In the 1990s a consensus has emerged in international relations and foreign policy analysis according to which it has become necessary to move from single-level approaches towards multilevel theorising. The thesis suggests that the network approach is especially suited for the development of a multilevel theory of foreign policy decision-making because it has already been successfully applied to national, transnational and international levels of analysis. The thesis expands the scope of the network approach by proposing a 'multilevel network theory' that combines all three levels. Moreover, the thesis addresses the widespread criticism that network models fail to explain the process of decision-making by putting forward testable hypotheses regarding the exercise of pressure and the changing preferences among political actors. The aim of the approach is to examine how networks among national, transnational and international actors influence foreign policy making. The thesis suggests that the outcome of the decision-making process can be explained by the formation of a majority coalition in favour of a particular policy. In order to test the proposed multilevel network theory, the thesis examines four cases of foreign policy decision-making after the end of the Cold War. The case studies include: (1) the decision of the British government to support air strikes in Bosnia, (2) the abolition of the tactical air-to-surface missile project by the British government in 1993, (3) the first despatch of German Tornados to Bosnia, and (4) the reduction of German export controls on goods with civil and military applications ('dual-use'). By analysing cases in which two Western European governments had the final decision-making authority, the thesis illustrates how 'national' foreign policy decisions can be the consequences of domestic, transnational and international pressure.

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Realist international relations theory is the most influential theoretical approach in the discipline of international relations. Within the realist paradigm there are several realist approaches. Various approaches, including classical realism, neorealism, offensive realism, neo-classical realism, and game theory, are part of the realist paradigm but some make different theoretically relevant assumptions, notably about international politics, international actors and actors' motivations. The first part of this thesis seeks to demonstrate how, despite their other differences, a fundamental assumption that anarchy determines the nature of international politics is characteristic of realist theorists as notable and different as classical realists Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Edward Hallett Carr and Hans Morgenthau, structural realist Kenneth Waltz, offensive realist John Mearsheimer, realist game theory analysis of international relations, and neoclassical realists Victor Cha, Thomas Christenson and Gideon Rose. This demonstration establishes the basis for proceeding to a critique of realists' fundamental anarchy assumption. The second part of this thesis presents an argument that realists' fundamental assumption that anarchy determines the nature of international politics has been responsible for theoretical shortcomings of realist analyses, and argues that a complexity basis for international relations theory would offer theoretical and analytical advantages. The cost of the assumption of anarchy for realist analyses is demonstrated in a critique of realist accounts of the outbreak of World War I, the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, and regional political integration in Europe. These major international developments should be readily addressed by the realist or any other paradigm of international relations theory. In all three cases, the factors involved leave realists struggling to re-visit their assumptions about international politics in order to explain what occurred. While such re-assessments have included a variety of efforts to broaden or redefine the factors considered, the role and implications of anarchy as a foundational assumption of realist theorising has rarely been questioned, and it remains a central realist premise. Complexity theory is being embraced in a variety of fields of social inquiry, including politics and international relations. This thesis proposes that the complexity of international politics is something that needs to be embraced and not sidelined. This is the case whether the international politics in question was in ancient times or the twenty-first century. The complexity of international politics, not anarchy, needs to be operationalised as the foundational assumption of international relations theory, in order to build international relations theorising on a more appropriate basis that can be applied more fruitfully in the descriptions and explanations of empirical international relations analyses. / Thesis (PhD)--University of South Australia, 2009

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Quantum approaches to International Relations theory have proliferated rapidly in recent years, challenging the field to come to terms with the influence of physics at its philosophical foundations. These new theoretical perspectives draw on quantum physics, quantum social theory, and prior quantum interventions in other disciplines of social science. But unlike prior debates around the desirability of "adding" science to the study of world politics (Morgenthau 1946; Kindleberger 1958; Bull 1966), the call of quantum IR theory is one for transformation (Barad 2007; Fierke 2022; Murphy 2021c; O’Brien 2021; Zanotti 2018). In this dissertation, I explore the stakes and scope of this quantum transformation to better understand the process of quantizing inquiry into International Relations. The first chapter sets out the metatheoretical stakes of quantizing IR by engaging with critical responses to prior works of quantum. Situating quantum approaches in the broader intellectual history of the field, I argue that understanding the "cost" of quantizing IR cannot take the form of a cost/benefit logic, instead recognizing the opportunity cost of remaining Newtonian. The second chapter turns to the development of quantum mechanics within physics to demonstrate the relatability of key concepts for social inquiry, despite the vernacular divide. The third chapter turns to methodology, discussing the philosophical sources supporting 'quantizing through translation,' drawing on both the quantum social theory of Karen Barad and broader influences including Walter Benjamin, actor-network theory, and Donna Haraway. The next trio of chapters serve to demonstrate the breadth of quantum's utility across the discipline through a set of conceptual case studies related to major subfields of IR. The fourth chapter speaks to debates in peace and security studies, and provides a quantized account of violence through a diffractive reading of Johan Galtung's "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research." The fifth chapter turns to foreign policy and strategic studies, arguing that the non-traditional diplomatic strategy of "track two diplomacy" abides a quantum game-theoretic logic, and that this can only be fully appreciated by interrogating its quantum-like assumptions. Chapter six then addresses international political economy through an attempt to redefine "the market" in quantum terms. Recognizing the stakes and scope of quantum IR explored through the dissertation, the conclusion reaffirms the case for quantum to be understood as transformation rather than addition, and sets out future directions for research in quantum IR.

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In this thesis my aims are twofold. First, I provide an auto-history of the concept of reason in Anglophone IR from 1919 to 2009. I uncover the centrality of the language of reason. I show that the concept of reason has constituted, undergirded, and empowered many prominent IR scholars’ discourses. Second, I bring out a taxonomy of four construal of rationality. I argue that IR thinkers have spoken in four languages of reason. Kantian reason stands in a relation opposed to passion, emotion and instinct, and makes the stipulation that to base actions on the intellect is prerequisite for pursuing interest and moral conduct. I argue that the British Liberal Institutionalists, Has Morgenthau, Richard Ashley and Andrew Linklater are bearers of this construal. Utilitarian reason refers to the maximization of interests under constraints, where interest can be defined as strategic preference, emotional attachment, or cultural value and constraints as a two-person game, uncertainty or risk. I demonstrate how Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, Glenn Snyder, Robert Keohane, Robert Gilpin, Helen Milner, Andrew Moravcsik and many other theorists use the concept. Axiological reason means following rules, cultures and norms, and always uses game as an analytical foundation and attends to the problem of how to enforce rules. I argue that Kenneth Waltz, Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil and K.M. Fierke have deployed the concept to construct their theories. Historical reason views all values as conditioned within a specific spatial-temporal background, and insists that moral problems, which are constituted in the margin of every political conduct, must be solved by overcoming universal morality and the unilateral pursuit of interest. I show that Raymond Aron, Martin Wight, David Boucher and Christian Reus-Smit have conceived of reason in this way.

Recently, many authors from various theoretical backgrounds have written books or articles trying to clarify what the role of the sovereign state is within the wider political context of “global politics.” This thesis seeks to critically engage with the way in which this debate has been framed by the vast majority of these authors. Indeed, while most authors frame this debate as an essentially empirical disagreement concerning the objective composition of global politics, we will be arguing that it is really a debate that concerns the problem of political foundation and the possibly changing nature of the dominant ways of answering this problem in contemporary “global politics.” From this perspective, the vast majority of those involved in this debate simply pass over - as somehow analytically uninteresting - most of the questions that would really need to be explained and understood. This thesis seeks to address this crucial oversight

This thesis explores the origins and evolution of European integration through the lens of classical realism. Classical realism, as an approach to International Relations, has had little to say about one of the most fascinating and politically important developments in the post-war international system, namely the effort by Western European states to integrate economically from the 1950s onwards. Grounded in classical realism’s ontology of power and the desire by states to secure autonomy and exert influence in the international system the thesis argues that a combination of military power, economic power, and power over opinion can explain the main contours and dynamics of integration. At the core of the argument is the idea of ‘Three Europe’s’ – Protected Europe, Confederated Europe, and a Europe of States – which have coexisted in a stable equilibrium for most of the post-war era. Protected Europe is grounded in both the military power and capacity of the United States and the national interest of the United States, remarkably static from 1945 onwards, to play a hegemonic role within the European military and security sphere. It was Protected Europe that created the military security and stability necessary for Western European states to pursue economic integration. It altered the guns versus butter trade-off and permitted Western European states to invest more in their welfare states. Most importantly if resolved the security dilemma that had existed between the most powerful states on the continent, France and Germany, and created a context in which their interaction shifted to one of intensive cooperation. The product was Confederated Europe. The logic at the core of Confederal Europe was a desire by France to bind Germany, and consent by the Germans to be bound. This was done for a variety of reasons. Internally the concern was to exert as much control over Germany as possible and Germany’s long-term national interest – to secure normalisation, independence, and reunification – complemented this urge. Externally the concern was to secure autonomy in the global economic system and to project power and influence within that system. But the components of the confederation remained distinct nation states and thus a Europe of States existed in an often uneasy tension with Confederal Europe. The fault line between a supranational economic structure and a political structure still tied to the states created intermittent tensions and political earthquakes that have punctuated the history of post-war Europe. However, throughout the period the European masses formed a permissive consensus vis-à-vis integration and, given the rather limited and technical nature of the confederation, this minimised the inherent tension between Confederal Europe and the Europe of States. All three Europe’s are, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, in a state of flux. The decline in the relative power of the United States, and the rise of new challenges in the Asia-Pacific, has triggered a strategic pivot away from Europe and a weakening of the commitment to Protected Europe. How Europe will manage this shift remains unclear but a more prominent European leadership role in NATO or a rejuvenated and more focused European security and defence policy seem necessary. The historical balance between a France that wished to bind and a Germany that consented to be bound has shifted palpably. More willing to act as a ‘normalised’ power in the European system, Germany has emerged as a clearly dominant actor and this will require a shift in the diplomatic practices of a European system that has become used to France leading and Germany both following and supplying the supporting economic power. If Confederal Europe is to survive it must accept stronger German leadership. Finally the permissive consensus at the mass level is being eroded as European integration touches upon ever-more salient policy spheres. This means that the power of the idea of Europe has to be strengthened and entrenched more firmly, thus diluting the prominence of the Europe of States, or integration must retrench to bring its competences back into line with its legitimacy.

Recently, many authors from various theoretical backgrounds have written books or articles trying to clarify what the role of the sovereign state is within the wider political context of “global politics.” This thesis seeks to critically engage with the way in which this debate has been framed by the vast majority of these authors. Indeed, while most authors frame this debate as an essentially empirical disagreement concerning the objective composition of global politics, we will be arguing that it is really a debate that concerns the problem of political foundation and the possibly changing nature of the dominant ways of answering this problem in contemporary “global politics.” From this perspective, the vast majority of those involved in this debate simply pass over - as somehow analytically uninteresting - most of the questions that would really need to be explained and understood. This thesis seeks to address this crucial oversight