Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003, 2006, 2009) contend that the government is justified in shaping certain choices of individuals to advance their well-being. In this paper, I argue that those who are committed to a robust notion of autonomy, which I call autonomy as authority, have good reason to reject the Sunstein-Thaler (S/T) argument for libertarian paternalism. I draw from Joseph Raz’s (1990) idea of exclusionary reasons and Daniel Groll’s (2012) conception of autonomy to argue that the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism fails to respect autonomy. I consider if soft paternalism could be called upon as a foundation for libertarian paternalism, but argue against this possibility. I conclude that an adequate defense of libertarian paternalism would need to directly attack the notion of autonomy as authority, but such an attack has yet to be mounted by the defenders of libertarian paternalism.

This thesis focuses on the issue of whether or not the government is ever justified in prohibiting the actions of an individual who is harming herself but not others. I first analyze some of the key historical figures in the paternalism debate and argue that these accounts fail to adequately meet the needs of a modern, pluralistic society. Then, I analyze and critique the nuanced, soft-paternalist strategy put forth by Joel Feinberg. Finally, I defend a version of hard paternalism, arguing that a balancing strategy that examines each action on a case-by-case basis shows all citizens equal, and adequate concern and respect.

Många motståndare till paternalism har försökt hitta icke-paternalistiska motiveringar för policys som de anser vara försvarbara. Detta har kulminerat till ett ”project of reconcilliation” som menar att förespråka och försvara vissa till synes paternalistiska policys utan att acceptera paternalism. Denna uppsats har till syfte att undersöka, framför allt, tre av dessa möjliga icke-paternalistiska motiveringar, specifikt i förhållande till tvångsvård – ”the psychic harm argument”; autonomi som intrinsikalt värdefullt, och fall av ofrivillighet eller mjuk paternalism. Denna uppsats menar att visa att tvångsvård inte alltid går att motivera icke-paternalistiskt, och att dessa anti-paternalistiska motiveringar lider av vissa stora brister som gör de svåra att acceptera som tillfredsställande, och därmed att ”the project of reconcilliation” misslyckas. / Many opponents of paternalism have tried to find non-paternalistic justifications for policies that they consider justifiable. This has culminated in a "project of reconciliation" that means to advocate and defend some paternalistic policies without accepting paternalism. The purpose of this essay is to examine, in particular, three of these possible non-paternalistic motivations, specifically in relation to compulsory care - "the psychic harm argument", autonomy as intrinsically valuable, and cases of involuntariness or soft paternalism. This thesis aims to show that compulsory care cannot always be motivated by non-paternalism, and that these anti-paternalistic motivations suffer from certain major shortcomings that make them difficult to accept as satisfactory, and thus that “the project of reconcilliation” fails.