Thesis (Ph.D.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2006. / (UnM)AAI3207869. Adviser: Graham A. Cole. Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-02, Section: A, page: 0602.

<p> This study explores the factors that affect the conversion trajectories of post-immersion missionaries. The data has been culled from focus group interviews and subjected to analysis from the perspectives of social philosophy, sociology, religious conversion theory, and Catholic Social Teaching. It follows the practical theological method known as &ldquo;shared Christian praxis.&rdquo; </p><p> It details the impediments to the subsequent deepening of conversion in the societal, ecclesial, interpersonal, familial, and intrapersonal spheres, namely, post-immersion depression, culture shock, feelings of guilt regarding one&rsquo;s own relatively luxurious living conditions, blaming God for the obstinate pervasiveness of extreme poverty and political injustices, and communication difficulties between the missionaries and their non-missionary family members and friends.</p><p> It concludes that the aforementioned discouraging factors can be effectively countered via attention, during the post-immersion stage, to the missionaries&rsquo; expressed needs to continue to meet regularly with their respective missionary communities, to deprivatize their visions of spiritual conversion, to live a less opulent lifestyle, to participate in hands-on community service projects in conjunction with local poor people, to continue attempting to contribute to the reign of God locally, and to speak publically about their missionary experiences. It also finds that guided prayer methods, communal liturgies, mentorship, debriefing retreats for the missionaries and their families, ongoing study of the Bible and Catholic Social Doctrine, and long-term commitment to the missions, can be efficacious tools in the promotion of the consolidation and deepening of conversion and the prevention of backsliding.</p>

Part One examines the general structure of Kant's System. Chapter I argues that his System cannot be fully understood without appreciating its radically theological orientation. Chapter II introduces the 'principle of perspective', and defines perspective as the 'context of or 'way of considering' a philosophical question and standpoint as the subject-matter which is under consideration. Chapter III suggests that a fixed, architectonic pattern gives Kant's System its 'Gopernican' character. Part Two investigates the epistemological underpinnings of Kant's System. Chapter IV defines his four main perspectives (the transcendental, empirical, logical, and practical) as dealing with the synthetic a priori, the synthetic a posteriori, the analytic a priori, and the analytic a posteriori, respectively. Chapter V applies this perspectival framework to Kant's six primary 'object-terms': 'thing in itself, 'transcendental object', and 'appearance' denote the object as viewed from the transcendental perspective; 'phenomenon', 'negative noumenon', and 'positive noumenon' denote the object as viewed from the empirical perspective. Chapter VT argues that faith in the thing in itself is the necessary starting point for Kant's System. Part Three uses the formal principles established in Parts One and Two to interpret the Critical System itself. Chapters VII-IX regard the three Critiques as systems based, respectively, on theoretical, practical, and empirical standpoints. Part Four discusses the theological implications of Kant's System. Chapter X portrays his theology as he himself regarded it: as a theism which urges a right respect for God by denying the possibility of human knowledge of His existence, yet allows for an adequately certain belief through moral and teleological arguments. Chapter XI interprets Kant's philosophy of religion as an experiment designed to prove that Christianity can serve as the universal religion of mankind. Chapter XII demonstrates Kant's deep concern for religious experience, and argues that the Critical System as a whole was intended to pave the way for a Critical mysticism.

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-71).

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 69-71).

Iconoclastic discourse, as a critique of ‘idols’ of various kinds, has been appropriated by a range of different thinkers and traditions – often not always explicitly religious – throughout history. One of the more recent targets of iconoclasm is metaphysics, understood as a way of doing philosophy that appeals to an ideal or transcendent ground that is used to offer a totalising explanation of ‘reality’. For some reason, the issue of ‘metaphysical idolatry’ has become entangled with the problem of ‘writing’, or ‘representation’ more generally, which is pictured in some rather strange ways by a range of thinkers and theorists – including philosophers and theologians such as Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Marion, and Catherine Pickstock – in order to either challenge, or to be held accountable for, the ‘idolatry’ of metaphysical thought. It seems, however, that these strange pictures of writing compound rather than solve the problem of metaphysics, and it is towards pictures such as these that we direct our own iconoclastic critique. What many critics of metaphysics have failed to comprehend, we argue, is that metaphysics is a certain type of philosophical practice, and it must therefore be judged from this perspective. Idolatry itself has, since biblical times, been understood as a form of sinful practice, and unless we understand iconoclastic problems in a praxeological way, we risk basing our critical arguments on delusional assumptions. We turn to the work of thinkers as diverse as Marx, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Ryle, Bourdieu, Ingold, and others, who have challenged metaphysics, and the strange pictures that metaphysical thought has inspired, through the adoption of what we call a praxeological approach. It is from this perspective, we argue, that we can make iconoclastic judgements, and justify these judgements, in a way that avoids the speculative conundrums of some other more problematic approaches.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Albert-Ludwigs-Universität zu Freiburg i. Br., 1933. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 76-78).

This thesis proposes that Søren Kierkegaard's thought - in particular, his theological anthropology - is undergirded by an inchoate metaphysics of modality. It focuses on the concept of possibility (Danish: Mulighed), arguing that possibility is a primary ingredient of the Kierkegaardian self and serves as a kind of 'engine' for the development of the individual before God. Accordingly, viewing Kierkegaard's works through the lens of possibility is a fruitful way to gain new insights into his beliefs, and clarifies what he sought to express in his authorship. Kierkegaard, I argue, formulates a multilayered account of possibility that, while not abandoning metaphysics, re-frames possibility existentially, in terms of what the self may actually become, not only in and for itself but also in relation to God. One's selfhood and one's relation to God both require an ontology of possibility. His existential concerns arise from this metaphysical footing. This thesis then considers how possibility is integral to human selfhood. Genuine selfhood is an openness towards God's eternal possibility, rather than the self's attempting to create its own eternal possibilities via some other means of actualization. If the human person, by faith, becomes 'grounded in the absolute', then that person is becoming a self precisely because God is actualizing her possibilities. God is for Kierkegaard the source of all possibility. Theologically, Kierkegaard's conception of possibility presents us with ideas that may be fruitful in further discussion of God's attributes and the ways in which God is understood to relate to the created world. Anthropology, ontology, and theology are thus inextricably linked.

This thesis is a contextual study of the work of Orkney theologian John Oman (1860- 1939), with reference to personal freedom as the unifying principle. Oman’s early life in Orkney, his philosophical awakening in Edinburgh and his wide reading of European thought are the contexts explored. From these contexts emerges a theology that is eclectic in nature and which finds coherence in the principle of personal freedom. Oman’s concept of freedom is defined theologically, metaphysically and personally; this is followed by discussion of its application to the specific subject areas of Christology and Ecclesiology. The priority that Oman gives to personal freedom results in a distinctive theology of Christ and the Church. Thus, the uniqueness of Christ lies in the freedom which he exemplifies in humanity; and the Church is a community of freedom transcending institutional expression. The thesis concludes that Oman’s sui generis theology is the outcome of the heritage of freedom gifted in various contexts. However, this heritage of freedom was radicalised by Oman, as he developed his own theological vision.

Cette étude poursuit l’objectif d’introduire la théologie de Barth en philosophie, à l’aide de la pensée de Bergson. Il y est montré que la conception barthienne de l’expérience religieuse peut être légitimement ressaisie sous la forme d’un problème philosophique d’une pleine actualité, celui de l’expérience pure, que la philosophie de Bergson permet de déployer dans toutes ses dimensions philosophiques. / This study aims at introducing Barth’s theology into philosophy, using Bergson’s philosophy. It is shown that Barth’s conception of religious experience can legitimately be reformulated as a philosophical problem, the problem of pure experience, which is of the utmost importance in the current philosophical debate, and that Bergson’s though allows to display in all its philosophical scope.