La guerre de 33 jours qui s’est déroulée au Liban en juillet-août 2006 a donné lieu à une panoplie de questions sur la légitimité du recours à l’usage de la force dont a fait preuve Israël au nom de son droit à la légitime défense. La problématique découlait surtout du fait que l’attaque initiale ayant déclenché cette guerre, en date du 12 juillet 2006, avait été menée par le Hezbollah, un groupe armé dont le statut étatique ou non étatique demeure difficile à cerner. Cette étude propose d’analyser si le Liban doit être tenu responsable pour le comportement du Hezbollah. Un survol de l’histoire du Liban et de la création du Hezbollah illustrera que la relation existant entre ces deux acteurs est d’une rare complexité, faisant en sorte que le rôle du Hezbollah au Liban est contesté de toutes parts. Ce débat aura une incidence certaine sur la question à savoir si le comportement du Hezbollah est attribuable à l’État libanais. Une étude approfondie des règles internationales régissant l’acte « d’attribution », notion centrale au droit de la responsabilité internationale des États, démontrera que la détermination de la nature du lien existant entre un État et une entité dont le comportement est contesté est d’une importance fondamentale. Dans une ère où les acteurs non étatiques sont devenus omniprésents sur la scène internationale et dans le cas du Hezbollah au Liban – une milice armée opérant au sein d’un État particulièrement à souveraineté limitée – le concept de l’attribution lui-même deviendra peut-être obsolète. / The 33 days of war that took place in Lebanon in the months of July and August 2006 have given rise to a wide range of questions about the legality of Israel’s use of force on behalf of its so-called right to self-defence. The issue at stake is mostly the result of the fact that the attack which provoked the beginning of the hostilities, on 12 July 2006, was performed by Hezbollah, an armed group whose status as a State or non-State actor remains difficult to pinpoint. This study puts forward the analysis of whether Lebanon must be held accountable for Hezbollah’s actions. A review of the history of Lebanon and of Hezbollah’s creation illustrates that the relationship between these two actors is particularly complex and that Hezbollah’s status is still widely contested. This will directly influence the answer to the question of the attribution of Hezbollah’s actions to the Lebanese State. An in-depth study of the international principles regulating the act of « attribution », a pivotal concept in the international law on the responsibility of States, will reveal that discerning the nature of the link between a State and an entity whose actions are contested is extremely important. In today’s world, where non-State actors have a major role on the international scene, and in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon – an armed militia operating from within a State with limited sovereignty – the notion of attribution itself might lose much of its significance.

This thesis deals with one of the modern topics of international law - diplomatic protection. It provides for its comprehensive assessment from a wider and deeper perspective on the background of the codification process, which culminated in 2006, when the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted 19 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection. In the current state of international law, diplomatic protection is based on customary international law. It is an instrument to protect nationals (be it a natural or legal person) by their state of nationality, if they injured by another (host) state in violation of international law. Under the current definition, diplomatic protection means the invocation (through peaceful means) by a state of the responsibility of another state for an injury caused to a national by an internationally wrongful act of that another state. The aim of diplomatic protection is to implement this responsibility. The application and exercise of diplomatic protection is considered to be a sovereign, discretional right of the state, although the thesis points out the some recent developments in international law towards the need to recognize the rights and interests of the individual, as well as the constitutional practice of some states guaranteeing its citizens a (domestic) right to...

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:30:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcos Antonio Paderes Barbosa.pdf: 784561 bytes, checksum: 2ef39eeca5cffb9ef39a6e86e8bac33e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-26 / This study aims to analyze State liability arising from an infringement of the right to reasonable duration of court proceedings. Whereas the theme is recent in Brazilian law and given the lack of works about it, the searchs were subsidied in Spanish law, in French law, in Italian law and European Court of human rights. We discussed the right to "reasonable term" and also that kind of responsibility in the countries mentioned, and in their courts too. In all countries analysed the violation of this right results in State responsibility, with the consequent damages reparation. It was seen also the definition of justice deny. In our law, we have been studying the origins of speedy procedure . The tradition of the courts is to deny State liability due to judicial activity, with arguments like sovereignty, iudicata, independence of judges and fallibility, we refute them all, notably with the most recent courts decisions of the countries of the european continent. In conclusion, we figured out that we can blame the Brazilian State for damage caused by unreasonable duration of the process / O presente estudo tem por objetivo analisar a responsabilidade do Estado resultante da violação ao direito a razoável duração do processo judicial. Considerando que o tema é recente no direito brasileiro e dado a falta de obras especializadas, buscamos subsídios no direito espanhol, no direito francês, no direito italiano e na Corte europeia dos direitos do homem. Analisamos o direito ao prazo razoável e também a responsabilidade nos países citados e na, respectiva, Corte. Em todos os países analisados a violação a esse direito enseja na responsabilidade do Estado, com a consequente reparação dos danos. Verificamos também a definição de denegação de justiça. Em nosso direito, estudamos as origens da celeridade processual até os dias atuais. A tradição dos Tribunais é negar a responsabilidade do Estado decorrente da atividade jurisdicional, com argumentos na soberania, coisa julgada, independência dos juízes e falibilidade humana, rebatemos todos, notadamente com as decisões mais recentes das Cortes dos países do continente europeu. Desta forma, concluímos que é possível responsabilizar o Estado brasileiro pelos danos provocados pela irrazoável duração do processo

Submitted by CARLA MARIA GOULART DE MORAES (carlagm) on 2015-06-24T18:22:49Z No. of bitstreams: 1 VirginiaIcleDireito.pdf: 919455 bytes, checksum: 652d8c36d0e378644606e95ab56970b0 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-06-24T18:22:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 VirginiaIcleDireito.pdf: 919455 bytes, checksum: 652d8c36d0e378644606e95ab56970b0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-10-27 / Nenhuma / A proposta em desenvolver os processos judiciais sem dilações indevidas deve ser desenvolvida mediante práticas que estejam em concordância com os ditames Constitucionais. Para a concretização da tutela jurisdicional, é necessário que tais práticas, além de estarem em conformidade com a segurança do ordenamento jurídico e, capazes de efetivarem o direito fundamental a razoável duração do processo, contribuam, de forma efetiva, com os objetivos traçados pela Constituição. A audiência preliminar será investigada como um instrumento processual capaz de evitar dilações indevidas no decorrer dos processos, seja mediante a possibilidade de conciliação entre as partes, seja por meio do saneamento do processo. Permite a participação mais ativa dos agentes do processo, através do uso da oralidade. Neste sentido, compõe um sistema processual dinâmico, permitindo o “acesso à justiça” em sentido amplo, contemplando ao povo, a adjetivação de cidadão e difundindo a democracia participativa como proposta de Estado a ser adotada para a sociedade contemporânea. Nesse contexto, se pode vislumbrar que o dispositivo do art.331 do Código de Processo Civil Brasileiro, contribui com a efetividade do direito fundamental à razoável duração do processo, objetivando a redução da demora processual injustificável. Para tanto, cabe aos magistrados utilizarem-se de uma interpretação hermenêutica dos ditames constitucionais conjugada com os fatores externos que irão influenciá-lo. A problematização em questão pretende estudar a sociedade no momento atual, onde anseia pela consagração do direito fundamental ao processo em tempo razoável, o qual deve ser promovido por parte do Estado, já que o mesmo lhe consagrou constitucionalmente com o advento da EC 45/2004. Nesse contexto, cabe ao Estado responder pela demora injustificada dos tempos processuais. E a reparação deve manifestar-se através da indenização em favor do cidadão que teve seu direito tolhido, por conseqüência de um ato estatal, ou, no caso da audiência preliminar, sua inércia. / The proposal to develop the judicial procedures without undue delay should be developed through practices that are in accordance with the constitutional dictates. For the completion of judicial review, it is necessary that such practices, and comply with the safety of the legal system and able to enforce the fundamental right to a reasonable duration of the process, contribute, effectively, to the goals set by Constitution. The preliminary hearing will be investigated as a procedural tool that will prevent undue delays during the process, either through the possibility of conciliation between the parties, either through the restructuring process. Allows more active participation of the process’s, through the use of orality. In this sense, forms a dynamic procedural system, allowing "access to justice" in a broad sense, covering the people, the adjective of citizen participatory democracy and spreading as a proposed rule to be adopted to contemporary society. In this context, we can see that the machinery of article 331 of the Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, contributes to the effectiveness of the fundamental right of a reasonable duration of the process, aiming at the reduction of procedural delay unjustifiable. For this, use it to judges is a hermeneutic interpretation of constitutional principles coupled with external factors which will influence him, adopting the theory as formalism evaluative procedures. The questioning concerned intends to study the society at present, which yearns for the consecration of the fundamental right to process in reasonable time, which should be promoted by the state, since the constitutionally enshrined it even with the advent of constitutional emendment 45/2004. In this context, the State must answer for the undue delay of the procedural time. And the repair should be manifested through indemnity in favor of the citizen who had checked his right, as a consequence of a state act, or, if the preliminary hearing, his inertia.

La guerre de 33 jours qui s’est déroulée au Liban en juillet-août 2006 a donné lieu à une panoplie de questions sur la légitimité du recours à l’usage de la force dont a fait preuve Israël au nom de son droit à la légitime défense. La problématique découlait surtout du fait que l’attaque initiale ayant déclenché cette guerre, en date du 12 juillet 2006, avait été menée par le Hezbollah, un groupe armé dont le statut étatique ou non étatique demeure difficile à cerner. Cette étude propose d’analyser si le Liban doit être tenu responsable pour le comportement du Hezbollah. Un survol de l’histoire du Liban et de la création du Hezbollah illustrera que la relation existant entre ces deux acteurs est d’une rare complexité, faisant en sorte que le rôle du Hezbollah au Liban est contesté de toutes parts. Ce débat aura une incidence certaine sur la question à savoir si le comportement du Hezbollah est attribuable à l’État libanais. Une étude approfondie des règles internationales régissant l’acte « d’attribution », notion centrale au droit de la responsabilité internationale des États, démontrera que la détermination de la nature du lien existant entre un État et une entité dont le comportement est contesté est d’une importance fondamentale. Dans une ère où les acteurs non étatiques sont devenus omniprésents sur la scène internationale et dans le cas du Hezbollah au Liban – une milice armée opérant au sein d’un État particulièrement à souveraineté limitée – le concept de l’attribution lui-même deviendra peut-être obsolète. / The 33 days of war that took place in Lebanon in the months of July and August 2006 have given rise to a wide range of questions about the legality of Israel’s use of force on behalf of its so-called right to self-defence. The issue at stake is mostly the result of the fact that the attack which provoked the beginning of the hostilities, on 12 July 2006, was performed by Hezbollah, an armed group whose status as a State or non-State actor remains difficult to pinpoint. This study puts forward the analysis of whether Lebanon must be held accountable for Hezbollah’s actions. A review of the history of Lebanon and of Hezbollah’s creation illustrates that the relationship between these two actors is particularly complex and that Hezbollah’s status is still widely contested. This will directly influence the answer to the question of the attribution of Hezbollah’s actions to the Lebanese State. An in-depth study of the international principles regulating the act of « attribution », a pivotal concept in the international law on the responsibility of States, will reveal that discerning the nature of the link between a State and an entity whose actions are contested is extremely important. In today’s world, where non-State actors have a major role on the international scene, and in the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon – an armed militia operating from within a State with limited sovereignty – the notion of attribution itself might lose much of its significance.

Jurisprudence / LL. D.

La réparation des dommages causés aux particuliers est une thématique ancienne en droit international. Toutefois, elle a été longuement appréhendée au seul prisme des relations interétatiques, l’individu n’étant perçu que comme un objet du droit international. Le bouleversement introduit par la protection internationale des droits de l’homme quant au statut de l’individu dans cet ordre juridique invite donc à une relecture de cette question. Les obligations substantielles contractées par les Etats en matière de protection internationale des droits de l’homme devraient logiquement trouver un prolongement dans l’existence d’une obligation de ces derniers de réparer les dommages causés aux particuliers. Or, l’identification d’une telle obligation s’avère délicate, tant au regard de ses créanciers que de son étendue. Sa réalisation est quant à elle laissée en grande partie aux mains du juge. Il s’avère donc malaisé de dégager un véritable régime juridique de la réparation des dommages causés par la violation des droits de l’homme. / The reparation of damage caused to individuals is a former thematic issue of international law. However, its development has been studied only from the point of view of interstate relations as soon as the individual was conceived and treated as an object, not as a subject of international law. The change, brought by the international protection of human rights relating to the status of individual, in this legal order, suggests to re-open the debate on this matter. As a result, the compelling obligations undertaken by member states regarding international protection of human rights, should logically lead to the existence of an obligation for the latter to repair the damage caused to the private individuals. But identifying such an obligation remains delicate both with regard to his creditors and with regard to its scope. Its implementation is left largely with the hands of the judge. It is therefore difficult to find a genuine legal regime for the reparation of damages caused by the violation of human rights.

Foreign investments in SADC are regulated by Annex 1 of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investments (SADC FIP), as well as the laws of SADC Member States. At present, SADC faces the challenge that this regime for the regulation of foreign investments is unstable, unsatisfactory and unpredictable. Furthermore, the state of the rule of law in some SADC Member States is unsatisfactory. This negatively affects the security of foreign investments regulated by this regime. The main reasons for this state of affairs are briefly explained below. The regulatory regime for foreign investments in SADC is unstable, due to recent policy reviews and amendments of key regulatory instruments that have taken place. Major developments in this regard have been the suspension of the SADC Tribunal during 2010, the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol during 2014 to bar natural and legal persons from access to the Tribunal, and the amendment of Annex 1 during 2016 to remove investor access to international investor-state arbitration, better known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The regulation of foreign investments in SADC has been unsatisfactory, among others because some SADC Member States have failed or neglected to harmonise their investment laws with both the 2006 and the 2016 Annex 1. Furthermore, SADC Member States such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have multiple Regional Economic Community (REC) memberships. This places these Member States in a position whereby they have conflicting interests and treaty obligations. Finally, the future of the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is unpredictable, due to regional integration efforts such as the recent formation of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Zone (T-FTA) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The T-FTA is entitled to have its investment protocol, while the AfCFTA investment protocol will be negotiated from 2018 until 2020. These developments entail that the 2016 Annex 1 will soon be replaced by an investment protocol at either the T-FTA or AfCFTA levels, thereby ushering a new regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC. The unknown nature of the future regulations create uncertainty and instability among foreign investors and host states alike. This study analyses the regulation of foreign investments in terms of Annex 1 and selected laws of SADC Member States. In the end, it makes the three findings mentioned above. In order to address these findings, the study makes four recommendations. The first is that foreign investments in SADC must be regulated at African Union (AU) level, by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol (which incidentally is now the case). Secondly, investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of a host state, optional ISDS, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR) or other agreed forum. Thirdly, an African Justice Scoreboard (AJS) must be established. The AJS will act as a gateway to determine whether an investor-state dispute shall be referred to the courts of a host state, ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forums. Fourthly, the office of an African Investment Ombud (AIO) must be created. The AIO shall facilitate the early resolution of investor-state disputes, so as to reduce the number of disputes that may end-up in litigation or arbitration. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.