This study aims at investigating Wittgenstein&rsquo / s conception of meaning. In this sense, philosopher&rsquo / s early and later periods will be examined. Key notions of Wittgenstein&rsquo / s philosophy of language, picture theory of meaning, language-game, rule following, Private Language Argument and his assertion that &lsquo / meaning is use&rsquo / will be analyzed. Out of this analysis, Wittgenstein&rsquo / s answer to the following basic question will be sought: How is meaning derived in a language? The outcome of this query will be comparatively read with four linguistic theories so as to position Wittgenstein&rsquo / s conception of meaning with regard to the linguistic turn. As a result of this, it will be argued that Wittgensteinian meaning can be regarded as the very first step of post-structural understanding of meaning and discourse theory.

Thesis (M.A.)--Indiana University, 2010. / Title from screen (viewed on February 26, 2010). Department of Philosophy, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). Advisor(s): Cornelis de Waal, André De Tienne, Nathan R. Houser. Includes vitae. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 104-114).

In Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference, Saul Kripke posited two kinds of reference involved in every use of a designator—a semantic reference, to the object picked out by the meaning of the words used—and a speaker reference, to the object to which the speaker aimed to call attention by deploying the designator. Kripke tentatively defined the notion of the speaker’s referent as the object that (i) the speaker wishes to call attention to, on a given occasion, and (ii) that he believes fulfills the conditions for being the description’s semantic referent. Although offered as a definition, this account is best interpreted as a tentative statement of the normal success conditions of speaker reference. As such, it raises the question of how special a role semantic reference plays in successful speaker reference. This report addresses that question by evaluating Kripke’s tentative account in the light of an extended series of examples in which definite descriptions are used to speaker refer to objects other than the objects to which the descriptions uniquely semantically refer. The report concludes that words’ semantic characteristics are only one of several forms of evidence that audiences regularly rely on to discern what object a speaker intends to call attention to by a particular act of reference. / text

Traditionally, mathematics and metaphor have been thought of as disparate: the former rigorous, objective, universal, eternal, and fundamental; the latter imprecise, derivative, nearly - if not patently - false, and therefore of merely aesthetic value, at best. A growing amount of contemporary scholarship argues that both of these characterizations are flawed. This dissertation shows that there are important connexions between mathematics and metaphor that benefit our understanding of both. A historically structured overview of traditional theories of metaphor reveals it to be a notion that is complicated, controversial, and inadequately understood; this motivates a non-traditional approach. Paradigmatically shifting the locus of metaphor from the linguistic to the conceptual - as George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, and many other contemporary metaphor scholars do - overcomes problems plaguing traditional theories and promisingly advances our understanding of both metaphor and of concepts. It is argued that conceptual metaphor plays a key role in explaining how mathematics is grounded, and simultaneously provides a mechanism for reconciling and integrating the strengths of traditional theories of mathematics usually understood as mutually incompatible. Conversely, it is shown that metaphor can be usefully and consistently understood in terms of mathematics. However, instead of developing a rigorous mathematical model of metaphor, the unorthodox approach of applying mathematical concepts metaphorically is defended.

The thesis presents a development of J. L. Austin's analysis of truth and its accompanying analysis of sentence structure. This involves a discussion and refinement of Austin's notions of the demonstrative and descriptive conventions of language and of the demonstrative and descriptive devices of sentences. The main point of the thesis is that ordinary language must be treated as an historical phenomenon: one that has evolved its more complex features through a long series of variations upon a small number of rudimentary conventions and locutions. The utility of Austin's analysis is shown to lie in the description that it provides of the functions of these rudimentary conventions and locutions. The analysis is used to illuminate a number of problematic sentences and expressions of ordinary language, including identity sentences, definite descriptions, existential sentences, and conditionals.

The purpose of this study is to present the metaphysical status of &ldquo / language game&rdquo / in later Wittgensteinian philosophy of language and to deal with the revolutionary role of &ldquo / language-game&rdquo / by means of Hintikka&rsquo / s interpretation of later Wittgenstein. It is usual to divide Wittgenstein&rsquo / s work into the early and the later period. The early period is based upon the picture theory of meaning, according to which a sentence represents a state of affairs. On the other hand, the later period gives special emphasis on the actions of people and the role their linguistic activities. The early period ignored factual or cognitive meaning since it relied on mirroring the structure of state of affairs by sentences. So, early period of Wittgenstein was concluded that &ldquo / whereof we can&rsquo / t speak, thereof we must be silent.&rdquo / This idea gives clues about metaphysics of early Wittgenstein. In this sense, language is treated in abstraction from activities of human beings. In the later work, Wittgenstein emphasizes everyday usage of language in &ldquo / language-game&rdquo / as social activities of ordering, advising, measuring, and counting and so on. These different &ldquo / language-games&rdquo / make up &ldquo / form of life&rdquo / . &ldquo / Language game&rdquo / with other vital notions of later Wittgenstein, as &ldquo / form of life&rdquo / , &ldquo / agreement&rdquo / establishes language matrix. So, later period of Wittgenstein is a rejection of his early period. Actually, his treatment of philosophy and philosopher is different from his early period. In addition to this, later Wittgenstein mainly focuses on the principle of &ldquo / meaning=use&rdquo / which is called contextual theory of meaning. In his later period, Wittgenstein aims to bring back words from metaphysics to everyday usage. On the other hand, metaphysics still plays a role in his later period as his early period, although he altered his early philosophy of language. To sum up, the notion of &ldquo / language-game&rdquo / is conceptually/ ontologically prior to its rules. In this sense, Wittgenstein forms &ldquo / language-game&rdquo / as a model for the other social activities of human beings. Furthermore, &ldquo / language-game&rdquo / is regarded as a bridge between language and reality and it shows &ldquo / language-game&rdquo / s revolutionary role in later Wittgenstein.

Cette thèse entend prendre acte de l'importance du Web d'un point de vue philosophique. Importance double : à la fois comme objet de recherche, qui, dans le sillage du Web Sémantique et de l'architecture du Web, à des titres divers, entre en résonance évidente avec les problématiques classiques de la métaphysique et de la philosophie du langage. Dans cette perspective, nous étudions quelques-uns de ses composants principaux (URI, ressources, tags, etc.). En parallèle, nous soulignons son importance au regard de la question du devenir de la philosophie elle-même. En effet, le travail entrepris ne s'est nullement contenté de projeter les concepts à priori d'une philosophia perennis. Il a consisté, au contraire, à interroger les architectes du Web eux-mêmes pour faire émerger leur métaphysique empirique, en observant les controverses qu'elle a suscitées. Prendre acte de la portée ontogonique d'une pratique telle que « l'ingénierie philosophique », selon l'expression de Tim Berners-Lee, pensée ici comme la production de nouvelles distinctions dans un monde en train de se faire, nous conduit à mener une réflexion plus vaste sur la nature de l'objectivation. Celle-ci rejoint en fin de compte des préoccupations politiques, dans la perspective de l'établissement d'un monde commun, auquel le Web participe activement. / The aim of this thesis is to account for the importance of the Web from a philosophical point of view. In a twofold fashion: as an object for research that, in the wake of the Semantic Web and Webarch, in different ways, is obviously consonant with many classical issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of language. From this perspective, we study some of its main building blocks (URI, resources, tags, etc.). Along with this aspect, we underline its importance as regards what's becoming of philosophy itself. This is all the more important since the task at hand demanded that we did not project philosophical categories a priori and lend ourselves to commit the "inscription error" acutely described by Brian Cantwell Smith, by resorting to a form of philosophia perennis. Conversely, we tried to focus our attention on Web architects themselves in order to bring their empirical metaphysics to the forefront, observing the controversies to which it lent itself. By acknowledging the « ontogonic » scope of such a practice as « philosophical engineering », an expression coined by no other than Tim Berners-Lee himself, understood as the production of new distinctions and entities like resources in a world that unfolds, we were made to ponder broader topics like the nature of objectivation. In the end, this gave rise to politic al concerns in line with the establishment of a shared world, in which the Web is heavily involved.

La présente thèse de doctorat propose une interprétation du Tractatus logico-philosophicus qui prend pour fil directeur l'analyse de la distinction opérée par Ludwig Wittgenstein entre « ce qui peut être dit » et « ce qui se montre ». Il s'agit, à partir d'une étude de la relation entre les développements logiques du Traité et son aspect « mystique » (c'est-à-dire ses considérations concernant la notion de valeur absolue), de poser le problème de son unité structurelle. L'unité du premier ouvrage de Wittgenstein s'avère étroitement liée à la distinction entre dire et montrer en laquelle résident selon l'auteur l'« argument principal » de son livre et le « problème cardinal de la philosophie ». Afin d'expliquer l'unité du Tractatus, ce travail de recherche s'efforce d'élucider la nature de la distinction dire/montrer, d'abord par une analyse de ses applications dans les remarques dont le Traité est composé, puis par une enquête sur ses origines dans les œuvres de Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Arthur Schopenhauer, Otto Weininger, William James et Léon Tolstoï. Selon la lecture du texte ici présentée, tous les emplois de cette distinction participent d'une forme commune qui est liée à la notion de réflexivité (ou d'autoréférence). / This PhD thesis deals with Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and intends to construct an interpretation of the book by using the distinction between ‘what can be said' and ‘what shows itself' as a central thread. Starting from a study of the relationship between the logical developments of the treatise and its ‘mystical' aspect (i.e. its remarks on the idea of an absolute value), the thesis raises the problem of the structural unity of Wittgenstein's early work. It appears that this unity is intimately related to the distinction between saying and showing, which is, according to Wittgenstein, the ‘main point' of his book and ‘the cardinal problem of philosophy'. To explain the unity of the Tractatus, the present work tries to elucidate the nature of the say/show distinction—first, through an analysis of its use in the book, and second, through an investigation into its origins in the works of Frege, Russell, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Weininger, James, and Tolstoy. According to the reading presented here, all the uses of this distinction pertain to a common form, which is linked to the concept of reflexiveness (or self-reference).

Submitted by Caroline Periotto (carol@ufscar.br) on 2016-10-03T18:51:50Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DissAK.pdf: 2342541 bytes, checksum: 8b85ee1e2faa78a4367d7ba3b9036cf1 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marina Freitas (marinapf@ufscar.br) on 2016-10-10T19:48:42Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DissAK.pdf: 2342541 bytes, checksum: 8b85ee1e2faa78a4367d7ba3b9036cf1 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marina Freitas (marinapf@ufscar.br) on 2016-10-10T19:48:52Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 DissAK.pdf: 2342541 bytes, checksum: 8b85ee1e2faa78a4367d7ba3b9036cf1 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-10T19:49:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DissAK.pdf: 2342541 bytes, checksum: 8b85ee1e2faa78a4367d7ba3b9036cf1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-04 / Não recebi financiamento / Electronic games currently move a lot of money in the entertainment industry, but are also used in other activities, such as educational and advertising, becoming a cultural item important to note. When researching more about it, it was perceived lack of language studies, especially studies that join linguistic theory with theories that deal with games. The aim of this study is to find a way to unite the two theories. We try to answer the following research questions: Which is the relationship between games and culture? In what sense games can be understood as texts? How games convey meanings? There is freedom within the game? Current research seeks to understand a process in which there is construction of meanings, so it fits in bakhtinian discussions on the production of humanities. It also deals with functioning forms of present both in games and in the language, moving towards a common origin. Both in games and in everyday life we see relations between restriction and freedom, relations that the individual is on the unpredictability of life. The main pillars of theoretical basis for the current research is in the area related to games, Huizinga texts (2008), and Frasca (2007) and Engenfeldt-Nielsen et al. (2009); as linguistic basis we use the concepts of Bakhtin (2003, 2009) of utterance, speech gender and ideological sign. / Jogos eletrônicos atualmente movem muito dinheiro na indústria de entretenimento, mas também são utilizados em outras atividades, como as educativas e de publicidade, se tornando um item cultural importante a ser observado. Ao pesquisar mais sobre o assunto, foi percebida a falta de estudos linguísticos, principalmente estudos que unam teoria linguística com teorias que tratam de jogos. O objetivo deste estudo é procurar uma forma de trabalhar com as duas teorias. Tentamos responder as seguintes perguntas de pesquisa: Qual a relação entre jogos e cultura? Em que sentido os jogos podem ser entendidos como textos? Como os jogos transmitem significados? Existe liberdade dentro dos jogos? A atual pesquisa, além de procurar entender um processo no qual existe construção de significados, e por isso ela se enquadra nas discussões bakhtinianas sobre a produção nas ciências humanas, também lida com formas de funcionamento presentes tanto nos jogos quanto na linguagem, caminhando para uma origem em comum. Tanto nos jogos quanto na vida cotidiana vemos restrição e liberdade, relações que o sujeito encontra na imprevisibilidade da vida. Os pilares principais de fundamentação teórica para a atual pesquisa são, na área relacionada a jogos, os textos de Huizinga (2008), Frasca (2007) e Engenfeldt-Nielsen et al. (2009); como base linguística usamos as noções de Bakhtin (2003, 2009) de enunciado, gênero do discurso e signo ideológico.

Submitted by IVAN PINHEIRO DE FIGUEIREDO null (ivanpfigueiredo@gmail.com) on 2016-12-12T13:15:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ivan Pinheiro Figueiredo (01 12 2016).pdf: 1350130 bytes, checksum: 220cffc1e9fc3b88d026ab0283750f63 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Felipe Augusto Arakaki (arakaki@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-12-15T14:42:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 figueiredo_ip_me_fran.pdf: 1350130 bytes, checksum: 220cffc1e9fc3b88d026ab0283750f63 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-12-15T14:42:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 figueiredo_ip_me_fran.pdf: 1350130 bytes, checksum: 220cffc1e9fc3b88d026ab0283750f63 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-11-13 / Qual pode ser o significado de o direito brasileiro adotar uma técnica de resolução de demandas que envolve a vinculação de decisões atuais às precedentes? A pergunta, por não inovar os termos nos quais é posta, já teve contra si opostas diversas respostas. Para ensaiar uma mais, o caminho seguido parte dos estudos acerca da linguagem. Desde que a linguagem é tomada como constituinte da sociabilidade, ficam prejudicadas as teorias do sujeito, se essas forem centradas na figura ausente ao sistema que propõem descrever, em torno da qual se estabiliza em univocidade o processo de significação. O atomismo lógico tampouco indica saída ao problema, pois pressupõe a figura do olho que olha apenas para fora, vê apenas projeções fixas correspondentes de figuras da realidade também inertes, no esquema de fotocópia ou espelhamento, em que não há lugar para discutir o método de cópula de um plano a outro, do projeto à construção. De outro lado, a dissolução de qualquer perspectiva de normatividade – ou seja, a posição de um modelo que não funciona, pois nega qualquer estabilidade em favor da mudança aleatória da posição dos termos – serve apenas para reforçar a dinâmica corrente sob uma discussão que, ao girar em falso, perde o pé da sociabilidade. Vistos sob essa luz, os movimentos ocorridos no direito, mesmo que iluminados por prismas diversos, respondem a essas questões. Nesse quadro, a legitimação da utilização de precedentes no Brasil como favor à racionalidade, ao atingimento de patamar avançado em que a pluralidade de significados socialmente atribuíveis tem de ser restringida para dar lugar à centralização da tutela do ordenamento jurídico em cortes às quais o acesso é restrito representa não apenas a integralização do direito como unidade, mas a unificação do acesso à possibilidade de significar a prática que se faz jurídica. / Which could be the meaning of the adoption, by the Brazilian law, of the resolution technique that involves binding precedent to current decisions? The question, that do not innovate the terms in which it is called, has had several answers opposed to itself. To test one more, the path taken follows the studies on language. Since the language is taken as a constituent of sociability, theories of the subject are damaged if centered on the absent figure from the proposed system description, around which can be stabilized at the univocal the meaning process. The logical atomism does not indicates any output to the problem either, because it assumes the figure of the eye that looks just out, sees only the corresponding fixed projections of reality figures also inert in a photocopy or mirroring scheme, where there is no place to discuss the method of copulation of one plane to another, from the design to construction. On the other hand, the dissolution of any normative perspective - i.e., the position of a model that does not work because it negates any stability in favor of random changes of the position of terms - only serves to reinforce the current dynamic under discussion when loses the foot of sociability. Seen in this light, the movements in law philosophy, even if illuminated by various prisms, answer these questions. In this framework, the legitimacy of the use of precedents in Brazil as a favor to a rationality, to the achievement of an advanced level in which the plurality of socially attributed meanings must be restricted to make way for centralization of authority of the legal system in courts, to which access is restricted, is not tributary to the conception of law as unity, but means the unification of access to the possibility to mean the practice that is named legal.