Thesis (Th. M.)--Calvin Theological Seminary, 2005. / Abstract. "May 2005." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-74).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Calvin Theological Seminary, 2005. / Abstract. "May 2005." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-74).

Thesis (M.A.)--Catholic Theological Union, 1978. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 110-111).

No description available.

Social science theories applied to the family make certain assumptions in the analytic categories of value-neutrality vs. value-ladenness, positivism vs. hermeneutics, and determinism vs. moral agency. New natural law, a different theory from the body of classical forms of natural law, provides a unique approach to the study of the family. New natural law provides a defense for the traditional conjugal family as well as provides difference conclusions and implications for empirical research.

No description available.

This thesis identifies two accounts within David Novak’s Jewish natural law theory. In the earlier account, Novak locates natural law within the Noahide commandments; in the later account, he also locates it within the reasons for the commandments and rabbinic enactments. The change between these accounts is marked by a shift in his description of rationality. The norms of the Noahide code are originally described as known strictly by reference to themselves. As he begins grounding the norms in the imago Dei, that knowledge becomes dependent on a “cultural heritage,” by which Novak comes to mean an explanation based on a doctrine of creation. By comparing the original presentation of the later account with its more developed iteration and highlighting the features that are unique to the earlier and later accounts, it becomes possible to identify components of the later account that are added to his subsequent treatment of the Noahide code and facets of the earlier account that are later added to his discussion of the reasons for the commandments and rabbinic enactments. These efforts at reconciliation include the normative content incorporated into the later account, the metaphysical background added to the later treatment of the Noahide code, the mediating concept of personhood, the phenomenological retrieval of the Noahide commandments, and the argument for minimal and maximal claims. Finally, this thesis analyzes the relationship between Novak’s natural law theory and his view of redemption. Given that as Novak’s natural law theory becomes less dependent on reason and more heavily based on a doctrine of creation, his treatment of redemption changes from being associated with a period of greater human understanding to a time that is characterized by God’s accomplishments on humanity’s behalf, I argue that there is a parallel between those concepts. I then draw on that parallel to show that Novak’s natural law is compatible with, and perhaps inseparable from, his covenantal thought. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

O Direito atual é estudado como fruto exclusivo da vontade humana. Nesse sentido, a lei é pensada como produto da razão, apartada de conceitos como Moral ou Justiça. Este modelo corresponde a determinado arranjo político-social e normalmente vem associado a um conceito de Estado regulador de conflitos. Esta organização jurídico-política nem sempre existiu. O Brasil Império possuiu outra forma de conceber Direito e Sociedade, na qual o Direito Natural possuía lugar de destaque. Em São Paulo, até a Conciliação, a disciplina esteve nas mãos de liberais e significava oposição ao governo monárquico. Neste período predominou o uso do compêndio de Perreau, de início, e o de Ferrer, posteriormente. Ambos possuíam raízes no liberalismo e foram adotados pelos professores Avellar Brotero e Amaral Gurgel. Em meados do XIX passam a vicejar na Academia de Direito as tendências espiritualistas. Ali se estabeleceram as doutrinas de Krause e o Ecletismo de Jouffrouy e Cousin. Nas últimas décadas do Oitocentos a disciplina Direito Natural passa a estar nas mãos de catedráticos politicamente conservadores, como João Theodoro Xavier de Mattos, e convictos católicos, como José Maria C. de Sá e Benevides. / Current Law is studied as the exclusive fruit of human will. In this sense, the law is thought as a product of reason, apart of concepts such as Moral or Justice. This model corresponds to a certain political-social arrangement and is usually associated with a concept of State that regulates conflicts. This legal-political organization has not always existed. Brazil Empire had another way of conceiving Law and Society, in which Natural Law had a prominent place. In São Paulo, up to the Conciliation period, the discipline was in the hands of liberals and meant opposition to the monarchical government. In this period predominated the use of the compendium of Perreau, at first, and Ferrer, later. Both had roots in liberalism and were adopted by professors Avellar Brotero and Amaral Gurgel. During the mid-nineteenth century, spiritualistic tendencies flourished in the Law Academy. There they established the doctrines of Krause and the eclecticism of Jouffrouy and Cousin. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the discipline of Natural Law came to be in the hands of politically conservative professors, such as João Theodoro Xavier de Mattos, and convinced Catholics, such as José Maria C. de Sá and Benevides.

O Direito atual é estudado como fruto exclusivo da vontade humana. Nesse sentido, a lei é pensada como produto da razão, apartada de conceitos como Moral ou Justiça. Este modelo corresponde a determinado arranjo político-social e normalmente vem associado a um conceito de Estado regulador de conflitos. Esta organização jurídico-política nem sempre existiu. O Brasil Império possuiu outra forma de conceber Direito e Sociedade, na qual o Direito Natural possuía lugar de destaque. Em São Paulo, até a Conciliação, a disciplina esteve nas mãos de liberais e significava oposição ao governo monárquico. Neste período predominou o uso do compêndio de Perreau, de início, e o de Ferrer, posteriormente. Ambos possuíam raízes no liberalismo e foram adotados pelos professores Avellar Brotero e Amaral Gurgel. Em meados do XIX passam a vicejar na Academia de Direito as tendências espiritualistas. Ali se estabeleceram as doutrinas de Krause e o Ecletismo de Jouffrouy e Cousin. Nas últimas décadas do Oitocentos a disciplina Direito Natural passa a estar nas mãos de catedráticos politicamente conservadores, como João Theodoro Xavier de Mattos, e convictos católicos, como José Maria C. de Sá e Benevides. / Current Law is studied as the exclusive fruit of human will. In this sense, the law is thought as a product of reason, apart of concepts such as Moral or Justice. This model corresponds to a certain political-social arrangement and is usually associated with a concept of State that regulates conflicts. This legal-political organization has not always existed. Brazil Empire had another way of conceiving Law and Society, in which Natural Law had a prominent place. In São Paulo, up to the Conciliation period, the discipline was in the hands of liberals and meant opposition to the monarchical government. In this period predominated the use of the compendium of Perreau, at first, and Ferrer, later. Both had roots in liberalism and were adopted by professors Avellar Brotero and Amaral Gurgel. During the mid-nineteenth century, spiritualistic tendencies flourished in the Law Academy. There they established the doctrines of Krause and the eclecticism of Jouffrouy and Cousin. In the last decades of the nineteenth century the discipline of Natural Law came to be in the hands of politically conservative professors, such as João Theodoro Xavier de Mattos, and convinced Catholics, such as José Maria C. de Sá and Benevides.

This thesis will inquire into the practicable strategies that Thomas Hobbes described in his major works of political philosophy, on the one hand, to allow his sovereign to ensure civil peace, and on the other, to enable his sovereign to defend the commonwealth. In terms of civil peace, the exercise of Hobbes's sovereign's 'absolute' authority is tempered by, and contingent on, its practical efficacy for securing and maintaining a peaceful commonwealth. To that end, I will argue that Hobbes's sovereign is obliged to rule according to the natural laws, and entailed in this obligation are coinciding liberties which Hobbes believed that subjects must perceive themselves to possess, and which sovereigns must respect, in order for peace to be realised. However, rather than situating the purpose of Hobbes's project in terms of civil peace alone—as the vast majority of his interpreters have—I consider alongside the purpose of civil peace, and contrast it with, the purpose of defence. Evident from this comparison is that the means by which Hobbes's sovereign must ensure the capability of the commonwealth to defend itself from foreign nations simultaneously undermines and counteracts his otherwise proto-liberal system. Distinct from other prominent interpretations, I will argue that this ambivalence is not a result of an imbalance between subjects' rights contra sovereign's rights, nor yet of an unsupervised agonistic counter-balance between the two. Instead, the affirmation of subjects' inalienable rights are depicted by Hobbes as a practically ineffective means by which to ensure defence. There exists a necessary ambivalence within Hobbes's theory of sovereignty itself and is to be managed solely according to the sovereign's ideally prudent and practicable judgment. Ultimately, I will characterize Hobbes as arguing that the unfortunate necessity of preparedness for foreign defensive wars is best mitigated by the sovereign's prudent and minimal exercise of the commonwealth's power in carrying out this intended purpose.