Any adequate interpretation of the concept of the will to power, given the radical break with the history of philosophy it presupposes, requires a preceding analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy as a critique of metaphysics. Only once Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics is properly understood as a critique of, in the broadest sense, any correspondence conception of truth, can the philosophical concept of the will to power, as a product of that critique, be understood as well. Each of the three typical types of interpretative approaches to the will to power (i.e. as a metaphysical concept, as an empirical concept, as an object of interpretive play) will provide a critically constructive opportunity to narrow an acceptable definition of Nietzsche’s positive conception of philosophy as a distinctive and unorthodox type of history, according to which any interpretation rests, not on truths, but on its author’s prejudices or fundamental values. Moreover, using Gilles Deleuze’s largely ignored or otherwise grossly misunderstood Nietzsche et la philosophie, a non-normative, post-metaphysical justification consistent with that critique can then be provided for Nietzsche’s radical reform to the philosophical method. According to Nietzsche, philosophy as a will to power is preferable to philosophy as a will to truth because it is consistent with his profound and unjustified love of life. In fact, the will to power it is the philosophical expression of that love.

Any adequate interpretation of the concept of the will to power, given the radical break with the history of philosophy it presupposes, requires a preceding analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy as a critique of metaphysics. Only once Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics is properly understood as a critique of, in the broadest sense, any correspondence conception of truth, can the philosophical concept of the will to power, as a product of that critique, be understood as well. Each of the three typical types of interpretative approaches to the will to power (i.e. as a metaphysical concept, as an empirical concept, as an object of interpretive play) will provide a critically constructive opportunity to narrow an acceptable definition of Nietzsche’s positive conception of philosophy as a distinctive and unorthodox type of history, according to which any interpretation rests, not on truths, but on its author’s prejudices or fundamental values. Moreover, using Gilles Deleuze’s largely ignored or otherwise grossly misunderstood Nietzsche et la philosophie, a non-normative, post-metaphysical justification consistent with that critique can then be provided for Nietzsche’s radical reform to the philosophical method. According to Nietzsche, philosophy as a will to power is preferable to philosophy as a will to truth because it is consistent with his profound and unjustified love of life. In fact, the will to power it is the philosophical expression of that love.

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Any adequate interpretation of the concept of the will to power, given the radical break with the history of philosophy it presupposes, requires a preceding analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy as a critique of metaphysics. Only once Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics is properly understood as a critique of, in the broadest sense, any correspondence conception of truth, can the philosophical concept of the will to power, as a product of that critique, be understood as well. Each of the three typical types of interpretative approaches to the will to power (i.e. as a metaphysical concept, as an empirical concept, as an object of interpretive play) will provide a critically constructive opportunity to narrow an acceptable definition of Nietzsche’s positive conception of philosophy as a distinctive and unorthodox type of history, according to which any interpretation rests, not on truths, but on its author’s prejudices or fundamental values. Moreover, using Gilles Deleuze’s largely ignored or otherwise grossly misunderstood Nietzsche et la philosophie, a non-normative, post-metaphysical justification consistent with that critique can then be provided for Nietzsche’s radical reform to the philosophical method. According to Nietzsche, philosophy as a will to power is preferable to philosophy as a will to truth because it is consistent with his profound and unjustified love of life. In fact, the will to power it is the philosophical expression of that love.

The following is an analysis of the affinity between the accounts of value of Nietzsche and Levinas—two philosophers commonly thought to be antithetical. I propose an account of value, derived from the aforementioned authors, according to which an enigmatic phenomenon beyond or hither from being orients one toward an invisible good. The analysis suggests that despite the fundamental role of value in philosophy and thought, value necessarily remains obscure.

Any adequate interpretation of the concept of the will to power, given the radical break with the history of philosophy it presupposes, requires a preceding analysis of Nietzsche’s critique of the history of philosophy as a critique of metaphysics. Only once Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysics is properly understood as a critique of, in the broadest sense, any correspondence conception of truth, can the philosophical concept of the will to power, as a product of that critique, be understood as well. Each of the three typical types of interpretative approaches to the will to power (i.e. as a metaphysical concept, as an empirical concept, as an object of interpretive play) will provide a critically constructive opportunity to narrow an acceptable definition of Nietzsche’s positive conception of philosophy as a distinctive and unorthodox type of history, according to which any interpretation rests, not on truths, but on its author’s prejudices or fundamental values. Moreover, using Gilles Deleuze’s largely ignored or otherwise grossly misunderstood Nietzsche et la philosophie, a non-normative, post-metaphysical justification consistent with that critique can then be provided for Nietzsche’s radical reform to the philosophical method. According to Nietzsche, philosophy as a will to power is preferable to philosophy as a will to truth because it is consistent with his profound and unjustified love of life. In fact, the will to power it is the philosophical expression of that love.

The aim of this study is to identify and explicate Nietzsche’s standard of value, that is, the basis upon which he approves of some human phenomena (e.g., moralities, philosophies, artistic and political movements, etc.) and disapproves of others. I argue that this standard is best captured by the concept of “degrees of strength.” Part I undertakes a detailed examination of Nietzsche’s philosophical methodology, which must be understood in order to understand his conception of degrees of strength. I argue that the central tenet of his methodology is his commitment to “historical philosophy,” that is, to the view that absolutely opposite phenomena like soul and body, good and evil, and so on, do not exist as opposites, and that their opposition is only relative. I here engage with what is perhaps the most prominent reading of Nietzsche’s methodology in the Anglophone world today, namely that it is a form of “naturalism,” understood as a commitment to some kind of continuity with the empirical sciences. I show that this reading relies on a definition of “nature” that Nietzsche never gives, and commits him to an ontology that he explicitly rejects, without doing anything to clarify his methodology that is not done by the concept of historical philosophy. Part II examines Nietzsche’s attempt to formulate a “proper physio-psychology” based on historical philosophy, which requires him to conceive of human beings as communities of willing subjects that he calls “drives.” I argue that Nietzsche adopts the notion of the human being as a multiplicity from physiology, and attempts to combine it with the notion of the willing subject that arises from introspective psychology. He believes that the human belief in causality is a result of the psychological experience of willing, and that physiology cannot explain the causal relations among events in the body without appealing to a concept of will. I then show how he extends this insight beyond the body to the world as a whole, arguing that we cannot comprehend causality at all except by means of the concept of “will to power.” This, I claim, is Nietzsche’s main reason for asserting that the world is “will to power and nothing else.” Part III introduces Nietzsche’s concept of the “problem of value,” the solution of which amounts to what he calls “the determination of the order of rank among values,” that is, of which human values contribute most to the enhancement of the power of humanity, and which frustrate such enhancement. I argue that the standard by which Nietzsche determines this is a symptomatology based on the concept of degrees of strength: those “ways of thinking and valuing” that are symptomatic of higher degrees of physio-psychological strength are more valuable for the enhancement of the overall power of humanity, while those that are symptomatic of weakness are less valuable, or even disvaluable, for that end. While the main focus of Part III is to explicate the concepts of physio-psychological strength and weakness, I conclude with an examination of what Nietzsche calls the “great economy of the whole,” according to which even weakness often has value for enhancing the power of humanity, so long as it is kept in its proper place and not valued more highly than strength. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

This thesis concerns the subject-reality relationship within the philosophy of the mature Nietzsche. The aim of this thesis is to highlight the interpretative dilemma that arises from apparent inconsistencies in Nietzsche’s analysis of that relationship. The ambivalence in Nietzsche’s ontology and epistemology leads many of his interpreters to endorse different and opposing readings of this relationship. Some interpreters are inclined to read the entirety of Nietzsche’s philosophy in light of his metaphysics. This is not the approach taken here but, it is important to establish common ground with respect to the interpretation of the relationship between us, knowing subjects, and an external reality.

[pt] Formulação de uma ferramenta teórica de descrição e explicação dos processos que constituem o mundo, com base no conceito nietzschiano de vontade de poder e em sua teoria das forças, segundo a qual tudo o que há são forças intrinsecamente impulsionadas pela vontade de poder. Todo e qualquer dado físico ou mental é concebido como expressão de forças pulsionais que, em seu movimento de acumulação e expansão de poder, atuam umas sobre as outras, estabelecem relações de poder entre si, aniquilam-se, dominam-se, escravizam-se, associam-se temporariamente, entrelaçam-se em rede e produzem, como efeito, configurações de forças de todos os tipos – células, tecidos, pessoas, coisas, instituições, ideias, etc. / [en] Formulation of a descriptive and explanatory theoretical tool to the processes that constitute the world, based on the Nietzschean concept of will to power and his theory of forces, according to which everything that exists are forces intrinsically driven by the will to power. Any given physical or mental data is conceived as an expression of instinctual forces that in its movement of accumulation and expansion of power, act on each other, establish relations of power between themselves, annihilate, dominate, enslave, get temporarily associated, intertwine in a network and produce, as effect, configurations of forces of all kinds – cells, tissues, people, things, institutions, ideas, etc.

Esta tese aborda alguns aspectos da recepção de Schopenhauer durante o percurso da obra de Nietzsche, procurando compreender sobretudo o papel desempenhado pelo autor de O mundo como vontade e representação no desenvolvimento do pensamento nietzschiano. A primeira parte analisa o período de juventude da obra nietzschiana, almejando evidenciar uma peculiaridade na relação de filiação existente entre o jovem filólogo e seu denominado educador. A aparente simplicidade da relação entre um discípulo e seu mestre, sugerida pela constatação de que Nietzsche assume grande parte da doutrina schopenhaueriana durante este período de sua obra, torna-se problemática ao percebermos uma diferença crucial de posicionamento ante a questão fundamental proposta por Schopenhauer e recebida por Nietzsche como orientadora de seu pensamento: a questão do valor da vida. Esta análise insere-se numa reflexão sobre a própria concepção de filosofia. Já na segunda parte, trata-se de abordar o período intermediário da obra de Nietzsche, procurando matizar a conhecida ruptura nietzschiana em relação a Schopenhauer durante este período. O intuito principal desta parte é expor como, ao mesmo tempo em que passa a rejeitar e tecer diversas críticas à doutrina schopenhaueriana, Nietzsche permanece ainda orbitando no horizonte daquela questão fundamental proposta por Schopenhauer. Na terceira parte, procura-se demonstrar como Nietzsche efetua uma autossuperação da filosofia da vontade ao elaborar uma nova concepção do querer, na medida em que a noção de vontade de potência é erigida tendo como pano de fundo o questionamento de um pressuposto velado que sustentava a filosofia de Schopenhauer. A partir dessa nova compreensão do querer, Nietzsche é capaz tanto de reelaborar algumas noções que apareciam desde o início de sua trajetória quanto de formalizar o derradeiro papel de Schopenhauer na constituição de seu próprio pensamento: para isso, será necessária uma contextualização e depuração daquela questão fundamental. / This thesis deals with some aspects of Schopenhauers reception during the course of Nietzsches work, aiming mainly at understanding the role played by the author of The World as Will and Representation in the development of Nietzschean thought. The first part analyzes the period of the youth of Nietzschean work, intending to evince a peculiarity in the relation of filiation existing between the young philologist and his so-called educator. The apparent simplicity of the relation between a learner and his master, suggested by the verification that Nietzsche largely assumes Schopenhauerian doctrine during this period of his work, becomes problematic as we notice a crucial difference of position when facing the fundamental question proposed by Schopenhauer and received by Nietzsche as a guideline for his thought: the question of the value of life. This analysis is part of a reflection on the conception of philosophy itself. The second part approaches the middle period of Nietzsches work, looking for the nuances of the known Nietzschean rupture in relation to Schopenhauer during this period. The main goal of this part is to show how, while rejecting and criticizing Schopenhauerian doctrine, Nietzsche continues to orbit in the horizon of that fundamental question proposed by Schopenhauer. In the third part, we seek to demonstrate how Nietzsche overcomes the philosophy of Will as he elaborates a new conception of will; the notion of will to power is built having as background the questioning of a hidden presupposition that held Schopenhauers philosophy. From this new way to understand the will, Nietzsche is able to re-elaborate some notions that were present since the beginning of his work and to formalize the last role of Schopenhauer in the constitution of his own thought: for this, it will be necessary to contextualize and depurate that fundamental question.