In the past decades, financial crises have recast the spotlight on sovereign debt restructuring (SoDR). Despite decades of discussion on how to reform SoDR, it still raises complex legal tensions. Among these tensions is the current lack of a mechanism to administer SoDR and the fact that the current SoDR regime is fragmented and leads to suboptimal and unfair results. This thesis critically assesses these tensions, with a focus on the international reform of the restructuring of privately held sovereign bonds. In making its contribution to the discourse on SoDR, this study seeks to bridge the gap between the legal and policy debates on SoDR. The novelty of the approach in this study is that it aims to add an African perspective to the international literature on the procedural, normative and conceptual reform of SoDR. Towards this end, the question of how to reform the SoDR landscape is addressed within the framework of a developmental and a human rights approach. This paradigm through which SoDR should also be viewed has only begun to feature in the literature recently and thus requires further evaluation. This study assesses the historical evolution of SoDR, the current challenges in the contemporary era of SoDR and evaluates the corresponding proposals for reform. While acknowledging the role that the contractual approach (the primary mechanism for SoDR) has already played in the current landscape, this study argues that this approach alone is not sufficient to ensure fair, transparent and prompt restructuring. The study consequently assesses the policy debate on viable options for reform. / Thesis (LLD)--University of Pretoria, 2020. / Centre for Human Rights / LLD / Unrestricted

Thesis advisor: Fabio Schiantarelli / In the aftermath of the Great Recession of 2007-2009, Europe has been grappling with both a debt and a banking crisis, which caused a prolonged recession and on-going stagnation in some countries of the Eurozone. The distinctive feature of the European crisis, compared to the global recession that originated in the United States, is that it emerged as sovereign debt crisis and later evolved into a banking crisis, finally affecting the real economy. The banking and sovereign crises are heavily intertwined because of the interplay between banks and sovereigns in Europe. In fact, the so-called bank-sovereign nexus works both ways: not only banks hold large amounts of sovereign debt, especially from the domestic government, but also European governments retain a significant presence in the domestic banks' ownership. The adverse feedback loop is reinforced during a sovereign debt crisis, as banks' losses from sovereign debt further exacerbate the strain on the domestic sovereign in expectation of a future bail-out. The overall goal of this dissertation is to have a better understanding of the interplay between sovereign, banks and capital regulation. In my first and second chapter, I analyze the two-way feedback loop between banks and sovereigns in Europe. In particular, in the first chapter, I show that banks' sovereign debt exposures had a negative effect on credit supply during the crisis. In the second chapter I explore the role that politics may play in determining banks' exposure to sovereign debt. Finally, the third chapter investigates the effect of changing bank capital requirements for the firms that borrow from the affected banks. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

The thesis analyses the moral hazard problem which arises in political or fiscal federations when member states anticipate being bailed out by the centre in case of financial distress. In particular, I examine whether an orderly default mechanism or deeper fiscal integration within the European Union can alleviate the soft budget constraint phenomenon and provide a solution to the sovereign debt crises engulfing the Eurozone and other parts of the world. The first essay adapts the standard Stackelberg approach of the bailout literature in order to study the effects of bankruptcy procedures on regional opportunistic behaviour. The insolvency mechanism is shaped by two parameters: the costs of default and the exemption level for public assets. The model lends support to the market discipline hypothesis if all public assets are exempt from seizure. If, by contrast, the exemption level for public assets is low, it is the central government rather than the credit market that discourages overborrowing since the former is incentivised to tax heavily indebted regions. The model's major policy insight is that an insolvency mechanism can lower the federation's welfare if it is not carefully designed. The second essay sheds light on the incentive effects of the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism which has been drafted by the Eurozone in response to the debt crisis. Employing a global game approach, the model analyses the impact of insolvency procedures on the size of the bailout, the level of effort exerted by the debtor country and EU welfare. Challenging some arguments in the policy literature, the model's major policy implication is that a half-hearted debt restructuring mechanism fails to mitigate the commitment and moral hazard problems embedded in the current EMU framework. The third essay questions the conventional wisdom that the Euro cannot survive without closer integration, using a simple political economy framework. The model compares the stability and welfare implications of the current "muddling through" scenario, an orderly default mechanism as well as a fiscal and a political union setting. Interestingly, the results suggest that the "muddling through" scenario is not more prone to break-up than the political or the fiscal union. The model's major policy recommendation is that implementing an orderly default mechanism and inserting an explicit exit clause into the European Treaties might prove more effective in preventing a Eurozone break-up than far-reaching institutional reforms.

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This study investigates the effect of the European sovereign debt crisis on alternative capital sources of public companies from France, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Specifically, it studies which financing choices expose a company to potential bank lending and demand shocks during the Euro crisis. To this end, the study employs average treatment effect estimations and difference-in-differences regressions to show whether financially more (less) constrained companies use more (less) alternative capital than matching control companies. I find that two of three financially more constrained company groups show higher use of alternative capital sources than matched companies due to evidence for bank lending shocks in Germany and France. Companies with a high financial dependence behave against the expectation because of high cash holdings and lower need for alternative capital. Companies with high cash holdings showed signs of a demand shock. Swiss and British companies appear to be much less affected by the Euro crisis because of weaker financial ties with the most affected southern Eurozone economies.

The concept of asymmetric information is probably best described by medieval idiom to buy a pig in a poke or to buy a cat in a sack, and is a long standing issue in a market economy. A solution to this predicament, is thought to be an objective third party certifier who would provide true information for the market participants. Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) by all definitions act as such certifiers within financial markets and have been on the public spotlight for the last years. In both cases, the US subprime mortgage crisis and the EU sovereign debt crisis, the agencies were charged for miss-information on quality of financial products, that led to financial losses for the investors or debtors. Theoretical deduction suggest that certain market reaction to CRA announcements may indicate  if markets perceive CRAs themselves as selling a cat in a sack to the investors. Event study approach is employed to investigate how do sovereign debt market react to CRA announcements. The results suggest that sovereign debt market reaction is more pronounced if three major CRAs issue clustered announcements, and more actively react to following announcements as opposed to the leading ones.

The purpose of this thesis is to identify key factors underlying exchange rate developments during the European sovereign debt crisis by examining the impact of credit rating news, published by the three leading credit rating agencies, on conditional returns and volatility of EUR/USD (direct quotation) exchange rate. Empirical results highlight the importance of interest rate differential and volatility index of options exchange in explaining EUR/USD exchange rate volatilities. Downgrade announcements by Standard & Poor’s as well as watch revisions by Fitch Ratings had a detrimental impact on the value of Euro, leading to a subsequent Euro depreciation over the period under consideration (January 2009 – April 2012).

[pt] A hipótese de que existe um problema grave de moral hazard no mercado de dívida soberana induzido pelo FMI é uma parte essencial do diagnóstico corrente das deficiências do sistema financeiro internacional. O mesmo pode ser dito em relação ao papel central que essa hipótese ocupa nas propostas de reformulação do sistema. A literatura empírica que avalia essa hipótese, contudo, apresenta suporte ambíguo à tese e os resultados não são definitivos. Aplicamos a metodologia de teste desenvolvida em Dell´Ariccia et al. (2002) à crise da Argentina de 2001 e realizamos dois outros testes da hipótese. Analisamos suas implicações teóricas, realizando, adicionalmente, uma extensão do modelo de Spiegel (2000) para interpretar o problema de moral hazard no mercado dívida soberana. Nossos resultados acrescentam evidência contrária à hipótese de moral hazard, mas estão sujeitos, assim como o restante da literatura, a um problema de interpretação. / [en] The hypothesis that there exists a significant problem of moral hazard induced by the IMF in the international loan market is an essential ingredient of the diagnosis of the deficiencies of the international financial system. The same applies to the current proposals to restructure the system. The literature presents ambiguous support to this thesis and the results are, in our view, not definitive. We apply the methodology developed by Dell Ariccia et al. (2002) to the Argentinean crisis in 2001 and carry out two other tests of the referred hypothesis. We also investigate its theoretical implications, extending Spiegel s (2000) model to interpret the problem of moral hazard in the international loan market. The results of this study provide additional evidence against the moral hazard hypothesis. There is, although, a caveat that we share with the rest of the literature that regards an identification hypothesis. We argue that it is not so important for the results presented in this study.

This research aims to explain mechanisms of the new twin crisis, the influence of such a crisis on European integration, and identify indicators that can predict such a twin crisis. First, the old and the new twin crisis will be explained and the necessity of this research will be elaborated upon. Hereafter, the main mechanisms of the new twin crisis will be identified based on a literature review. From this literature review a set of indicators, accompanied by certain thresholds, will be created that can indicate that a twin crisis is about to happen. These indicators will be used to analyse data from 1970 until 2015 to asses whether this new twin crisis has occured in the past and what its political consequences were. The constructed mechanism to explain the new twin crisis and the list of indicators will be put to the test by conducting an indepth case study of Italy and its risk of encountering a new twin crisis. Based on the model that links the new twin crisis to political consequences, the case study attempts to link the new twin crisis to the European integration project. This research will lay the foundation for the creation of predictive models for the new twin crisis and provide insights in one of the main destabilisers for European integration. It therefore establishes a set-up and lay-out for future research in this specific field.

Standard economic theory suggests that capital should flow from rich countries to poor countries. However, capital has predominantly flowed to rich countries. The three essays in this dissertation attempt to explain this phenomenon. The first two essays suggest theoretical explanations for why capital has not flowed to the poor countries. The third essay empirically tests the theoretical explanations. The first essay examines the effects of increasing returns to scale on international lending and borrowing with moral hazard. Introducing increasing returns in a two-country general equilibrium model yields possible multiple equilibria and helps explain the possibility of capital flows from a poor to a rich country. I find that a borrowing country may need to borrow sufficient amounts internationally to reach a minimum investment threshold in order to invest domestically. The second essay examines how a poor country may invest in sectors with low productivity because of sovereign risk, and how collateral differences across sectors may exacerbate the problem. I model sovereign borrowing with a two-sector economy: one sector with increasing returns to scale (IRS) and one sector with diminishing returns to scale (DRS). Countries with incomes below a threshold will only invest in the DRS sector, and countries with incomes above a threshold will invest mostly in the IRS sector. The results help explain the existence of a bimodal world income distribution. The third essay empirically tests the explanations for why capital has not flowed from the rich to the poor countries, with a focus on institutions and initial capital. I find that institutional variables are a very important factor, but in contrast to other studies, I show that institutions do not account for the Lucas Paradox. Evidence of increasing returns still exists, even when controlling for institutions and other variables. In addition, I find that the determinants of capital flows may depend on whether a country is rich or poor.