The question this contribution sets out to address is whether law can be regarded as a science. This notion is readily accepted by many, yet it is submitted that a proper theoretical justification for such an assumption is usually missing. The traditional primary sources of law, South African case law and legislation, distinguish between legal practice and legal science, but the basis of the distinction is not clear. However, an entire body of literature in the philosophy of science has developed around the question of when a discipline will amount to science. Various demarcation criteria proposed in philosophy of science are considered. These include that science uses the scientific method, is susceptible to falsification, is puzzle-solving within a paradigm or renders beneficial results. None of these criteria offer a satisfactory solution to the problem. The proposition by a group of philosophers including Herman Dooyeweerd, Marinus Stafleu and DFM Strauss, that the answer to the demarcation question is to be found in modal abstraction, is then considered. Modal abstraction amounts to a consideration of reality (persons, things, theories and rules) from one or more defined point(s) of entry. It is an artificial and learnt manner of thinking as it approaches reality from the perspective of one of the modalities of being. For example, juridical abstraction would mean that a cow is considered as the object of someone‟s proprietary rights. An abstract idea of the cow‟s characteristics, from a juridical point of view, is formed and the rules of property law are applied. A number of South African legal philosophers, amongst others Van Zyl, Van der Vyver and LM du Plessis, have followed this approach. The South African legislature also attempted to define the terms “science” and “research”, mainly for funding purposes. These definitions are considered and the conclusion is that they do not provide the clear-cut answers one would expect. It will be argued that the nature of activities will determine whether an endeavour is scientific or not. The conclusion is that an alignment of the demarcation criterion developed by Strauss and others and the statutory definitions can provide a workable demarcation criterion. This “test” is then applied to activities of law students, academics, practitioners and judicial officers to determine when they will be practicing “science”. / MPhil, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

The question this contribution sets out to address is whether law can be regarded as a science. This notion is readily accepted by many, yet it is submitted that a proper theoretical justification for such an assumption is usually missing. The traditional primary sources of law, South African case law and legislation, distinguish between legal practice and legal science, but the basis of the distinction is not clear. However, an entire body of literature in the philosophy of science has developed around the question of when a discipline will amount to science. Various demarcation criteria proposed in philosophy of science are considered. These include that science uses the scientific method, is susceptible to falsification, is puzzle-solving within a paradigm or renders beneficial results. None of these criteria offer a satisfactory solution to the problem. The proposition by a group of philosophers including Herman Dooyeweerd, Marinus Stafleu and DFM Strauss, that the answer to the demarcation question is to be found in modal abstraction, is then considered. Modal abstraction amounts to a consideration of reality (persons, things, theories and rules) from one or more defined point(s) of entry. It is an artificial and learnt manner of thinking as it approaches reality from the perspective of one of the modalities of being. For example, juridical abstraction would mean that a cow is considered as the object of someone‟s proprietary rights. An abstract idea of the cow‟s characteristics, from a juridical point of view, is formed and the rules of property law are applied. A number of South African legal philosophers, amongst others Van Zyl, Van der Vyver and LM du Plessis, have followed this approach. The South African legislature also attempted to define the terms “science” and “research”, mainly for funding purposes. These definitions are considered and the conclusion is that they do not provide the clear-cut answers one would expect. It will be argued that the nature of activities will determine whether an endeavour is scientific or not. The conclusion is that an alignment of the demarcation criterion developed by Strauss and others and the statutory definitions can provide a workable demarcation criterion. This “test” is then applied to activities of law students, academics, practitioners and judicial officers to determine when they will be practicing “science”. / MPhil, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

This thesis is a study of the coerciveness of legal systems. I defend two main claims: that typical legal systems are much less coercive than most legal and political philosophers think, and that legal systems are not necessarily coercive. My defence is developed in three parts. The first is dedicated to building the necessary theoretical framework to defend the main claims of this thesis. This is where I offer a rigorous formulation of the questions that this thesis addresses and contextualise them within broader debates about the relationship between law and coercion. A substantial portion of the first part of the thesis is devoted to the development of two accounts: an account of coercion and an account of the conditions legal systems must satisfy in order to be coercive. The second part is where I advance two arguments for the claim that typical legal systems are much less coercive than it is usually thought. The first is an argument that establishes that our legal systems rarely issue conditional threats. Given that issuing conditional threats is a necessary condition for any legal system to be coercive - or so I claim in the first part of the thesis - the fact that our legal systems rarely do so undermines the view that our legal systems are pervasively coercive. The second argument is based on the reasons why citizens comply with legal mandates. I analyse the relevant empirical data and show that compliance is not frequently owed to the threat of unwelcome consequences. This should not have been the case had our legal systems been as coercive as philosophers generally think. The third part deals with the claim that legal systems are necessarily coercive. There I address some methodological concerns that this claim gives rise to and propose two arguments for viewing coerciveness as a contingent feature of our legal systems.

South Africa's protected areas are at the forefront of the county's efforts to conserve it's unique flora and fauna. The setting aside of these vast tracts of land has been the main thrust of Western conservation efforts for over two centuries. Despite the significant financial and human resources allocated to the protection of these natural areas, the extinction of many plant and animal species continues to occur on a daily basis. This study sets out to explore one of the crucial weaknesses of traditional protected areas management - the failure to incorporate and empower the people with the greatest knowledge and need of the natural resources in their areas - the local indigenous communities. In the past, the legislative focus was aimed at the total exclusion of these communities from protected areas. In South Africa, these 'preservationist' laws have been bitterly flavoured by the apartheid ideology, resulting in widespread environmental inequity and injustice for those societies targeted by racist and discriminatory policies. The thesis traces the history of the national parks concept, from its preservationist origin in the late nineteenth century United States, to modern day national parks that operate in terms of joint-management agreements in Australia and South Africa. It also exposes the detrimental effect that the establishment of national parks has inflicted on local indigenous communities around the globe. The experiences of Zimbabwe, Namibia, Canada and Australia are of particular relevance and value to South Africa in this respect. An overview and assessment of the current legal regime governing protected areas in South Africa reveals that further legislative transformation is required in order to integrate human development and wildlife conservation ideals. In particular, greater emphasis is needed to ensure the participation of local indigenous communities in the management natural resources in and around national parks. A failure to meet this objective may seriously undermine the future well-being of all of South Africa's inhabitants. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2002.

Abstract not available. / Thesis (M.LL.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1995.

This study examines the need for nature conservation legislation and the enforcement thereof in the Gauteng province. The study commences with an in depth examination of the historical background to nature conservation and nature conservation legislation in order to explain why the present condition exists. Some of the guidelines of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) are considered in this regard as well as fines and penalties that are inadequate as deterrents for contraventions of nature conservation legislation. The necessity of the appointment of provincial departments of environmental affairs and the importance of environmental education as a means to an end are touched on. There is attention given to the economic importance of tourism for the realisation of economic prosperity to the regiol') and how that depends of adequate nature conservation legislation enforcement. The roles that different departments of the state and the private sector and organised pressure groups can play are also identified. An investigation has been conducted into the inner workings of the Gauteng Nature Conservation Directorate with a statistical analysis, sampling and arguments. Local and international case studies have been used as examples for analysis as well as statistics of previous trends. The study ends with conclusions which have been reached followed by recommendations which may be implemented. / Public Administration / Thesis (M. Pub. Admin.)--University of South Africa, 2001. / M. Pub. Admin.

This study examines the need for nature conservation legislation and the enforcement thereof in the Gauteng province. The study commences with an in depth examination of the historical background to nature conservation and nature conservation legislation in order to explain why the present condition exists. Some of the guidelines of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) are considered in this regard as well as fines and penalties that are inadequate as deterrents for contraventions of nature conservation legislation. The necessity of the appointment of provincial departments of environmental affairs and the importance of environmental education as a means to an end are touched on. There is attention given to the economic importance of tourism for the realisation of economic prosperity to the regiol') and how that depends of adequate nature conservation legislation enforcement. The roles that different departments of the state and the private sector and organised pressure groups can play are also identified. An investigation has been conducted into the inner workings of the Gauteng Nature Conservation Directorate with a statistical analysis, sampling and arguments. Local and international case studies have been used as examples for analysis as well as statistics of previous trends. The study ends with conclusions which have been reached followed by recommendations which may be implemented. / Public Administration and Management / Thesis (M. Pub. Admin.)--University of South Africa, 2001. / M. Pub. Admin.

The movement to conserve natural resources in the United States began as a response to the perceived inefficiency which governed resource allocation. The subsequent environmental movement served to expand the definition of conservation to include not only the efficient use of resources, but also the preservation of land in its natural state. In Indiana, this supposed deficiency in conservation led some environmentalists to establish the Indiana Nature Preserves System which locates remnants of the Indiana wilderness and protects them from development. The Indiana Nature Preserves System is symbolic of the Land Ethic proposed by the early ecologist Aldo Leopold, who believed that man was but one component of the "land community." To alter all natural areas, Leopold and Indiana preservationists argued, was both an assault on ecological stability and on the right of nature to exist for its own sake. / Department of History

Cette thèse a pour but de comprendre si les droits humains contemporains sont les équivalents des droits naturels affirmés à l’époque moderne. En un premier temps, les conceptions contemporaines sur la nature des droits humains sont étudiées, en particulier les conceptions qui reconstruisent le sens des droits de l’homme à partir des positions ontologiques. En un second temps, une reconstruction de cette comparaison est mise en évidence sous trois perspectives : l’idée des droits naturels, le concept des droits naturels et les théories des droits naturels. Enfin, une fois mis en évidence les aspects significatifs de ces catégories, on procède à leur comparaison, en soulignant les points de continuité entre droits humains et droits naturels et les différences qui séparent leur chemin. / The aim of this work concerns the relation between human rights and natural rights, in order to understand if human rights are those natural rights affirmed in the modern age. First of all, we analyse the contemporary conceptions about human rights nature, especially those which find their meaning from ontological positions. Secondly, we reconstruct the term of this comparison from three perspectives : the idea of natural rights, the concept of natural rights, the theories of natural rights. At last, after the individuation of relevants aspects between both categories, we compare them, highlighting the common points and the differences that separate their path.

This thesis aims to critique the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and its underlying moral justification in order to provide a stronger and improved version of both. In Chapter 1 I explore what sort of moral justification is necessary to establish the Universal Declaration on firm grounds and explore its relation to environmental ethics and rights discourse. I argue that a non-anthropocentric perspective is necessary to justify the Universal Declaration’s rights. In Chapter 2 I explore the underlying justification of the Universal Declaration as discovered in the works of Cormac Cullinan and Father Thomas Berry. I argue that their ethical framework is indeterminate, has many ambiguities and uncertainties, and, among other problems, it does not provide a clear action-guiding framework. In Chapter 3 I develop an alternative justification for the Universal Declaration. I argue against many predominant moral theories, that in light of our best scientific and moral understanding we should expand the realm of moral concern to include all living beings, a moral theory I call Life’s Imperative. In Chapter 4 I illustrate that Life’s Imperative is a much stronger, more coherent justification for the Universal Declaration, one that coheres with both our best understanding of the natural world and our relation to it, and to an environmental ethic reflective of that relationship. Unfortunately many of the weaknesses in the current implicit justification of the Universal Declaration have also led to it enshrining rights that are themselves problematic. In order to address these issues, I revise its rights to accord with the stronger justification that I established in Chapter 3. The end result of doing so is a revised version of the Universal Declaration