Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1975. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 193-199).

The thesis of this paper on John O'Hara is that certain of his novels contain sufficient characteristics of literary naturalism to reward a study of them from that perspective. In part, the purpose of this paper is to illustrate O'Hara's merits and, hopefully, to enhance his reputation as a writer of literary worth by viewing his novels from the proper perspective.

In this thesis, I argue that the current biolinguists commit a categorical error when they study the so-claimed “language organ” (an ontological non-naturalist act) with methods that (they claim) align with natural sciences (a methodological naturalist act). I will argue that they are turning linguistic studies into “demonology”, a cult-like dogma, by having this disassociation in their ontological and methodological views, for this disassociation lets linguistics lose the ultimate ground that validates all knowledge: the reality, or experience in Kant’s term. In turn, this disassociation enlarges the split of current linguistic study: the generative/biolinguistics vs. the cognitive linguistics/psych-linguistics/ usage-based linguistics (or whatever other name one wants to call them). I will first briefly introduce what Kant said about similar issues (chapter 2). Then, I will introduce the disassociation of methodological and ontological naturalism in current linguistic doctrine (chapter 3) and how this disassociation is turning linguistics into a self-entertaining demonology with examples of the language organ, language evolution, and Principles and Parameters. Chapter 4 will be a discussion as why things have become what they are, and ends with some conclusions / Thesis / Master of Science (MSc) / This thesis criticizes the general biolinguistics enterprise in terms of the first suggestion that Kant would give in chapter 2.6; namely that biolinguistics distances itself from reality. Generally, like all dogmatism or rationalism that Kant meant to criticize, biolinguistics is no exception. However, it redeems itself from being yet another dogmatism with this seemingly justified disassociation of ontological dualism and methodological naturalism. It is doing this so covertly that many scientists fall into believing it is a science. As an undergraduate student, I was always awed at ideas like universal grammar and how it affects language learning. My impression was that Kant was being re-invited: that unlike other language theories, nativism recognizes that the internal epistemological factors are part of the language itself. This is parallel to Kant, for Kant recognized how a seemingly completely external entity such as experience is actually heavily constructed by our cognition. Then, there was something that did not feel right, something that was not very Kant when I heard “language came from a sudden mutation around…years ago and had no evolution; children learn L1 so effortlessly solely because of the language organ; language is biologically innate…”. I now know and will argue that they all come from the disassociation that I did not notice then, the disassociation that makes linguistics only a science on the surface but a dogmatism in the core, like demonology.

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Inaug.-Diss.--Königsberg/Pr. / Lebenslauf. "Quellen": p. 76.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 192-195). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 192-195). Also available on the Internet.

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The contemporary study in the philosophy of language concentrates extensively on a cluster of questions defining the problem of linguistic knowledge (Evans 1981, Davies 1989, Dummett 1991). What explains a speaker's language mastery? Is it knowledge that underwrites our linguistic abilities, and if so, what is the nature of this knowledge? Is rationality an intrinsic feature of language mastery, and if so, how does an account of linguistic knowledge accommodate the connection between language and rationality? While philosophers emphasize the importance of such questions for an account of language, the only systematic response to them has been based almost exclusively on research in psycho-linguistics, and in cognitive science, generally. And prominent cognitivists, such as Chomsky, use their view of linguistic knowledge to promote fervently the naturalistic ideal that the language researcher adhere faithfully to the methodology of the natural scientist, and to provide a thorough critique of any alternative (i.e., non-naturalistic or dualist) approach to language (Chomsky 1995a). / In the thesis, I respond to the negative side of cognitivism, and defend a non-naturalistic approach to linguistic knowledge which I call interpretivism. I argue that when applied to interpretivism the cognitivist's critique is rather inconclusive. And, by itself, the cognitivist's explanation of language does not imply that interpretivism is invalid, but rather leaves room for it. The cognitivist explicates linguistic knowledge either as a system of computational states (Stich 1975) or as a set of intentional states (Dwyer and Pietroski 1996). And while under the computationalist construal the cognitivist cannot address the rationality of language, under the intentionalist construal he does not do full justice to it. The interest of interpretivism lies thus in its emphasis on the rational aspects of language, and on the related idea that linguistic knowledge is multifarious: not only intentional or computational, but also similar in kind to the capacity for thought. Following Sellars [1960/1963], I introduce a broad view of explanations of human behaviour within which both the cognitivist and the interpretivist model of explanation are tenable. I conclude that there is room and a need for a non-naturalistic approach to linguistic knowledge, and that naturalism cannot be the only defensible strategy in the study of language.