While dominant International Relations (IR) theory has constructed the concept of security in such a way that excludes economic sanctions from considerations of violence, the track record of embargo tells a different story, one with a significantly higher death toll. This project challenges the borders of the hegemonic IR discourse to make room for a theoretical and political account of the deadly impacts of sanction regimes. Through a discourse analysis of IR theory, using Laclau and Mouffe’s holistic discourse theory, it looks to the spaces of meaning negotiation emerging from feminist IR theory. The renegotiated concepts of human security and structural violence make visible economic sanctions as acts of violence, and displace the binary oppositions of international/domestic, military/economic, public/private which shield embargo from the sight of its own violence. Having broken embargo out of its conceptually locked box, this project pushes further, and interrogates the connections of embargo and empire. Embargo functions to uphold imperial control and Western interests, while (re)producing racist colonial narratives. While deconstructing and reconstructing three competing understandings of embargo – embargo-as-nonviolent, embargo-as-violence, and embargo-as-imperial – I interrogate the political implications of hegemonic ways of knowing. I argue that, by challenging the hegemony of IR, we can unmask the practice of embargo, and locate its violent role in upholding imperial structures of power. / Graduate

The premiership of Shinzo Abe has had a significant impact on the debate surrounding Japanese foreign policy. In the autumn of 2020, Shinzo Abe resigned, ending what would become the country’s longest consecutive tenure in history, lasting from 2012 to 2020. Following the Second World War, Japan has per its 1947 constitution constrained its foreign policy unlike that of any other country of comparable size. During Shinzo Abe’s tenure, from 2012 to 2020, the academic debate surrounding the potential dismantling of said constraints has moved significantly towards finding a so-called remilitarization a likely outcome. International relations schools of realism and to some extent liberalism find that predictions of remilitarization might strike true while constructivist scholars find that this might be the case despite prior reservations. This is a significant shift in the debate consensus, especially on the part of constructivist analysis which often held that Japan’s unique character, be it norms or institutions, was inherently antimilitaristic. Through previous literature we learn that there was long a divide between authors arguing for a remilitarization being imminent while others take the opposite stance. A shift in Japanese foreign policy has a number of implications for international relations theory, previously a hallmark of constructivist argumentation surrounding identity and a thorn in the side of realist assumptions of power politics. A methodical approach of theory comparison sheds light on the empirical case of Japanese foreign policy by the means of assessing each relevant perspective’s arguments against each respective set of expectations in the event of a remilitarization. Through this study we find that contributions to the debate overwhelmingly argue for an increased possibility of a remilitarization taking place. Likewise, we find that this may come to play into the hands of both realism and liberalism as well as potentially doing so for constructivist analysis. Despite the case of an antimilitarist Japan being an example showcasing the strengths of constructivist analysis, it might instead provide an opportunity wherein it is able to showcase the flexibility and adaptability of constructivism as an analytical approach. The study also explores the possibility of whether there is room for employing a theoretically eclectic approach to the case at hand as a means to break the deadlock within the debate on the topic and offer analysis that escapes the pitfalls inherent in each theoretical perspective when employed on its own.

The past decades have seen a growing critique of international relations theory (IRT) as being Eurocentric, inspiring the development of alternative interpretations of international politics. One such development is the emergence of Buddhist IRT, which, with only a handful of texts written on the subject, is still very much in its cradle. This analysis attempts to systematically analyse this new contribution through the use of Lindberg’s VDP-triad of ideational analysis as well as thematic analysis. This is important given the power of ideas to shape people’s conceptions of the world and provide road maps for policy makers, as well as the role theory may have in the serving of certain interests. The analysis finds a theory rich in both value judgments, descriptions, and prescriptions, where the most important descriptions regard a unique ontology of radical interdependence, an ontology which deeply affects all other stand-points within the theory. Further, the analysis identifies several areas which need to be clarified and/or confronted in the future development of the theory, including a number of in-consistencies as well as a possible framework for the justification of violence and authoritarian policy.

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The aim of this essay is to explain how IR theory relates to the European Union. Thisis motivated by the extensive use of empirical and descriptive studies on the EU. Togenerate knowledge on how theory relates to the EU, two seemingly differenttheories are compared. Neorealism and social constructivism are used to generatehypotheses, which are then tested on a quantitive study on the EU’s Common Foreignand Security Policy. The study covers the years of 2003-2005 and uses a statisticalmethod to present to empirical findings, which is supplemented by previous studieson EU’s foreign policy. The theoretical framework enables comparison of the twoemployed theories’ explanatory powers. The essay concludes that none of the theoriesprovides satisfactory explanations of in regard to EU’s global power and/or influence.Nevertheless, they are able to explain different aspects of the developments of EU’sforeign policy. Further theoretical studies should be undertaken in order to highlightthe issues of theory vis-à-vis the European Union.

[pt] Esta dissertação objetiva problematizar o conceito de poder presente na filosofia de Michel Foucault a fim de mostrar as suas conseqüências para se pensar o político na Teoria de Relações Internacionais (RI). Busca, desse modo, aprofundar o diálogo com as vertentes críticas que contestam os pressupostos do realismo desde a década de 80. Mesmo se tais perspectivas já obtiveram certa visibilidade na área de Teoria das Relações Internacionais, as teorias que seguem o pós-estruturalismo continuam confinadas às margens do pensamento de RI. A presente dissertação busca, portanto, explorar o conceito chave do pensamento de Foucault, o poder, para expor tanto os pressupostos quanto as implicações de sua utilização para se pensar a política global. Por meio da análise do modo com que Foucault trabalha o conceito de poder, conclui-se que o filósofo apaga, em grande medida, as fronteiras normativas entre os conceitos de poder e violência. Como conseqüência dessa indiferenciação conceitual, Foucault concebe o fenômeno político como campo de forças, como acontecimento estratégico ou como a continuação da guerra por outros meios. Pretende-se, por meio deste trabalho, pensar acerca da desejabilidade normativa de tal concepção política e de sua capacidade de prover um modelo capaz de constituir alternativa ao realismo em RI. A dissertação contrapõe, finalmente, a visão do político de Foucault a visões que outras perspectivas críticas, como aquelas inspiradas pelos trabalhos da Escola de Frankfurt, oferecem para se pensar um novo paradigma teórico e prático para a política global. / [en] This dissertation problematizes the concept of power present in Michel Foucault`s philosophy in order to show its consequences for thinking the political in International Relations (IR) Theory. It seeks to deepen the dialogue with the critical perspectives that question the assumptions of realism since the 1980s. Even if such critical perspectives have already obtained some visibility in International Relations Theory, poststructuralist theories remain confined to the margins of IR thought. This dissertation seeks, consequently, to explore the key concept of Foucault`s thought, power, in order to reveal its assumptions as well as its implications for thinking abou global politics. By means of the analysis of the way Foucault constructs his concept of power, we arrive at the conclusion that the philosopher erases the normative borders between the concepts of power and violence. As a consequence of his conceptual indifferentiation, Foucault conceives the political phenomenon as a field of forces, as a strategic event or as a war continued by other means. This work seeks to question the normative desirability of such a conception of the political and about its capacity to provide an alternative model do realism in IR. This dissertation opposes, finally, Foucault`s vision of the political to visions that other critical perspectives, such as those inspired by the works of the Frankfurt School, offer to help us think another theoretical and practical paradigm for global politics.

[pt] Desde sua criação em 1944, o Fundo Monetário Internacional já sofreu grandes crises de legitimidade; no entanto, após períodos de rejeição e limbo, a instituição sempre logrou renascer das cinzas; argumentar-se-á que esta aparente imortalidade do FMI é devida à capacidade da instituição de adequar-se aos novos ciclos normativos que emergem de crises financeiras. Esta capacidade se vincularia, por sua vez, à legitimidade da instituição relacionar-se à justificação de sua atuação em coerência com o propósito para o qual teria sido criada. Assim, se o discurso que emerge como consenso da análise das crises acusa a instituição de ter tido parte nas causas da instabilidade, o realinhamento do FMI à nova norma em ascensão pode resultar em mudanças em sua orientação prática, como quando após a crise asiática teve sua relevância significativamente reduzida com a adoção da política de supervisão e liberalização financeira ditada pelo mercado, e não mais ordenada por si, ao longo dos anos 2000. Já a crise que se desenvolve, ao final da primeira década do século XXI, com origem nos maiores produtores de consenso sobre política macroeconômica — Estados Unidos e União Européia — mostra-se como oportunidade para reajuste do papel do Fundo em uma posição novamente central, propiciando uma análise dos interesses diversos que esta instituição, com 187 Estados-membros e potencial de levantamento de centenas de bilhões de dólares em poucos dias, é capaz de atender ou suscitar em um cenário de maior equilíbrio financeiro nos países emergentes e desequilíbrio nos grandes centros. / [en] Since its inception in 1944, the International Monetary Fund has suffered major crises of legitimacy; however, after periods of rejection and limb, the institution was always able to rise from the ashes. It will be argued that this apparent immortality of the Fund is due to its ability to adapt to the new normative cycles that emerge from financial crises. This ability could be traced to the relation between the legitimacy of the institution and the justification of its acts in coherence with the purpose for which it was created. In this sense, if the discourse that emerges — as a consensus from the analyses of the crises — accuses the institution of having had a part in the causes of the instability, the realignment of the IMF to the new ascending norm may result in changes in its practical orientations, as it happened, for instance, after the Asian crisis, when the Fund had its relevance significantly reduced with the adoption of a policy of market-led financial liberalization throughout the decade of 2000, replacing the former model of IMF-led orderly liberalization. Finally, the crisis developed by the end of the first decade of the XXI century and that originated in the largest producers of macroeconomic policy consensus — the United States of America and the European Union — presents itself as an opportunity for readjustment of the Fund s role once again in a central position, allowing for the analysis of the diverse interests that this institution — with its 187 member-States and potential for raising hundreds of billions of dollars in a few days — is able to meet in a scenario of greater financial balance among emerging markets, along with the instability of the great centers.

<p>Adopting a socio-cultural approach to the study of cold war historiography, this master’s degree essay is a comparative study of the two main disciplinary fields of cold war scholarship, diplomatic history and international relations theory (IR). The study applies the theory of scientific development formulated by Thomas Kuhn and the concept of paradigm on the field of cold war research.</p><p>Diplomatic history and IR shows many similarities in their development, and in the importance different schools has had in scholarly debate. These different schools are analysed as paradigms, a concept that has been more willingly adopted within IR than in diplomatic history. The transition from what historian John Lewis Gaddis has termed Old Cold War History to New Cold War History is discussed in terms of paradigms and paradigm shift. What this shift has meant for historical cold war research is also addressed. With the starting point in conclusions by historian Anders Stephanson, the study also suggests that the predominating view of the cold war during the cold war can be analysed as a paradigm, effecting interpretations and theories about the conflict. As IR scholar Ted Hopf has suggested, the normal science during the cold war prevented IR research from correctly predicting the end of the cold war.</p><p>From a Kuhnian perspective, an interpretation of the difficulties in communication and scholarly interchange between diplomatic history and IR is offered. The study emphasizes the importance of political and social factors in the development of the different paradigms within the field, and concludes that the goal to become a paradigmatic science might not be attainable, or even desirable, for disciplines such as diplomatic history and IR.</p>