentation. The distinction between aboutness and directedness is a part of a proposed approach to Intentionality based on the script theory of Roger Schank and Robert Abelson (1977). Scripts are schemata—organized knowledge structures that guide our understanding of the world around us. Schank and Abelson's basic ideas are extended to yield four different script-types: episodic (related to situations and events), instrumental (related to procedural knowledge), personal (representing an agent's goals and plans), and definitional (involved in object-recognition). The relationship between scripts and the Intentionality of thought is the main focus of this dissertation. An important secondary concern is the viability of externalism and internalism. It is argued that neither of these attitudes is independently adequate to provide a full account of Intentional content. Rather, the proper approach is to confine externalistic influences to aboutness and then characterize directedness in a manner that captures the world-according-to-the-agent. This strategy is implemented in the following way: aboutness is construed causally-evolutionarily; directedness is constructed with the help of the notion of an equivalence class; aspectual shape is shown to be a function of the kind of information a script provides; and an account of misrepresentation is given by comparing the different extensions generated from aboutness and directedness respectively.

Husserl’s Logical Investigations contain an apparent discrepancy in their account of meaning. They first present meanings, contra psychologism, as commonly available, reiterable, invariant, possibly valid, and independent of our “acts of meaning”. They then present meaning, almost psychologistically, as a kind of intentional experience on which all truths and other transcendent meanings depend. I offer a critical developmental study of this problem within Husserl’s semantics. I argue (1) that Husserl had reason to adopt his dyadic account of signification, (2) that this “two-sided” account shaped, and was reciprocally informed by, the two-step phenomenological method, and (3) that Husserl’s proposed resolution to the strain within his semantics, while driven by legitimate motivations, is precarious. I begin with the Logical Investigations and their context. I represent their two sets of semantic claims, recalling how the discord between claims of those sets would have been especially conspicuous when the Investigations were published, amid much debate over psychologism, in 1900-01. I then show why Husserl embraced two discordant views of meaning. I survey the 19th century sources for these views, confirming Jocelyn Benoist’s genealogical thesis that Husserl’s semantics took its psychological and logical sides primarily from Franz Brentano and Bernard Bolzano, respectively. And I present the Bolzanian arguments and Brentanian descriptions that served as grounds for Husserl’s semantics, showing how these pieces of reasoning were appropriated, and weighing their strength. Next, I trace how Husserl’s two-sided theory of meaning, and its apparent incoherence, both inspired and determined the transcendental and eidetic reductions. I then examine how Husserl subsequently used the phenomenological method to reinforce, to integrate, and to revise his theory of meaning. And I address a methodological criticism that this circular development prompts. Finally, I assess Husserl’s attempt to explain the division within the phenomenon of meaning by reference to what he called “transcendental subjectivity”. I consider two contrary objections to this explanation. I indicate how Husserl’s explanation is responsive to the insight behind each objection, but contend that it is perhaps not adequately responsive to the insight behind either.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Carleton University, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 243-249). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Title from title page of PDF (University of Missouri--St. Louis, viewed February 16, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 49-50).

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Basel, 1938. / Vita. Bibliography: p. 125.