John Finnis is one of the seminal contemporary jurisprudential thinkers working within the natural law tradition. His Natural Law and Natural Rights, first published in 1980, has had a significant impact and stands as a centerpiece of modern natural law theory. It is at once a work of ethics, political philosophy as well as jurisprudence. The starting point of his theory of natural law con­sists in concepts such as basic human goods, practical reasonableness and the common good. These concepts provide the foundation for his analysis of communities and society as well as the legal system. This thesis sets out to expound on his theory of natural law by exploring Finnis’ understanding of the basic human goods, practical reasonableness and the common good and the way they interact with his ideas of law and justice. Some of the more controversial or contentious aspects of his theory will also be addressed; such as the supposed self-evident nature of the basic goods and their incommensurable status. Some critics allege that his theory is lacking some of the defining characteristics of a natural law theory and that it thus fails as a theory of natural law, while others have claimed that his theory lends itself to the justification of an authoritarian society. Some of these criticisms carry more strength than others and I conclude by granting that Finnis’ theory contains some weaknesses. However, these should not weaken our appreciation of his vision of the good that law can do and the interrelatedness of law and morality.

Precipitated by important work in recent natural law political theory, this research revisits the relationship between political association and human flourishing. Does the political community itself realize some aspect of human sociability intrinsic to our full flourishing or is it simply an instrumental good? The inquiry begins with a thorough examination of the merits of John Finnis’s influential argument for an instrumental political common good, pointing to a significant lacuna in his inattention to the value of political activity, as opposed to the operation of government and law. In building an alternative positive account the argument relies upon both formal and substantive considerations, generally employing an Aristotelian methodology of understanding the whole via a consideration of its constitutive parts. First, drawing from Aquinas’s Aristotelian commentaries to unpack the basic structure of part/whole relationships within the “body politic,” I argue that political community is partially defined by the nature of its basic constitutive parts. The next chapter considers the substantive good of familial association, particularly in light of longstanding concerns with the family’s particularity and inequality. I argue that the intrinsically liberal and educative character of parental love rightly orients children to virtuous activity and invests familial association with an intrinsic rationality. The final two chapters bring direct focus onto the political common good: First, I argue that a normatively compelling account of the political common good must be both inclusivist, i.e., including within its purpose the irreducibly diverse goods of every individual and basic association within the community, and distinctive, i.e., including within the calculus of practical reason the good of the political association as such. Lastly, I argue that the political common good is intrinsically—though only partially—constitutive of the human social good. Aquinas makes a crucial shift away from Aristotle’s political primacy in his more pluralistic account of human sociability and emphasis on the extensiveness of the political good over the superiority of political activity per se. Nevertheless, there are essential human virtues—justice, love, generosity—that are uniquely, if not exclusively, fostered in political community and potentially realized in civic friendship. / text

Esta dissertação tem por objetivo verificar se a teoria da justiça desenvolvida por John Finnis na obra “Natural Law and Natural Rigts” está em consonância com a tradição aristotélicotomista. Para tanto, primeiro é desenvolvida a teoria da justiça apresentada por Aristóteles na obra “Ética a Nicômaco”, na qual Aristóteles faz a divisão da justiça em duas partes: justiça legal e justiça particular e, depois, subdivide esta última espécie em justiça distributiva e justiça corretiva. Após é apresentada a teoria da justiça de Tomás de Aquino, extraída das obras “Suma Teológica” e “Comentários à Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles”. Para a análise das duas teorias, o trabalho observou a estrutura do conceito de justiça social identificada pelo professor doutor Luis Fernando Barzotto no artigo “Justiça Social – Gênese, Estrutura e Aplicação de um Conceito”. Assim, são especificadas as partes componentes do conceito: a relação regulada pela justiça; a identificação do bem a ser alcançado pela justiça; a atividade, ação humana que é realizada; o sujeito beneficiado na relação de justiça; o dever oriundo dessa relação; sua adequação, formulação e fundamentação ética. A segunda parte do trabalho apresenta a teoria da justiça de John Finnis, ressaltando a importância do conceito de razoabilidade prática em sua exposição. São identificados os elementos da justiça, a importância do conteúdo do bem comum em sua análise, bem como a sua divisão da justiça. Por fim, é feita uma breve exposição sobre o que Finnis disse na obra “Aquinas”, em que o referido autor, analisando a obra de Tomás de Aquino, faz suas conclusões a respeito da justiça na ótica do filósofo medieval. Questões às quais Finnis entende como relevantes para serem analisadas sob a luz da justiça são discutidas. / This dissertation tries to answer the question of knowing whether the theory of justice developed by John Finnis in his work “Natural Law and Natural Rights” is in accordance with the Aristotelic-Thomist tradition. For the consecution of this objective, the theory of justice presented by Aristotle in his work “Ethics to Nicomacus” is first developed. Aristotle divides justice in a twofold view: legal justice and private justice and then, he subdivides the latter in distributive justice and corrective justice. Thomas of Aquinas’ theory of justice is then presented, taken from the works “Suma Theology” and “Comments to Aristotle’s Ethics to Nicomacus”. For the analysis of theories, this work followed the structure of the concept of social justice identified by the Prof. Dr. Luis Fernando Barzotto in the article “Justiça Social – Gênese, Estrutura e Aplicação de um Conceito” (“Social Justice – Genesis, Structure and Implementation”). So then, the parts of the concept are specified: the relation regulated by justice; the identification of the wealth to be reached by justice; the activity, performed human action; the benefited subject in the relation of justice; the duty resulted from this relation; its adequateness, formulation and ethic theoretical support. The second part of the work presents John Finnis’s theory of justice, highlighting the importance of the practice reasonableness concept in his exposition. The elements of justice, the importance of the common wealth content in his analysis, as well as his division of justice are identified here. At last, a brief exposition about what Finnis said in the work “Aquinas” is made, where the author, analyzing the works of Thomas of Aquinas, draws conclusions about the justice through the eyes of the medieval philosopher. The questions Finnis understands as relevant for being analyzed through the scope of justice are discussed here.

Esta dissertação tem por objetivo verificar se a teoria da justiça desenvolvida por John Finnis na obra “Natural Law and Natural Rigts” está em consonância com a tradição aristotélicotomista. Para tanto, primeiro é desenvolvida a teoria da justiça apresentada por Aristóteles na obra “Ética a Nicômaco”, na qual Aristóteles faz a divisão da justiça em duas partes: justiça legal e justiça particular e, depois, subdivide esta última espécie em justiça distributiva e justiça corretiva. Após é apresentada a teoria da justiça de Tomás de Aquino, extraída das obras “Suma Teológica” e “Comentários à Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles”. Para a análise das duas teorias, o trabalho observou a estrutura do conceito de justiça social identificada pelo professor doutor Luis Fernando Barzotto no artigo “Justiça Social – Gênese, Estrutura e Aplicação de um Conceito”. Assim, são especificadas as partes componentes do conceito: a relação regulada pela justiça; a identificação do bem a ser alcançado pela justiça; a atividade, ação humana que é realizada; o sujeito beneficiado na relação de justiça; o dever oriundo dessa relação; sua adequação, formulação e fundamentação ética. A segunda parte do trabalho apresenta a teoria da justiça de John Finnis, ressaltando a importância do conceito de razoabilidade prática em sua exposição. São identificados os elementos da justiça, a importância do conteúdo do bem comum em sua análise, bem como a sua divisão da justiça. Por fim, é feita uma breve exposição sobre o que Finnis disse na obra “Aquinas”, em que o referido autor, analisando a obra de Tomás de Aquino, faz suas conclusões a respeito da justiça na ótica do filósofo medieval. Questões às quais Finnis entende como relevantes para serem analisadas sob a luz da justiça são discutidas. / This dissertation tries to answer the question of knowing whether the theory of justice developed by John Finnis in his work “Natural Law and Natural Rights” is in accordance with the Aristotelic-Thomist tradition. For the consecution of this objective, the theory of justice presented by Aristotle in his work “Ethics to Nicomacus” is first developed. Aristotle divides justice in a twofold view: legal justice and private justice and then, he subdivides the latter in distributive justice and corrective justice. Thomas of Aquinas’ theory of justice is then presented, taken from the works “Suma Theology” and “Comments to Aristotle’s Ethics to Nicomacus”. For the analysis of theories, this work followed the structure of the concept of social justice identified by the Prof. Dr. Luis Fernando Barzotto in the article “Justiça Social – Gênese, Estrutura e Aplicação de um Conceito” (“Social Justice – Genesis, Structure and Implementation”). So then, the parts of the concept are specified: the relation regulated by justice; the identification of the wealth to be reached by justice; the activity, performed human action; the benefited subject in the relation of justice; the duty resulted from this relation; its adequateness, formulation and ethic theoretical support. The second part of the work presents John Finnis’s theory of justice, highlighting the importance of the practice reasonableness concept in his exposition. The elements of justice, the importance of the common wealth content in his analysis, as well as his division of justice are identified here. At last, a brief exposition about what Finnis said in the work “Aquinas” is made, where the author, analyzing the works of Thomas of Aquinas, draws conclusions about the justice through the eyes of the medieval philosopher. The questions Finnis understands as relevant for being analyzed through the scope of justice are discussed here.

Esta dissertação tem por objetivo verificar se a teoria da justiça desenvolvida por John Finnis na obra “Natural Law and Natural Rigts” está em consonância com a tradição aristotélicotomista. Para tanto, primeiro é desenvolvida a teoria da justiça apresentada por Aristóteles na obra “Ética a Nicômaco”, na qual Aristóteles faz a divisão da justiça em duas partes: justiça legal e justiça particular e, depois, subdivide esta última espécie em justiça distributiva e justiça corretiva. Após é apresentada a teoria da justiça de Tomás de Aquino, extraída das obras “Suma Teológica” e “Comentários à Ética a Nicômaco de Aristóteles”. Para a análise das duas teorias, o trabalho observou a estrutura do conceito de justiça social identificada pelo professor doutor Luis Fernando Barzotto no artigo “Justiça Social – Gênese, Estrutura e Aplicação de um Conceito”. Assim, são especificadas as partes componentes do conceito: a relação regulada pela justiça; a identificação do bem a ser alcançado pela justiça; a atividade, ação humana que é realizada; o sujeito beneficiado na relação de justiça; o dever oriundo dessa relação; sua adequação, formulação e fundamentação ética. A segunda parte do trabalho apresenta a teoria da justiça de John Finnis, ressaltando a importância do conceito de razoabilidade prática em sua exposição. São identificados os elementos da justiça, a importância do conteúdo do bem comum em sua análise, bem como a sua divisão da justiça. Por fim, é feita uma breve exposição sobre o que Finnis disse na obra “Aquinas”, em que o referido autor, analisando a obra de Tomás de Aquino, faz suas conclusões a respeito da justiça na ótica do filósofo medieval. Questões às quais Finnis entende como relevantes para serem analisadas sob a luz da justiça são discutidas. / This dissertation tries to answer the question of knowing whether the theory of justice developed by John Finnis in his work “Natural Law and Natural Rights” is in accordance with the Aristotelic-Thomist tradition. For the consecution of this objective, the theory of justice presented by Aristotle in his work “Ethics to Nicomacus” is first developed. Aristotle divides justice in a twofold view: legal justice and private justice and then, he subdivides the latter in distributive justice and corrective justice. Thomas of Aquinas’ theory of justice is then presented, taken from the works “Suma Theology” and “Comments to Aristotle’s Ethics to Nicomacus”. For the analysis of theories, this work followed the structure of the concept of social justice identified by the Prof. Dr. Luis Fernando Barzotto in the article “Justiça Social – Gênese, Estrutura e Aplicação de um Conceito” (“Social Justice – Genesis, Structure and Implementation”). So then, the parts of the concept are specified: the relation regulated by justice; the identification of the wealth to be reached by justice; the activity, performed human action; the benefited subject in the relation of justice; the duty resulted from this relation; its adequateness, formulation and ethic theoretical support. The second part of the work presents John Finnis’s theory of justice, highlighting the importance of the practice reasonableness concept in his exposition. The elements of justice, the importance of the common wealth content in his analysis, as well as his division of justice are identified here. At last, a brief exposition about what Finnis said in the work “Aquinas” is made, where the author, analyzing the works of Thomas of Aquinas, draws conclusions about the justice through the eyes of the medieval philosopher. The questions Finnis understands as relevant for being analyzed through the scope of justice are discussed here.

A sound theory of adjudication and of judicial duty requires or presupposes a sound theory of law and of legal argument. Jurisprudential inquiry is properly grounded not in reflections on conceptual properties of law but in reflections on human goods and needs as understood in a morally articulated theory of practical reason and compactly expressed in the normative concept of the common good. Such reflections confirm that law exists, in its central case, as a means to various types of authoritative co-ordination solutions. The underdetermined nature of (a) the positive requirements of practical reasonableness and the common good and of (b) the appropriate means of enforcing compliance and remedying non-compliance with either these requirements or the determinate negative precepts of practical reasonableness entails that a practically necessary aspect of the positive law’s role is constituting the requirements of justice, i.e. of what is due to whom generally and in particular situations (including situations where an injustice has been or is alleged to have been done). As a distinct and practically necessary mode of legal co-ordination for the common good, adjudication, in its central case, answers litigated questions of justice by applying all relevant law in accordance with the legal system’s practice of legal argument. Thus adjudication is performed by authoritative law-applying institutions precisely because it is about answering questions of justice, and not despite that fact. Theories of law developed on the assumption that it is possible to understand the ‘what’ of law without reliance on any moral judgments deny any practically necessary connection between (a) the promotion of justice and the common good and (b) the nature of law, in its central case, and, hence, the adjudicative application of the law. In the absence of this connection a judicial duty to do justice according to law is unintelligible.

This essay is an exploration of the debate between John Finnis and Stephen Macedo on the value of homosexuality. In “Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?” Finnis, a natural law theorist, rejects value-neutralist arguments, stating that the political community can and should make value judgments about its members’ life-choices and that such normative evaluations are compatible with liberalism. Particularly, Finnis argues that homosexuality is in its essence always harmful and degrading, thus unable to participate in the basic human goods it imitates. Furthermore, he argues that the political community in liberal democratic societies is justified in discouraging homosexual conduct as a viable way of life. Macedo, while also rejecting pure value-neutralist liberalism, carefully considers but rejects Finnis’s argument, which rests on an unrealistic description of value and ends of human sexual activity.

墨家法思想與傳統中國法學所引為依據的儒家仁學是完全不同的：儒家之仁乃是以自身道德的直覺判斷作為衡量世間萬物的最高準則，並藉此與生俱來的直覺與其他萬物有了所謂''感通"之效應來評斷世上價值。但楊日然教授已在三十年前就提出這種以自身道德直覺為準的儒家哲學，將有導致個人將以其內心的道德判斷取代客觀的禮儀及法律規範的危險。 依據撰著者的觀點，論文最重要在於第二章，即承襲先聖前賢思想的寶貴結晶，把墨家的兼愛思想分成兩個層次而定義為： 兼愛的消極定義：透過自我否定來達到消除敵對意識的精神作用。 兼愛的積極定義：所愛之人的實然性欲求(即被愛之人的期待與物質利益)，即是自我的應然性義務之內涵。 換言之，在墨家法思想中，應然與實然是交互影響的，即他人實然欲望即為自己的應然義務，我的實然欲念即為他人的應然責任。 此論文第二章之目的即在於以現代法學觀念對墨家法思想重新作整理，彰顯中國傳統法思想較忽視的一面，作為往後與傳統法思想對照的一塊墊腳磚，從而在價值規範的論證上可獲儒家思想以外的參考資料，故為墨家法思想所做的整理與歸納是希望可達到本文第一目標。 本論文之第二目標即在於比較墨家與聖多瑪斯自然法並歸納出兩者相同之處，蓋在時間相隔長達一千七百年(墨子約是450 B.C.時代的人，而 聖多瑪斯則為1250 A.D.左右的人)，空間距離超過數萬公里之遙，兩者不可能有任何的影響，若能在此絕對隔絕的環境下產生相同之思想，那這些思想的結晶或許真有其普世性的價值存在，此為本文第二目標。