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Kantian ethics has a strong following amongst the philosophical community when it comes to morality and ethics. Many Kantians, including Christine Korsgaard, subscribe to the view that Kantianism is opposed to Non-Naturalism. This view, while understandable, is incorrect. In fact, the Kantian approach to ethics has a strong commitment to Non-Naturalism in its metaphysical construction. The purpose of this paper is to prove this dependence by showing the inferences and concepts of Kantianism that one cannot accept without accepting Non-Naturalistic principles. To demonstrate this connection between Kantianism and Non-Naturalism, I will give a summary of Kantianism through the interpretation given by Velleman (2005). Then I will present Non-Naturalism as presented by Fitzpatrick (2008) and Cuneo and Shafer-Landau (2014). After explaining these views as clearly as possible, I will explain why Kantianism is committed to Non-Naturalism, address the possible contradiction of Kantianism and Fitzpatrick's idea of 'ethical truths being independent of any perspective,' as well as address the issues raised by Korsgaard (2003) concerning the realist approach to Kantian ethics. / Master of Arts

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A critical study of naturalism and its influence in the works of Stephen Crane.

This work employs John Dewey's cultural naturalism to explore how and why the orthodox economic tradition functions as a religious faith.Scholars such as the theologian Harvey Cox and others now view orthodox economic practice as a religion. Other scholars such as Max Weber, Alasdair MacIntyre, and numerous others view modern economic practice as exemplifying a particular ethic. The focus in this work is placed upon the destructive consequences of practicing the Market faith. This work argues that much of contemporary economic practice maintains a view of science that is incompatible with the kind of naturalism found in Classical American Pragmatism. The history of the development of economics as a religious faith is explored beginning in the seventeenth-century up to the present day. The philosophical assumptions that have composed this relatively new faith are analyzed in detail. The conclusion provides an account of what we may hope for in the future.

While naturalism is said to be the oldest and most popular view among contemporary philosophers and scientists, serious and pervasive questions linger concerning its nature, norms, goals, and status. I critically assess these issues in defending a metaphilosophy of naturalism. I begin in arguing that naturalism is neither a trivial nor empty worldview suffering from a lack of cohesion or content. In support of this, I develop a typology of naturalism from which I extract three “core” commitments exemplified by nearly all forms of the doctrine. I thus provide some preliminary, non-arbitrary grounds for the naturalist to defend the thesis from many objections. In the second chapter, I address the fundamental ontological commitments of metaphysical naturalism. Problems with defining naturalism are connected to the many ways these notions are understood, and I defend account of what it is for an entity, process, phenomenon, etc. to be natural or occur naturally. In furtherance of this, I defend in Chapters 3 and 4 an analysis of nature according to its two primary senses: The first is the particular sense, as picked out in claims referring to the nature of some entity, and the second is the universal sense, as is picked out in reference to nature itself. For both primary senses, I assess various arguments for acosmism, the thesis that nature does not exist (in either sense). In response to these challenges, I argue that the concept of nature in both senses is theoretically and ontologically fundamental, and thus indispensable to philosophy and science. The penultimate chapter constitutes an analysis of the relationship between naturalism and physicalism. I argue that even if the basic principles upon which physicalism rests are true, they nevertheless highly questionable and problematic. I connect and resolve these issues with an assessment of the relations between them and the Principle of Sufficient Reason. I conclude the chapter with an account of naturalization. In the final chapter, I criticize various interpretations of the claim that metaphysics and science, are and/or ought to be “continuous.” I argue that there are deep commonalities between metaphysics and science which frustrate attempts to show that there is a fundamental distinction between them. In conclusion, I show that metaphysical naturalism is not only more rich and complex than what most of its sympathizers and detractors believe, but also that it is consistent with many theses, norms, and posits of traditional, non-naturalistic approaches in philosophy generally.

Recent literature concerning laws of nature highlight the close relationship between general metaphysics and philosophy of science. In particular, a person's theoretical commitments in either have direct implications for her stance on laws. In this dissertation, I argue that an ontic structural realist should be a realist about laws, but only within a non-Whiteheadean process framework. Without the adoption of a process framework, any account of laws the ontic structural realist offers will require metaphysical commitments that are at odds with ontic structural realism. In arguing towards this aim, I adopt an attenuated methodological naturalistic stance to show that traditional substance metaphysics, of the sort neo-Aristotelians endorse, is problematic and that we have naturalistic reasons for further developing process metaphysics. I then apply this framework to develop a processual account of mereological structures and show how we can understand structures as being stable processes. In the final section, I argue that these are the kind of structures with which the ontic structural realist concerns herself. By adopting a realist account of laws the ontic structural realist can explain how these structures enter into modal and causal relations.

This paper examine's painters attempts to find, in their chosen medium, a meaningful representation of nature. It proposes the idea that despite the best efforts of some of western art's most gifted artists, this has remained an elusive goal so far and this is likely to remain the case in the future. The paper concludes with an examination of Postmodern theoretical discourse and the effects it has had on painters who may want to attempt to make a meaningful statement about nature with their art. It goes on to make a case that despite the difficulty of the task, there are some very sound reasons why any painter wishing to attempt it, should do so. Some associated issues are raised in the course of the investigation: 1/. An investigation of perception of nature. 2/. The role of language in shaping our perceptions of nature. 3/. The inability of language itself to capture a satisfactory recreation of the experience of nature. 4/. An examination of Paul Cezanne's attempts to record nature using his empirical optical method. 5/. An examination of Barnett Newmans's attempts to recreate the experience of nature through the use of symbols. 6/. The work of the phenomenologists with regard to nature and painting. 7/. The problem of aesthetics. 8/. The apparent reluctance of many critics and theoreticians to take the importance of nature as a vital and indispensable starting point for some artists / Master of Arts (Hons)

The modern sciences are characterised by a methodological atheism. Even though religions offer what appear to be explanations of various facts about the world, such proposed explanations are not taken seriously within the sciences. Even if no natural explanation were available, it would be assumed that one exists. Is this merely a sign of atheistic prejudice, as some critics suggest? Or are there good reasons to exclude from science explanations that invoke a supernatural agent? My answer to this question has two parts. On the one hand, I concede the bare possibility that talk of divine action could constitute a potential explanation of some state of affairs, while noting that the conditions under which this would be true are unlikely ever to be fulfilled. On the other hand, I argue that a proposed explanation of this kind would rate poorly, when measured against our usual standards of explanatory virtue. Even if it were the only proposed explanation on offer, we would have good reason to seek an alternative.

<p>Naturalism faces problems caused by a lack of agreement about whether there is or can be a meaningful and useful conception of naturalism as a general research position. Without a widely agreed upon account of what naturalism in general amounts to there is no clear and definitive way to adjudicate disputes as to what is consistent with naturalism; the absence of such an account also makes it impossible for specific projects in naturalistic inquiry to take guidance from naturalism in general. In the following, I develop a determinate account of naturalism in general, which I think could find acceptance among naturalists because it accounts for many of the features commonly associated with naturalism. To do this, I first lay out the problem to be solved, express its importance, and explain what a solution to the problem would involve. I then make appeal to an account of naturalism developed by Penelope Maddy and use this account to show that the published and unpublished work of Charles Sanders Peirce offers, prima facie, a more determinate account of naturalism than is commonly recognized and that goes beyond the account given by Maddy. With this Peircean account developed, I then measure it against the criteria I develop and conclude that a Pericean account of naturalism does promise to adjudicate various disputes in the naturalism literature and to offer guidance to the development and application of specific projects in naturalistic inquiry.</p> / Dissertation