The main objective of this study is to examine the behavior of sellers in a sealed offer market in three distinct environments. The dissertation examines the mechanism to determine its competitive characteristics when sellers are unable to engage in overt communication. Next, the market setting is changed in order to consider the ability of sellers to form stable and effective cartels when the subjects are given the opportunity to conspire. Finally, the consequences of antitrust enforcement is considered. First, by reducing the number of communication episodes between sellers and second, by separately introducing random monetary penalties whenever the observed winning offer was greater than sellers cost. A secondary but significant contribution of this research was the use of prison inmates as subjects in economic experiments. Therefore, the financially motivated behavior of student subjects could be contrasted with prisoner subjects in a laboratory environment. This contrast proves extremely interesting when an antitrust environment, using randomly imposed monetary penalties, was introduced. The results of my research indicate, given equal constant cost suppliers, the sealed offer auction mechanism has the potential to generate very competitive behavior by sellers when communication between subjects is prohibited. However, in an identical environment, when conspiratorial opportunities exist prior to every auction, one observes very stable and effective cartels. These first two conclusions are insensitive to the subject pool under consideration (i.e., student versus prisoner subjects). When the frequency of communication is reduced (i.e., as a result of antitrust enforcement) the market is still conducive to effective collusion. However, in comparison to the experiments where subjects were allowed to communicate prior to every auction, the cartel in this environment were more unstable and less effective at extracting monopoly profit from the market. Finally, when antitrust enforcement is introduced by imposing random monetary penalties whenever the observed winning offer is greater than seller cost, the behavior of sellers is extremely sensitive to the expected returns from collusion as well as the dispersion of these returns. Also, the cartels collusive behavior indicated that students were risk averse, responded more to changes in the severity of the penalty specification (the penalty amount) while the prisoner cartels were risk takers, being more sensitive to changes in the certainty of the penalty specification (the detection level).

The primary focus of the research is the application of computer technology to the field sales function. A review of the literature, a survey of an industry and a study of a geographic market indicate the general lack of direct computer support currently available to the field salesman. At the same time, selling costs are increasing and capable sales people are scarce. Computer support that results in better sales calls meets an existing and important need. A model of the sales decision process was developed. It addresses the two major questions all field salesmen ask: on whom to call and how to prepare. The information content of the model was identified and a decision support system was designed and developed to provide the needed data. A number of organizations were studied to test the implementations. These case studies formed the basis for the results. The computer based system collects, maintains and retrieves data on customers, prospects and sales calls. This information helps the salesman to select daily those companies on which to call and to better prepare for those calls. Management control of sales activity is improved and the data becomes a company resource. The system does not make decisions for the salesman. It does provide information to help the salesman manage his territory and it offers continuity to the organization when responsibility is transferred. The research also investigates the behavior of system users and the iterative nature of the design process. The system provides a convenient vehicle to do this as its five implementations have spanned four and a half years and have included six organizations, seventeen salesmen and real-time, batch and service bureau modes of operation.

Wong, Chi-Wing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 149-153). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgement --- p.iv / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- MPIS --- p.3 / Chapter 1.2 --- ISM --- p.5 / Chapter 1.3 --- MPIS and ISM --- p.5 / Chapter 1.4 --- Thesis Organization --- p.6 / Chapter 2 --- MPIS --- p.7 / Chapter 2.1 --- Introduction --- p.7 / Chapter 2.2 --- Related Work --- p.10 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Item Selection Related Work --- p.11 / Chapter 2.3 --- Problem Definition --- p.22 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- NP-hardness --- p.25 / Chapter 2.4 --- Cross Selling Effect by Association Rules --- p.28 / Chapter 2.5 --- Quadratic Programming Method --- p.32 / Chapter 2.6 --- Algorithm MPIS_Alg --- p.41 / Chapter 2.6.1 --- Overall Framework --- p.43 / Chapter 2.6.2 --- Enhancement Step --- p.47 / Chapter 2.6.3 --- Implementation Details --- p.48 / Chapter 2.7 --- Genetic Algorithm --- p.60 / Chapter 2.7.1 --- Crossover --- p.62 / Chapter 2.7.2 --- Mutation --- p.64 / Chapter 2.8 --- Performance Analysis --- p.64 / Chapter 2.8.1 --- Preparation Phase --- p.65 / Chapter 2.8.2 --- Main Phase --- p.69 / Chapter 2.9 --- Experimental Result --- p.77 / Chapter 2.9.1 --- Tools for Quadratic Programming --- p.77 / Chapter 2.9.2 --- Partition Matrix Technique --- p.78 / Chapter 2.9.3 --- Data Sets --- p.81 / Chapter 2.9.4 --- Empirical Study for GA --- p.84 / Chapter 2.9.5 --- Experimental Results --- p.92 / Chapter 2.9.6 --- Scalability --- p.102 / Chapter 2.10 --- Conclusion --- p.106 / Chapter 3 --- ISM --- p.107 / Chapter 3.1 --- Introduction --- p.107 / Chapter 3.2 --- Related Work --- p.108 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Network Model --- p.108 / Chapter 3.3 --- Problem Definition --- p.112 / Chapter 3.4 --- Association Based Cross-Selling Effect --- p.117 / Chapter 3.5 --- Quadratic Programming --- p.118 / Chapter 3.5.1 --- Quadratic Form --- p.119 / Chapter 3.5.2 --- Algorithm --- p.128 / Chapter 3.5.3 --- Example --- p.129 / Chapter 3.6 --- Hill-Climbing Approach --- p.134 / Chapter 3.6.1 --- Efficient Calculation of Formula of Profit Gain --- p.134 / Chapter 3.6.2 --- FP-tree Implementation --- p.135 / Chapter 3.7 --- Empirical Study --- p.136 / Chapter 3.7.1 --- Data Set --- p.137 / Chapter 3.7.2 --- Experimental Results --- p.138 / Chapter 3.8 --- Conclusion --- p.141 / Chapter 4 --- Conclusion --- p.147 / Bibliography --- p.153

Dissertation : Berlin :Freie Universitat Berlin, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 254-294)

This dissertation investigates whether short sellers establish short positions prior to accounting restatement announcements and whether the levels of short interest are related to the severity of restatements. Using 565 firms with restatement disclosure during the period of 1995 to 2002 and matched control firms with no restatements announcements, I find that the level of short interest is higher for the sample firms compared to the control firms in the months surrounding the announcements. The level of short interest increases as the restatement announcement date approaches and declines thereafter. Related to severity of restatement, I find that the level of short interest in the pre-disclosure period is higher for restatements involving fraud and the revenue accounts. There exists limited evidence that the pre-disclosure level of short interest is positively associated with the number of quarters restated and the magnitude of the restatements. Finally, I find cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcements are more negative for restatement firms that have a higher level of short interest. These results suggest that short sellers are highly sophisticated investors who can see through accounting manipulation and consequently profit from their knowledge.

This dissertation investigates whether short sellers establish short positions prior to accounting restatement announcements and whether the levels of short interest are related to the severity of restatements. Using 565 firms with restatement disclosure during the period of 1995 to 2002 and matched control firms with no restatements announcements, I find that the level of short interest is higher for the sample firms compared to the control firms in the months surrounding the announcements. The level of short interest increases as the restatement announcement date approaches and declines thereafter. Related to severity of restatement, I find that the level of short interest in the pre-disclosure period is higher for restatements involving fraud and the revenue accounts. There exists limited evidence that the pre-disclosure level of short interest is positively associated with the number of quarters restated and the magnitude of the restatements. Finally, I find cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcements are more negative for restatement firms that have a higher level of short interest. These results suggest that short sellers are highly sophisticated investors who can see through accounting manipulation and consequently profit from their knowledge.

Thesis (M.A.)--The University of Texas at Arlington, 2007. / Adviser: Tom Christie. Includes bibliographical references.

This dissertation consists of two empirical essays on the interactions among three financial markets, namely, the stock market, the options market, and the equity lending market. In the first essay, we study the role of analysts and options traders in the information transmission between options and stock markets. We first show that the predictive power of option-implied volatilities (IVs) on stock returns is more than doubled around analyst-related events, indicating a significant proportion of the options predictability on stock returns comes from informed options traders’ information about upcoming analyst-related news. We examine three explanations for this finding: tipping, reverse tipping and common information. We find that analyst tipping to options traders is the most consistent explanation of these predictive patterns. In the second essay, we examine the relationship between put options and short sales. We are able to separate the speculative demand of informed traders from the hedging demand of options market makers in the lending market. We find that the put option bid-ask spread and put option trading volume both increase with the equity lending fee. However, we also find that put option trading volume decreases with the lending fee for banned stocks during the 2008 Short-Sale Ban period, i.e., when only options market makers can short. These findings suggest that when informed traders are allowed to short, their speculative demand dominates and drives the substitution that is observed between the two financial instruments. Nevertheless, the “complementarity” of these financial instruments might prevail when options market makers significantly reduce the supply of put options because of high hedging costs. / published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

No description available.

Thesis (MBus) -- University of South Australia, 1994