How did the domestic, ecclesiological and political treatises of the early modern era come to be dominated by the language of paternal authority? Hitherto scholars have attributed this phenomenon to Protestantism, characterized by married clerics dependent on the protection of governing powers. That view is challenged by a broad survey of catechetical literature, sermons, and government ordinances in Germany from the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries. Already in the thirteenth century, clerics were showing new interest in defining standards of conduct for the laity through the Ten Commandments. A narrow reading of the fourth commandment--Honor your Father and your Mother--came to serve as the rubric under which reformers in each subsequent age and all major confessions worked to shore up the authority of male leadership in the household, the Church, and the body politic. Priests and preachers promoted this program as an antidote to the turmoil caused by the plagues, war, rebellions and movements of reform that mark the end of feudal Europe. Though the program left its traces on each institution it was intended to shape, in the latter half of the sixteenth century it scored its most spectacular success: Protestant and Catholic rulers made the model of the disciplining father their own.

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The aim of the thesis is to develop a theory of autonomy-respecting paternalism which delineates an area of morally permissible paternalistic interference. Paternalism is defined as any infringement of a prima facie right to non-interference for the purpose of protecting or promoting the recipient's well-being. It is argued that autonomy involves not only liberty of action, but also the achievement of self-construction and self-control. The role of rational reflection in the achievement of self-construction is discussed at some length, and the importance of knowledge, including self-knowledge and moral sensitivity is emphasized. The right to non-interference is taken to be grounded in the intrinsic value of autonomy, and possession of a prima facie right to non-interference is extended to all beings with desires. This general right is discussed in terms of three rights of greater specificity: non-interference with actions, states, and opportunities. An account of the vehicle for alienation of the right to non-interference is developed in terms of a technical notion of subsequent approval. The principle of respect for autonomy is shown to be as applicable in paternalistic dealings with children as it is with adults, without this having counter-intuitive consequences in practice. It is also shown how far the paternalistic promotion of a recipient's well-being, understood as the satisfaction of informed desires, can be reconciled with the principle of respect for autonomy. Finally, the theory is applied to particular cases of paternalism in familial, medical, and legal contexts.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Loyola University, Chicago, 1999. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 153-161).

Thesis (M.A.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Philosophy, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references.

Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003, 2006, 2009) contend that the government is justified in shaping certain choices of individuals to advance their well-being. In this paper, I argue that those who are committed to a robust notion of autonomy, which I call autonomy as authority, have good reason to reject the Sunstein-Thaler (S/T) argument for libertarian paternalism. I draw from Joseph Raz’s (1990) idea of exclusionary reasons and Daniel Groll’s (2012) conception of autonomy to argue that the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism fails to respect autonomy. I consider if soft paternalism could be called upon as a foundation for libertarian paternalism, but argue against this possibility. I conclude that an adequate defense of libertarian paternalism would need to directly attack the notion of autonomy as authority, but such an attack has yet to be mounted by the defenders of libertarian paternalism.

It is commonly believed that paternalism is at odds with libertarianism. Recent literature has suggested that there are forms of paternalism which are acceptable to libertarians: namely “nudging”, sometimes even referred to as “libertarian paternalism”. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, to investigate the taxonomical question of how libertarianism, paternalism and nudging relate to each other. Secondly, to investigate whether, and if so when, paternalism is compatible with libertarianism. I argue that any action which is not coercive is compatible with libertarianism. Thus, any non-coercive paternalist action is compatible with libertarianism. I also argue that there are several paternalist action types, such as nudges, informing and incentivizing, which are not coercive, and thus are compatible with libertarianism.

År 2003 publicerade Richard H. Thaler och Cass R. Sunstein två artiklar om en föreslagen policymetod, på svenska kallad libertariansk paternalism, som med hjälp av både öppna och subtilt influerande metoder är tänkt att bistå människor med bättre beslutsfattande, och samtidigt tillfredsställa libertarianska ideal och principer rörande individuell autonomi genom dess avsaknad av tvångsmetoder. Min tes hävdar, såsom flertalet kritiker, att denna föreslagna policymetod och dess praktiska metoder inte klarar av att leva upp till de libertarianska idealen och principerna gällande individuell autonomi, då de trots allt innehåller paternalistiska aspekter av tvång, vilket anses vara anti-libertarianska. Jag argumenterar för att de främsta anledningarna till detta är 1) avsaknaden av medgivande från tilltänkt influerad agent, samt 2) att de utövade metoderna kan anses vara manipulativa och inte respektera en agents originella preferenser. I denna uppsats undersöker jag även om och på vilka grunder manipulation som fenomen kan anses innehålla aspekter av tvång. / In 2003, Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein published two articles presenting a proposed policy method called libertarian paternalism, which with the help of both open and subtly influential methods is intended to assist people with better decision-making, and at the same time satisfy libertarian ideals and principles of individual autonomy through its lack of coercive methods. My thesis argues, like most critics, that this proposed policy method and its practical methods fail to live up to the libertarian ideals and principles of autonomy, as the nevertheless contain paternalistic aspects of coercion, which is considered anti-libertarian. I argue that the main reasons for this are 1) the lack of consent from the intended influenced agent, and 2) that the methods practiced can be considered manipulative and not respect an agent’s original preferences. In this paper, I also examine whether, and on what grounds manipulation as a phenomenon can be considered to include aspects of coercion.