The Soviet economy experienced a marked decline in the rate of growth of output in the mid 1970s. Research was conducted for Soviet postwar industry in order to try and identify when the shift was strongest, and in which industrial branches. A statistical technique known as the "Chow Test" was used to test for a "break" year -- the year when the production function most dramatically changed. Regression results showed that two types of industry -- that which was closely associated with military production, and industry responsible for producing consumer goods, showed little or no shift in the mid 1970s. The remaining sectors, which were primarily resource intensive, did show a significant shift in 1974. A description of the investigation, including input data and regression results, is included. / M.A.

This dissertation will analyse the history of the Russian Archaeological Institute in Constantinople, which operated between 1895 and 1914. Established under the administrative structure of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, the institute occupied a place at the intersection of science and politics. Focusing nearly exclusively on Byzantine and Slavic antiquities in the Ottoman Empire, the activities of the institute reflected the imperial identity of Russia at the turn of the century. As was explicitly expressed by Russian diplomats, bureaucrats, and scholars, the establishment of an archaeological institution in the Ottoman capital was regarded as a foreign policy tool to extend Russia’s influence in the Near East, a tool of “soft power” in modern parlance. On the Ottoman side, foreign archaeological activities were regarded with suspicion especially in the later part of the 19th century. In an attempt to preserve its vulnerable sovereignty, Ottoman Empire closely monitored foreign archaeological activities on its territories. For the Ottoman Empire, archaeology was also a way of projecting its image as a modern, Westernised empire. For both Russian and Ottoman archaeologists, European scholarship was regarded as an example that should be followed, and a rival at the same time. Russian archaeologists had to close down their office with the outbreak of World War I. The complications that arose with the disintegration of the institute were solved only in the late 1920s between the Soviet Union and Republican Turkey, under completely different political circumstances.

This thesis is not primarily concerned with Andre Gide's interest in and subsequent disillusionment with communism and the Soviet Union for this has been sufficiently dealt with elsewhere but is concerned with the five companions he invited to accompany him on his journey to the Soviet Union in 1936: Jacques Schiffrin, Eugene Dabit, Louis Guilloux, Jef Last and Pierre Herbart. Chapter I examines French interest in the Soviet Union during the Interwar period. Four main areas of interest are defined in respect of Gide and his travelling companions: the growth of French interest in Russian culture; the impact of the Revolution and the Soviet Union in France in terms of both literature and literature-based organisations, as well as in terms of political ideology; the rise of fascism in Europe, and the attraction of the Soviet Union as the land of sexual freedom. Chapters 11 to VI examine each of the five figures, highlighting their literary and political development and outlining their interest in the Soviet Union. Chapter 11 outlines the activities of Jacques Schiffrin (1892-1949), an important figure in the Parisian publishing world, who founded the Editions de la Pleiade, translated Russian classics into French (sometimes in conjunction with Gide) and introduced what is now known as the Bibliotheque de la Pleiade. Chapter III covers the career of Eugene Dabit (1898-1936) which spanned a period that saw intense literary and political debate and shows how he was caught up in the inevitable mix of politics and literature as he was involved successively in various groupings. Chapter IV concentrates on Louis Guilloux (1899-1980) and outlines the development in his literary work from works based on a depiction of le peuple to a more personal aesthetics taking in part as its inspiration the breadth of great nineteenth-century Russian authors. It also outlines how he came to terms with his role as a writer in society. Chapter V outlines the activities of Jef Last (1898-1972) who, as a Dutchman, had a wider knowledge of the European political world. He was a militant communist who had already visited the Soviet Union three times before he met Gide. His attraction to communism and the Soviet Union was based on several reasons: economic, political, religious, sexual and cultural. Pierre Herbart (1903-1978) is the subject of Chapter VI. He was an intimate member of Gide's circle and he influenced Gide politically. A member of the communist party, his literary output was, at certain times, influenced by his political commitment. Prior to Gide's journey to the Soviet Union he worked in Moscow as a redacteur on the La Litterature Internationale. The final chapter examines the journey itself, suggesting reasons for what went wrong, causing Guilloux and Schiffrin to return early and an account is given of Dabit's death in Sevastopol. The responses of the travelling companions both to the journey itself and to Gide's publications on his return provide a much more complicated and diverse picture than is normally available while the conclusion shows that the position of Western intellectuals to the situation in the Soviet Union in 1936 was often obscured by immediate tactical concerns such as the Spanish Civil War.

Much research has been conducted about the diffusion of nonviolent civil resistance and its various mechanisms, with a majority of the attention being paid to diffusion on a global level via external pressure and normative imitation. There is little research, however, about the mechanisms that occur on a much narrower field via individual-level communications, which lead to individuals learning from surrounding ideas and adapting them to fit their situation. Using the case study of the independence movement of the late 1980s in the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, I provide a nuanced analysis of these communications between the former republic and its neighbors, specifically Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, all of which were going through their own independence movements at the same time. I address the importance of these individual-level communications to the movement's success and ultimately conclude that without them, the diffusion of nonviolent civil resistance into Ukraine would not have occurred and the movement would not have proven to be successful in bringing down the Soviet regime.

This study attempts to ascertain the nature of détente by clarifying the term, identifying common elements working for and against détente, and considering whether the history of various periods of détente suggests a cyclical or progressive pattern. First, détente is defined as a process - not a condition, policy or historical period. More specifically, it is the process of easing tension between states whose interests are so radically divergent that the possibilities of reconciliation are inherently limited. Second, by examining the post-war Soviet-American relationship and focusing individually on the four periods of détente that occurred during this time ('spirit of Geneva' 1955; 'spirit of Camp David' 1959; Post- Missile Crisis détente 1963-4; Moscow détente 1972-5), those common elements influencing the rise and fall of détente emerge. They include the influence of individual leaders, the fear of nuclear war, the self-perceived strength of the superpowers, the convergence of superpower special interests, the changing perceptions of détente and the national interest, and the difficulties in reaching a common code of détente. Finally, the character of détente is found to be progressive due to the legacy left by each period.

This study examines spatial dimensions of state violence against the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the 1930s, and the creation of a place of surveillance, the famous House of Writers (Budynok Slovo), an apartment building that was conceived by an association of writers “Slovo” in Kharkiv. This building fashioned an important identity for Ukrainian intellectuals, which was altered under state pressure and the fear of being exterminated. Their creative art was gradually transformed into the art of living and surviving under the terror, a feature of a regimented society. The study explores the writers’ behavior during arrests and interrogation, and examines the Soviet secret police’s tactics employed in interrogation rooms. The narrative considers the space of politics that brought the perpetrators of terror and their victims closer to each other, eventually forcing them to share the same place. Within this space and place they became interchangeable and interchanged, and ultimately were physically eliminated. Importantly, the research illuminates the multiethnic composition of the building’s residents: among them were cultural figures of Ukrainian, Russian and Jewish origins. Their individual histories and contributions to Ukrainian culture demonstrate the vector of Stalin’s terror which targeted not Ukrainian ethnicity as such but instead was directed against the development of Ukrainian national identity and Ukrainian statehood that were perceived as a challenge to the center’s control and as harbingers of separatism. The study also reveals that the state launched the course of counter-Ukrainization in 1926 and disintegrated the Ukrainian intellectual community through mass repressive operations which the secret police began to apply from 1929. The study also demonstrates that, together with people, the state purposefully exterminated national cultural artifacts—journals, books, art and sculpture, burying human ideas which have never been and will never be consummated. The purpose was to explain how the elimination of most prominent Ukrainian intellectuals was organized, rationalized and politicized. During the period of one decade, the terror tore a hole in the fabric of Ukrainian culture that may never be mended.

Russian foreign policy from the mid-1960s has vacillated between periods of expansion and retrenchment in which the military and diplomatic reach of the state has extended to continents or been retracted to very modest conceptions of national defense. During this period, the financial centrality of energy exports has come to dominate the Russian economy, leading scholars and observers to draw a causal link between the two: as energy revenues go up, expansionism does as well, while declines in revenues lead Russia to behave less assertively. This dissertation outlines an alternative argument for petrostate foreign policy in which positive or negative revenue environments determine the menu of policy options available to policymakers, but that internal politics determine the content of those foreign policy choices. I argue that foreign policy choices are conditional on the mediating political institutions and circumstances existing at the time of booms and busts, namely that how energy revenue shocks affect foreign policy decision-making in a petrostate after a revenue shock depends on the political environment before the shock. The petropolitics foreign policy theory thus provides insight as to when the expansionism might occur. By focusing on revenue yet allowing politicians to retain agency, this “petropolitics” foreign policy theory links structural theories of foreign policy to leadership-driven models of political decision-making. This petropolitics theory then reassesses Russian foreign policy by analyzing leadership tenures from Leonid Brezhnev to Vladimir Putin. I show that Soviet expansionism in the Third World in the 1970s was not simply because of a positive revenue shock, but because of Brezhnev’s political weakness after his installation in a palace coup. Similarly, I show that Mikhail Gorbachev’s retrenchment of foreign policy commitments arose not solely from a lack of energy revenues, but from his political strength in light of the poor performance of his predecessors. Finally, I show that Vladimir Putin’s selective expansionism and retrenchment emerges in a skillful consolidation of domestic political strength, a fortuitous influx of energy revenues, and a willingness to change foreign policy strategies to serve a single preference of maintaining power. / text

As a notable academic, Marxist writer and one-time political activist, an extensive critique of Rudolf Schlesinger’s writings is long overdue. Raised in the revolutionary atmosphere of early twentieth century Austria, Schlesinger soon became embroiled in central European communism, taking on full-time work for the German Communist Party in Berlin, Prague and Moscow. He left the Soviet Union during the purges, having been described as ‘alien to the party’, and made his way to the UK where he fostered a reputation as an informed and prolific scholar. This investigation is not intended to be a biography of Schlesinger, but rather an ‘intellectual biography’, an examination of his monographs, papers, drafts and memoir reflections. This allows for an appreciation of his academic contribution and an understanding of his unique personal motivation and perspective. Given his experiences, as well as the cultural, political and ideological paradigm from which he emerged, this analysis provides insights into Marxist theory, the labour movement, the Soviet Union and German communism. It also throws light upon the intellectual climate in the West during the cold war, providing a historiographical snapshot of academic Soviet studies, particularly in the UK. The thesis is divided into two sections, with each exploring a different aspect of Schlesinger’s writing. The first traces Schlesinger’s theoretical development and education, detailing and analysing the impact of Luxemburg, Lenin, Marx and Engels on his thought and writing. Schlesinger emerges as a Leninist, whose understanding of the dialectical nature of Marxism leads him to seek the next stage in its development, since Lenin’s revolutionary successes forever altered the socio-economic landscape and thus fated his theories to obsolescence. An examination of Schlesinger’s attitude towards Stalin as a Marxist theorist illuminates his pragmatic stance regarding the Soviet leader. Whilst Stalin’s rule had a considerable human cost and a deleterious impact upon Marxist theory, to Schlesinger, his leadership was necessary to further the existence of the Soviet state, the sole manifestation of the great social democratic experiment. The second section focuses on Schlesinger’s writings concerning Soviet historiography. It is possible to discern changes in tone, emphasis and argument in his work on this subject. A dichotomy emerges between Schlesinger’s positive portrayal of historiographical developments in the Soviet Union in papers written before Stalin’s death and his retrospective condemnation of these events after 1953. This latter attitude chimes with his personal memoir reflections of life as an intellectual in Stalin’s Russia, in which he described a highly controlled, academically stagnant society; yet it contrasts starkly with his earlier position. It is also possible to detect parallels between Schlesinger’s changing emphasis and the dynamics of official Soviet attitudes. An explanation is required if Schlesinger is not to be dismissed as inconsistent or polemical. It is argued that Schlesinger can be accurately described as a ‘scholar advocate’, both in terms of a defender of the Soviet experiment and a proponent of Marxism and social democracy. This characterisation allows for an understanding of Schlesinger’s changing stance and motivations and explains his apparent inconsistency. Schlesinger was loyal to Marxism in general, but not to the fluctuating dictates of the Russian party. He was not a polemicist or propagandist but instead sought to stay loyal to wider Marxist ideals and methodology. For Schlesinger, his pragmatism ensured that he did not judge events in Russia from the rose-tinted spectacles of utopianism; his attitude was not swayed by single events, however tragic, and he was aware both of the utility and the transient nature of Stalin’s rule. This helps to explain his positive attitude. In addition, Schlesinger was keen to defend Marxism and the Soviet Union against what he perceived as unfair criticism; he sought to counter myths and misunderstandings propagated by disillusioned supporters and opponents. Schlesinger consciously attempted to combat what he saw, and many academics have recognised, as the cold war bias of a section of Western comment and scholarship. This may, perhaps, have led Schlesinger to paint too optimistic a picture of the Soviet Union, but his work is a useful and necessary counterbalance to other literature. Schlesinger was no propagandist, and recognition of his unique and conscious motivation allows for a full appreciation of his rich and varied writings.

No description available.

The present thesis aims to examine how the Russian General Staff observed and assessed the Russian Empire’s Asiatic frontier during the period of its greatest extent (between 1860 and 1917). By providing an overview of the entire length of the Asiatic frontier it aims to provide an original addition to the existing historiography. Through analysis of the original records of the Asiatic Department of the Russian General Staff, it furnishes insight into areas of response by the Russian General Staff towards crisis situations where previously little or no scholarly work has been carried out. Thus, to cite just two examples, the thesis contains the first detailed coverage on the posting of the first Russian military agents to China during the so-called ‘Ili Crisis’ of 1881, and of the response of the General Staff to the revolt of Ishaqu Khan in northern Afghanistan in 1888. These new additions are complemented by detailed analysis of more conventional aspects of the existing historiography. For example, by studying the prelude to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 it provides for the first time in English a detailed analysis of the specific difficulties experienced by Tsarist military intelligence in the Far East in the years immediately preceding that conflict. The overall form of analysis is in the main geographically determined, but with the sections examining individual sections of the Russian Asiatic frontier preceded and followed by more general chapters surveying the development of doctrinal, organisational and ideological currents within the General Staff as a whole at both the beginning and end of the period under review. Chapter one in its first par surveys the development of the General Staff system itself in the Russian army. It provides in addition an analysis of available sources alongside a basic military history of the expansion of Russia’s Asiatic frontiers across this period. The first part of chapter two provides an overview of the instruments and ideas that had evolved and that were available to the Russian General Staff in its study Asia on the eve of the major Central Asian conquests of the 1860s. The second section of chapter two analyses how some of these currents, both cultural and doctrinal, intermingled and responded between approximately 1859 and 1873, with the characters of Prince Bariatinskii, Viceroy of the Caucasus during this period, providing a central focus and case study. Chapters three examines how some of the purely tactical and technical tools employed by the Russian army in its Asiatic conquests evolved over time and again looks at the role of individual thinkers in this evolutionary process. Chapter four, the main body of the work, in three major sub-sections analyses the fully developed use of all these instruments and trends in the Russian General Staff’s plans and threat-assessments for the three major areas of their Asiatic frontier - the Far East, the Caucasus, and the region of Central Asia-Afghanistan. The conclusion seeks to contribute a new perspective to current levels of analysis by setting the Tsarist military’s orientalist activities within the context of the current debates regarding European colonialism and the nature of orientalism in general. In doing so it also seeks to draw together the three underlying themes running throughout the work - the development of the General Staff’s analysis of Asia by 1917, the still unresolved conflict of centre-periphery relations that afflicted every aspect of Russian Asiatic policy, and the growing consciousness of a ‘knowledge crisis’ that afflicted the Tsarist General Staff as a whole, a crisis reflected in the press and academic organs of the day. This last phenomenon, along with many of the tools and approaches to tackle it, would form one of Tsarist Russia’s largest legacies to the Soviet Union. The thesis will prove useful to students of military history, Russia-Asia diplomatic relations, and those interested by the development and evolution of the ‘knowledge-state’ between the late eighteenth and early twentieth centuries. Above all it seeks to provide a prism through which the reader can appreciate many of the difficulties attached to the development of military intelligence and the modern ‘knowledge economy’, difficulties that continue to afflict many states, not least Russia, even today.