The origin of this thesis can be traced back to a deceptively simple question that struck me when reading Hegel for the first time: What, if anything, can be made of human freedom when we live in a world that has a profound impact on who we are and what we do? Unhappy with the way existentialist reactions to Hegel characterized freedom as our ability to step out of our world and determine our identity through our own decisions and will, but nevertheless inspired by Heidegger’s depiction of human agents as always already in the world, this thesis answers the aforementioned question by turning the existentialist conception of freedom on its head: that is, instead of characterizing freedom as detached decisionism, I argue that freedom is a function of our ability to recognize and respond to the disparate demands our world places upon us. Specifically, and unlike Heidegger’s existentialist interpreters, I read Heidegger’s account of authenticity as a case of engaged-agency in which we clarify the possibilities others make available and then act accordingly. There is, however, a certain limitation to this interpretation of human agency: namely, that treating freedom as an active response to the wants and needs of others binds the agent to possibilities present in her current situation and therefore fails to capture the kind of freedom we associate with cultural transformation or artistic creativity. Hence, this thesis addresses a second set of questions: What conditions make historical change possible? And how is it that artists are able to alter the world? In response to the first query, I turn to Heidegger’s claim that we are in truth and in untruth as well as his discussion of Gelassenheit to argue that the play between the possibilities present in a particular culture and those that are excluded by it along with a release from our present activities create the conditions for cultural transformation. In reply to the second question, I examine Heidegger’s account of the happening of truth and show how thinkers and artists are able to reveal the possibilities concealed in their culture through the creative use of language. Finally, I contend that the freedom associated with cultural transformation and artistic creativity is also a form of responsibility insofar as the success of a given transformation depends on others recognizing that transformation as valuable and thus worthy of their support.

This thesis presents an account of the nature of structured propositions and addresses a series of questions that arise from that proposal. Chapter 1 presents the account and explains how it meets standard objections to such views. Chapter 2 responds to the objection that this version of propositionalism is really a form of sententialism by arguing for the distinct advantages of the propositionalist view. Chapter 3 argues against a closely related view of propositions by way of general principles about how to construct such theories. Chapter 4 illustrates how a theory of propositions of the sort proposed can be defended against a recent argument that propositions need not play a central role in linguistic theory.

Is truth valuable? In addressing this question, one must parse it into questions that are more manageable. Is the property of truth only instrumentally valuable, or is it both instrumentally valuable and noninstrumentally valuable? Is the normativity of the concept of truth an intrinsic or extrinsic property of the concept? In addressing the first of these questions, I show that certain arguments are flawed, arguments that purport to show that truth is not valuable in any kind of way. After establishing that it is reasonable to think that the property of truth is valuable, I show how inflationists and deflationists can agree that the property of truth is noninstrumentally valuable. In addressing the second question, I rely on the distinction between semantics and pragmatics and the resources of moral semantics to claim that the normativity of the concept of truth is an extrinsic feature of the concept. I conclude that the property of truth is both instrumentally and noninstrumentally valuable and that the normativity associated with the concept of truth is an extrinsic property of the concept. In doing so, I suggest that beginning with an investigation about the value and normativity of truth has important ramifications for theories of truth in general.

Introduction: I lay out the broad contours of my thesis: a defence of mathematical nominalism, and nominalism more generally. I discuss the possibility of metaphysics, and the relationship of nominalism to naturalism and pragmatism. Chapter 2: I delineate an account of abstractness. I then provide counter-arguments to claims that mathematical objects make a di erence to the concrete world, and claim that mathematical objects are abstract in the sense delineated. Chapter 3: I argue that the epistemological problem with abstract objects is not best understood as an incompatibility with a causal theory of knowledge, or as an inability to explain the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, but resides in the epistemic luck that would infect any belief about abstract objects. To this end, I develop an account of epistemic luck that can account for cases of belief in necessary truths and apply it to the mathematical case. Chapter 4: I consider objections, based on (meta)metaphysical considerations and linguistic data, to the view that the existential quantifier expresses existence. I argue that these considerations can be accommodated by an existentially committing quantifier when the pragmatics of quantified sentences are properly understood. I develop a semi-formal framework within which we can define a notion of nominalistic adequacy. I show how our notion of nominalistic adequacy can show why it is legitimate for the nominalist to make use of platonistic “assumptions” in inference-making. Chapter 5: I turn to the application of mathematics in science, including explanatory applications, and its relation to a number of indispensability arguments. I consider also issues of realism and anti-realism, and their relation to these arguments. I argue that abstraction away from pragmatic considerations has acted to skew the debate, and has obscured possibilities for a nominalistic understanding of mathematical practices. I end by explaining the notion of a pragmatic meta-vocabulary, and argue that this notion can be used to carve out a new way of locating our ontological commitments. Chapter 6: I show how the apparatus developed in earlier chapters can be utilised to roll out the nominalist project to other domains of discourse. In particular, I consider propositions and types. I claim that a unified account of nominalism across these domains is available. Conclusion: I recapitulate the claims of my thesis. I suggest that the goal of mathematical enquiry is not descriptive knowledge, but understanding.

This thesis defends Semantic Pluralism, the view that sentences express sets of propositions in context. It puts forward two arguments against Contextualism, the main opposing view, on which each sentence expresses exactly one proposition in context. It spells out two versions of Pluralism: Flexible Pluralism, which takes most sentences to be context-sensitive, and Strong Pluralism, which denies that context-sensitivity is widespread. And it defends Flexible Pluralism and Strong Pluralism from a number of objections.

In contemporary formal theory of truth, model-theoretic and non-classical approaches have been dominant. I rather pursue the so-called classical axiomatic approaches toward truth and my dissertation begins by arguing for the classical axiomatic approach and against the others. The classical axiomatic approach inevitably leads to abandonment of the nave conception of truth and revision of the basic principles of truth derived from that nave conception such as the full T-schema. In the absence of the general guiding principles based on that nave conception, we need to conduct tedious but down-to-earth eld works' of various theories of truth by examining and comparing them from various points of view in searching for satisfactory theories of truth. As such attempt, I raise two new criteria for comparison of truth theories, make a proof-theoretic study of them in connection to the foundation of mathematics.

Thesis advisor: John Sallis / The present dissertation explores the motif of gesture and demonstrates that it encompasses the resonances between the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. My thesis specifically is that the notion of gesture articulates the problems of art and language, revealing fundamental convergences in the ways in which Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty investigate a non-metaphysical approach to the sensible and question the limits of philosophy. I develop this argument by closely following Merleau-Ponty's reading of Heidegger's works in the lecture-notes from his courses at the Collège de France. I also rely heavily on Heidegger's reflections on gesture and the body as they are depicted in the Zollikon seminars, considering that some of these reflections retrieve crucial arguments from Being and Time and that they bear a significant resemblance to Merleau-Ponty's understanding of the body. In this way, I elucidate what may be called the gestural character of the work of art and language, establishing structural connections between the texts of these two thinkers. This dissertation is divided into three parts. I devote the first part to the themes of the body and gesture and show that the concept of form and the problem of perception lead to questions concerning the possibilities of a phenomenology of the body. I conclude this part by arguing that, for both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, the notion of gesture corresponds to a phenomenological approach to the body as openness to the world and as an affective milieu. Departing from the arguments and comparisons delineated in the first part, in the second and third parts I examine separately the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty in order to determine the settings of the notion of gesture within their respective approaches to art and language. The second part treats problems concerning the sensible character of the work of art, arguing that gestures perform a poetical disclosure of nature. In the third part I focus on questions of language and demonstrate that gestures unfold what could be called the logos of the sensible, which constitutes the primary source of language and meaning. I conclude by interpreting Heidegger's work as a gestural philosophy that emphasizes the performative dimension of language, an emphasis that is missing from Merleau-Ponty's work. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Satire is often construed as little more than an entertaining form of mockery, of which political and religious satire are only topical instances. However, trends in contemporary satire suggest that it can operate as a sui generis mode of rational discourse. I argue that recent satire often trades in undermining the exchange of coercive ideas, that in doing so it exhibits specific social/political commitments, and that it suggests ways of diminishing the harmfulness of abusive speech through practices of reading or hearing such discourse which do not permit violent ends. This argument proceeds along the following steps: First, satire’s rational function is to undermine the strength of reasons through repeating and embellishing their irrational use. Employing arguments of JL Austin and Robert Brandom, I describe satire as a way of interrupting the giving and asking for reasons by supposing expressed beliefs to have unrealistic intentions, and thus employing them toward unlikely ends. Second, political and religious satire exhibits at least two identifiable commitments which are central to classical social contract theory: that political power should be subject to the collective consent of the governed, and that those in power should not cause harm to the governed. Third, especially within liberal democratic contexts, satire can function to undermine the abuse of power by employing such coercive speech towards socially just ends. Undermining harmful speech implies an ontological consequence that one is denied the social role of perpetrator. This consequence is suggestive for the view that human identity is significantly rooted in public discursive performances; that is, satire exhibits strategies both for diminishing the effectiveness of harmful speech and creating for the perpetrator a new public role. The approach to theorizing from recent satirical trends has consequences which evoke explicitly theological themes of justice and reconciliation.

In his opus magnum Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, the prominent (post)analytic Richard Rorty calls for such a philosophical inquiry, thath would rather fit under the term hermeneutics, than epistemology. Hermeneutics being the trademark term of an important movement of continental philosophy, this comes as a suprise. By examining Richard Rorty's criticism of epistemology and Hans- Georg Gadamer's concept of hermeneutics, this paper tries to find out, how much do they have in common. Source texts for this research are the topic-relatively relevant texts from the books Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and Truth and Method. In conclusion, the main difference appears to lie in their answers to the hardly solveable question of importance of the very concept of truth. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

Much neglected is Heidegger's latter work in favor of the fundamental ontology of Being and Time. Consequentially, conceptions of Heidegger's question of Being are oftentimes misconceived. Currently three main models have been proposed: (1) existential phenomenology, exemplified by Joseph Langan in the 1950s; (2) the popular thought of Being model in the 1960s as developed by William Richardson; (3) and in counter distinction to these unified models Joseph Kockelmans offers in the 1970s the many ways model, touting the end of systems. These misconstruals have spawned much Heideggerian dialogue, and in recent years, has had its effect upon Western continental scholarship from structuralism to post-structuralism. <br>Rather than usual conceptual models, this dissertation proposes a new model of Heideggerian scholarship seen through the lens of "Being as Saying." Neither mystical nor incomprehensible Heidegger's; unique linguistic turn negotiates the inadequacies of modern conceptions of the subject, object and cognition. Through a careful reading of Heidegger's work from 1949-1976, I trace Heidegger's utter reliance upon language as the way-making of Being, "Sprache als Be-wëgen." More originary than ordinary language, Heidegger's Being as Saying arises from Nietzsche's insights on nihilism. For Heidegger Being is no-thing, and as such reveals itself as unconcealment. We hear it as a deep, unsettling silence. From Being's two-fold character of concealing and revealing and humanity's subsequent discomfit, we derive all forms of communication, including thought and logic, even our world as a response to, and evasion from this pervasive silence. <br>Most notably Heidegger unseats the preeminent stature of thought and subject, only to reincorporate them within language. To achieve this he develops notions of Ereignis and Geviert, at once simple and complex, by which Being manifests itself, no longer through Dasein as prime discloser, but through a crossing of four regions. What emerges is a dynamic gathering-as-separated dialogue, a far richer, relational understanding of the world and the person. Heidegger's new way can best be described as a phenomenology of the inapparent, wherein Being and humanity are in a relational dialogue of unconcealing and revealing. With this insight we can reengage the Western philosophical tradition meditatively. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts / Philosophy / PhD / Dissertation