Durant la décennie 1990, de nouveaux défis s’imposent aux Etats européens dans le domaine de l’asile. La transformation des flux de migration forcée et la construction d’un espace de libre circulation conduisent à porter la question de l’asile au sein de l’arène européenne. La politique d’asile de l’Union européenne est élaborée afin de répondre à l’échelle européenne aux défis de la protection et des flux spontanés. Plus de 10 ans après son coup d’envoi, le bilan est mitigé. Certes, une réponse européenne a été apportée au moyen du développement du droit communautaire de l’asile, porteur de nouveaux droits subjectifs. Toutefois, l’espace européen de l’asile reste un espace hétérogène au sein duquel la répartition des charges de l’asile est particulièrement inéquitable. L’harmonisation des normes des systèmes d’asile nationaux est inachevée, le système Dublin est un échec, la solidarité financière entre les Etats est minimale. Au-delà du territoire des Etats membres, de nouvelles politiques sont élaborées dans le prolongement de celles mises en œuvre sur le territoire des Etats membres. Les politiques extraterritorialisées de contrôle des frontières extérieures de l’Union visent à limiter les charges de l’asile assumées par ces derniers. Elles conduisent à faire émerger un nouveau défi dans le domaine de la protection : celui de l’accès à l’espace européen. La dimension extérieure de la politique d’asile constitue une réponse partielle et inachevée à cette nouvelle problématique. Aussi, l’Union européenne porte désormais de manière systématique ses intérêts migratoires au sein de sa coopération avec les Etats non membres de l’Union européenne. La coopération qu’elle mène avec la Turquie dans le domaine de l’asile illustre la portée et les limites de telles politiques. Si l’influence de l’Union européenne sur le système d’asile turc est certaine, son impact sur la répartition des charges de l’asile entre la Turquie et les Etats membres est sujette à discussion. Tout en explorant la relation dialectique entre droit d’asile et politique migratoire, cette recherche sur l’espace européen de l’asile et ses frontières sonde les transformations de la territorialité de l’asile et en propose une approche renouvelée. / During the 1990s, European States face new challenges in the asylum area. The transformation of forced migration flows and the achievement of the common area of free movement bring the asylum issue in the European arena. The European Union asylum policy is built to answer at the European level to the protection and mixed migration flows challenges. More than 10 years after the policy has been launched, the picture is mixed. A European answer has certainly been elaborated through the development of the EU asylum law, guaranteeing new subjective rights for asylum seekers and refugees. However, the common European asylum area remains an heterogeneous area in which fair burden-sharing is not ensured. The harmonization of the legal norms of the domestic asylum system is unachieved, the Dublin system is a deadlock, and only minimum financial solidarity mechanisms between the Member States have been established. Beyond the Member States territories, new answers are being built as a continuation of those implemented within the European Union. The extraterritorialization of border control policies aims to limit the Member states’ asylum burden. Access to the asylum territory is the new protection challenge emerging as a result of those policies. The external dimension of the European Union asylum policy is a partial and unachieved attempt to address this issue. Also, the European Union now systematically integrates its migrations concerns within its cooperation policy with non-EU Member States. Its cooperation with Turkey in the asylum area illustrates the scope and the limits of this policy. The influence of the European Union on the Turkish asylum system is uncontested. However, whether the European Union has an impact on the asylum burden-sharing between Turkey and the Member States is subject to discussion. While exploring the dialectic relation between the right to asylum and migration policies, this research on the common European asylum area and its borders focuses on the transformation of asylum territoriality and seeks to propose a renewed approach of it.

The Dublin Regulation determines the Member State responsible for accepting and making a decision on asylum claims lodged in the European Union (‘EU’), Norway and Iceland. It aims to ensure that each asylum claim is examined by one and only one Member State, to put an end to the practice of ‘asylum shopping’ and to prevent repeated applications, both of which have been costly for the receiving Member States and caused severe inefficiencies in the determination processes in the EU in the past. With the first Member State of entry being the major determinant for the allocation of asylum responsibility under the Dublin Regulation, there has been growing discontent among Member States at the external borders of the EU, particularly the southern Member States in the Mediterranean, over what they see as a system that has unjustly placed disproportionate burdens on them regarding the admission of seaborne asylum seekers and the costs associated with it. As a result of changes in migration rules and consequent adjustments in the entry strategy employed by irregular migrants and people smugglers, the Member States at the EU’s ‘southern frontline’ have unwillingly played the role of reluctant hosts to boatloads of unwelcome asylum seekers. This thesis aims to examine how the EU has attempted to tackle the challenging situation of the unauthorised migration of asylum seekers into its territory by sea, and in particular, how it has responded to demands from affected Member States for a more equitable system of asylum responsibility allocation in spite of and outside the Dublin framework. It would argue that the ‘small’ EU Member States in the Mediterranean themselves have, over the last five years at least, become the unexpected drivers of the EU’s declared commitment to the principles of ‘solidarity’, ‘fair sharing of responsibility’ and ‘effective multilateralism’. ‘ Small’ as they may be in terms of resources, size or influence vis-à-vis the larger Member States, the former have been able to create their own mark in a global regime that has traditionally been resistant to the idea of burden-sharing. The measures taken by the EU’s ‘southern frontline’ have collectively changed the landscape of a global protection regime where not only is asylum ‘burden sharing’ highly elusive – its terms and conditions are also dictated by the more powerful sovereign states. While the theoretical point of departure in this study is the influence wielded by the ‘small’ EU Member States in the burden-sharing debate, the degree or level of ‘influence’ small Mediterranean Member States can exercise in pushing for cooperative arrangements is itself determined by a system that is biased towards large states, increasingly securitised, and is therefore limited in both nature and scope. Nevertheless, the experience of ‘burden-sharing’ in the EU between 2005 and 2010 demonstrates that the Member States at the periphery have proactively taken the responsibility for the operationalisation of the founding values and principles of the EU, and through active norm advocacy and related strategies, have been able to achieve what has eluded the global protection regime so far – a refugee burden sharing scheme.

Le flux massif des réfugiés provenant de la Syrie a pris au dépourvu la capacité d'accueil de certains pays euro-méditerranéens, et mis en relief l'absence de solidarité et de partage équitable de responsabilités entre les États de l'Union européenne. En premier lieu, cette étude définit le concept de “burden-sharing” entendu comme une mesure concrète de solidarité à réaliser à travers la distribution des risques et des coûts parmi les membres d'un groupe pour la réalisation d'un objectif commun. Après avoir analysé l’évolution de ce principe dans le droit international, on évalue sa mise en oeuvre dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union européenne, notamment, dans le Système Européen Commun d'Asile (SECA) consacré par l’article 80 TFUE. En analysant le system Dublin et les réponses les plus actuelles à l’émergence syrienne on conclut que l’Union européenne est encore loin de la complète réalisation du principe du burden sharing. / The massive flow of refugees from Syria caught out the reception capacity of some Euro-Mediterranean countries, and highlighted the lack of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities among the States of the European Union. Firstly, this study defines the concept of "burden-sharing" conceived as a concrete measure of solidarity to be accomplished through the distribution of risks and costs among the members of a group in order to achieve a common goal. After analyzing the evolution of this principle in international law, we evaluate its implementation in the legal order of the European Union, particularly in the European Common Asylum System (CEAS) as enshrined in Article 80 TFEU. By assessing the Dublin system and the most current answers to the Syrian emergence, we will argue that the European Union is still far from the full realization of the principle of burden sharing.

There is a crisis of asylum in Africa. In response to large and protracted refugee populations, declining donor assistance and a range of related security concerns, a significant number of African states have limited the asylum they offer to refugees. Some states have closed their borders to new arrivals and pursued early repatriations. Many other states have contained refugees in isolated and insecure camps. Given the scale of this crisis, the global pressures on asylum, and the disproportionate share of the global refugee burden borne by Africa, understanding the responses of African states poses an important challenge. A critical examination of the factors influencing the refugee policies of African states is, however, strikingly absent from the scholarly literature. The objective of this thesis is to address this gap by examining the responses of Kenya, Tanzania and Guinea to the arrival and prolonged presence of significant refugee populations. Drawing on field research, this thesis argues that the asylum policies of the three cases are the result of factors both related to the presence of refugees, such as burden sharing and security concerns, and unrelated to the presence of refugees, such as foreign policy priorities, democratization, economic liberalization and the sense of vulnerability experienced by many regimes in Africa. Drawing on a political history of the post-colonial African state, this thesis argues for an approach that recognizes the politics of asylum in Africa. Such an approach highlights the importance of incorporating the host state into any examination of asylum in Africa and the predominant role that broader political factors play in the formulation of asylum policies. This is not to suggest that factors such as the protracted nature of refugee populations, levels of burden sharing and security concerns are irrelevant to the study of asylum in Africa. Instead, the thesis argues that such factors are very relevant, but need to be understood in a more critical way, mindful of the political context within which asylum policies are formulated. This approach leads to important lessons not only for the study of asylum in Africa, but also for the future of the refugee protection regime in Africa.

This paper examines the effect of burden sharing in peacekeeping operations (both among contingent troops and in the entirety of the mission) and effectiveness, specifically whether a party chooses to renege on a peace agreement. The author hypothesizes that burden sharing will make it less likely that a party reneges on a peace agreement. The theoretical argument made in the paper is that burden sharing will help in solving the commitment problem inherent to peace agreements, by signaling to the combatants that the peacekeeping mission is there to stay (and won’t be vulnerable to a potential withdrawal from an important contributor), as well as signaling that there is international support for punishing measures against a party who would renege on the agreement. The paper examines all peacekeeping missions that deployed following a peace agreement between 1992-2016 using data on peacekeeping contributions from the United Nations. The hypotheses will however not be supported by the empirics. In fact there is limited evidence for burden sharing among contingent troops to increase the likelihood that a party chooses to renege on a peace agreement, while burden sharing among all personnel (military and civilian) have no effect on the matter.

The end of the Cold War in 1990 was followed by a shift from a bipolar to a unipolar world, profoundly transforming the nature of international alliance politics. Then, what are the systemic features of the unipolar system that have changed alliance relations in comparison to the previous bipolar and multipolar world? How can we explain the diverse reaction of the U.S. allies in different regions in response to the U.S. request for the modification of alliance functions and reshaping of the alliance burden sharing? How do we measure and interpret changes in the nature of alliance politics in a unipolar system? The goal of this project is to provide a systematic answer to these questions. Focusing on international system polarities and alliance burden sharing behavior, this dissertation builds a framework for understanding the dynamics of alliance politics. In particular, I argue that alliance burden sharing as an empirical indicator plays a critical role in explaining the changed nature of the unipolar alliance system. First, I examine how the two interrelated systemic factors - external threat and the distribution of power - influence alliance burden sharing with a system-level analysis by utilizing a quantitative method with state-year burden sharing data from 1885 to 2000. Second, I present case studies of South Korea and Japan's alliance burden sharing in the post-Cold War period. A central argument of the dissertation is that the role and function of alliance is determined by structural constraints of different international system polarities. Specifically, this project demonstrates that burden sharing is a key factor representing the impact of systemic properties of unipolarity on the behavioral changes in alliance politics.

This diploma thesis analyzes the phenomenon of NATO burden-sharing. Due to late security crises in Europe, such as Crimea crisis, the never-ending alliance issue has been encased in new dynamics. This new dynamics supposedly threatens the long preserved status quo and can even lead to the breakup of the alliance. The thesis uses methodological framework prescribed by Lene Hansen. This framework draws heavily on work from David Campbell and his Writing Security. For the successful analysis, we first designate our inter-textual governmental field in which we then try to observe the repeating ideational/argumentative norms of the respective discursive actors in the alliance. We also divide our research field into two time units: the 1990s era and events after 9/11. Interpretation of the behaviour of certain members shows establishment of a several interconnected centres of argumentation, which somehow coincides with the three largest European members of NATO. The thesis also shows, that these argumentative actors tend to transform their argumentative structures along with the changing environment and context. For better understanding, the work encompasses the short-term, intensive burden-sharing situations, like NATO interventions, but also debates on long-term institutional solutions, which are mostly seen...

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the burden-sharing behavior of new NATO members and the impact of enlargement on NATO burden-sharing. Qualitative and quantitative methods are used to test several hypotheses. The findings suggest that large NATO members are burden-sharing at a greater rate than smaller NATO members when looking at military expenditures and air contributions to NATO missions, in accordance with the logic of collective action. Contribution of troops to NATO missions depends on the mix of private and public benefits received, in accordance to the joint product model. The findings support the hypothesis that new NATO members are burden-sharing at a greater rate than older NATO members. An analysis of the burden-sharing behavior of NATO's new members reveals that new NATO members have demonstrated the willingness to contribute to NATO missions, but are often constrained by their limited capabilities. However, new member contributions to NATO have improved and, in comparison to older NATO members, the new members are doing quite well. Finally, NATO expansion did not lead to greater free-riding behavior in NATO. / Political Science

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No / The Atlantic burden-sharing debate during the early part of the twenty-first century is shaping up to be very different from those of NATO's first fifty years. The resources needed for direct defence of western Europe have fallen sharply, and further cuts are possible. The gradual strengthening of European cooperation means that the EU is becoming an actor in its own right in many international regimes. Debates about which countries are pulling their weight internationally are also taking into account contributions to non-military international public goods¿financing EU enlargement, aiding the Third World, reducing emissions of climate-damaging pollutants. In this new multidimensional debate, it becomes more apparent that states that contribute more to one regime often do less than most in another. Germany, for example, is concerned about its excessive contribution to the costs of EU enlargement, but it spends considerably less than France and the UK on defence. European countries contribute three times as much as the United States to Third World aid, and will soon pay almost twice as much into the UN budget. Yet they were dependent on the US to provide most of the military forces in the 1999 Kosovo conflict, and would be even more dependent in the event of a future Gulf war. This widening of the burden-sharing debate contains both dangers and opportunities. It could lead to a fragmentation of the Atlantic dialogue, with each side talking past the other on an increasing number of issues, ranging from global warming to Balkan peacekeeping. In order to avoid such a dangerous situation, the US and European states should maintain the principle that all must make a contribution to efforts to tackle common problems, whether it be through troops in Kosovo or commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Yet there should also be some flexibility in defining who does how much. The preparedness of some countries to lead, by doing more, will be essential if international cooperation is to have a chance to work.