In Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, David Brink defends a version of moral realism that makes use of a coherentist epistemology. I argue that we have good reasons to prefer a coherentist epistemology in ethics, and that common arguments in favor of foundationalism and against coherentism fail. I conclude that only the multiple coherent systems (MCS) objection poses a serious threat to coherentism, and that there is a way of meeting this objection as it is traditionally construed. Doing so requires adding an explanatory requirement to coherentism: a coherent system must not only be coherent, but explain why it is coherent. Though I argue that the MCS objection fails as traditionally construed, I propose variants of the objection which apply specifically to coherentist moral realism. Based on the social intuitionist model of moral decision-making, I point to evidence which indicates that intuitive moral judgments are the cause of reasoned moral judgments. This raises two problems: "the problem of intransigence" and the "limited problem of intransigence." These two problems constitute MCS objections to coherentist moral realism. The first problem claims that coherentism itself might not be possible for actual human beings, and that even if people are capable of forming coherent systems of belief, these systems are necessarily radically divergent as a result of various cultural and sociological factors. The second problem is that the coherentist moral realist should not expect a single moral system to result from moral reasoning (even ideally), because all such systems will include intuitions which are immune to reasoning. I argue that these MCS objections must be overcome if coherentist moral realism is to be a viable option.

[pt] Esta dissertação tem como objetivo apresentar uma análise preliminar das causas que fomentam os conflitos político-ideológicos, utilizando como uma das principais bases teóricas os estudos do psicólogo social Jonathan Haidt, dentre outras abordagens por mim consideradas relevantes no tema. O objetivo é identificar se essas causas podem explicar o nível de polarização apresentado nas eleições de 2018 no Brasil, esclarecendo as causas gerais do comportamento humano que levam à polarização, como as razões que levam seres humanos a se unirem em grupos e a entrarem em conflitos, além de identificar as causas específicas dos conflitos entre direita e esquerda, delimitando de forma objetiva as suas diferenças e incompatibilidades. Para alcançar esse objetivo, foi necessário realizar um levantamento de teorias de diversas áreas do conhecimento, como a Psicologia Social, Biologia Evolutiva, Filosofia Moral, além das Ciências Sociais. As conclusões preliminares indicam que há fatores evolutivos e inatistas que norteiam a divisão de grupos e que as causas dos conflitos ideológicos estão relacionadas à dificuldade de diálogo e consenso devido às divergentes visões de mundo e fundamentações morais. A polarização brasileira vista nas eleições presidenciais de 2018 se tratou de uma polarização político-ideológica. Dessa forma, o levantamento teórico apresentado neste trabalho poderá servir de base para uma análise empírica mais aprofundada sobre o tema. / [en] This master s thesis aims to present a preliminary analysis of the causes that fuel political-ideological conflicts, using as one of the main theoretical bases the studies of the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt, among other relevant theoretical approaches. The objective is to identify whether these causes can explain the level of polarization presented in the 2018 elections in Brazil, clarifying the general causes of human behavior that lead to polarization, such as the reasons that lead humans to join groups and enter into conflicts, as well as identifying the specific causes of conflicts between right and left, objectively delimiting their differences and incompatibilities. To achieve this objective, it was necessary to survey theories from various areas of knowledge, such as Social Psychology, Evolutionary Biology, Moral Philosophy, and Social Sciences. Preliminary conclusions indicate that there are evolutionary and innate factors that guide the division of groups and that the causes of ideological conflicts are related to the difficulty of dialogue and consensus due to divergent worldviews and moral foundations. The Brazilian polarization seen in the 2018 presidential elections was a political-ideological polarization. Thus, the theoretical survey presented in this work can serve as a basis for a more in-depth empirical analysis of the subject.

The focus of this study was the organizational working environment and existing partisanship evident in the United States Congress. There has been a reduction in the number of laws passed over the last 30 years from a high of over 1,000 to a low of around 120, with a period of complete government shutdown in 2013. This qualitative research utilized qualitative content analysis to discover the nature of partisan conflict as demonstrated by 6 members of Congress. The conceptual framework for this study was moral foundations theory. Different moral principles held by Democrats and Republicans were studied as a possible explanation for the inability of one end of the political spectrum to identify with, work with, and comprehend the belief systems of the other. Archival video data for each participant was viewed on C-Span and related transcripts were analyzed using qualitative content analysis. Emerging themes were then inductively coded in order to understand the nature of the partisan conflict in Congress. Results demonstrate that Republicans and Democrats rely on different sets of moral foundations and that there is limited crossover between those who occupy the extreme ends of the ideological continuum. This lack of crossover essentially leads members with differing ideology and moral foundations to not comprehend the moral message of their opponents. With this knowledge, political strategists can help to develop communication and political approaches that take into consideration the moral foundations of ideological opponents. Social change implications include improved understanding of the ideological stance of members of the opposing party and improved working relationships in Congress, resulting in an organizational working environment that is less conflicted.

The knowledge base of empirical psychology is more expansive than ever before. So too is the impulse to integrate this factual knowledge into political theory. But how should this psychological turn be undertaken? What would a political psychology for political theorists look like? How could psychology credibly tackle the questions that political theorists characteristically ask, especially regarding the nature and consequences of prescriptive political judgment? In this thesis, I explore this issue through the framework of recent debates between political moralists—specifically, John Rawls, G. A. Cohen, and Peter Singer—and political realists—largely Bernard Williams. Deploying the insights of political realists, I argue that moralists cannot quarantine the relevance of psychological facts through the ideal of a 'pure' normative judgment. To explore what this empirical engagement might look like, I contrast these moralist ideals of judgment with Jonathan Haidt’s social intuitionism, which proposes a more affectively laden and pluralistic model of judgment. I then redeploy the insights of political realism to critique social intuitionism, to uncover its weaknesses from the perspective of existing political theory. Finally, to stabilize this critique, I lay out the framework for a reflexive political psychology, which acknowledges the co-constitutive relationship between the discipline of psychology and its subject matter: human psychology. This reflexive political psychology offers an agenda by which we can investigate the political usefulness of psychological and political theories.