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L'avocat est devenu aujourd'hui un professionnel incontournable de notre société. Celui-ci doit engager sa responsabilité comme tout autre professionnel vis-à-vis de son client au titre de ses droits et devoirs. De nos jours, toute personne est dans le droit d'attendre une réparation lorsqu'un professionnel commet une faute dans l'exercice de ses fonctions. A titre d'exemple, les médias relatent souvent des cas dans lesquels la responsabilité des médecins est engagée par leurs patients. Qu'en est-il du client ayant subi un préjudice causé par son avocat ? Quels sont les mécanismes juridiques mis en œuvre pour engager la responsabilité de celui-ci ? Ce professionnel du droit dispose-t-il d'un système d'assurance particulier ? Autant de questions qui sont souvent méconnues à la fois des justiciables et des professionnels du droit. / Lawyers have become an essential profession in our modern society. Like any other profession, lawyers have a liability towards their clients in respect to their rights and obligations. Nowadays, everyone is entitled to expect compensation when professional people commit an error while performing their duties. As an example, the media often highlight cases in which doctors are held liable by their patients. What about the client who has suffered a loss caused by their lawyer ? What legal mechanisms are used to hold the lawyer responsible? Does this legal professional have access to specific insurance cover ? These and many other questions are frequently unrecognised both by those to be tried and professionals in the law.

<p>&quot / The following thesis investigates the MACR in African Legal Systems. The MACR is the youngest age at which children in conflict with the law find themselves caught up in the harsh realities of the criminal justice system. Up until recently, debates around fixing a MACR had been successfully side-stepped since the adoption of the UNCRC in 1989. The UNCRC has provided for human rights for children on a global scale while the ACRWC provides for such rights regionally. Contracting States Parties to these treaties agree that there needs to be a MACR in place and have adopted a childrens rights-based framework for reviewing their current child laws, policies and practices in accordance with the minimum standards provided. They do not however, agree on what the fixed minimum age should be...&quot / </p>

This study explores the role engagement in a school-based music ensemble plays in the development of social responsibility in middle school students. The study involved 9 music students, 18 non-music students, and 5 teachers at a suburban middle school in Coquitlam, B.C. Students were compared using three measures – office referral data, a Social Responsibility Quick Scale, and a moral dilemma writing activity – and were subsequently interviewed to determine their thoughts on how musical engagement in music classes might impact their development of social responsibility. Interviews with teachers focused on activities that they believe foster social responsibility as well as their perspectives on this area of child development. Students are referred to the office for misbehaviour at school, and office referral data for the entire school population revealed that students in music classes are referred significantly less often than students not engaged in music (males p = .001; females p = .005). Musically engaged students achieved higher assessed scores on the Social Responsibility Quick Scale and the moral dilemma activity, but the statistical significance of these relationships is questionable owing to the small sample size. Interviews with students and teachers suggested that public performance, music teacher mentorship, and shared in-group responsibilities contribute to fostering development of social responsibility in music students.

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Experiences of disorientation can be common and powerful parts of moral agents‘ lives, yet they have not been characterized by mainstream Western philosophers, and their effects have not been adequately recognized by ethicists. In this dissertation, I remedy these gaps by providing an account of disorientations as multi-dimensional experiences and by fleshing out a more nuanced analysis of disorientation within the framework of experienced agency. I argue that, contra the philosophical tradition, disorientations are not always bad for moral agency. This thesis has two main aims: first, to introduce a philosophical framework to clarify experiences of disorientation and their effects; and second, to clarify the relation between disorientation and moral agency, showing how responsible action can both require and produce disorientation. In chapter one, I introduce disorientations as complex experiences of unease, discomfort, and uncertainty which vary in degree and in effects. In chapters two to four, I characterize disorientations on three axes: corporeal, affective, and epistemological. I argue that disorientations always involve all three dimensions of bodily, emotional, and cognitive experience and that shifts in body, affect, and knowledge can trigger experiences of disorientation. I draw on examples of how agents can become disoriented in periods of illness, trauma, grief, self-doubt, and education. In chapter five, I draw two lines of connection between disorientation and moral agency: experiences of disorientation can help us act more responsibly, and acting responsibly can be disorienting. In chapter six, I consider the political promise of disorientations, focusing on the way individuals‘ disorientations in response to a hate crime in their community prompted the creation of less harmful norms, and thereby a better place for individuals to live. In chapter seven, I conclude by outlining implications of my view for how we should face disorientations and what kinds of conditions should be in place to support those who are disoriented. Disorientations do not always enable moral agency. Given that moral philosophers are better versed in the ways disorientations can harm, my project is to distinguish the ways they can help, contesting the assumption that moral agency is always better the more oriented we are.

Moral responsibility is an issue at the heart of the free-will debate. The question of how we can have moral responsibility in a deterministic world is an interesting and puzzling one. Compatibilists arguments have left open the possibility that the ability to do otherwise is not required for moral responsibility. The challenge, then, is to come up with what our attributions of moral responsibility are tracking. To do this, criteria which can adequately differentiate cases in which the agent is responsible from cases in which the agent is not responsible are required. I argue that an agent is responsible for the consequences of an action if they stem, in an appropriate way, from the agent's deep values and desires. These deep values and desires make up the Deep Self. Parts of the Deep Self, first, tend to be enduring; second, desires within it tend to be general (as opposed to directed towards specific things); third, they tend to be reflectively endorsed by the agent; fourth, these traits are often central to the agent's self-conception; and fifth, they are not generally in extreme conflict with other deep traits. Empirical work is drawn upon to help develop a suitable account of what deserves to be called a part of the Deep Self. I also strengthen and extend this view by considering issues of poor judgement and weakness of will, and when and how we can be considered responsible for them.

Recently a number of philosophers have begun to promote what are broadly referred to as attributionist or real self views of moral responsibility. According these views a person is responsible for a thing just in case it is indicative or expressive of her judgments, values, or "world-directed" attitudes. These philosophers have focused a great deal of attention on dissolving the apparent tension between our commonsense intuitions concerning the connection between control and responsibility, on the one hand, and our lack of voluntary control over our values, beliefs and attitudes on the other. In attempting to relieve this tension, many of them have introduced various forms of non-voluntary control or agency we are said to exercise with respect to things such as our values, beliefs and attitudes. I argue that these supposed forms of non-voluntary agency are untenable because they typically rest on a failure to adequately distinguish between two ways in which we make up our minds; in short, they rest on a failure to adequately distinguish theoretical from practical reasoning. Once certain fundamental differences between theoretical and practical reasoning are brought back to the fore of the discussion, it becomes much harder to sustain some sort of unique species of agency that can be said to apply to beliefs and certain other world-directed attitudes. Without such forms of non-voluntary agency, however, proponents of attributionists accounts of moral responsibility seem to face a dilemma; they must either: sneak volition in through the backdoor or commit to holding people responsible for things with respect to which they are passive. The thesis falls into four main sections. In the first section, I introduce the problem by describing an ongoing debate between defenders of attributionist accounts of moral responsibility and defenders of what have been termed volitionist accounts of moral responsibility. In the second section, I explicate Pamela Hieronymi's construal of the form of non-voluntary agency she calls "evaluative control." In section three, I critique Hieronymi's account of evaluative control by pointing to two predominant points of divergence between theoretical and practical reasoning. In the fourth section, I examine the upshots of the absence of non-voluntary for attributionist accounts of moral responsibility; I do so by examining each horn of the dilemma mentioned above.

In recent years, economical fast development, the corporate faces the globalization expansion, and in under pursue biggest profit premise, every managers tries to utilization each innovation transforms the strategy makes every effort the promotion competitive advantage in the global market. To achieve the enterprise continues forever goal of the development. However, one after another financial scandal erupted in the American and Asia, it impacts the corporate to think about relationship between the corporate competition and the corporate social responsibility. In the past, to pursues the maximum profit is traditional ideas for the practice of market. Since the corporate scandal erupted, corporate starts to consider how to evaluate the business performance. Moreover, the regards the topics on environmental protection and staff rights and interests attack corporate image seriously. Definitely, more and more evidence to show the ethics orientation obtain the positive benefit. More and more corporate expresses the social responsibility is helpful for the company. They understand the company can gain the long-term competitive advantage with the fusion for the company image and the corporate social responsibility. They understand the respect from social is not only create the value for the shareholder, but also unfold the intense support environmental protection and the social responsibility. This study is according to the humanity responsibility, ethics responsibility, the legal liability, in Carroll, Archie B. (1991) The Pyramid of Social Responsibility ( in the Chapter II), and using the case study. It is positive relationship when company provides the result: the company competition and to implement the social responsibility.

Univ., Diss.--Amsterdam, 2007.