The purpose of this investigation was to test the hypothesis that perceived responsibility is a major determinant of compulsive checking. Thirty participants recruited from the community through the local media, who met criteria for Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, received four conditions. In the low responsibility condition, perceived responsibility for an anticipated negative eventt was transferred to the experimenter. In contrast, in the high responsibility condition, perceived responsibility for an anticipated negative event was given to the participant. The remaining two conditions served as control conditions. Subjects were assessed before and after each experimental manipulation. Results suggest a causal connection between decreases in perceived responsibility and compulsive checking. Decreases in perceived responsibility produced decreases in several measures critical to compulsive checking. Results from increases in perceived responsibility were less clear. However, increases in perceived responsibility lead to increases in panic and likelihood of anticipated criticism. There were trends for increases in perceived responsibility to lead to increases in perceptions of discomfort experienced, urge to check, and severity of anticipated criticism. There was no relationship between variations in perceived responsibility and perceived extent of controllability over an anticipated negative event. Theoretical implications of the results and, in particular, the value of a cognitive analysis of compulsive checking, are discussed.

<p>&quot / The following thesis investigates the MACR in African Legal Systems. The MACR is the youngest age at which children in conflict with the law find themselves caught up in the harsh realities of the criminal justice system. Up until recently, debates around fixing a MACR had been successfully side-stepped since the adoption of the UNCRC in 1989. The UNCRC has provided for human rights for children on a global scale while the ACRWC provides for such rights regionally. Contracting States Parties to these treaties agree that there needs to be a MACR in place and have adopted a childrens rights-based framework for reviewing their current child laws, policies and practices in accordance with the minimum standards provided. They do not however, agree on what the fixed minimum age should be...&quot / </p>

A central tenet of democratic theory is that the exercise of governance be both legitimate and accountable. Elections constitute the fundamental means through which these ends are met. Critical to this process is the ability of the citizen to correctly assign responsibility for government action. Institutional arrangements are central to defining the pathways of accountability. In institutional contexts with only one level of government, assigning responsibility is relatively straightforward. However, in situations of multiple and overlapping levels of government, the process of correctly assigning responsibility and ultimately holding governments accountable for their actions is much more difficult. In comparative contexts, there has been and continues to be a long-term trend towards the decentralization of political authority to sub-national levels of government. Despite this widespread current, little is known about the effects these processes have on democratic accountability. / The central proposition tested in this dissertation is that decentralized multi-level governance undermines democratic accountability. This proposition is tested through drawing on the reward and punishment calculus of economic voting: incumbent governments are rewarded (punished) for good (bad) economic conditions. When lines of accountability are clear, the individual voter can easily apportion blame (credit) to the government for economic conditions by voting against (for) the government. Where multiple levels of decentralized authority cloud responsibility, accountability for economic outcomes (either positive or negative) is likely to be undermined. / This proposition is tested comparatively using cross-national aggregate economic and election statistics as well as cross-national individual-level data. Case studies of institutional change towards multi-level governance in Belgium, Scotland and Spain are examined for the theorized effects on accountability for economic conditions. Finally, a case study of federal and provincial economic voting in Canada is conducted using individual-level data from recent Canadian Election Studies. Both comparatively and in case studies, the findings of this dissertation consistently indicate that accountability for economic conditions is undermined by the presence of decentralized multi-level governance. / This dissertation makes an important contribution to the study of multi-level governance, economic voting and comparative politics through uncovering institutional effects of decentralized multi-level governance that undermine political accountability and, ultimately, the health of democracy.

Existing literature and research findings indicated that cost monitoring and control of construction projects by contractors at the level of site operations has remained ineffective largely due to inability of existing control systems to accurately predict when, to what extent and why an on-going operation or project is to overrun its planned duration and cost. In most cases the information that would enable such advance detection becomes available to decision makers after the affected operation or project is completed. It is then hoped that the information could be used to 'control' future similar situations which in the case of construction projects hardly arise, at least never under identical circumstances. The existing cost control systems also fail to enable rational corrective decisions to be formulated. This resulted in total reliance on previous experience and personal intuition to make a guess of corrective measures. Most research efforts have focussed mainly on various aspects of project modelling and cost control using traditional accounting approaches that consistently fail to meet the requirements and schedule of timely cost control. This research identified, from empirical evidence, construction and management science literature, the essential criteria and features of an effective cost monitoring and control approach for construction projects. The evidence from these three sources led to the formulation of an alternative approach based on quantitative analysis of cost data from construction projects. The cost monitoring and control process carried out on sites was formulated as a problem whose solution process is implemented using multiple regression and goal programming models and techniques that enable timely evaluation and prediction of costs and a rational computation of corrective decisions. This allowed cost deviations to be detected and optimum corrective measures calculated while the affected operation or project was still in progress.

The just war tradition has largely consisted of dialogues, approaches, and frameworks dominated by the conceptual primacy of the individual. While such focus upon the individual is appropriate for many battlefield contexts, it is by no means exhaustive. My aim is to demonstrate that in addition to battlefield harms amenable to traditional individually-oriented approaches, there exists another set of unique battlefield harms problematic for such individualistic approaches and thus warranting a structural account instead. I will conclude that in order for Just War Theory to be fully adequate, it must both recognize the unique set of battlefield harms caused by structures as well as account for them by means of a notion of structural responsibility. / Graduate

No description available.

Moral responsibility is an issue at the heart of the free-will debate. The question of how we can have moral responsibility in a deterministic world is an interesting and puzzling one. Compatibilists arguments have left open the possibility that the ability to do otherwise is not required for moral responsibility. The challenge, then, is to come up with what our attributions of moral responsibility are tracking. To do this, criteria which can adequately differentiate cases in which the agent is responsible from cases in which the agent is not responsible are required. I argue that an agent is responsible for the consequences of an action if they stem, in an appropriate way, from the agent's deep values and desires. These deep values and desires make up the Deep Self. Parts of the Deep Self, first, tend to be enduring; second, desires within it tend to be general (as opposed to directed towards specific things); third, they tend to be reflectively endorsed by the agent; fourth, these traits are often central to the agent's self-conception; and fifth, they are not generally in extreme conflict with other deep traits. Empirical work is drawn upon to help develop a suitable account of what deserves to be called a part of the Deep Self. I also strengthen and extend this view by considering issues of poor judgement and weakness of will, and when and how we can be considered responsible for them.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2005. Graduate Programme in Education. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 169-180). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pqdiss&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:dissertation&rft_dat=xri:pqdiss:NR11563

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Melbourne, Dept. of Philosophy, 2004. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 273-279).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Riverside, 2007. / Adviser: Georgia Warnke. Includes bibliographical references.