No description available.

No description available.

The cleavage in voter loyalties that was to sustain the Second Party System in Ohio was created in the thirty years before 1830. Its origins are to be found in the national disputes of the 17908, which by 1802 had become involved with the issue of Ohio statehood. These early divisions were more deep-rooted than commonly assumed, dictating political behaviour for over a decade and providing political experiences that became controlling influences on later developments. However, the more immediate origin of the divisions established by the 1830s was the many-sided crisis of 1819-22, which made men look to politics for the solution of their problems, break with older loyalties and create new ones. In Ohio the demands for a non-slave-holding President and positive federal economic legislation melded into what became the National Republican and Whig parties, though a minority of Ohioans - for reasons peculiar to particular localities and particular ethnocultural groups - insisted on supporting Andrew Jackson in 1824 and subsequent years. The contest between these two groupings drew unprecedented numbers of new voters to the polls in 1828, most of whom committed themselves to Jackson, thus establishing the balanced distribution of party strength that was to persist for decades. Jackson's advantage in 1828 came from neither superior party organization nor the "rise of democracy," but from the opportunity to harness social resentments of long standing which had previously disrupted rather than reinforced party ties. Jackson's partisans could also call upon old-party loyalties that dated back to the War of 1812, and so created a party that bore some resemblance to the Jeffersonian Democrats, even if the crisis of the early 1820s had forged a nationalist opposition party far more powerful electorally in Ohio than the Federalists had ever been.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

This study covers aspects of political life at Kingston-upon-Hull between 1678 and 1835, and is part history and part edition. The historical section is an essay on the character and course of Hull politics between these dates. The edition on which that essay is based, consists of a selection from the surviving correspondence. The resulting picture is fragmentary, but it does contribute to our understanding of Hull at that time. The years 1678 to 1835 were marked by a political stability at Hull established during the first ten years and challenged only during the concluding five. Until the mid 1830's local political power was held by a merchant-maritime oligarchy which in times of need called upon local magnates who served the town as High Stewards. The Crown had some influence at Hull, as it was a garrison town and port; but the town corporation, Trinity House, Dock Company, and a number of wealthy families, some of whom had reached gentry status, held the monopoly of political influence. The freeman electorate was large, and as elections approached, unregistered voters pressed the Bench for their franchise. Some attempt was made by the corporation to restrict this. The paying of polling money was almost inevitable, especially in the later eighteenth century, and wise candidates also contributed to local charities, clubs and racing plates. Members of Parliament kept the town fully informed of national political issues especially up to about 1710. From then until the late 1760's the members seem less assiduous in their correspondence, and also in their performance in the Commons. Between 1766 and 1820 the Rockingham Fitzwilliam interest returned many personal nominees, and the quality of many of the members rose. These Whig magnates did not, however, have a monopoly at Hull. Wilberforce stood as an independent and later several government, or perhaps Tory candidates, were returned. Closely contested and expensive elections were common after 1796. Threats from Jacobites and American privateers, with the possibility of a French invasion, caused local political squabbles, but the French danger may have helped prevent the spread of revolutionary societies and Radicalism was really born in Hull in 1818 with the Political Protestants. However it played some part in turning Hull Whig/Liberal opinion against Liverpool's Tory government. The 1830's, with the campaign for the Reform and Municipal Corporation Acts, led to a crystallisation of local political parties which culminated in the defeat of the Tory corporation in the municipal election of 1835. The activities of the radical Acland added to the political strife, but he overplayed his hand. The stability created by conflict in the 1680's was transformed by conflict in the 1830's. The intervening years thus have some unity.

No description available.

The thesis is a political narrative in three parts. It has two themes. One is the rise to power of Sir Francis Walsingham. The second is the contention that the promulgation of the plan to marry Elizabeth I to the Duke of Anjou in the period 1579-1581 was more serious, and its consequences more damaging to the interests of the government, than is normally remembered. Against this damaging conduct of policy by his opponents, Walsingham's own ideals are contrasted. Part I explores Walsingham's conduct after appointment as Secretary in 1573. It analyses political conditions at Court, in particular the role of Burghley, and illustrates how by 1578 Walsingham had overturned expectations by allying with Leicester and Hatton. The effectiveness of this alliance is measured by an examination of the success of these three courtiers in cooperating during Walsingham's Embassy to the Netherlands in 1578. A discussion follows of recent writing on patronage and clientage, which concludes that patronage was more often directed by party political considerations than the historians discussed have accepted. This is substantiated by a chapter tracing Walsingham's creation, in Ireland, of a party of followers, of a sophisticated mixture, but in which the influence of common political and religious aims are noted. Part II has two large chapters. The first follows the debates in Council of 1579 in which Burghley propounded the case for the Anjou Marriage, concentrating on the Hatfield papers in which Burghley's thoughts are laid bare, and arguing that his policy was far more peculiar, and less cerebral, than is commonly realised. In order further to demonstrate the linkages between patronage and policy, the remainder of part II traces the impact of the reverses suffered by Leicester and Walsingham at Court on the conduct of English government in Ireland, and foreign policy, especially towards Scotland: the neglect of the earl of Morton is studied in detail through his slow downfall from 1579 to 1581. In conclusion, Walsingham's preferred policy, and its intellectual grounds, are briefly explored. Part III, the shortest of the three, examines each of these three areas of policy for the subsequent impact of the Anjou Marriage perturbations. The thesis concludes that the combination of Burghley and Sussex's marriage policy, and the Queen's more detached preference for procrastinatory diplomatic manoeuvres, had combined to frustrate (in part intentionally) the committedly interventionist and quasi-imperialist policy for which the Protestant party (Walsingham and Leicester, with Hatton, and their evangelical . Protestant followers) had argued. But by 1582, with the marriage clearly impossible of achievement, the Protestant party's agenda was unchallenged.