Thesis (M.P.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references.

Akademisk afhandeling--Uppsala. / "Kallor och litteratur": p. [v]-xi.

Thesis (M.P.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print.

Zugl.: München, Techn. Univ., Diss., 2010

Zugl.: Berlin, Humboldt-Univ., Diss., 2008.

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Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:24:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2000Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:10:38Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 rosa_ptr_me_fran.pdf: 808699 bytes, checksum: 59c9ac04886eb40983d163dd552b8dbc (MD5) / O Estado é o responsável pela preservação da ordem pública e da incolumidade das pessoas e do patrimônio e desenvolve suas atividades por meio das forças policiais. A missão das forças policiais é assegurar ao cidadão o exercício dos direitos e garantias fundamentais e o direito à segurança pública. Os agentes policiais encontram-se legitimados a empregarem à força quando esta for necessária para o cumprimento de suas funções. O uso da força deve estar sujeito aos limites da lei, evitando-se o abuso e o excesso que podem levar à prática de atos arbitrários. A responsabilidade do Estado é objetiva, bastando ao administrado demonstrar o nexo de causalidade existente entre o dano e o ato praticado para que seja indenizado. O fundamento legal da responsabilidade do Estado é o art. 37, § 6º, da Constituição Federal do Brasil. A ação de indenização por atos das forças policiais deve ser proposta contra a Fazenda Pública, e o Estado em sua defesa poderá alegar a ocorrência de uma das excludentes de responsabilidade. O uso legítimo da força ou a ocorrência de uma das excludentes afastam ou diminuem os valores devidos ao administrado pelo dano suportado. / The State is responsible for the preservation of the public order, the people's integrity and the patrimony and it develops its activities by means of the police forces. The police force mission is to assure to the citizen the exercise of the rights and fundamental warranties and the right to the public safety. The police agents are legitimated to use the force when it is necessary for the execution of its functions. The use of the force should be subject to the limits of the law, being avoided the abuse and the excess that can take to the practice of arbritrary acts. The responsibility of the State is objective, being enough to the administered to demonstrate the connection between the damage and practiced act so it is reimbursed. The legal foundation of the responsibility of the State is the art. 37, § 6°., of the Federal Constitution of Brazil. The compensation action for the police forces acts should be proposed against the Public Finance, and the State in its defense can allege the occurrence of one of the excluded responsibility. The legitimate use of the force or the occurrence of one of the excluded move away or decrease the values to the administered by the supported damage.

There seems to exist a tension between our metaphysical and phenomenological commitments in the free will debate. On the one hand, I argue that at the metaphysical level we cannot coherently defend the belief that we are morally responsible in the sense that we deserve to be rewarded and punished for our actions, where desert-entailing moral responsibility is the primary understanding of moral responsibility presupposed in the free will debate. I argue that we are responsible for our actions but only in the weaker sense, termed ‘attributability’ by Gary Watson. On the other hand, we are allegedly unrenounceably committed at the phenomenological level to conceiving of, and treating, ourselves and one another as morally responsible beings in the desert-entailing sense. P. F. Strawson famously defends this claim in his seminal work, ‘Freedom and Resentment’. In my thesis I will set out this tension by exploring both commitments in turn. I then aim to show that the tension can be dissolved by arguing, contra P. F. Strawson, that our phenomenological commitment is not in fact unrenounceable. The dissolution of this tension entails, I argue, that we must examine our conception of self and other. We must explore the implications of adopting a position which denies that we are morally responsible beings for our life-hopes, personal feelings, inter-personal relationships and projects. Most importantly, I argue that we must renounce our current retributive condemnatory practices which are based on the unjustified belief that we are morally responsible beings.