Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:24:14Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2000Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T19:10:38Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 rosa_ptr_me_fran.pdf: 808699 bytes, checksum: 59c9ac04886eb40983d163dd552b8dbc (MD5) / O Estado é o responsável pela preservação da ordem pública e da incolumidade das pessoas e do patrimônio e desenvolve suas atividades por meio das forças policiais. A missão das forças policiais é assegurar ao cidadão o exercício dos direitos e garantias fundamentais e o direito à segurança pública. Os agentes policiais encontram-se legitimados a empregarem à força quando esta for necessária para o cumprimento de suas funções. O uso da força deve estar sujeito aos limites da lei, evitando-se o abuso e o excesso que podem levar à prática de atos arbitrários. A responsabilidade do Estado é objetiva, bastando ao administrado demonstrar o nexo de causalidade existente entre o dano e o ato praticado para que seja indenizado. O fundamento legal da responsabilidade do Estado é o art. 37, § 6º, da Constituição Federal do Brasil. A ação de indenização por atos das forças policiais deve ser proposta contra a Fazenda Pública, e o Estado em sua defesa poderá alegar a ocorrência de uma das excludentes de responsabilidade. O uso legítimo da força ou a ocorrência de uma das excludentes afastam ou diminuem os valores devidos ao administrado pelo dano suportado. / The State is responsible for the preservation of the public order, the people's integrity and the patrimony and it develops its activities by means of the police forces. The police force mission is to assure to the citizen the exercise of the rights and fundamental warranties and the right to the public safety. The police agents are legitimated to use the force when it is necessary for the execution of its functions. The use of the force should be subject to the limits of the law, being avoided the abuse and the excess that can take to the practice of arbritrary acts. The responsibility of the State is objective, being enough to the administered to demonstrate the connection between the damage and practiced act so it is reimbursed. The legal foundation of the responsibility of the State is the art. 37, § 6°., of the Federal Constitution of Brazil. The compensation action for the police forces acts should be proposed against the Public Finance, and the State in its defense can allege the occurrence of one of the excluded responsibility. The legitimate use of the force or the occurrence of one of the excluded move away or decrease the values to the administered by the supported damage.

Orientador: Luiz Antonio Soares Hentz / Resumo: O Estado é o responsável pela preservação da ordem pública e da incolumidade das pessoas e do patrimônio e desenvolve suas atividades por meio das forças policiais. A missão das forças policiais é assegurar ao cidadão o exercício dos direitos e garantias fundamentais e o direito à segurança pública. Os agentes policiais encontram-se legitimados a empregarem à força quando esta for necessária para o cumprimento de suas funções. O uso da força deve estar sujeito aos limites da lei, evitando-se o abuso e o excesso que podem levar à prática de atos arbitrários. A responsabilidade do Estado é objetiva, bastando ao administrado demonstrar o nexo de causalidade existente entre o dano e o ato praticado para que seja indenizado. O fundamento legal da responsabilidade do Estado é o art. 37, § 6º, da Constituição Federal do Brasil. A ação de indenização por atos das forças policiais deve ser proposta contra a Fazenda Pública, e o Estado em sua defesa poderá alegar a ocorrência de uma das excludentes de responsabilidade. O uso legítimo da força ou a ocorrência de uma das excludentes afastam ou diminuem os valores devidos ao administrado pelo dano suportado. / Abstract: The State is responsible for the preservation of the public order, the people's integrity and the patrimony and it develops its activities by means of the police forces. The police force mission is to assure to the citizen the exercise of the rights and fundamental warranties and the right to the public safety. The police agents are legitimated to use the force when it is necessary for the execution of its functions. The use of the force should be subject to the limits of the law, being avoided the abuse and the excess that can take to the practice of arbritrary acts. The responsibility of the State is objective, being enough to the administered to demonstrate the connection between the damage and practiced act so it is reimbursed. The legal foundation of the responsibility of the State is the art. 37, § 6°., of the Federal Constitution of Brazil. The compensation action for the police forces acts should be proposed against the Public Finance, and the State in its defense can allege the occurrence of one of the excluded responsibility. The legitimate use of the force or the occurrence of one of the excluded move away or decrease the values to the administered by the supported damage. / Mestre

Non-recognition as lawful of a situation created by a serious breach of a peremptory norm is regarded as a well-established customary duty. Since such a duty fulfils an important function in the preservation of the international legal order, scholars have generally considered its emergence as a welcome development. However, while State practice confirms that there is an established trend towards non-recognition of unlawful situations, it also illustrates that its content is controversial. More specifically, there is a gap between State practice and the prevailing scholarly understanding of this duty, which roughly corresponds to that of the ILC enshrined in Article 41(2) ARSIWA. The cases in which non-recognition has been invoked as a response to certain violations of international law are more complex than is generally assumed and each of them is rather specific. It seems that this norm was consolidated mostly thanks to a political consensus on the underlying primary norms that characterize the contemporary international legal order—ie, the right to self-determination and the prohibition of conquest. In addition, there is one question that has been mostly glossed over by the scholarship, that is whether the international community can subsequently validate by means of recognition such a breach. The problem is that when States face intractable conflicts, the consensus in favor of the norms that should be protected by non-recognition is weakened by the competing consensus that peace processes aimed at settling long-standing conflicts should not be jeopardized. In these cases, there is an erosion of non-recognition in the sense that while States support in principle this duty, their behavior leads to the gradual validation of the unlawful situation.

This thesis examines the role of necessity, as a defence to State responsibility, in international law. Necessity provides a State with a defence to the responsibility that would otherwise arise from its breach of an international obligation where the only way that State can safeguard an essential interest from a grave and imminent peril is to breach an obligation owed to a less imperilled State. It is a defence that has generated a considerable body of jurisprudence in recent years and yet it continues to be plagued by a perception that States have abused it in the past and by fears that States will abuse it in the future - 'necessity', declared the German Chancellor on the eve of World War I, 'knows no law'. This thesis contends that this perception is flawed and these fears are unfounded. The main claim of this thesis is that necessity operates as a safety valve within the law of State responsibility that mediates between the binding quality of international obligations and the harsh consequences that may follow from requiring compliance with those obligations at all costs. This safety valve promotes the reasonable application of international law and it recognises that international law must sometimes bend so that it does not break. The thesis bears out this claim by contending that necessity has a stronger pedigree than is commonly appreciated and that it is solidly grounded in, and its contours are constrained by, customary international law. It charts those contours by first examining the scope of the obligations to which necessity may provide a defence, which includes examining how necessity relates to fields of law that contain their own safety valves regulating emergency situations. It then proceeds to examine the conditions that a State must satisfy in order to establish necessity and it finally examines the consequences of necessity, including for the stability of international law. The thesis concludes that any suggestion that 'necessity knows no law' has no place in international law today.

No description available.

This thesis is concerned with the ways in which international law regulates state and individual complicity. Complicity is a derivative form of responsibility that links an accomplice to wrongdoing by a principal actor. Whenever complicity is prohibited, certain questions arise about the scope and structure of the complicity rule. To answer these questions, this thesis proposes an analytical framework in which complicity rules may be assessed, and defends a normative claim as to their optimal structure. This framework and normative claim anchor the thesis’ analysis of complicity in international law. The thesis shows that international criminal law regulates individual complicity in a comprehensive way, using the doctrines of instigation and aiding and abetting to inculpate complicit participants in international crimes. These doctrines are marked by the breadth of the complicit conduct prohibited, a standard of knowledge in the fault required of the accomplice, and an underused nexus requirement between the accomplice’s acts and the principal’s wrong. In contrast, international law’s regulation of state complicity was historically marked by an absence of complicity rules. In respect of state complicity in the wrongdoing of another state, international law now imposes both specific and general complicity obligations, the latter prohibiting states from aiding or assisting another state in the commission of any internationally wrongful act. In respect of the ways that states participate in harms caused by non-state actors, the traditional normative structure of international law, which imposed obligations only on states, foreclosed the possibility of regulating the state’s participation as a form of complicity. As that traditional normative structure has evolved, so the possibility of holding states responsible for complicity in the wrongdoing of non-state actors has emerged. More and more, both the wrongs that international actors commit, and the wrongs they help or encourage others to commit, matter.

Causation has, at the very minimum, two functions in legal responsibility regimes. First, there is no responsibility without a conduct with causal consequences, making causation a condition of responsibility. Second, causation determines and delimits the extent of liability. The first claim of this study is that the decision of the International Law Commission to construct a responsibility regime unconditional on damage did not result in the exclusion of causation from the conditions of responsibility. There are at least two signs demonstrating that the attempt to exclude responsibility-grounding causation from State responsibility did not hold ground in practice. First, there is abundant case law pre- and postdating the codification of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA), confirming that responsibility-grounding causation exists in international law. Second, notwithstanding the denial of ARSIWA and its commentaries, reading between the lines reveals that several concepts of State responsibility are of a causal nature and their application inevitably implies a causal inquiry. There are two interrelated explanations for this. First, at the heart of the system of State responsibility lies the concept of the ‘internationally wrongful act’. I argue that the law of State responsibility lacks a coherent action theory. In particular, a causal theory of action would explain several anomalies visible in the case law. The second explanation rests on approaching causation in the law of international responsibility as a general principle of law. The prevailing view in the case law and the academic contributions is that causation and, more specifically, certain standards of causation are general principles of law. In making the second claim of this thesis, I will argue that this is only partially true. Causation is a general principle in as much as the existence of a causal link is a condition of responsibility and one possible condition of delimiting liability. ARSIWA therefore runs contrary to this general principle. However, the authorities arguing for a specific test of causation, be it directness, proximity, foreseeability or other tests, do not have a substantial basis to do so. What remains, as an empirical and inductive method in line with Article 38 (1) d) of the ICJ Statute, is to distil the actual practice of international courts and tribunals. My third claim is that there is merit in this exercise and it is possible to identify recurring solutions to recurring problems of causation. This study is the second one to conduct this survey and analysis of the case law, following the footsteps of Brigitte Stern, updating and complementing her otherwise exhaustive and authoritative text on the subject. The thesis concludes with a list of the distilled principles and postulates on respective problems of causation, in particular on the applicability and the limits of the ‘but for’ test, the applicable standard of remoteness, multiple causation and contributory negligence.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:22:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Fernanda Garcia Escane.pdf: 4077968 bytes, checksum: 05f51fe398a9690e34554fc5ef1e4e0e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-11-06 / A presente tese, tomando como base a vertente constitucional, de direitos humanos e, ainda, a efetividade da Lei de Execução Penal, tem por objeto desenvolver um estudo que contempla a demonstração da responsabilidade do Estado na ressocialização do Sentenciado. Para tanto, abordam-se as garantias mínimas dos direitos fundamentais do Sentenciado em face da Constituição Federal, considerando-se a finalidade da pena e a responsabilização do Estado. Diante da difícil tarefa de demonstrar a responsabilidade objetiva do Estado por omissão, em face da falência do sistema prisional, procurou-se descrever a situação penitenciária contemporânea, especialmente do Estado de São Paulo, para o que contribuiu uma coleta de depoimentos de presos. Com a apresentação e análise desses dados, pretendeu-se ampliar a compreensão das necessidades para a transformação da sociedade. This thesis, based on the constitutional aspect of human rights, and also the effectiveness of the Penal Execution Law, is engaged in developing a study that addresses the demonstration of state responsibility in the rehabilitation of the sentenced. Therefore, it deals with the minimum guarantees of fundamental rights of one sentenced in the face of the Federal Constitution, considering the purpose of punishment and governmental liability. Faced with the difficult task of demonstrating the strict liability of the State for failure to act in the face of the collapse of the prison system, we sought to describe the contemporary prison conditions, especially in Sao Paulo, for which a collection of testimonies from prisoners contributed. With the presentation and analysis of these data, we sought to expand the understanding of the requirements for the transformation of society as a whole. The thesis is concluded with the presentation of general considerations about the prospect of studying and working as alternatives able to promote rehabilitation and especially reintegration of the Sentenced back in society / A presente tese, tomando como base a vertente constitucional, de direitos humanos e, ainda, a efetividade da Lei de Execução Penal, tem por objeto desenvolver um estudo que contempla a demonstração da responsabilidade do Estado na ressocialização do Sentenciado. Para tanto, abordam-se as garantias mínimas dos direitos fundamentais do Sentenciado em face da Constituição Federal, considerando-se a finalidade da pena e a responsabilização do Estado. Diante da difícil tarefa de demonstrar a responsabilidade objetiva do Estado por omissão, em face da falência do sistema prisional, procurou-se descrever a situação penitenciária contemporânea, especialmente do Estado de São Paulo, para o que contribuiu uma coleta de depoimentos de presos. Com a apresentação e análise desses dados, pretendeu-se ampliar a compreensão das necessidades para a transformação da sociedade. Concluiu-se com a apresentação de considerações gerais acerca da perspectiva do estudo e do trabalho como alternativas à ressocialização e, especialmente, à reinserção do Sentenciado na sociedade

In the dissertation the author conducts analysis of general and special international legal regulations governing the ways for resolving treaty conflicts. Author researches the content and systemic ties between norms of the law of treaties, state responsibility and international legal proceedings pertinent to treaty conflict resolutions, as well as ways methods of treaty conflict resolution embodied in selected subsystems of international law (European Union law, World Trade Organization law, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms). Based on this research the author provides conceptual findings concerning the notion of conflict of treaties, relationship between methods for resolving treaty conflicts in general and special international law and provides recommendations cncerning interpretation and application of legal regulations governing treaty conflict resolutions. / Disertacijoje tiriamas bendrasis bei specialusis tarptautinių sutarčių kolizijų sprendimo būdus nustatantis teisinis reguliavimas bei jo keliamos mokslinės ir praktinės problemos. Disertacijoje analizuojamas tarptautinių sutarčių teisės, valstybių atsakomybės teisės bei tarptautinio teisminio proceso normų turinys bei jų tarpusavio ryšiai, o taip pat analizuojami tarptautinės teisės posistemėse (Europos Sąjungos teisėje, Pasaulinės Prekybos Organizacijos teisėje ir Žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių apsaugos konvencijoje) nustatyti tarptautinių sutarčių kolizijų sprendimo būdai. Disertacinio tyrimo pagrindu autorius pateikia konceptualias išvadas dėl sutarčių kolizijų sampratos, bendrojoje bei specialiojoje tarptautinėje teisėje nustatytų kolizijų sprendimo būdų santykio, bei pateikia pasiūlymus dėl sutarčių kolizijų sprendimą nustatančio teisinio reguliavimo aiškinimo bei taikymo.

Disertacijoje tiriamas bendrasis bei specialusis tarptautinių sutarčių kolizijų sprendimo būdus nustatantis teisinis reguliavimas bei jo keliamos mokslinės ir praktinės problemos. Disertacijoje analizuojamas tarptautinių sutarčių teisės, valstybių atsakomybės teisės bei tarptautinio teisminio proceso normų turinys bei jų tarpusavio ryšiai, o taip pat analizuojami tarptautinės teisės posistemėse (Europos Sąjungos teisėje, Pasaulinės Prekybos Organizacijos teisėje ir Žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių apsaugos konvencijoje) nustatyti tarptautinių sutarčių kolizijų sprendimo būdai. Disertacinio tyrimo pagrindu autorius pateikia konceptualias išvadas dėl sutarčių kolizijų sampratos, bendrojoje bei specialiojoje tarptautinėje teisėje nustatytų kolizijų sprendimo būdų santykio, bei pateikia pasiūlymus dėl sutarčių kolizijų sprendimą nustatančio teisinio reguliavimo aiškinimo bei taikymo. / In the dissertation the author conducts analysis of general and special international legal regulations governing the ways for resolving treaty conflicts. Author researches the content and systemic ties between norms of the law of treaties, state responsibility and international legal proceedings pertinent to treaty conflict resolutions, as well as ways methods of treaty conflict resolution embodied in selected subsystems of international law (European Union law, World Trade Organization law, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms). Based on this research the author provides conceptual findings concerning the notion of conflict of treaties, relationship between methods for resolving treaty conflicts in general and special international law and provides recommendations cncerning interpretation and application of legal regulations governing treaty conflict resolutions.