As a result of the Supreme Court’s broad definition for ‘best interests of the corporation’ in recent decisions, the author examines to whom managers ought to owe their fiduciary duties normatively and what role managerial discretion has in this debate. The author argues that the lack of clarity offered by the judiciary, in this area of corporate law, has led to the adoption of a wide discretion being afforded to managers. An examination of several rationales fails to justify this continued adoption of a broad discretion. The author argues that granting managers with wide discretionary powers is problematic because the interests of constituencies will not be adequately protected. At the very least, statutory reform is necessary to protect the most vulnerable stakeholders. The author recommends that the law be amended to require that managers, in performing their fiduciary duties, regard the interests of employees and shareholders.

As a result of the Supreme Court’s broad definition for ‘best interests of the corporation’ in recent decisions, the author examines to whom managers ought to owe their fiduciary duties normatively and what role managerial discretion has in this debate. The author argues that the lack of clarity offered by the judiciary, in this area of corporate law, has led to the adoption of a wide discretion being afforded to managers. An examination of several rationales fails to justify this continued adoption of a broad discretion. The author argues that granting managers with wide discretionary powers is problematic because the interests of constituencies will not be adequately protected. At the very least, statutory reform is necessary to protect the most vulnerable stakeholders. The author recommends that the law be amended to require that managers, in performing their fiduciary duties, regard the interests of employees and shareholders.

One of the most conspicuous features of mergers is that they come in waves that are correlated with increases in share prices and price/earnings ratios. We use a natural way to discriminate between pure stock market influences on firm decisions and other influences by examining merger patterns for both listed and unlisted firms. If "real" changes in the economy drive merger waves, as some neoclassical theories of mergers predict, both listed and unlisted firms should experience waves. We find significant differences between listed and unlisted firms as predicted by behavioral theories of merger waves. (author's abstract)

This dissertation is a series of study on CEO turnover, succession, and compensation, which consists of three essays. In essay 1, I investigate how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) affects CEO tenure and the characteristics of CEO turnover. I do not find a significant relation between financial reporting and CEO turnover even though SOX enforces accurate financial reporting and personal responsibilities. However, I find SOX affects CEO turnover via the changes to corporate boards. I provide some evidence supporting the idea that intensified monitoring significantly reduces CEO tenure. Specifically, I find SOX significantly affects the relation between CEO tenure and the independence of the board. I find that the likelihood of forced CEO turnover is higher in the post-SOX period. I also document that intensified monitoring increases the likelihood of forced turnover, specifically, I find CEO power concentration, institutional ownership, negative news, and shareholder governance proposals significantly affect the odds of forced turnover. I also provide some evidence supporting the hypothesis that firm performance is inversely related to forced CEO turnover. I document that the average number of audit committee meetings significantly increased in the post-SOX period, and the interaction between the number of audit committee meetings and firm performance significantly increase the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. Overall, the results support the notion that SOX affects boards' decisions on CEO turnover. I do not find that the proportion of outside directors significantly affects the odds ratio of forced turnover, indicating outside dominated boards may not be effective in removing CEOs. Managerial discretion defines the working environment of a manager and could potentially affect a board's choice of a successor CEO. In essay 2, I hypothesize that boards tend to appoint younger (older) CEOs in firms with high (low) managerial discretion. I further propose that the relation between managerial discretion and successor CEO age may be moderated by the age of board members, the origin of the successor, and the successor's designated heir status. Using a sample of 629 successions occurring between 1994 and 2005, I find empirical evidence that supports my first hypothesis for the total sample and the sample of successions with voluntary turnover. Board age, successor origin, and the successor's designated heir status do not moderate the results for the total sample. However, I find that board member age and designated heir status moderate the relation between managerial discretion and CEO age following forced turnover. Following voluntary turnover, successor origin and designated heir status moderate the result. The above mentioned three board and CEO characteristics may either strengthen or weaken the link between managerial discretion and CEO age depending on how the incumbent CEO leaves the CEO position. In addition, several other factors also statistically affect boards' decisions regarding CEO age, including governance, CEO board tenure, and titles held by the successor. In essay 3, I examine the role of managerial discretion in setting CEO pay at succession. Using a sample of 656 successions from 1994-2005, I provide evidence that a successor CEO's pay level is positively and significantly associated with the level of managerial discretion. However, outside succession moderates the link between managerial discretion and pay level. I further find that the moderating effect of a successor's origin is contingent upon the bargaining power of the board of directors for the total and forced turnover samples. As for the pay structure of a successor, the results of the total sample and forced turnover subsample provide evidence that managerial discretion positively relates to the proportion of risk-based pay and outside succession has a moderating effect on this relation; and the moderating effect depends on the board bargaining power. As for the voluntary turnover sample, the pay structure of the new CEO is mainly determined by the pay structure of the predecessor, firm performance, and the board bargaining power. This study enriches existing research on managerial discretion and succession by linking CEO bargaining power at succession with the theory of managerial discretion.

A importância e papel do executivo de marketing são temas em evidência entre os acadêmicos dessa área. Embora os administradores sejam essenciais para as organizações, há certa dúvida quanto a atual relevância do diretor de marketing em relação a outros cargos de nível estratégico. Nesse contexto, esta dissertação busca averiguar qual o impacto da substituição de altos executivos de marketing em empresas listadas na BOVESPA. Realizouse um estudo de evento, contendo trinta empresas, para identificar o impacto dessa mudança na administração das companhias. Posteriormente, comparou-se o retorno identificado aos fatores da liberdade administrava, pois, de acordo com esse conceito, a importância dos dirigentes depende de alguns aspectos que acabam por limitar ou ampliar as suas opções de ação. Assim, características da empresa e do próprio profissional foram, por meio de uma análise de regressão múltipla, comparadas com o impacto financeiro da substituição do executivo. Os resultados sugerem que há uma relação entre o retorno anormal e as características do evento, tal como o diretor já ter trabalhado em outra ocasião na empresa que o contratou. / The importance and role of the marketing executive is a highlighted subject between the academics of this area. There is no consensus about the current relevance of the chief marketing officer in relation to other functions in the top board of company’s executives. This research seeks to access what impact the change of the chief marketing officer has in the value of companies listed in BOVESPA. An event study has been realized, with thirty firms, to identify the impact of this change in the board of Brazilian companies. After that, the observed return was compared to aspects of managerial discretion, this concept defends that the executive’s importance is a function of some characteristics that limit or amplify its options of action. Therefore, these aspects were compared with the abnormal return trough a regression analysis. The results suggest the existence of a relationship between individual characteristics, such as the executive being an insider, and firm-specific characteristics, such as the size of the company, and the abnormal return of the event.

A importância e papel do executivo de marketing são temas em evidência entre os acadêmicos dessa área. Embora os administradores sejam essenciais para as organizações, há certa dúvida quanto a atual relevância do diretor de marketing em relação a outros cargos de nível estratégico. Nesse contexto, esta dissertação busca averiguar qual o impacto da substituição de altos executivos de marketing em empresas listadas na BOVESPA. Realizouse um estudo de evento, contendo trinta empresas, para identificar o impacto dessa mudança na administração das companhias. Posteriormente, comparou-se o retorno identificado aos fatores da liberdade administrava, pois, de acordo com esse conceito, a importância dos dirigentes depende de alguns aspectos que acabam por limitar ou ampliar as suas opções de ação. Assim, características da empresa e do próprio profissional foram, por meio de uma análise de regressão múltipla, comparadas com o impacto financeiro da substituição do executivo. Os resultados sugerem que há uma relação entre o retorno anormal e as características do evento, tal como o diretor já ter trabalhado em outra ocasião na empresa que o contratou. / The importance and role of the marketing executive is a highlighted subject between the academics of this area. There is no consensus about the current relevance of the chief marketing officer in relation to other functions in the top board of company’s executives. This research seeks to access what impact the change of the chief marketing officer has in the value of companies listed in BOVESPA. An event study has been realized, with thirty firms, to identify the impact of this change in the board of Brazilian companies. After that, the observed return was compared to aspects of managerial discretion, this concept defends that the executive’s importance is a function of some characteristics that limit or amplify its options of action. Therefore, these aspects were compared with the abnormal return trough a regression analysis. The results suggest the existence of a relationship between individual characteristics, such as the executive being an insider, and firm-specific characteristics, such as the size of the company, and the abnormal return of the event.

A importância e papel do executivo de marketing são temas em evidência entre os acadêmicos dessa área. Embora os administradores sejam essenciais para as organizações, há certa dúvida quanto a atual relevância do diretor de marketing em relação a outros cargos de nível estratégico. Nesse contexto, esta dissertação busca averiguar qual o impacto da substituição de altos executivos de marketing em empresas listadas na BOVESPA. Realizouse um estudo de evento, contendo trinta empresas, para identificar o impacto dessa mudança na administração das companhias. Posteriormente, comparou-se o retorno identificado aos fatores da liberdade administrava, pois, de acordo com esse conceito, a importância dos dirigentes depende de alguns aspectos que acabam por limitar ou ampliar as suas opções de ação. Assim, características da empresa e do próprio profissional foram, por meio de uma análise de regressão múltipla, comparadas com o impacto financeiro da substituição do executivo. Os resultados sugerem que há uma relação entre o retorno anormal e as características do evento, tal como o diretor já ter trabalhado em outra ocasião na empresa que o contratou. / The importance and role of the marketing executive is a highlighted subject between the academics of this area. There is no consensus about the current relevance of the chief marketing officer in relation to other functions in the top board of company’s executives. This research seeks to access what impact the change of the chief marketing officer has in the value of companies listed in BOVESPA. An event study has been realized, with thirty firms, to identify the impact of this change in the board of Brazilian companies. After that, the observed return was compared to aspects of managerial discretion, this concept defends that the executive’s importance is a function of some characteristics that limit or amplify its options of action. Therefore, these aspects were compared with the abnormal return trough a regression analysis. The results suggest the existence of a relationship between individual characteristics, such as the executive being an insider, and firm-specific characteristics, such as the size of the company, and the abnormal return of the event.

L’influence des dirigeants sur la performance (ou contre-performance) de la firme fait l’objet de nombreux débats. Selon la vision déterministe, les pressions internes et externes qui s’exercent sur le dirigeant sont si importantes que ce dernier dispose de très peu de marge de manoeuvre pour influencer les résultats de la firme. D’un autre côté, selon les partisans de l’école du leadership, le dirigeant est l’unique architecte de l’entreprise et c’est à lui qu’incombe la performance de l’entreprise. Ces deux points de vue sont nuancés par le concept de latitude managériale qui mesure la marge de manoeuvre dont le dirigeant qui lui permet de se démarquer significativement des autres entreprises du secteur. Cette thèse s’intéresse à la responsabilité du dirigeant sur la performance de la firme ainsi que sur les décisions qui y sont opérées. Elle porte sur les grands patrons français qui ont, notamment, la particularité de former de puissants réseaux sociaux. Le premier chapitre dresse un portrait des grands dirigeants français et met en évidence les principales caractéristiques des décideurs hexagonaux. Le deuxième chapitre étudie le phénomène d’endogamie observé lors des successions de dirigeants ainsi que l’impact sur la performance de la firme. Le troisième chapitre propose une évaluation de l’effet du dirigeant sur la performance de la firme. Enfin le quatrième chapitre mesure l’impact du pouvoir du dirigeant sur les décisions de de croissance externe de la firme. Cette thèse corrobore l’idée que le pouvoir économique demeure au sein d’une castedirigeante fermée / CEO effect on firm performance (or non-performance) is the point of many debates. According to the deterministic view, the CEO is constrained by internal and external forces and has no enough latitude for influence significantly the firm out comes. Other side, the leadership school considers that the CEO is the only one designer of the firm and is the responsible of the firm performance.These views are qualified by the managerial discretion which measures the margin flexibility theCEO has in order to make decisions to, significantly, differentiate the firm from others within a same sector. This thesis focuses on the CEO’s effect on the firm performance and the decisions that are operated in the firm. It deals with the major French CEOs who have the particularity to build powerful social networks. Chapter 1 is about the major French CEOs and draws the main features of these deciders. The phenomen on of endogamy observed during CEO succession and its impact on the firm performance are studied in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 offers an evaluation of the CEO’s impact on the firm performance and Chapter 4 measures the CEO’s power on decision about the acquisitions. This thesis confirms the idea that the economic power remains inside a closed executive cast

La thèse cherche à comprendre la marge de manœuvre des dirigeants mandataires sociaux pour l’engagement stratégique socialement responsable des entreprises françaises cotées. Notre cadre théorique se définit autour des approches financières et stratégiques de la latitude managériale des dirigeants dans une vision synthétique des théories contractuelles et cognitives de la gouvernance.Nous adoptons une démarche d’exploration hybride alternant logique abductive et déductive. Un design multi-méthodes est mobilisé : entretiens, tests statistiques et étude de cas unique. Nos résultats montrent la prudence des dirigeants d’entreprises françaises cotées concernant leur engagement dans la RSE (Responsabilité Sociale de l’Entreprise) à titre individuel. Ils ne s’engageraient que dans le cas de pratiques proactives de leurs entreprises ou dans le cas de l’atteinte d’une performance financière conséquente. Une importante logique de légitimation de ces acteurs est révélée.Concernant l’influence des dirigeants sur l’engagement dans RSE de leurs entreprises, leur ancienneté en poste y serait positivement associée. Le renforcement de la capacité des dirigeants à percevoir et à répondre à la demande sociale tout au long de leur mandat peut expliquer ce résultat. Les dirigeants rechercheraient aussi leur enracinement à travers la RSE. Celui-ci pourrait être favorable à la performance de long terme des entreprises notamment celles témoignant de systèmes de gouvernance très financiarisés. Pour éviter des dérives personnelles dommageables, nos résultats montrent que l’autonomie acquise par les dirigeants par leur ancienneté se devrait d’être contrebalancée par des mécanismes de contrôle.Nos résultats insistent sur le rôle actif et positif potentiellement endossable par les dirigeants pour le repérage et l’intégration stratégique d’opportunités liées à la RSE dans le cadre d’une création de valeur partenariale / The research aims to understand top managers’ discretion for the strategic commitment of French listed companies to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Our theoretical framework is based on the financial and strategic views of managerial discretion. Our approach simultaneously considers the contractual and cognitive approaches of corporate governance.We conducted an exploratory study based on both abductive and deductive reasoning. A multi-method design is developed and includes interviews, statistical tests and a case study.Our results show the top managers’ caution to be personally committed to CSR. Looking for legitimization, they would only be socially committed when their companies had demonstrated a strong positioning in this field or when they have reached a sufficient financial performance. Top management team’s tenure also appears positively linked to the company’s CSR strategic commitment at an organizational level. Indeed, top managers’ tenure contributes to develop their capabilities to perceive and to answer stakeholders’ expectations. Top managers may also have the possibility, year after year, to seek for their entrenchment through CSR. This managerial entrenchment could be positive for the long term performance of companies characterized by a strongly short-term oriented governance system. To avoid top managers’ personal abuses of their autonomy, control mechanisms may also have to be implemented in the same time.Our results underline the critical but fundamental role of top managers to identify and integrate CSR strategic opportunities for creating shared value

Baselregelverket är en samling råd och riktlinjer som har som mål att skapa finansiell stabilitet för banker världen över. Det finns i tre omfattningar och efter finanskrisen år 2008 påbörjades ett betydande reformarbete av Basel II efter att banker inte fångade upp riskerna i tillräckligt stor utsträckning. Med ökade kapitalkrav och en förbättrad riskhantering hos bankerna har Baselkommittén som mål att de tidigare bristerna med regelverket inte ska upprepas. Detta har medfört stora interna organisatoriska förändringar för bankerna. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att undersöka hur finanskrisen år 2008 och reformarbetet av Baselregelverket påverkat chefers handlingsutrymme på svenska banker, där begreppet handlingsutrymme utgår från managerial discretion som handlar om chefers handlingsfrihet under påverkan av externa faktorer. Studien kommer därmed att bidra med en ökad förståelse för regelverket och lyfta fram personliga uppfattningar om hur regelverket har påverkat cheferna.   Kandidatuppsatsen är baserad på en kvalitativ forskningsmetod där vi utförde semi-strukturerade intervjuer med åtta respondenter med chefserfarenhet från svenska banker. Empirin som vi har fått fram tyder på att cheferna upplever ett minskat handlingsutrymme som en påföljd av mer komplexa regelverk. Det har blivit mer komplicerat för cheferna i dag jämfört med innan krisen att styra bankernas dagliga verksamhet på grund av ökade krav på regelefterlevnad och noggrannare uppföljning av riskmätning och kapitalkrav. Vi har även kommit fram till att cheferna upplever förändringar i sitt handlingsutrymme beroende på faktorer som exempelvis bankens storlek och deras införande av olika internmetoder. / The Basel Accords are a collection of advice and recommendations that strives to establish a financial stability of banks all over the world. The accord exists in three versions and after the financial crisis 2008 a considerable reform was established of Basel II due to the fact that previous versions did not accurately handled risks well enough. With the increasing capital requirements and improved risk management at banks, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision wants to ensure that the previous flaws with the accord will not be repeated. This has resulted in big organizational changes for the banks. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the financial crisis 2008 and the reform of the Basel Accord that followed have affected the latitude of managerial action of the managers in swedish banks, which is based on managerial discretion that mean changes in managerial roles under influence of external factors. The study will thereby contribute with an increased understanding for this accord and point out personal perceptions of how the regulation have affected the managers.   This bachelor thesis is based on a qualitative research where we performed eight semi-structured interviews with respondents having managerial experiences from swedish banks. The empirical data we have obtained shows that managers perceive a reduced latitude of managerial action as a consequence of more complex regulations. It’s more complicated for managers today considering how it was before the crisis to control the daily operations of the bank because of the increased demand for compliance and a stricter monitoring of risk measurement and capital requirements. We have also concluded that managers are experiencing different changes in the latitude of managerial actions depending on factors such as the bank’s size and how they introduce the various internal methods