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Os Dois tratados sobre o governo, de John Locke, têm um papel de destaque na filosofia política das Luzes. Neles, ao afirmar as idéias de liberdade e igualdade naturais dos homens, o autor mina as bases do pensamento absolutista. Apesar de ser no Segundo tratado que o autor estabelece de modo mais evidente sua teoria política, é importante notar que o pressuposto lógico desta obra é o Primeiro tratado sobre o governo, texto menos conhecido e estudado pela história da filosofia, no qual Locke refuta de forma minuciosa as idéias de Robert Filmer, sistematizador da doutrina patriarcalista e do direito divino dos reis. Ao rejeitar argumentos de Filmer, Locke mostra que o poder político não se constitui apenas de vontade, mas envolve consenso, lei e entendimento. O propósito deste trabalho é apresentar o lado menos conhecido desse debate: os argumentos elaborados por Filmer para criticar a teoria da soberania popular e o contratualismo nem sempre são respondidos com eficácia absoluta por Locke. Além disso, a intenção é também expor o quanto o pensamento lockiano é marcado pelas asserções de Filmer, cujas idéias podem ter mais importância do que história da filosofia lhe tem atribuído. / John Locke\'s \"Two Treatises on Government\" have an important role in the political philosophy of the Enlightenment. By stating the ideas of the natural liberty and equality of men, the author undermines the bases of the absolutist thought. If it is in the Second Treatise that the author establishes his political theory in a more evident way, it is important to notice that the logical presupposition of this work is the First Treatise on Government, a less known text in which Locke refutes in a minutious way the ideas of Robert Filmer, who sistematized the patriarchalist doctrine, as well as the one concerning the divine right of kings. By rejecting Filmer\'s statements, Locke shows that political power is not constituted only by will, but involves consent, law and understanding. This work aims to present an aspect of this debate which is less known: the arguments elaborated by Filmer to criticize the theory of popular sovereignty as well as contractarianism are not always answered with total eficacy by Locke. Besides, we intend to expose how much the Lockean thought is determined by Filmer, whose thought may have a greater importance than what the history of philosophy has attributed to it.

This thesis examines the question of how primitive states form. The first part of the thesis defines a state. I then analyse Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Acquisition (TCA), expounded in Leviathan. I conclude that this theory fails as an answer to the question of how primitive states form as it suffers from at least five major flaws. I go on to explain, modify and correct Hobbes�s TCA through techniques that have been used in modern critiques of Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Institution. The result is the strongest possible answer that Hobbes can give to the question of how primitive states form. I conclude that his attempt fails as even if the technical aspects of his theory can be fixed, the overall problem of empirical falsification occurs. I then put forward my own theory, based on the modified Hobbesian theory. The major innovation is the replacement of individuals with groups in the Hobbesian State of Nature. This move answers the problem of empirical falsification, at least initially. The theory also helps to explain several of the more technical problems with Hobbes�s theory. The resulting theory is a Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. The next step in the thesis is to match the Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation to the empirical evidence of primitive state formation, represented by anthropology. I analyse the anthropological literature and put forward that at least one recent research program in anthropology matches my Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. I conclude that Hobbesian theory, based on the TCA can be successfully modernised into a plausible answer to the question of how primitive states formed.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2007. / Thesis directed by Vittorio Hösle for the Department of Political Science. "December 2007." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 181-186).

Can explicitly Christian principles be invoked and put into practice in political life without thereby rendering that politics fideistic, exclusionary and immoderate? Could such principles in fact strengthen the rule of reason in politics? Many secular and Christian thinkers agree that the answers to these questions must be no, only parting ways on their practical conclusions. But Aquinas' much-neglected De Regno suggests the matter is not so simple. In his careful pedagogical structuring of De Regno, Aquinas opens up the possibility of a kind of dialogue between convention, reason and revelation, one that permits him to propose and reformulate his political teachings according to diverse but convergent principles. I aim to develop an account of Aquinas' political teaching that reveals itself as indebted to revelation for its principles but grounded in and open to reason, and thus neither irrational, exclusionary nor immoderate. I will focus particularly on his treatment of the natural law. / text

In the postscript to The Concept of Law, H.L. A. Hart describes the on-going debate inspired by his book, focusing on the criticisms of Ronald Dworkin. In this essay, I will discuss Dworkin’s criticisms of Hart, as well as Hart’s responses, showing that while Hart responds adequately to some criticisms, he fails to respond adequately to others. I will also reconstruct and evaluate the arguments given for and against the separation thesis by Dworkin and Hart. Finally, I will argue that the debate about the separation thesis – the thesis that morality and law are separable – is misguided, conflating as it does two distinct questions. These are the questions of what the positive law is, that is, the law that is posited in a specific time and place, and of what the natural law is, that is, the law that (if it exists) is universal and timeless. Once we distinguish these questions, we will see that the answer to the question of whether law is separable from morality depends on which sense of ‘law’ is relevant, and that there are two different answers corresponding to the two senses of positive law and natural law. Positive law is separable from morality while natural law is not. / text

Precipitated by important work in recent natural law political theory, this research revisits the relationship between political association and human flourishing. Does the political community itself realize some aspect of human sociability intrinsic to our full flourishing or is it simply an instrumental good? The inquiry begins with a thorough examination of the merits of John Finnis’s influential argument for an instrumental political common good, pointing to a significant lacuna in his inattention to the value of political activity, as opposed to the operation of government and law. In building an alternative positive account the argument relies upon both formal and substantive considerations, generally employing an Aristotelian methodology of understanding the whole via a consideration of its constitutive parts. First, drawing from Aquinas’s Aristotelian commentaries to unpack the basic structure of part/whole relationships within the “body politic,” I argue that political community is partially defined by the nature of its basic constitutive parts. The next chapter considers the substantive good of familial association, particularly in light of longstanding concerns with the family’s particularity and inequality. I argue that the intrinsically liberal and educative character of parental love rightly orients children to virtuous activity and invests familial association with an intrinsic rationality. The final two chapters bring direct focus onto the political common good: First, I argue that a normatively compelling account of the political common good must be both inclusivist, i.e., including within its purpose the irreducibly diverse goods of every individual and basic association within the community, and distinctive, i.e., including within the calculus of practical reason the good of the political association as such. Lastly, I argue that the political common good is intrinsically—though only partially—constitutive of the human social good. Aquinas makes a crucial shift away from Aristotle’s political primacy in his more pluralistic account of human sociability and emphasis on the extensiveness of the political good over the superiority of political activity per se. Nevertheless, there are essential human virtues—justice, love, generosity—that are uniquely, if not exclusively, fostered in political community and potentially realized in civic friendship. / text

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This thesis examines the question of how primitive states form. The first part of the thesis defines a state. I then analyse Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Acquisition (TCA), expounded in Leviathan. I conclude that this theory fails as an answer to the question of how primitive states form as it suffers from at least five major flaws. I go on to explain, modify and correct Hobbes�s TCA through techniques that have been used in modern critiques of Hobbes�s Theory of the Commonwealth by Institution. The result is the strongest possible answer that Hobbes can give to the question of how primitive states form. I conclude that his attempt fails as even if the technical aspects of his theory can be fixed, the overall problem of empirical falsification occurs. I then put forward my own theory, based on the modified Hobbesian theory. The major innovation is the replacement of individuals with groups in the Hobbesian State of Nature. This move answers the problem of empirical falsification, at least initially. The theory also helps to explain several of the more technical problems with Hobbes�s theory. The resulting theory is a Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. The next step in the thesis is to match the Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation to the empirical evidence of primitive state formation, represented by anthropology. I analyse the anthropological literature and put forward that at least one recent research program in anthropology matches my Hobbesian theory of primitive state formation. I conclude that Hobbesian theory, based on the TCA can be successfully modernised into a plausible answer to the question of how primitive states formed.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Baylor University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 206-218)