Zugl.: Hamburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007 u.d.T.: Glöckner, Arne: Kommunale Infrastrukturverantwortung und private Leistungserbringung im Rahmen von Konzessionsmodellen. / Literaturverz. S. [XVIII] - XXXII.

St. Gallen, Universiẗat, Diss., 2007. / Auch als: Schriftenreihe des Instituts für Öffentliche Dienstleistungen und Tourismus : Beiträge zum Öffentlichen Management ; 21.

Master-Arbeit Univ. St. Gallen, 2007.

Augsburg, Univ., Diss., 2008.

No description available.

Nesta dissertação, Plataformas Logísticas são apresentadas como infraestruturas para integração de transportes e geração de negócios. O interesse de diversos atores (operadores logísticos, indústrias, autoridades locais e regionais) requer um complexo planejamento de atividades associadas a aspectos geográficos, operacionais, gerenciais, administrativos e econômicos. Baseando-se em experiências internacionais, destacadamente a experiência alemã com as Güterverkehrszentren, este trabalho busca sistematizar as etapas necessárias para se avaliar a viabilidade de projetos que, muitas vezes, requerem participação pública e privada. Tal interação entre entes públicos e privados deixa o processo ainda mais complexo, dados os intrínsecos conflitos de interesse ao se planejar e projetar uma Plataforma Logística. Ao se buscar o estado da arte sobre o assunto, um procedimento de análise de projetos é sugerido e sua aplicação é feita associada ao caso da Plataforma Logística de Goiás, para a qual se identificaram possíveis fatores que levaram a não conclusão do empreendimento, apesar das medidas de governança adotadas pelo Estado. / In this dissertation, logistics platforms are presented as infrastructures for the transport integration and business generation. The interest of several stakeholders (third-party logistics, industries, local and regional authorities) requires a complex plan of activities associated with geographic, operational, managerial, administrative and economic features. Based on international experiences, especially the German experience with Güterverkehrszentren, this dissertation seeks to systematize the steps needed to assess the feasibility of projects that often require public and private participation. Such interaction between public and private entities makes the process even more complex, given the inherent conflicts of interest when planning and designing a logistics platform. Considering the state of the art on the subject, a design analysis procedure is proposed and its application is in the form of case study of the Logistics Platform of Goiás, for which have been identified possible factors leading to non-completion of the project despite measures taken by the State for governance.

The main purpose of this research project is to bridge the existing knowledgegap in the empirical identification and understanding of the most frequentcorrupt actions and the causes behind during procurement of infrastructureprojects in Pakistan, in addition to exploring the ways to enhance institutionalbasedtrust between the participants of the procurement process. Consequentlythe study aims to provide a conceptual framework to control corruption ininfrastructure procurement while proposing the institutional trust-buildingmechanisms. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches are utilised in thisstudy to achieve this research aim. Quantitative research data is collected usinga questionnaire survey. A total of 450 questionnaires were sent to variouspeople engaged in procurement of infrastructure projects in Pakistan. Theresponse rate was 36.7% (n=165). The questionnaire comprises of two mainquestions; one is about the most frequent corrupt actions in traditional andPublic Private Partnership (PPP) infrastructure procurement processes whileother question asks about the perceived institutional trust-building mechanismsin context of infrastructure procurement market in Pakistan. Various appropriatestatistical methods, including Mean Ranking and ANOVA were utilised toanalyse the collected data. The questionnaire survey was followed by 15 indepth semi-structured interviews with a variety of stakeholders. Theseinterviews provided information on various causes of corruption and reasons asto why people do not for example report a known incident of corruption. A traditional content analysis approach was used to analyse the data collectedusing interviews. From the analysis a cyclical framework of corruption controlemerged, and this is outlined within the thesis. The goal of this framework is tofacilitate procurement stakeholders (individuals, groups, or organisations), toimprove their anti-corruption plans from project to project. This research studyhas filled the knowledge gap through identifying the top twenty potentialcorrupt practices in traditional and PPP infrastructure procurement processes inPakistan and explored the causes behind their occurrence. The study alsorecommends the solutions to mitigate this problem throughout the life cycle ofprocurement process. In addition, the study proposes the institutional trustbuildingmechanisms in the context of infrastructure procurement market inPakistan to cater for the likely loss in trust due to perceived level of corruptionin this sector. The study has also introduced a conceptual framework to controlcorruption in infrastructure procurement process in general and particularly inPakistan. The framework does not intend to introduce new alternatives butinstead builds on existing practices so that users can more easily adapt to theimprovement. The findings of this research are believed to be useful for allpractitioners who are either considering or currently involved in infrastructureprocurement process in Pakistan and trying to avoid or minimise the influenceof corruption.

The performance of public utilities in low-income countries with respect to service to all customers, and particularly lower-income urban consumers, is understood to be limited in many cases. The Government of Ghana chose to implement a private sector management contract in order to deliver significant change in service delivery and financial viability. The five year management contract with Aqua Vitens Rand Limited ran from 2006 to 2011 and was not renewed. This study investigates the public utility outcomes, both as a state owned corporation and a state owned limited liability Company, and compares those outcomes with the achievements of the private operator through a Management Contract. The latter two management models operated under the oversight of the newly formed economic regulator, the Public Utility Regulatory Commission in 1999 and any effect of that regulation is considered. The hypothesis of the study developed in 2008 was that “a management contract would not provide the necessary level of empowerment, incentives and commitment and access to resources for a private operator to adequately and efficiently perform even where there is an established economic regulator with a clear mandate”. The case study approach was employed for the study data was gathered on the operations, activities, regulation and management of the urban water utility through documentary review, key-informant interviews, household surveys, public hearing meetings and user observations. However, three major cities including Accra, Kumasi and Tamale were used for the household survey. These three cities were carefully picked out taking into account the political, economic, geographical, social and cultural significance that each of the them represents and commands in Ghana.

Cette thèse propose d'étudier le rôle du secteur privé dans la fourniture des biens et services publics dans le cadre du récent contrat de Partenariat Public-Privé (PPP). Le premier chapitre de cette thèse a pour but de comparer l'efficacité du PPP à sa forme plus ancienne, le contrat de Délégation de Service Public (DSP). Le PPP permet au gouvernement de déléguer à un opérateur privé à la fois la construction d'une infrastructure publique et son exploitation. Cela revient à lui confier de plus grandes responsabilités comparées à ce qu'elles sont dans la DSP et lui confère également une dimension de long terme. L'efficacité du PPP devient alors dépendante des engagements pris par le gouvernement à l'étape de construction, qui peuvent ne pas être honorés à celle d'exploitation. A l'inverse, le contrat de DSP ne souffre pas de cet éventuel opportunisme du fait que les deux tâches relatives à la fourniture de services publics sont réalisées par deux firmes différentes. Nous montrons dans ce chapitre que l'efficacité du PPP est endommagée par l'opportunisme du gouvernement, mais pas suffisamment pour recommander la DSP. Nous concluons que, contrairement à l'opinion générale, l'engagement du gouvernement n'est pas un facteur clés du succès du contrat PPP. Le deuxième chapitre contribue au débat sur l'efficacité de la fourniture du service de l'eau par le secteur privé. Pour cela, nous menons une étude empirique en France, pays pionnier en matière de gestion privée de l'eau. Dans ce chapitre, nous évaluons l'impact du choix de gestion de l'eau sur les prix de l'eau, en prenant soin de corriger le biais de sélection dont souffre cette évaluation. Pour cela, nous estimons un modèle d'effet de traitement à l'aide d'un modèle à variable latente empruntant ainsi la méthodologie de Carpentier et al. (2006). L'effet moyen de la délégation et celui sur une municipalité ayant choisie la gestion privée de l'eau sont examinés. Contrairement aux études empiriques précédentes, nous montrons qu'il n'y a pas de différences significatives de prix de l'eau selon le mode de gestion de l'eau choisi. Le troisième chapitre examine la fourniture de biens publics lorsque ces derniers sont soumis à un risque d'interruption. Afin de pallier ce risque, une autorité publique peut adopter une politique de dédoublement des sources approvisionnement. Au lieu de confier toute la fourniture d'un bien public à une seule et même source, elle peut la confier à deux distinctes. De cette manière, si l'une est interrompue, l'autre peut prendre le relais. Dédoubler les sources approvisionnement permet d'assurer la continuité du bien public mais engendre des coûts, une source plus coûteuse pouvant prendre le relais. C'est ainsi que l'autorité publique fait face à un dilemme entre confier l'approvisionnement du bien public à une ou deux sources. Dans ce chapitre, nous étudions tout d'abord le choix d'approvisionnement avant de nous intéresser au partage respectif de la fourniture du bien public entre les deux sources en cas de dédoublement. Nous analysons également le choix de l'autorité publique en matière d'approvisionnement lorsqu'elle est susceptible d'être influencée par des groupes d'intérêt. / This thesis investigates three questions related to the role of private sector involvement in the provision of public goods or services. The State withdrawal from such provision has led to the use of partnerships between the public and the private sectors. They take place through a variety of contracts from the traditional form of public procurement to the modern form, Public-Private Partnership (PPP). The first chapter analyzes the contracting out of public services through Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) subject to government opportunism. The construction of a public infrastructure and its operation are carried out by a private sector firm. Due to bundling of these two tasks, the PPP efficiency is affected by government's commitment power, contrarily to the traditional procurement, in which the two tasks are contracted out separately. We find that the PPP cost efficiency is damaged by the government opportunism but not sufficiently to recommend the use of TP contract. PPP contract should still be preferred by the government. We conclude that, contrarily to the widespread view, government commitment is not the key factor determining the success of PPP. The second chapter offers an empirical study to contribute to the debate over the efficiency of private provision of water services, looking at the main policy lessons that can be drawn from recent French experience. The purpose of this paper is to accurately evaluate the impact of private management on water prices after taking into account the selection bias. To do so, we use a treatment effect approach in a latent variable framework following the Carpentier et al. (2006) methodology. Two specific treatment parameters are reexamined: the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the effect of Treatment on the Treated (ATT). Contrary to the previous empirical findings, we show that private management does not have a significant impact on water prices. The third chapter examines the provision of a public good subject to a risk of disruption in a dynamic setting. To hedge against this risk, a public authority may use a dual sourcing policy. Instead of awarding the entire production to one firm (sole sourcing), he may split production among two firms (dual sourcing). If the production of one firm is disrupted, the other firm may take over. However, ensuring the continuity of production increases the procurement cost since a less efficient firm may be awarded part of the production. The public authority thus faces a trade-off when deciding upon the procurement policy. We first examine the optimal choice between sole and dual sourcing. Then, we determine the optimal share of production awarded to each firm in case of dual sourcing. We also consider how asymmetry of information on the secondary firm's efficiency affects the optimal procurement policy since an informational rent is given up to this firm. Finally, we extend our model to consider the influence of lobbying on the public authority's choice of procurement policy.

Masters in Public Administration - MPA / Cape Town’s MyCiTi Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) service is part of an ambitious plan to integrate various modes of transport and “place at least 75% of Cape Town’s population within 500 meter of the system”. MyCiTi would replace the ubiquitous mini-taxis on most major routes. The scheduled public bus service began in the city in 2010, and has since expanded considerably through the phased roll-out of several new routes, the most recent being one that reaches the Cape Flats. Yet in the early stages, there was considerable opposition from various stakeholders and some of that still continues. This research looks at how key stakeholders shifted their views over the period 2008-2015. Three stakeholder groups and their interactive dynamics in the context of ongoing uncertainty about the system are explored in this mini-thesis. The findings show that despite much pre-planning, the MyCiTi project has been negotiated and re-negotiated as the City embarked on a voyage into uncharted territory. The transformation of sections of the taxi industry from the informal sector to the formal sector has been presented as a big challenge but has also been seen as its biggest phase one success so far. Yet, in 2015, the city blamed at least half of its revenue shortfall on having to compete with the minibus taxi industry, which it failed to “contain” as planned. The mini-thesis shows that mega-public-private projects are messy at best and that without effective monitoring, public support and consultation the best laid plans and policies can fail. More research is needed into the complexities of public private partnerships and the City needs to take such knowledge into the next phases.